< Previous | Contents | Next >

Strathclyde Police: Primary Inspection 2000

5. Processes

5.1 This chapter considers how the Force plans, manages and improves its processes in support of its policy and strategy.

Resource Allocation

5.2 There was mixed evidence about the effective use of activity analysis. Not all divisional and departmental management routinely gather information about demand to inform deployment decisions. There were examples where some basic analysis of demands was being undertaken (eg day and time of peak demand) but it lacked consistency and sophistication across the areas of the Force visited. HMIC suggests that a framework for routine analysis is established. (It is appreciated that current technology may be a limiting factor.)

5.3 In particular HMIC examined the Force response to automatic alarm calls. False activations (in excess of 90% of alarm calls) represent a significant abstraction of police resources, especially during mornings and early evenings. The actual amount of time spent on these duties is not regularly measured and consequently an accurate record could not be produced.

5.4 HMIC appreciates that the Force view a response to alarms as part of the service it provides and recognises there are risks associated with not attending -even where there is repeat evidence of false activation. Clearly the provider and user of the alarm has a responsibility to ensure the system is effective and not mis-used. This is an issue that HMIC has found in other forces and needs to be addressed on a Scottish wide basis. HMIC recommends that the Force, in conjunction with ACPOS and other stakeholders, consider establishing a policy and practice that will result in more effective management of police response to false alarm activations.

Court Citations

5.5 The service of court citations within divisions is managed by appointed support staff although actual service was undertaken by police officers. HMIC is aware of pilot schemes where citations are being posted to individuals.

5.6 There was evidence that postal service was effective (and could be made more so) and significantly reduces the costly and generally inappropriate use of police officers. This issue has a significance and relevance across Scotland and HMIC considers that the Scottish Executive, in conjunction with the Crown and ACPOS need to pursue this matter in order to increase the efficiency of this aspect of the criminal justice system.

Warrants

5.7 A further area of continuous and increasing demand is the execution of court granted warrants. Collation and dissemination of all courts warrants is managed through a headquarters department which is responsible for processing the 60,000 warrants each year onto the Police National Computer (PNC) system and distributing the warrants to the respective divisions for local execution. The management of warrants is an area where the lack of networked technology systems reduces the overall efficiency of the organisation.

5.8 During visits to divisions HMIC established that some were holding in excess of 4,000 live warrants. Divisions were prioritising these and directing their efforts towards enforcing what they described as 'route one' apprehension warrants that generally accounted for approximately 10% of the totals. In some divisions, additional police officers had been transferred to full time posts to tackle an ever increasing problem but it was not clear that the additional officers had any real prospect of significantly reducing the numbers.

5.9 Divisions have to cope with managing the process by means of a paper based record held at individual control rooms, a rather burdensome and slow system.

5.10 Many of the warrants are means related and HMIC questions whether this is an appropriate use of police resources. The demand created by warrants is exacerbated by the increasing requirement for evidence that warrants are being actively pursued so as to avoid later challenge in court. In effect this means more frequent enquiries by police. The Courts and the Crown undertake some monitoring and filtering but despite these efforts and action by the Force the numbers remain persistently high. This is an issue across forces in Scotland and would benefit from a co-ordinated consideration by all partners in the criminal justice system.

Command Areas and Responsibilities

5.11 Chief superintendents are responsible for commanding the 9 territorial divisions and those seen during the Inspection were very supportive of the new structures. They all expressed a high level of satisfaction with the liaison and relationships with local elected members and representative bodies. Much of this positive comment arose from the redefining of the police boundaries that created conterminus alignment with the local authority areas.

5.12 Each divisional commander has a deputy at superintendent rank level. The 'deputies' role is almost exclusively tied to managing divisional personnel issues with some operational responsibilities, involving sporting or other major events or when on-call. Managing police officer staff appraisals and career development are important and substantial roles in the now large 9 territorial divisions. Discussions with a number of deputies found them committed to their role but working long hours to provide a high level of service. The introduction of senior support staff to divisions will provide an opportunity to consider the duties of the deputy divisional commander. The limitations of the current IT to support the personnel function at a divisional and departmental level is acknowledged and will improve.

