Security

4.1 The security perimeter of the establishment consisted of a single chain link fence which had recently been fitted with an electronic intruder detection system monitored by closed circuit television (CCTV) from within the Gate Complex (see paragraph 4.11). The last escape from within the prison had occurred almost two years before the inspection and during the last year there had been one absconding from an outside work party although he was recaptured within minutes. Immediately prior to our inspection, the establishment’s security procedures and systems had been audited by the SPS Security Audit Team.

4.2 We were satisfied that searching was taking place within appropriate timescales and that comprehensive records relating to such searching were being maintained. A Security/Intelligence Unit had been set up shortly before our inspection and was currently being staffed by an Officer and an Intelligence Analyst. Along with other intelligence data, the Unit compiled comprehensive security related statistics and produced a monthly Security/Intelligence Report for the information of staff. Our scrutiny of the records and procedures confirmed that any illegal substances found in the prison were being disposed of in accordance with SPS policy.

Control

4.3 We noted that for 1997-98 there had been a marginal reduction in the recorded level of violence. Only one minor assault on an Officer had occurred compared to two in the previous year, whilst serious prisoner on prisoner assaults had reduced from 15 to 14. However, there were suggestions that a significant number of assaults were not being reported by the victims (but see paragraph 5.32).

Orderly Room

4.4 We observed the Orderly Room procedures and were satisfied that they were being conducted in a fair and open manner. In the 12 months prior to our inspection, the average daily number of Disciplinary Reports was 2.12, of which 38% were for Mandatory Drug Testing related offences. Notwithstanding our comments relating to the punishments for such offences (see paragraph 5.9), we were satisfied that the Orderly Room disposals and awards were both consistent and appropriate.

Separate Cells

4.5 There were four Separate Cells which were located within the main Residential area. The security category of the prisoners they were required to retain impacted upon the extent to which these cells could be considered totally secure. However, they appeared to be adequate for their purpose, which was primarily for holding prisoners on punishment or those temporarily removed from circulation in the interests of maintaining good order and discipline within the establishment. We were assured by the Governor that if such prisoners were also considered to be security risks, they would immediately be transferred to HMP Barlinnie. We did have some minor concerns relating to aspects of the regime for those cells, but these were brought to the Governor’s attention and were addressed prior to the conclusion of our inspection.

Contingency Plans

4.6 The establishment’s Contingency Plans were examined and found to be comprehensive, well presented and user friendly. The plans had recently been revised to incorporate the co-ordinated role of the emergency services and we noted that representatives from those services had assisted in that task.

Gate

4.7 The Gate Complex area consisted of three fairly large rooms, each one leading into another, and within that area three staff were on duty on each of the two main shifts. One Officer was located in an area which functioned as an Operations Control Room, one was responsible for dealing with staff and visitors, whilst the third Officer was responsible for the keys and facilitating access and egress for personnel and vehicles entering and leaving the establishment.

4.8 Visitors and staff entered the Gate Complex via separate doors and reported to different reception points. Staff entered via a small seated area which also served as an Information Centre within which there was a cold drinks machine and a staff toilet. The visitors’ entrance had a public telephone and a cold drinks machine and there was an adjacent large visitors’ waiting area ( see paragraph 6.53).

4.9 The fact that visitors and staff reported to separate reception windows meant that the same Officer was required continually to walk back and forwards between the two areas. The requirement also to attend to a SPIN computer and a telephone meant that this Officer was often extremely busy.

4.10 The key safe was well ordered though we did have some concerns about the number of staff not employed in the Gate area who were allowed free access in the key safe area. In general, all documentation appeared to be satisfactory though we have written to the Governor about one minor issue relating to the recording of individuals, vehicles, etc., in and out of the establishment.

4.11 Although a range of necessary security communication equipment was present within the Operations Control Room, it appeared to have been assembled over time as the establishment had developed and it was not well laid out. We had some other concerns relating specifically to the CCTV equipment and about which we have written separately to SPS HQ.

Comment

4.12 We suggest that the Governor should investigate the possibility of relocating the staff and visitor reception points and the key safe to enable the Officer working in that area to be able to operate at each point simultaneously. We believe that this could be done without compromising the security of the area and could have the added advantage of providing the Officer with a clear view of the main access gate to the prison. Additionally, the secure status of the Gate complex would be enhanced if Gate Officers enforced an arrangement whereby only essential personnel were permitted entry into the secure part of the area.