5. Major Custody Issues

Introduction

5.1 In his initial briefing at the start of the inspection, the Governor explained that the establishment was in a state of transition, with major changes being effected via a number of innovative management systems. There were, however, a number of concerns:-

5.1.1 Following many years when there had been very little investment in the prison, there was now an overwhelming need for the basic fabric of all five residential Halls to be refurbished and for in-cell sanitation to be installed. A rolling programme, which involved emptying one Hall at a time, had now started with ‘D’ Hall but this had led to an initial loss of 186 places; this loss had been compensated, to an extent, by the erection of a temporary structure - Letham Hall - which had a capacity of 76. However, at much the same time as prisoners were being decanted, the national population had also begun to rise with the result that most prisoners were now having to double up in cells throughout the establishment.

5.1.2 There had been a similar lack of investment in the visits area and it had long been recognised that what was available to the public and to prisoners was wholly inadequate, if not ‘Dickensian’. Similarly, some of the conditions under which staff were required to operate were unsatisfactory. However, a new £4.6 million complex which combined a much larger visits and staff facilities area was now being built adjacent to the main Gate and this would begin to address these issues. The Governor also referred to the inadequate size of the gymnasium which could not yet be solved because of a lack of funds.

5.1.3 Whilst the establishment’s facilities and programmes had been designed mainly for short-term prisoners, there had been a steady rise in the number of LTPs. In 1993 there had been an average of 80, whereas the total was now 198. Those individuals were also being held for much longer periods because of a shortage of space elsewhere in the prison estate.

5.2 Our observations on these and other issues are shown below.

5.3 Many of our previous formal reports have entirely supported the assessments noted above. Average overcrowding rates since the last formal inspection are:-

5.4 In May 1997, the population had risen to 1266, but the effective design capacity of the prison had been reduced to 807, resulting in an overcrowding figure of 51% at the time of inspection (see paragraph 2.5).

Comment

5.5 We consider that the single most important issue which has been affecting the prison for many years - and which shows every likelihood of continuing - is that of chronic overcrowding. In percentage terms, Barlinnie has become Scotland’s most crowded jail and in the course of our inspection we were confronted with the fact that prisoners were being doubled up in inadequate conditions in nearly every location. The situation for remands was particularly restrictive, with individuals not only being crammed together in one cell, but also for very long periods throughout each day, as well as during the night.

5.6 The effects of that overcrowding were pervading almost every aspect of the prison and its regime, starting with the obvious wear and tear on the fabric of the buildings and corridors, together with various health and hygiene implications. There were many other important side effects which were greatly impinging on the lives of the prisoners and staff throughout each successive day; for example, there were insufficient places in the worksheds (see paragraphs 6.18-29) and as a result, a proportion of prisoners were not acquiring skills which would be useful to the community on completion of their sentence. Many could also be seen loitering idly in their cells.

5.7 Prisoners were prevented from taking part in a variety of activities such as drug reduction and other offending behaviour programmes because there were insufficient resources to support their inclusion. Visit facilities which were already inadequate meant that only the barest of statutory requirements were being provided in what is a critical and emotive area for all concerned. The pressures caused by overcrowding also meant that staff were unable to devote sufficient time to those prisoners who were often in most need of attention - particularly those on remand or in the early stages of their sentence. The potential effects on tension and control need no further rehearsing.

5.8 Solutions are much more difficult to quantify; nevertheless, the various effects are becoming urgent and we therefore offer the following observations:

5.8.1 Long Term Solutions

• Some relief can be expected when the new prison at Bowhouse, Kilmarnock comes into operation in 1999 - 2000. However, this unit is likely to be a national facility and is some 30 miles away from Glasgow; whether this will be sufficient to reduce the pressures of overcrowding at Barlinnie is, therefore, questionable at this stage.

• Some vacant land which might be suitable for development is still available within the prison’s perimeter.

5.8.2 Medium Term Solutions

• A substantial increase in the number of bail beds in the Glasgow area could help greatly by reducing the number of those remanded in custody.

