4. SECURITY, DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL

Security and Control

4.1 Although the NIC is an independent establishment, its perimeter security was monitored from within the Operations Room in the main prison. There had been no major breaches of security since opening.

4.2 Security checks and cell-searching records were up to date and were being given the appropriate priority, whilst rub down searches were being carried out as necessary. We also noted that all prisoners were strip searched after visits.

4.3 In the 12 months prior to our inspection, there had been a number of occasions when drugs had been found in the possession of prisoners or their visitors as a result of intelligence received and the good co-operation which existed between the NIC, the main prison and Motherwell Police had proved crucial in the resolution of the majority of those incidents. Any illegal substances found by NIC staff were passed to the Security Unit in the main prison and disposed of in accordance with SPS policy.

4.4 We were much encouraged by the relatively low level of violence which had occurred within the NIC since it had opened, though there had been one serious staff assault in 1996.

Comment

4.5 The successful provision of a regime conducive to the needs of prisoners who are commencing very long sentences was underpinned by the quality of the relationships which existed between staff and prisoners. From our discussions both with prisoners in the NIC and with those in other establishments who had previously served part of their sentence there, it was evident that the culture of mutual respect which prevailed in the NIC was the major contributory factor in the maintenance of good relationships and the achievement of good order. We were pleased also to note that this culture did not appear in any way to compromise the professional status of staff.

4.6 We regularly observed the movement of prisoners to and from the accommodation area and the adjoining general activity areas; we also observed prisoners on outdoor activities in the customised sports area which was enclosed within the main perimeter to the rear of the establishment.

4.7 We were, however, extremely concerned about the lack of supervision on the staircase between each landing in the accommodation area. The structure of the staircase was too narrow to facilitate effective supervision by staff and even if such supervision could have been provided, staff would still be extremely vulnerable. Equally, in the absence of appropriate staff supervision, prisoners were also placed in a vulnerable situation. We, therefore, recommend that CCTV surveillance equipment be installed in the staircase within the accommodation area and on each of the landings in order to support staff in monitoring the activities and movement of prisoners in those areas. This should, in our view, be implemented without delay.

4.8 An SPS Security Audit had been undertaken in February 1997. Separately, we have written to SPS HQ about two security matters, which are not for general publication.

Orderly Room

4.9 An indication of the level of general good order being maintained throughout the NIC was demonstrated by the fact that only 104 Disciplinary Reports had been incurred over the previous 12 months, many of which had been for MDT related offences.

4.10 Only one Disciplinary Hearing took place during the period of our inspection and was conducted by the Governor I/C. We observed the procedure in question and were satisfied that it was entirely consistent with the requirements of the Prison and Young Offenders (Scotland) Rules 1994. A subsequent examination of the Disciplinary Records confirmed that Disciplinary Reports were being dealt with in a fair and consistent manner.

Separate Cells

4.11 Two separate cells were located in the basement of the accommodation unit and had appropriate sanitation and washing facilities, together with a small exercise yard. We noted that these cells were rarely ever occupied.

Contingency Plans

4.12 Our examination of the Contingency Plans indicated that though they were comprehensive, the nature and detail of their content did not dovetail sufficiently with those which existed in the main prison (and upon whom the NIC would rely for support services in the event of an incident). We suggest, therefore, that there should be an early review of the Contingency Plans to ensure that there is much more consistency with those in the main prison.

Escorting Arrangements

4.13 Unlike other long term prison establishments, the NIC did not have Operations Officers to carry out their external escort duties which meant that all staff were required to perform escorting duties at one time or another. The nature of the offences for which NIC prisoners have been sentenced are invariably very serious; consequently, regular liaison with the local police on security matters relating to external escorting arrangements was always effected.

4.14 The strength of each escort was determined by a risk assessment procedure with handcuffs and closet chains being issued on all occasions and written instructions given to every Officer. Verbal guidance was also given by one of the Supervisors who personally despatched each escort.