4.1 The most recent audit of security at the Peterhead Unit had been carried out by the SPS security audit team in August/September 1998, an initial audit having first been conducted in March 1997.
4.2 Whilst there had been no escapes from the Unit since it had opened in 1995, a prisoner had escaped from a hospital escort in October 1996 following an incident in the Unit.
4.3 In common with the security audit team, we found a number of practices in the Unit that were not in accordance with security standards. In his briefing, the Governor spoke of the unusual environment and ethos of small Units which do not lend themselves to the formal system and procedures which are laid down in security standards. Nevertheless, he described secure custody and good order as fundamental to the operation of the Unit and stated that staff and prisoners were all aware of this absolute priority.
4.4 We noted that security standards were currently being revised in the light of experience and were said to be less mechanistic and prescriptive.
4.5 That said, however, the security audit team noted that management and supervisory practices and procedures still required major review, particularly in relation to intelligence information, searching arrangements and CCTV surveillance (which is unlikely to improve until a new facility is built in the main prison).
4.6 The principles underpinning the operation of small Units include a commitment to participate in the regime. Implicit in this commitment is the exercise of personal responsibility and an understanding that inappropriate behaviour will be challenged. We saw written evidence of how individual lapses in conduct were addressed by prisoners and staff operating as "four groups", a forum that comprised two prisoners and two staff who formerly addressed the issue of inappropriate behaviour, including the underlying causes. In discussions with staff, however, it was stated that this system was not consistently applied, which they perceived to contribute to an erosion of standards by attrition (see also paragraph 8.9).
4.7 On 4 November 1998, a prisoner assaulted another prisoner and following a special meeting, was removed from the Unit for breaching the terms of the prisoner contract concerning violence. Of the remaining 6 prisoners, 5 asked to be returned to the mainstream. Later that evening, 2 prisoners, one of whom had earlier attempted to assault a Shift Manager, were seen to detain 3 other prisoners in a cell and subsequently claimed to be holding them hostage.
3.8 Staff were deployed in accordance with local contingency plans and an Incident Command Team was deployed by SPS Headquarters after the prisoners claimed to be in possession of a firearm. Negotiations and contact with the prisoners continued through the night until the Incident Command Team took over at 0510 on 5 November. Detailed arrangements to end the incident, including the deployment of a Police Tactical Firearms Unit, were finalised and command of the incident was passed to the Police for this phase of the operation. The prisoners were removed from the area in a controlled fashion and command of the incident was returned to the SPS Commander. No firearm was found although a couple of makeshift stabbing weapons were recovered. Subsequently, the Unit was closed for a short period to reorganise.
4.9 Given the nature of the Unit and the alternative methods of addressing inappropriate behaviour, orderly room adjudications were extremely rare for breaches of discipline except for drug misuse. We were satisfied that the procedures being followed were in accordance with SPS guidance.