5.13 While divisional commanders have a direct and clear responsibility for the resources and performance of their divisions there is one area where there is an overlap of responsibilities. There are 6 area detective superintendents who report directly to the detective chief superintendent (operations) at Headquarters. They each offer support to a number of divisions and will lead major enquiries or undertake reviews of serious crimes. Given the level of serious criminality in the Strathclyde Police area this resilience and expertise is a judicious investment.

5.14 As with the move to 9 divisions the present role of the area superintendents is new and will develop. Divisional detective chief inspectors appear to have line command responsibilities to the area detective superintendent and the divisional commander. HMIC will be interested to note the development of the role of the area detective superintendents.

5.15 The 9 divisions all have sub-divisional structures each commanded by either superintendents or chief inspectors. The restructuring has resulted in a number of legacy issues affecting those sub-divisions which were merged to create a new divisional structure. In particular HMIC noted that command and control in most divisions was being managed from separate control rooms located within sub-divisions. The technological infrastructure necessary to either centralise command within a division or on a broader front does not currently exist. HMIC is aware that this situation has been considered during an overall review of internal communications. What is not yet clear however is how the Force intend to take forward the issue of 'control' in a holistic sense and whether or not divisional, area or central command and control is a likely option for the future. An early indication of the way ahead for the new command and control structure is important.

5.16 As part of the Inspection programme HMIC visited a number of stations within the new divisional structures. Each division has a spotlight co-ordinator, although the rank of the postholder varied from chief inspector to sergeant level. The commitment of the people carrying out this duty impressed and their pivotal role in providing impetus and direction for local Spotlight initiatives is acknowledged.

5.17 Spotlight co-ordinators in divisions reported they were spending about 8 hours a week on this activity. In some divisions they were also responsible for 'operational planning', and were managing a number of police and support staff carrying out administrative as well as operational duties. HMIC noted that licensing, warrants, resource planning and case management activity had a significant police officer element. This was also the case in control rooms (see also paragraph 4.95) and public counter areas with police officers carrying out a range of duties which might be undertaken by skilled support staff.

5.18 HMIC appreciates that the Force plans to civilianise some activities but suggests that it would be useful to undertake a comprehensive look at roles which might be undertaken. In Strathclyde support staff represent almost 22.9 % of the total force strength which is low in relation to Scotland and other forces.

Staff Consultation

5.19 HMIC met with officials from the staff associations including the Scottish Police Federation, the Association of Scottish Police Superintendents and UNISON. All reported that the Chief Constable and Force executive operated an open door policy and that direct communication was good. The police staff associations attend Joint Negotiating and Co-ordinating Committee (JNCC) meetings. Representatives felt that 'late' production of the agenda for these meetings sometimes hindered an otherwise open process. Minutes from the Force policy group were not as a matter of routine circulated to the associations and HMIC considers that circulation enhances communication. (See paragraph 1.3)

5.20 HMIC noted that the police staff associations and the unions representing support staff had no formal arrangements to meet as representative bodies. However this gap was now to be filled and HMIC supports constructive contact and liaison between these important groups.

Intelligence Management

5.21 Strathclyde Police place great emphasis on a pro-active intelligence led approach to policing. This strategic approach underpins much of the activity of the Force and is evidenced by the commitment of a large number of specialist resources. Force intelligence is the responsibility of Headquarters CID. At the time of inspection intelligence was being managed by one of the 3 HQ detective chief superintendents. With the imminent retirement of a detective chief superintendent the Force will restructure responsibilities by combining the roles of the management of intelligence and special branch.

5.22 The figure below sets out the structure of the various specialist cells currently forming HQ CID intelligence.

Figure 8 - HQ CID Intelligence Structure

5.23 The units are supported by a combination of police and support staff. HMIC found the staff to be highly motivated and committed to providing an effective service. These efforts were being impeded by the lack of effective information technology (IT). The Force is currently using two different computer applications for managing intelligence flow. The Strathclyde Criminal Intelligence Database (SCID) is an MS DOS based system and regarded as outmoded and unable to comply with the demands of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in meeting the required standards for recording and dissemination of intelligence. In addition the system fails to meet the demands of the Data Protection Act, 1998 in relation to the safeguarding of data, as the system is not fully auditable. The requirements for reporting and recording under the new 'National Intelligence Model' cannot be configured.

