| REPORT BY HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS ON HM
PRISON, ABERDEEN 1997 4. SECURITY, DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL Security 4.1 In the twelve months prior to our inspection there had been one escape from custody - viz, from an escort at Aberdeen Sheriff Court. In addition, one prisoner had absconded from an outside work placement and two prisoners had failed to return from local leaves. From our examination of the records of those incidents, we were satisfied that full investigations had been conducted and we noted that as a result of the escape, new equipment had been brought into use. 4.2 Given the mix and the high number of prisoners within the establishment, we were satisfied that the appropriate security category procedures and systems were in place and that they appeared to be operating satisfactorily. We noted also that a Perimeter Security Audit had been conducted in January 1997; we were satisfied that the recommendations contained in the subsequent report had received the appropriate priority and that plans were well advanced to implement the necessary improvements. Some minor issues concerning security were brought to the attention of the Governor during the course of our inspection, all of which were addressed. In addition, we have written to the Governor about a number of other security matters which require attention. Control 4.3 In the twelve months prior to our inspection, eleven prisoner on prisoner assaults had been reported, of which four were of a serious nature. Over the same period, one serious assault on staff had taken place but no hospital treatment had been required. The levels of control which we observed were entirely appropriate for this type of establishment and it was also apparent that a good relationship existed between staff and the majority of prisoners. In our meetings with prisoners, they confirmed that conclusion and also said that Aberdeen was a relatively safe place in which to serve a sentence. It was clear that considerable efforts had been made to curtail the traffic in illegal substances into the prison and in the twelve months prior to our inspection there had been over 100 drug finds within the establishment. Orderly Room 4.4 We observed the Orderly Room procedures and were satisfied that they were in line with SPS policy and were being conducted in an open and fair manner. In the 12 months prior to our inspection, the average daily number of reports was 4.6 and from an examination of the records of the hearings, we noted that the majority were for relatively minor breaches of the Prison Rules and we were satisfied that disposals and awards were entirely appropriate. Record keeping in this potentially sensitive area was also satisfactory. Separate Cells 4.5 There was a small separate cells unit which consisted of five single cells - four of which had integral sanitation - plus one silent cell. Within the unit there were toilet and shower facilities and a small kitchen area. However, despite the overall appearance being bright and clean, it was clear that there was a lack of storage space with cleaning and other materials lying around which gave the area a somewhat cluttered appearance. A separate exercise area, which consisted of two enclosed pens roofed by security mesh, completed the facility. 4.6 At the time of our inspection, three prisoners were located in the unit and the routine confirmed that the area was being managed properly. From an examination of the records, we were satisfied that the silent cell was rarely used and even then, only for very short periods of time. Contingency Plans 4.7 The Contingency Plans for the establishment were examined and found to be comprehensive and generally satisfactory, though one minor matter was brought to the attention of the Operations Supervisor. 4.8 We noted that regular contact was made with the Police and other emergency services and we were assured that this ongoing liaison had positive effects on the working relationship which existed between the various agencies and the prison. Gate 4.9 In the report of our 1993 inspection, we had expressed some serious concerns about the Gate operation. At that time, we had found that in addition to its normal equipment and furnishings, there was a number of security systems located in the area which not only created congestion but also resulted in a warm and stuffy atmosphere and a cluttered and untidy appearance. We had also been concerned that staff responsible for monitoring those security systems could easily be distracted by the normal activity taking place within the Gate area. At that time, we had concluded that the solution to those problems would be the provision of a separate, self-contained Operations Room and had recommended accordingly. It is, therefore, extremely disappointing to record that some four years later, there was no progress to report and that we found the situation generally to be unchanged. 4.10 The Gate operation was undertaken by three staff who, as well as managing the basic functions of the electronic locking systems and monitoring all access to and egress from the establishment, were expected to monitor a CCTV system which consisted in total of eleven monitors; they were also required to monitor a number of alarm and other systems. It was, therefore, very clear to us that the overall working environment, combined with the number of systems located in the area and the fact that staff were expected to deal with all the normal Gate duties as well as monitoring the wider security of the prison, continued to be a totally unacceptable situation. It is for that reason that we have to repeat our previous recommendation that the way to address this problem is through the provision of a new Operations Room - see paragraph 13.3. |