HM Inspectorate of Prisons report HM National Induction Centre 1998 7. PRIMARY SERVICES 7.1 All meals were prepared in the main prison kitchen and an advance menu system was in operation, with NIC prisoners having the same choices as those in Shotts. Meals were collected from the kitchen by a prisoner under escort and transported by means of heated trolley. They were then distributed from a pantry area which was located in the recreation room. The area in question was very clean and well maintained and the meals were distributed by two prisoners under the supervision of a member of staff. Prisoners came for their meals on a landing by landing basis, with all meals being eaten in the accommodation areas - see paragraph 3.5. 7.2 The layout of the NIC dictated that when meals were being delivered, the trolley had to be emptied and the trays and containers containing the food carried up an outdoor flight of stairs. This is unsafe and we suggest, therefore, that consideration should be given to finding alternative means of delivery. This might include the possibility of installing some form of hoist as a means of getting the trays up to the higher level. 7.3 As part of our inspection, we sampled the food and were satisfied with both the quality and the temperature. Prisoners also confirmed that they were generally happy with what was on offer. 7.4 The timings of the evening meal and weekend lunch were outwith the relevant SPS Operating Standard and we suggest, therefore, that those times should be altered. 7.5 There was a canteen facility which was located adjacent to the pantry in the recreation room. Staffing was provided by an Officer from each shift with one more Officer from each shift providing back-up cover. There was also a small focus group comprising the four Canteen Officers and a Supervisor who met once a month to discuss general issues relating to the running of the canteen. 7.6 Prisoners transactions were all in cash and wages were paid through the Canteen on Thursday afternoons. Access was also available during recreation periods on every other day except Saturday, though on Wednesday the only service available was for those prisoners who, as appellants, were entitled to additional telephone cards - see paragraph 3.7. 7.7 A good range of stock was available at reasonable prices and a price list was on prominent display. In addition to the range of goods being held, a sundry purchase scheme was in existence. Under that scheme, prisoners could place weekly orders for any item that was available in the local Chemist, Newsagent or Fruit Shop, provided the article in question was allowed under Prison Rules. The actual purchases were made by staff from the main Prison at the same time as they were collecting items for that establishments corresponding scheme. 7.8 We were concerned about some security issues related to the running of the facility, and have drawn these matters to the attention of the Governor in writing. 7.9 Under a local agreement, HMP Shotts undertook the laundering of larger items, such as sheets, towels and jeans. That arrangement was working very well with items normally being returned on the same day as they were sent. 7.10 In addition to that service, the NIC had its own industrial size washing machine and tumble drier which were operated by a passman. Prisoners were supplied with individual laundry bags and made use of the local system for smaller items of prison issue kit as well as for the laundering of personal items of clothing. 7.11 An Officer had the role of Fire Precautions Officer (FPO) with another Officer acting as Deputy and both had been trained at the Scottish Fire Services Training School. No specific time had been set aside for FPO duties but we were assured that this did not present any real problems and informal arrangements existed to allow time off to undertake specific tasks on an as required basis. There was no separate Fire Committee though the FPO was part of the local Health and Safety (H & S) structure - see paragraphs 7.16-19. 7.12 Fire raising had not been a problem within the establishment since it had opened, there having been only one relatively minor incident which had occurred in the workshed in 1996. The local Fire Brigade, which was manned on a part-time basis, had a video of the NIC for training purposes and arrangements were in place to ensure that they would be called out on every occasion when a fire took place. Call-out time was just over six minutes with a back-up service being provided from the Fire Station at Motherwell, which was about 11 minutes away from the establishment. Due to the fact that the area around the prison could be subject to severe weather conditions, plans were in place to begin a training programme for staff in basic fire fighting techniques. 7.13 All staff had been trained in the use of the short duration breathing apparatus (SDBA) equipment, which had now been installed at appropriate locations throughout the establishment; a programme of refresher training was underway. Training had also been provided in the use of hose reels and fire extinguishers and each day, staff coming on duty were required to undertake a basic check of all such appliances and sign a document to confirm that such checks had been carried out. The regular maintenance of those appliances was the responsibility of Estates staff in the main Prison and we were assured by NIC staff that this task was being properly undertaken. 7.14 Training for prisoners took the form of an information session which included showing a video of staff using the SDBA equipment together with a general talk on fire hazards. However, evacuation drills had not been carried out recently, though we expect this now to have been remedied. Fire notices were at convenient locations throughout the establishment but an exercise was about to be undertaken to upgrade them to comply with current standards. All cell doors in the establishment had been fitted with inundation bungs and keys to remove the bungs were kept in the hose-reel boxes, for which all staff had a key. Appropriate arrangements were in place to allow staff to over-ride the night sanitation locking system and enable a full evacuation to take place in the event of a real emergency. 7.15 The establishment had not yet been inspected by HM Inspectorate of Fire Services, but a local safety inspection had been undertaken a year ago, when a number of issues had been highlighted and subsequently addressed. 7.16 Responsibility for managing H & S issues in the NIC had recently passed to one of the Supervisors who was the establishments H & S Co-ordinator. He was also Chairperson of the H & S Focus Group, which was a forum considering itself to be performing the role of the statutory H & S Committee. The Co-ordinator had received some limited training prior to taking up the role, which had become vacant due to the recent transfer of his fully-trained predecessor. 7.17 A recently updated H & S Policy for the NIC had been published and circulated throughout the establishment. We noted also that relevant statutory and other notices appropriate to specific areas were on display. A programme of Risk Assessments was ongoing and an internal Safety Inspection and Audit had been undertaken in November 1997 by members of the Focus Group. 7.18 Although the H & S structure had helped Risk Assessment requirements, there was an absence of any records relating to accidents; in particular, there was no system in place to ensure that any accidents were being investigated or notes made to prevent a repeat of incidents. Also, no first aid equipment was provided, though Crash Packs were available on each landing. 7.19 These and other matters ought to be
remedied without delay; we suggest also that a properly constituted H & S Committee be
established. |