5.24 The Force Intelligence Log (FIL) system, which was developed in-house and regarded as the future replacement for the SCID system, has the same inherent problems. HMIC found little confidence and wide scale criticism from users and operators of the systems. They were found to be lacking any credible auditing facility and do not permit remote, real time access, to current intelligence. The Force has recognised these failings and in response has commenced the tendering process for a new system that could provide a basis for a national approach to intelligence sharing. The Force has decided to adopt the National Intelligence model developed by the National Criminal Intelligence Service.

5.25 Many of the problems were recognised during a review of the Force intelligence bureau, completed during 1998. HMIC was advised that the review made a number of relevant recommendations, but at the point of Inspection none had been implemented, pending the development of the manual of standards. While Force performance in crime related matters is good, suggesting that the present intelligence system has been at least adequate, there is a very strong acceptance throughout all levels of the Force that the system is not allowing the real potential to be achieved. HMIC notes the work in place to acquire a replacement computer based intelligence system which conforms to the new standards inherent in the National Intelligence Model which the Force has adopted. A new system is due for commission in March 2001. HMIC recommends development of the new intelligence system continues to receive a high priority.

5.26 The Force has developed an in-house computer based system for the management of informants. At the time of the Inspection a significant number of informants were being managed centrally although the large numbers were raising handling issues. Training for those officers involved in handling informants is somewhat limited and generally restricted to input during the national detective training course at the Scottish Police College. The Force has developed their own handlers course and intends involving officers in the National Criminal Intelligence Service course later this year. Handling of informants is a high risk area and HMIC suggests the Force establish their training arrangements in line with national standards at the earliest opportunity.

5.27 The Force has a number of support staff analysts, working within the headquarters bureau and at divisions. Their roles fluctuate between managing day to day information, assisting in the production of intelligence led target packages and providing an integral link within the major crime environment, producing evidential products and materials for court. The staff HMIC spoke to were enthusiastic and displayed high levels of knowledge about their roles. There were however some concerns at the availability of equipment, in particular the limited availability of computers systems and licensed analytical software. This is compounded by the acknowledged inadequacies of the crime recording system.

5.28 HQ CID Intelligence produces a regular newsletter 'The Informer' for the department staff that contains information about developments and changes in the intelligence field. This product is valued and is a useful means of improving communications in an ever changing specialist area of policing and represents good practice.

Communication and Information Technology

5.29 Communication and Information Technology is headed by a department manager who is responsible to the assistant chief constable (strategic support). The department manager has been with the Force for over 10 years and is a recognised professional in this discipline. Over a number of years HMIC has commented on the low level of funding attributed to IT. HMIC found significant levels of dissatisfaction amongst a wide range of staff, about the quality of IT provision. The dysfunctional aspects of the Force crime intelligence system and the lack of effective networking for crime recording and other applications were subject of particular criticism. The Force has continued to develop a range of in-house applications and HMIC noted the development of the Force Intranet being piloted in a division. HMIC considers the use of Intranet and the development of electronic transfer of information to be an essential element in delivering open and effective means of communication both within and outside the organisation. Such capability is now the expected norm in modern organisations.

5.30 At the time of the Inspection the department was under the direction of the assistant chief constable (strategic support). There has been a number of recent staffing changes including the appointment of a further 11 technicians to the IT section. The following schematic outlines the existing staff structure.

Figure 9 - Communications and IT Staffing Structure

Policy and Strategy

5.31 The Force have abandoned their annual communication and IT policy and have created a 'draft' 5 year strategy. Underpinning this is the long term commitment to the Scottish Police Information Strategy (SPIS) and the move from disparate systems to a corporate data base approach. HMIC notes the creation of this strategy and looks forward to viewing the final version.

5.32 Historically Strathclyde Police has adopted an approach to systems of 'build rather than buy'. The rationale is predicated on such an approach being a cost effective solution. (There have been exceptions.). This dovetailed with the original methodology of SPIS. Against some objective measures it can be argued that limited capital and revenue allocated to IT/IS infrastructure has been too limited over a long period. It has also to be recognised that the Force and the Joint Police Board are always faced with competing demands and priorities.

