Hitting Home - A Report on the Police Response to Domestic Violence 1997 TAKING THE CALL 4.1 The Inspection found that there was room for improvement in the management of information to aid the initial response. It became clear, from discussion with patrol officers and their supervisors, that the quality and quantity of information available both to operations room staff who dispatch officers to calls, and to officers allocated to attend, will largely determine the degree of priority afforded to response, as well as the initial approach on arrival. It also became clear that the way in which the two main sources of information are handled can affect that quality and quantity. 4.2 The primary source of information is the incoming intimation that police assistance is needed. In over 90% of incidents this will take the form of a telephone call from a member of the public. This may not always be first-hand intimation from the victim. It can be another member of the household, a concerned neighbour or someone else who suspects that something is amiss. Whoever the caller is, the opportunity needs to be taken at that time to extract as much information as possible to aid response. 4.3 Some police operations room staff handling calls like these are understandably reluctant to press distressed callers for detail, not least because callers themselves may not appreciate the need, particularly in cases of urgency where there is the possibility of continued violence. However, tactful questioning, and an assurance in urgent cases that officers have already been despatched, can reap rewards. Good practice noted during Inspection was the maintenance of an open line with victims who intimated that the aggressor was still in the vicinity. However, because there may be some circumstances in which victims would be safer to leave the scene, all cases have to be assessed individually. 4.4 The second source of information is any knowledge which the force may have about previous incidents of domestic violence relating to the parties involved. It is obviously to both the victims and the police officers advantage if the latter is aware of previous history before knocking on the door. This in itself is one of the reasons why call-handlers need to extract the best possible information from callers. 4.5 At present only two forces (A and G) have configured their command and control computer systems so that all terminals can be used to search for previous incidents of domestic violence at a given address or involving a named person. Three other forces (B, D and H) maintain 'stand-alone' computer databases of domestic violence and two of these are accessible to all officers at all times. The stand-alone system used in Force H is accessible at most main stations and in the Force Operations Room and is particularly user-friendly in terms of retrieving previous call history, albeit this must be instigated by the call-handler or the officer attending. The remaining forces (C, E and F) maintain manual files, accessible to varying degrees by operational officers. 4.6 Despite the fact that most forces have systems for identifying repeat victimisation, the Inspection found that they were considerably under-used for the purpose of providing advance notice to attending officers. This seemed to be largely because most were not primarily designed for that purpose and thus involved police staff engaging in too complex or time-consuming retrieval tasks. Force G is currently the only force with IT which is capable of automatically indicating previous call history to operations room staff. Even there, the system had not yet been configured to isolate domestic violence calls to a specific address. Most forces indicated either a firm intention or at least a desire to develop IT for this purpose. The need is not of course restricted to domestic violence but, as the crime with perhaps the highest incidence of repeat victimisation, it deserves the earliest attention. 4.7 There are other databases maintained by forces which can also provide useful information to attending officers, including those which each force maintains on interdicts with power of arrest granted under the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981. The Inspectorate was pleased to note that all forces had devised systems to ensure that officers attending incidents were advised of these interdicts prior to or during attendance. Other examples which are not routinely or automatically searched prior to or during police attendance are databases on firearms licences, criminal convictions, pending cases, etc. The aim should be to have systems which do not require lengthy keyboard manipulations, or place the onus on the attending officer to ask for information searches. Recommendation 3 That forces develop
information technology which will automatically provide
officers attending at 4.8 Figure 4.1 provides a snap-shot picture of the number of interdicts with power of arrest in force at one point in time across Scotland. Since this may be an indicator of the comparative extent of domestic violence within each force area, it is interesting to note that the one force which does not count incidents or crimes of domestic violence separately from other incidents (Force E) covers the police area with the highest rate of arrest interdicts at the time these figures were collated. However, the incidence of interdicts with power of arrest may also reflect different operation of the Matrimonial Homes Act by courts in different areas. Figure 4.1 - Interdicts Granted under the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act, 1981
