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3.1 The establishment's security procedure and systems had been examined in considerable detail by the SPS security audit team in August 1997. We were satisfied that any areas of concern noted during the course of our inspection had already been covered by that comprehensive process.
3.2 There had been no escapes during the year prior to our inspection.
3.3 As noted earlier in this report, extensive refurbishment work was ongoing but we were satisfied that appropriate security precautions were in place. Nevertheless, we were advised that there had been difficulties in conducting background security checks on contractors and sub-contractors due to non-compliance with agreed timescales for notification to the establishment of projected manpower. A pragmatic and flexible approach had been adopted but this matter substantially remained to be resolved.
3.4 In the twelve months prior to our inspection there had been a number of incidents, including a disturbance in the female unit and two instances of concerted indiscipline in November in 'B' Hall, resulting in damage to 42 of the 54 cells. The purported cause of those latter incidents was the imposition of closed visits for those who tested positive for drugs under random Mandatory Drug Testing (MDT) arrangements. It was interesting to note, however, that since that decision, the rate of random MDT positives had fallen from 36% in November 1998 to nil in February 1999.
3.5 Also in the year prior to our inspection, there had been ten serious assaults by YOs and prisoners on their peers. This was in marked contrast to the previous year when there had been no such incidents. These assaults largely coincided with the transfer of a group of YOs from HMYOI Polmont to ease overcrowding at that establishment.
3.6 We were pleased to note that, notwithstanding our comments above, good discipline and control were generally being maintained. The impact of the refurbishment programme and the impending closure of 'B' Hall could have some unsettling effect and will, therefore, require careful and sensitive handling.
3.7 The incidents in November and the rise in serious assaults served to remind that Dumfries houses a significant number of volatile and often unpredictable YOs. It also illustrates the need for stability and effective channels for passing information in clear and unambiguous ways, if dramatic reactions are to be avoided. Since the events of November, a degree of stability had been regained and there had been some restoration of the open and generally relaxed atmosphere that we had found during previous visits.
3.8 Staff and YOs to whom we spoke remarked on the relaxed atmosphere that was being re-established but it was acknowledged that it would take some time to return to pre-incident levels. Nevertheless, staff spoke of the significant improvement in relationships with YOs since our previous formal inspection in 1994 and said that this was largely attributable to the use of first name terms.
3.9 Adjudications were normally conducted by the Governor or his Deputy during the week and by the Duty Managers on Saturday mornings. In the twelve months prior to our inspection, there had been a total of 775 alleged breaches of discipline, an average of 2-3 per day. For YOs, the three most common charges were for abusive words or behaviour, failing to work properly or refusing to work and disobedience. A small number of YOs accounted for a disproportionate amount of reports.
3.10 We reviewed a sample of records and were satisfied that there was consistency both in approach and in the punishments awarded.
3.11 We examined the contingency plans and found them to be clearly and logically laid out. We were pleased also to note that joint plans had been prepared where appropriate with the police and other emergency services, including fire, ambulance and the local hospital. Action check lists were appropriately distributed and staff to whom we spoke were aware of the procedures to be followed. We noted that incident management training was part of a comprehensive training programme that was scheduled to coincide with increased staff availability during the planned refurbishment of 'B' Hall.
3.12 The Gate and Electronic Control Room (ECR) seemed to be sufficiently staffed to cope with periods of routine and peak activity, especially during visits. In addition to the main key safe, fire, staff and generator alarm repeaters were all located in the gatehouse. A sample check of key bunches and sealed packs was made against the register and was found to be correct. Security procedures for unlocking to allow access were also found to be satisfactory during a night visit.
3.13 Above the Gate and joined by a spiral staircase was the ECR, where control of the radio net and CCTV monitoring of the perimeter were primarily carried out. CCTV surveillance also covered the visit room and sensitive areas of the establishment, including the basement of 'B' Hall, which was normally the separate cells area but was also being used to house vulnerable and at risk prisoners during Phase I of the refurbishment programme.
3.14 Staff in the Gate and the ECR demonstrated competence and courtesy both in their dealings with visitors and in carrying out their other duties.
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