5.33 A range of staff commented that too much effort is being spent on developing new systems under SPIS and Integration of Scottish Criminal Justice Information Systems (ISCJIS) and too little on ensuring that the embedded systems are working efficiently and effectively. In essence this is a perception and communication issue which the Force needs to address but it is probably symptomatic of the underlying dissatisfaction with the quality of the IT infrastructure as a whole.

5.34 The "draft" strategy identified 8 key objectives for the department, with the primary objective being "In order to meet business needs, the Force should have reliable and rapid access to relevant information". To meet this objective it is imperative that the department is aware of the business needs, both from a top down and bottom up approach. The Force programme board is responsible for a number of key areas including that of IS/IT projects. The head of the department is a full member of the programme board. Due to the rapid change and development of IS/IT in the Force HMIC considers it appropriate that a separate IS/IT board is established given the direction and impetus necessary for a step change in the progress of the IT infrastructure. HMIC recommends the creation of a dedicated IS/IT programme board reporting to the Force programme board.

IS/IT Budget

5.35 During the 1997 Primary Inspection and subsequent 1998 Review Inspection, HMIC commented that the communications and IT department was under-resourced both in staffing levels and funding.

5.36 There is evidence that some effort has been made to address the issue by, in particular, the recruitment of additional staff. The capital budget has been criticised within the Force due to the low level and lack of identified funding for infrastructure.

5.37 HMIC acknowledges the difficulties of project managing the introduction of new applications and hardware. However, there is concern at the underspend on the capital budget in years 97-98, 98-99 and 99-00. During this period a total of £800,000 (approx) has been diverted to other departments due to the cancellation, delay or change of budgeted items. In addition £595,000 was found in the 1998-99 budget to purchase a new corporate database server. This was achieved through the delay in purchase of HOLMES 2 (an important computer system for the management of serious crime and other incidents) (£330,000 saving). The 1999-2000 budget has lost £400,000 which was also allocated for HOLMES 2. HMIC is concerned that this will impinge on the Force's ability to replace the current HOLMES system at the predicted end of its useful life in 2001.

5.38 A further area where savings have been made is in the purchase of CCTV systems for custody areas. Efficiency savings of £89,500 were made on a budget of £200,000 in 1998-99. However, the budgeted spend of £100,000 in 1999/2000 has been postponed until 2000-2001 where the budget is shown as £120,000. HMIC believe that CCTV systems in custody centres are essential for enhancing safety of officers, support staff and prisoners as well as providing levels of public confidence (see also paragraph 5.47).

5.39 In the department strategy there is recognition that there is a likelihood that they will not receive the budget that has been submitted. It is believed that capital expenditure will be limited to £2.1 million in 2000-2001 and £2.5 million in 2001-2002. The revenue budget is criticised within the Force as being insufficient to cover the running costs of the Communications and IT department effectively. There has been a stand still budget in 1999-2000, effectively reducing it by the headline rate of inflation. In accepting the historical evidence and recognising that current capital expenditure is likely to severely inhibit command and control replacement and many other on-going projects, HMIC recommends that the Force reviews current budget arrangements for delivering the essential IS/IT requirements.

Consultants

5.40 Strathclyde Police is a large organisation that has pursued a development path of self-build in relation to IS/IT. This policy appears to have given rise to some of the underlying problems currently being faced by the Force. It is recognised that the staff within the department advocate this policy. However it is agreed at all levels of the Force that a step change in the provision of IS/IT is a priority area for the immediate future. HMIC strongly advocates early development and delivery of effective systems and recommends the Force consider the use of consultants to help advance the progress.

Briefings

5.41 The effective use of briefing and de-briefing is a key factor in an intelligence led approach. Strathclyde Police have recognised the importance of this procedure making appropriate use at tactical and operational level. The Force has specifically identified duty periods at the start and end of shifts within the new shift structure recently introduced to divisions. This is a major investment in terms of time and resources and consequently must add value to existing practices. HMIC observed a number of briefings and although there was some focus on historical incidents and events, there was less evidence of imaginative or proactive tasking and therefore opportunities to deploy effectively and subsequently evaluate performance were being missed. The Force in pursuit of being intelligence led need to look again at this aspect of management and HMIC suggests that this would be best achieved by a review of existing briefing formats and structures to provide a better quality and improve standards.