4.9 It will be noted that three forces maintain records of those interdicts which do not have a power of arrest attached. The Inspectorate remains to be convinced that this serves any useful purpose and suggests that it may even lead to confusion since the existence of such an interdict cannot influence police action. 4.10 It is important to bear in mind that the functions and capabilities of police officers do not extend to meeting all the needs of victims of crime (such as counselling, social assistance, accommodation and other material needs), and also that police responsibilities in domestic violence may extend beyond those victim needs which present themselves (to the needs of other vulnerable household members, particularly children). The following sections, distilled from the best practice noted during Inspection, aim to show how the core functions of the police service should be applied at the scene of a domestic incident. POLICE FUNCTIONS Public Order 4.11 If the disturbance is still occurring when police arrive at the scene their priority, whether called to the scene by the victim or by some other person, must be to restore order. This may take some time but, as in all disturbances, takes precedence over investigation. Part of this function is to ensure that, where violence has apparently occurred, any risk of recurrence, directed at the victim, perpetrator, or other people present, is minimised. This will of course generally accord with the primary need of the victim and may indeed appear to officers to be the over-riding need of that individual, perhaps re-enforced by conversation with her/him. However, even if that is the case, police officers cannot assume that restoring order is their only function. Victims of domestic violence, particularly at a time of crisis, are faced with very difficult and conflicting pressures and may not always be in a position to clearly and rationally voice their needs to an unknown police officer. 4.12 It has been shown that women generally do not look for help from outside agencies until violence has persisted for some time. A Canadian study found that, on average, women had been assaulted 35 times before contacting the police. 4.13 An experienced research team which has conducted studies in Scotland and elsewhere points out that: It is important for professionals to recognise that it may not be the severity of a particular attack that leads a woman to seek help. Rather, it may be the cumulative effect of persistent violence and intimidation, decreasing acceptance of the man's justifications for violence and repeated failures to solve the problem alone. Even then, the decision to approach a formal agency is so fraught with misgivings and trepidation that the nature of the response can easily lead to discontinuation of contact. (Reluctance to report, for whatever reason, may of course also apply to male victims who were not included in either of the research studies referred to here). 4.14 It follows that the quality of police intervention at the first report of violence, and its perceived effect on the offender's behaviour, are crucial in determining whether the victim will continue to seek help as well as in securing her/his immediate safety. Public Safety 4.15 The immediate safety of a victim and any other adults or children present is also a responsibility of the police. If an assault has been committed and there is sufficient evidence to justify arrest of the offender, the safety of the victim and any others involved is more than enough reason to exercise the power of arrest. If the circumstances do not justify such action other immediate remedies have to be explored, with the victims needs paramount. Because of the law on rights of occupancy, the other partner may have to be negotiated with to achieve a temporary physical separation by his/her departure from the home. Investigation 4.16 When it is suspected that a crime has been committed, it is apparent from examination of force written policies and operational guidance, but most encouragingly from Inspection interviews of operational officers, that all forces operate a clearly 'pro-arrest policy' (more properly described as a 'pro-charge policy'). The 1990 Scottish Office circular advocated this and pointed to the types of corroboration which might be available in the typically 'one-witness' situation of domestic violence. 4.17 What is not clear is whether all officers, throughout the ranks, appreciate the value of this approach. It has already been pointed out that arrest can serve to secure the immediate safety of a victim and other vulnerable family members. An increasing majority of police officers accept this reasoning, but there are still some who feel that arrest is of little value because some cases may not go any further. The majority will proceed to court or result in other action such as the pilot diversion from prosecution schemes operating in some fifteen local authority areas, but some may result in no action either at the request of the victim or because evidence is not deemed sufficient by the procurator fiscal. Further frustration arises if police officers form the impression that the courts deal leniently with offenders. While these perceptions should not influence police behaviour it is inevitable that this will sometimes happen. 4.18 All of these considerations however ignore one of the strongest arguments for charging offenders, which is founded on the influence of police action: perhaps underestimated most by police officers themselves. Research throughout the UK and other countries has shown that perpetrators of domestic violence do not readily see their actions as criminal, and that many victims feel blameworthy in some way for the violence which they often suffer in silence. The act of charging an offender sends a clear message to both partners, i.e. that an independent person believes that the actions of the accused were criminal. Regardless therefore of what happens to a case after the police have charged the offender and reported it to the procurator fiscal, that police action in itself has significant value. 