4. Security, Dicipline and Control

4.1 Perimeter security of the establishment consisted mainly of an inner and an outer wall with the inner wall and some parts of the outer wall being topped by dannert wire. Attached to the inner wall was an electronic intruder detection system in addition to which, the walls were covered by closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance; both those systems were monitored by staff in the Emergency Control Room (ECR). There was one small section of the prison which was protected by an outer wall and an inner fence and though the area was protected by dannert wire and had the same electronic detection system and CCTV surveillance as elsewhere, nevertheless we were concerned that it did not provide adequate security for a category ‘A’ prison. In our opinion, therefore, there should be a second security wall in the area in question and we therefore recommend that the Governor should include such a project in his Strategic Plan.

4.2 The ECR, which was staffed by two Officers, was located above the Gate in the Administration block. Over recent years a number of new items of security equipment had gradually been added and we were pleased to learn that there were plans to upgrade the CCTV recording system and the prisoners’ telephone monitoring system. That said, it was clear that the ECR was now becoming very cluttered and was in urgent need of expansion and refurbishment. We understand that a local working group is currently considering this whole issue and we recommend that approval for such a project should be granted as a matter of priority. We noted that work was well advanced towards the introduction of CCTV in ‘C’ Hall; this is the first such project in the SPS and we share the Governor’s view that it will go a long way towards assisting control in that greatly overcrowded area of the prison.

4.3 We had some concerns about the way category ‘A’ prisoners were being dealt with and we have, therefore, written to SPS HQ about those concerns. We have also written to the Governor and to SPS HQ about a number of other security issues which for obvious reasons are not detailed in this report. However, following some major attempted breaches of security, there had been a general tightening-up in a number of areas as follows:-

4.3.1 A new emphasis had been given to searching procedures throughout the establishment, including the use of metal detectors. All the measures were in line with SPS procedures though we suggest that there should be the occasional doubling-back on cell searches to remove any feeling of complacency among prisoners whose cells have recently been searched.

4.3.2 A new dedicated search team had been introduced, the function of which was to target special areas - including cells - throughout the establishment. The team employed a very thorough technique and since its introduction there had been a number of notable finds of both drugs and weapons. At the time of inspection, it was a temporary arrangement but we have written to SPS HQ suggesting that appropriate resources should be made available to give the team a greater degree of permanency.

4.3.3 Following a recent major key compromise, a completely new security locking system had been introduced. This was the first of its type within the SPS and we noted that in the event of any further compromises, it would be possible to alter the configuration of the locks in situ thereby greatly reducing the costs involved.

4.4 We were satisfied with the arrangements for the storage and maintenance of the Control and Restraint (C & R) equipment and with the level of training provided for staff.

4.5 Prisoners’ security categories were reviewed by a Security Committee and from an examination of their records, we were satisfied that decisions were being made in a consistent manner and consequently that all prisoners were being dealt with fairly. We have, however, wirten to the Governor suggesting that a Deputy Chairman of the Committee should be appointed to cover for periods of routine absence.

4.6 Shortly before our inspection, the establishment had been visited by the newly-formed SPS Security Audit team. Their comprehensive report has now been prepared and has been submitted to SPS HQ and the Governor for appropriate action.

Comment

4.7 Given Perth’s status as a category ‘A’ prison with chronic overcrowding, we fully appreciate the difficulties in maintaining proper levels of security and control. That said, there was a number of areas which gave us cause for concern and these are either outlined above or have been included in letters to the Governor or SPS HQ.

4.8 On the positive side, we welcomed the recent initiatives regarding the introduction of CCTV surveillance in ‘C’ Hall and the new dedicated search team. Overall, however, we had some concerns as to whether the establishment was still fully meeting the specifications of a category ‘A’ establishment - see paragraph 4.1.

Contingency Plans

4.9 The establishments contingency plans were examined and found to be comprehensive and satisfactory. However, the degree to which they are user friendly could usefully be reviewed, whilst the introduction of summaries which detail the action required by those first on the scene should also be considered.

Orderly Room

4.10 The current location of the Orderly Room in ‘A’ Hall was a temporary arrangement until the refurbishment of ‘D’ Hall was complete. We were satisfied that the procedures were in line with SPS policy and a check of the Register of Punishments confirmed that hearings were being conducted in a fair and consistent manner.

4.11 We noted that the number of prisoners attending the Orderly Room had increased; in 1993-94 there had been an average of three prisoners per day whilst the current average was six. We had some concerns about that trend given that the prison population had not shown any significant increase. However, there was now much more overcrowding - particularly in ‘C’ Hall - and random Mandatory Drug Testing (MDT) also accounted for some of this increase; local management were also having to manage a situation in which some prisoners were reluctant to attend work.

4.12 Our only other concern related to the timing of the Orderly Room but we have taken this up with the Governor separately in writing.