Care and Custody of Prisoners

5.42 A regular and important feature of any HMIC Inspection is the examination of custody areas and the processes used to manage appropriately, the handling of prisoners. A number of stations were visited and custody areas inspected. The force use a computer based package, developed in-house for processing persons detained. It records personal information details of the detention and specific requirements for their care.

5.43 This system was supported by hand held barcode readers which recorded automatically the regular checks made on prisoners. The barcode system was a very easy to use method of tracking key points in the care of prisoners and is valued by the police officers involved. The system is no longer new and is beginning to show reliability problems. A number were not in service at the time of Inspection. Officers were mostly aware that the computer system was being upgraded in an attempt to provide an integrated link to force-wide systems, the Police National Computer and the Scottish Criminal Record Office.

5.44 The Force use civilian custody support staff who receive appropriate training for their role. Those spoken to had a good understanding of the prisoner care systems they were required to follow, and were conscious of the need to safeguard against potential suicide risks and give particular attention to those prisoners made more vulnerable by alcohol or drugs. HMIC believes that the role of support staff in the management of those in custody has the potential to be expanded to include the taking and recording of fingerprints, photographs and DNA samples. This will release officers for other duties, reduce training needs and make quality assurance a little easier. HMIC recommends the Force give early consideration to the expansion of the duties of support staff in the management of those in custody to include the taking of impressions, such as fingerprints, photographs and DNA samples.

5.45 Police casualty surgeons were readily contactable and had facilities for the medical examination of prisoners. Good systematic arrangements existed for the administration of the medication they prescribed. Fire evacuation procedures were clearly understood.

5.46 In the main HMIC found custody areas to be clean and free from hazards. Health and Safety considerations in custody areas are particularly important. The catering arrangements consisted of pre-packed meals contained in the custody area freezer. Dietary requirements of prisoners from minority ethnic groups, were catered for by the inclusion of vegetarian as well as halal and kosher food. There was less certainty amongst officers over arrangements to permit religious observance and the Force may wish to include this topic in their wider programme of training related to ethnic issues. Custody officers were aware of the facility to obtain interpreters through the Force control room. Many of the arrangements for washing, showering and shaving of prisoners must be regarded as poor by modern standards and should also be kept under consideration.

5.47 The concern for the appropriateness of custody and the care of prisoners is reinforced by the regular visits of senior officers who audit the computer trail related to prisoners in custody and speak to the cell inmates. HMIC suggest the Force may wish to consider the additional safeguard of adopting a lay visitors scheme. This is where members of the public appointed by the Joint Police Board pay regular but unannounced visits to police stations to monitor the welfare of people in custody. A number of forces have already introduced this scheme and HMIC made a particular reference to its benefits within the recent complaints against the police thematic Inspection.

5.48 HMIC confirmed that full closed circuit television (CCTV) with audio facility, is not established in all custody areas. HMIC has highlighted this issue during previous Inspections and in the recent thematic Inspection report concerning complaints against the police. When speaking to officers during the course of the Inspection all advocated the installation of CCTV in custody areas. This continues to be an important issue and HMIC remains convinced of the value of such provision for the protection both of those citizens held in police custody and the police staff tasked with managing their care. While noting the Chief Constable's intention of progressing this matter HMIC recommends development of an action plan for installation of CCTV to custody areas, detailing the type of equipment and agreed timescales for introduction.

5.49 HMIC noted that the Force deploys inspector rank duty officers in the larger custody areas with sub-divisional areas normally served by sergeants. Visits to a police office in one division that had a small custody area, found the responsibility being discharged by a constable, albeit with remote support and supervision from a nearby inspector. The Force may wish to review the appropriateness of this arrangement including the Best Value implications in divisions where small units of cells are only able to cater for specific gender prisoners.

< Previous | Contents | Next >