4.19 Victims do occasionally insist that they do not want charges to be preferred or even make claims that injuries resulted from an accident. It is good practice in these cases for police officers to explore the reasons for this, for instance if it arises from fear of repercussions then measures might be taken to minimise that fear. It may also be that victims are so confused by the trauma of the situation that interview at a later date is necessary (see also Chapter 5). 4.20 If a victim persists in the desire not to co-operate with an investigation and her/his evidence is crucial, then there is little the police can do to pursue a prosecution. If, however, there are other vulnerable people in the household (generally children) and there is sufficient evidence without the victim's statement to prefer a charge, there may be a need to do so in the wider interests of the household. 4.21 The statistics in Chapter 5 do not allow straight comparisons to be made between police forces in many categories of response, but Figure 4.2 (an abridged version of Figure 3.9) shows some of the broadly comparable figures relating to investigation. Figure 4.2 - Investigation of Domestic Violence, 1996
** Figures refer to assaults only 4.22 Force H is the only force to maintain statistics which show whether people reported to the procurator fiscal as a result of a domestic crime were arrested at the time of the incident or not, as shown in Figure 3.8. It would be foolish to assume that these statistics are broadly representative of the general picture across Scotland. On the other hand there is no evidence available to suggest the contrary. The fact that just under half of those so reported in Force H were arrested is likely to reflect the similar proportion of those who were accused of a crime of assault (41% were accused of breach of the peace). One other reason for not arresting at the time of the incident is the disappearance of the accused prior to police arrival. The proportion of those charged with breach of the peace itself may indicate that, where there is no or insufficient evidence of physical violence, police officers are not prepared to dismiss disorderly behaviour in the home as readily as might have been the case in the past. 4.23 Investigation should also take into account any previous history of violence, whether reported to the police or not. Where force information systems can supply information on previous incidents this can at least be checked after attendance and some forces intimated that such action was expected of officers, although interviews with operational officers suggested that this was not widespread practice. Victims themselves may volunteer information and, even if referring to un-reported incidents, this can assist the attending officer to decide on initial action and should also be noted on the crime/domestic incident report so that subsequent monitoring can be better informed. Regardless of what information is available from other sources it is important that attending officers specifically ask the victim for details of any previous violence. Recommendation 4 That forces review procedures and training to ensure that any history of domestic violence is considered by attending officers at the time or immediately after the current incident and that such history is recorded by them in the crime/incident report. Advice 4.24 Police officers are not trained counselors nor social workers in the professional sense of that term. Those roles could conflict with peace-keeping and law enforcement. For instance, most force instructions on domestic violence correctly warn officers not to attempt to encourage reconciliation. However, they do need to be aware of the public services and voluntary agencies who can provide assistance to victims. 4.25 As the one social emergency service which is present on the streets across the country for every minute of the day, the police service is accustomed to acting as a referral agency for other organisations whose functions more properly cater for other needs of the public. Some forces, as a result of liaison with those organisations (see Chapter 6), are able to provide victims of domestic violence, either at the time of initial attendance or through subsequent communication, with written details of contact numbers for further assistance. HMIC recognises this as good practice and commends it to all forces. Recording 4.26 The final act of initial response to a domestic incident lies in recording. Chapter 2 fully illustrated the many needs for separate recording of domestic violence. The Inspectorate found that, in some forces where IT was not readily adaptable, senior officers had implemented manual systems to record domestic violence separately. While this is fully justified, it has led to a situation where operational officers in at least one force are expected to record the same domestic incident three times in different formats. This can only be a short-term solution since it has been found, for all policing matters and not just for domestic violence, that such systems lead to under-recording. During Inspection several forces admitted honestly that this was suspected in respect of domestic violence. Recognition of that fact is halfway to solution. Forces are encouraged to seek means of recording which are "user-friendly". |