Separate Cells

4.13 In the report of our last formal inspection we had recommended that due to the size, complexity and function that it carries out, Perth should have a proper separate cell facility. This recommendation had not, however, been given effect though we understand that an option appraisal on the building a new separate cell unit was being considered and that the Governor had made representations to SPS HQ on this matter.

4.14 The existing separate cell facilities, which were located in the basement of ‘C’ Hall, comprised six cells, toilets, a wash-hand basin and a shower; a small enclosed exercise area was adjacent to the cells area. The facilities were basic and cramped with poor ventilation and no natural light. The area was staffed by a Supervisor and two Officers, but they were only provided with a small office with all other facilities being shared with ‘C’ Hall staff.

Comment

4.15 Given the mix of prisoners in ‘C’ Hall and the level of overcrowding there, we remain of the view that the location of the separate cells unit is wholly inappropriate and given the size and nature of the prisoner population, the facilities themselves were inadequate. We acknowledge that some progress has been made towards the provision of a new facility but we believe that this should now proceed apace. We therefore repeat our recommendation that a purpose built separate cells unit with self contained facilities and dedicated staffing is an immediate priority for this establishment.

Prisoners Grievance Procedure

4.16 Staff in each Hall were responsible for collecting Grievance Procedure (GP) forms and data which were then collated at a later date to produce overall statistics for the establishment. In general terms, we were satisfied with the level of recording and that responses were being provided within the specified timescales. We were satisfied also that prisoners were aware of how the scheme operated and how to access the GP forms. We suggest, however, that the following specific issues need to be addressed:-

4.16.1. For the sake of consistency in record-keeping, all staff in the Halls should be using the locally-produced computerised GP recording system;

4.16.2. In GP6 (confidential access to the Governor) cases, the Governor should retain the actual form even when other staff are being asked to provide background information for the reply; and

4.16.3. All medical complaints should go direct to the Medical Officer (MO) who should send a copy to the Governor.

4.17 With regard to cases which were considered by the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC), again we were satisfied with the overall arrangements and we noted that Committee members could be drawn from a wide variety of functions throughout the establishment. ICC hearings were held every Friday afternoon with the Chairperson being the manager who was on duty that weekend, thereby ensuring that the workload was spread round different individuals. We noted with interest that the ICC also undertook the function of the local Claims Assessment Panel which in addition to providing consistency, reduced the need for the establishment of another body.

Illicit Substances

4.18 We were satisfied that the procedures being followed in respect of illicit substances found within the establishment were in accordance with SPS policy. We were pleased to note also that the SPS drug dogs visited the prison on a regular basis and that appropriate records were being maintained.

'E' Unit

4.19 This six cell Unit, located beside ‘E’ Hall, was a secure facility which for a number of years had been used as a national resource for prisoners who had been experiencing difficulties in coping with mainstream prison life and who needed a 'time out' facility for a period of adjustment. It had also been used as a short term half way house for those who had spent lengthy periods in other Units or in lock-down conditions. Its primary aim had, therefore, been to prepare prisoners for a return to normal circulation in a long term prison, including Perth.

4.20 At the time of our inspection, however, its function had been changed to that of holding prisoners who had been causing particular problems either in Perth or elsewhere and who required to be taken out of general circulation so that good order and discipline could be maintained. Prisoners in the Unit were not on punishment and we were, therefore, concerned to ensure that their conditions, which entailed a degree of separation from others, were time limited and not abused.

4.21 The Unit was adequately decorated and clean though there was a lack of natural light. In addition to its six cells, there were staff and prisoner toilets and shower facilities as well as a staff office and an area which had previously been used for recreation purposes. There was a totally enclosed exercise yard adjoining the Unit which was extremely limited in size.

4.22 The regime required the prisoners to be entirely segregated from one another but in reality that was not possible and some contact did take place. Work was available and at the time of our inspection one prisoner was co-operating in that respect with appropriate wages being paid.

4.23 Meals were provided from the prison kitchen at normal times and prisoners had appropriate access to showers, clean clothing and exercise. Visits were taken in the main closed visit area but that was an issue which was raised by the prisoners as they saw it as being a form of punishment. However, we were satisfied that the placing of the Unit’s prisoners on closed visits was being carefully and individually considered and that such conditions were being kept under regular monthly review. (Shortly after our inspection we learned that two of the Unit’s prisoners had been returned to open visits.)

4.24 At the time of inspection there were four prisoners in the Unit and we spoke to all of them; we also spoke to staff and to the manager who was in day to day charge. From what we saw and what we were told, we were satisfied that the rules and regulations applying to such prisoners were being properly applied. The main issue which was brought to our attention by the prisoners, other than the general complaint about closed visits, concerned a lack of knowledge about their future - ie, how long would they be held in the Unit and to what prison they would next be sent. All the prisoners confirmed that they knew why they were being held in the Unit but we noted that there was no written material outlining their entitlements or other conditions. We subsequently raised this issue with the Governor who undertook to rectify the position.

