5. MAJOR CUSTODY ISSUES

Introduction

5.1 In his initial briefing at the start of the Inspection, the Governor outlined his major concerns for the establishment, which were as follows:-

5.2 Since the NIC opened, the demand for prisoner places had increased, as had the diversity of their needs. The Governor indicated that in turn, this had produced difficulties, with some prisoners now having to stay longer than the 6-12 month period which had originally been envisaged. (For example, at the time of inspection one prisoner had been in the NIC for over 15 months.) The Governor said that this had been caused by an apparent shortage of space in Shotts, Glenochil and Perth.

5.3 The Governor also said that what prisoners had achieved in the NIC was not always being properly recognised when they moved on to the next establishment. Arrivals at Perth and Glenochil were being considered as ordinary admissions, which meant that individuals were not being credited with the time they had already served at the NIC. This left them behind in the progression systems which existed in those prisons and undermined the ethos and purpose of the NIC.

5.4 On the other hand, Perth had adopted a policy of sending an intended Personal Officer or some other suitable representative to interview each prisoner prior to transfer from the NIC. Those interviews were considered to be a natural progression in the induction process and according to the Governor, had been of considerable benefit to the prisoners concerned. The Governor was now seeking to encourage Shotts and Glenochil to adopt a similar practice.

5.5 We were told that the relatively high number of prisoners and the subsequent necessary expansion of the Regime Activities Programme had placed great physical pressure on the already limited association/activity areas, for example:-

• the visit room was too small for its purpose and also had to be used for Staff Training, Cognitive Skills Coaching and Groupwork;

• the TV room doubled as a classroom for Education, Discussion Groups and Information Sessions; and

• the recreation area often became overcrowded which made it both unsafe and difficult to control.

Comment

5.6 The fact that local management were being inhibited in their efforts to transfer prisoners to Shotts, Glenochil and Perth after they had served the optimum period in the NIC was, in our view, a major limitation. Similarly, we considered it unfair that prisoners being transferred to Perth and Glenochil were not being credited, for progression purposes, with time served in the NIC. In our opinion, significant progress with such prisoners had the potential to be neutralised by unreasonable delays in their transfer. Similarly, failure to recognise prisoners’ progress in the NIC after transfer could compromise the credibility of the NIC in its efforts to deliver a meaningful and effective National Induction process for very long term prisoners. We therefore recommend that the SPS more clearly defines and then strictly implements, a policy which ensures that prisoners are transferred from the NIC to HMPs Perth, Shotts and Glenochil without undue delay and that they are not disadvantaged in terms of subsequent progression.

5.7 We commend the practice adopted by HMP Perth in facilitating the interview of prisoners by intended Personal Officers prior to transfer from the NIC and suggest that this practice is adopted forthwith by HMPs Shotts and Glenochil.

5.8 We considered that the visits and recreation room were adequate for their primary purpose but agree with the Governor’s view that they were not adequately equipped nor had sufficient capacity for the multi-functional roles they are currently expected to meet. In order to maintain and ultimately further develop the Regime Activities Programme in an environment conducive to its purpose, we support the Governor’s bid for an appropriate reconfiguration and extension of the estate.

Drug Abuse

5.9 The introduction of MDT in March 1997 had highlighted significant deficiencies in the provision of appropriate Drug Support Programmes. Although four staff had received training in Drug Awareness, the Governor believed that the level of related support offered to prisoners who requested/required assistance with drug misuse problems, was inadequate and that some professional support was required. Consequently a strategic bid had been submitted for the recruitment of a part-time Addictions Worker.

5.10 The MDT process was managed and co-ordinated by the staff in the main prison’s MDT Unit. This meant that the only time staff in the NIC became involved in the process was either when they asked the MDT Unit to test an individual on grounds of suspicion or following a positive test and subsequent disciplinary hearing, the Governor decided that someone should be on a frequent test programme. In both cases, the actual timing of the tests would still be determined by the MDT Unit, with Orderly Room hearings for those tested positive being held in the NIC.

Comment

5.11 The MDT process appeared to operate in a cohesive manner and to the mutual satisfaction of the Governor and the MDT Supervisor. Nevertheless, we were greatly concerned by the extent of the drugs problem, which was evidenced by the comparatively high level of positive tests being produced. During the six months prior to our inspection, 54% of those prisoners randomly tested had produced positive results, 40% of which were for Class ‘A’ drugs.

5.12 Despite the best efforts of those NIC Officers who had been trained in Drug Awareness, the nature and extent of the drugs problem in the NIC was, in our opinion, far more complex than could be addressed by their level of training. Prisoners openly expressed the view that MDT was not a deterrent during the early stages of a long sentence and we considered that there was a requirement for the development of a much more comprehensive strategy to deal with all aspects of drug misuse in the NIC.

5.13 We believe that much more must be done to reduce drug misuse before prisoners are passed on to long term establishments. We, therefore, recommend the early appointment of an Addictions Worker, on a part time basis, to support the Governor and staff in the development and maintenance of a more effective Drug Strategy for the NIC. Given our perception of the urgent nature of this recommendation, we suggest that, as an interim measure until such time as this appointment can be made, consideration should be given to drawing on the professional expertise of existing Addictions Workers currently employed in the SPS (for example, from receiving establishments).

5.14 The monitoring of security cameras in the visits area (see paragraph 6.32) could also significantly reduce the introduction of illicit drugs.