Comment

4.25 Although the Unit was secure and well managed, it was not entirely suitable for its current purpose; the conditions were basic and adequate only for short term occupancy. Prisoners held out of circulation because of their propensity for violence towards staff or others require to be exposed to influences which will modify their behaviour, whether by specialised counselling or through regular contact with prison staff. Such work can be done in appropriate surroundings whereas the conditions in the Unit were not conducive to that approach.

4.26 In our view, there will always be a small number of potentially dangerous or difficult individuals who require to be held out of general circulation, hence our recommendation at paragraph 4.15 that Perth should be provided with a purpose-built separate cells unit as a matter of priority. We believe that the construction of such a facility would go a long way to addressing our concerns about the ‘E’ Unit.

Gate

4.27 The Gatehouse was part of the Administration block and was of modern design with good visibility of the main approaches to the establishment. CCTV surveillance was in operation to provide additional cover for monitoring visitors and vehicles entering and leaving the establishment.

4.28 Staffing was provided by one Supervisor and two Officers on each shift with an additional Officer being provided during prisoner visiting times. The staff facilities were adequate for the number on duty and the Gatehouse itself was decorated and maintained to a satisfactory standard.

Comment

4.29 The Gate was a busy area, not only with visitors but also with the vehicles which were included in the ‘D’ Hall upgrading work and were in addition to the normal flow of traffic in and out of the establishment. The overall impression was of a busy but efficient area which was satisfactorily discharging its duties though we have written to SPS HQ and the Governor concerning a number of security issues.

Reception

4.30 As at the time of our last inspection, the Reception was located in a two storey building which was fundamentally unsuitable for the purpose of receiving prisoners safely into the establishment. Ideally, what was required is a building which is spacious with good sightlines, providing ample accommodation for processing prisoners and storing their property; instead, the reception area at Perth was a veritable rabbit warren of rooms and spaces producing an environment in which staff were struggling to cope. Because of the piecemeal layout of the accommodation, everything tended to look grubby and it was only because of the skill and determination of the staff that the reception and discharge processes worked. The area was managed by two Officers, assisted from time to time by other Discipline staff, with one Officer spending most of the day dealing with queries and requests about prisoners’ property. We were, in fact, impressed by the approach of staff towards prisoners which was firm but helpful.

4.31 There was an effective system for the checking and double checking of warrants to ensure the legal custody of prisoners, each of whom was interviewed on arrival by the reception Officer in a cramped, partitioned office where details were recorded on computer. Normally prisoners were informed of their anticipated date of discharge within 24 hours. That said, very little formal training was given to reception staff in understanding the contents of warrants. We suggest, therefore, that staff required to work in reception, whether full time or as reliefs, should receive formal training in this important aspect of their work. All prisoners were interviewed by medical staff within 24 hours of being received into the establishment.

4.32 Five passmen were employed to assist staff when admissions were received and we were satisfied that staff took what precautions they could to prevent those prisoners from having access to sensitive information about other prisoners. However, in the context of this cramped environment it would be surprising if the passmen were not able to listen to conversations to which they should not have been part.

4.33 Apart from the office and a desk behind which a member of reception staff sat, the main facilities on the ground floor consisted of admission and discharge cubicles (which were very small but reasonably clean), a holding room for prisoners, showers and toilets. We had some concerns about the main holding room because although it contained a television to keep prisoners occupied, it was an obvious trap for bullying. With sometimes as many as 17 prisoners in the area at one time, staff were quite unable to provide proper supervision of such a large area. A short term remedy would be to introduce a CCTV camera into this area but that would be viable only if staff were available to monitor what was happening.

4.34 Because the facilities were limited, it was essential that reception and discharge procedures worked efficiently. Discharges were normally released before 0700 hours and prisoners for court were picked up at 0730 hours. As regards admissions, prisoners were received from court after midday until as late as 2000 hours. There were no proper servery arrangements for distributing meals but reception staff and passmen did their best, though the lack of facilities meant that prisoners did not receive a cup of tea on first arrival.

4.35 Reception staff were properly sensitive to the needs of those admissions whom they considered to be at risk of self harm. In such cases, details were recorded in a ‘risk’ book and Medical and Hall staff were advised accordingly.

4.36 On the first floor there was a properly racked but overcrowded prisoners’ property room and we were not satisfied that the most sensible use was being made of all the available space in that area. A suitable selection of discharge clothing was available for prisoners in need.

Comment

4.37 As noted above, the reception area was fundamentally unsuitable for its purpose and the ideal situation would be the construction of a new purpose-built facility. However, we accept that such a project is not really practical given other priorities within Perth but some short-term measures ought to be taken to improve the existing operation. We suggest therefore that there should be a safer area for the holding of prisoners (particularly vulnerable prisoners for whom the arrangements were totally inadequate) who are going through the reception process and there should be a review of the arrangements for the distribution of meals and drinks.