5.8.3 Other Solutions

• Additional and more immediate relief might be obtained via the greater use of diversionary schemes by local Courts. This might include the application of many more Supervised Attendance and Community Service Orders (CSOs) - which apparently are also much cheaper to administer.

• We understand that the erection of extra accommodation blocks in other Central Belt prisons would be helpful to the SPS’s management of LTPs - including those at Barlinnie. The construction of a 125-cell block within the perimeter of HMP Edinburgh has just been announced, whilst additional space also exists at HMP Shotts.

5.9 Our central recommendation is that the present levels of critical overcrowding must be reduced, especially amongst remand and long term prisoners, and that these problems must be addressed on a strategic basis now.

Drug Abuse

5.10 In the report of our 1993 inspection, the main references to drug abuse were related to AIDS. By 1997, however, it had become apparent that drug abuse was established amongst most remand and convicted prisoners well before their arrival in the prison. The scale of drug abuse had grown in the outside community and in turn, in all five of the prison’s accommodation Halls. Many Medical, Specialist and Discipline staff were of the opinion that drug misuse within the prison had become commonplace.

5.11 The Governor took the view that the problem was no worse than in any other comparable prison. That conclusion was based on recent MDT results which had shown that those providing a positive sample was 39% over a two month period, whilst at HMP Edinburgh, for example, the comparative rate had been 46% over six months.

5.12 Based on those figures, we were inclined to agree with the Governor’s conclusion, though we assessed that the overall number of actual drug users was probably higher than those who had tested positive as a result of MDT. Three levels of probable abusers were identified:

• Occasional drug users - i.e., those making smoking cannabis for recreational purposes.

• Regular abusers of a variety of drugs including the smoking and chasing of heroin.

• An interdeterminate, though probably transient element of individual injectors.

5.13 Other evidence of increasing drug abuse included:-

• The number of disciplinary cases coming before the Governor (see also paragraph 4.7).

• Intelligence targeting; in recent months there had been 47 drug captures during visits and 84 in the Halls.

Mandatory Drug Testing Unit

5.14 The MDT Unit had been operational since March 1997. It was being run by a Supervisor and three Officers including one relief, which ensured that two members of staff were always present when prisoners were being tested.

5.15 In the two months since opening, the Unit had tested 439 prisoners, of whom 130 had produced positive results (though 31 results were outstanding at the time of inspection). Of 15 prisoners tested under the risk assessment protocol, one had been positive, whilst seven of the 29 tested under the frequent test programme had also produced a positive result (14 results were outstanding). Sixty one had been tested on the grounds of reasonable suspicion and of these, 45 were positive (14 results were outstanding). Two prisoners had refused to provide a sample.

5.16 At the time of inspection 68 prisoners had appeared before the Governor as a result of a positive test; three of those prisoners had pleaded not guilty, though one of the tests had later produced confirming laboratory results. (One test was still outstanding.)

5.17 Prisoners were selected for testing at random by computer; sampling then took place one prisoner at a time but before doing so, an Officer in the waiting area explained the procedures and obtained a signature on an authorisation form. A sample was obtained in the sampling area and placed in two separate sealed containers. Bar codes were used to identify them so that complete anonymity was maintained; to ensure fairness, special kits were used to seal and pack the specimens which were then sent to an outside laboratory for testing. Individuals also had to witness and verify each step and were provided with duplicate copies of all documentation.

5.18 Results were normally available within two to four days and if the test was positive, the prisoner would normally be brought before the Governor. If substance abuse was denied, a further confirming test was carried out by the laboratory to confirm the original findings and the nature of constituent drugs. If a prisoner pleaded guilty, he was given an appropriate punishment suspended for three months (unless his liberation date was less than that period of time). All prisoners who were given a suspended sentence were required to provide at least one negative test result before the suspension could be lifted. If further testing did not produce a negative result, the initial punishment was then effected together with any new punishment for the second offence. A prisoner who sustained two positive tests was placed on a frequent testing programme.

Comment

5.19 The unit was understaffed by one Officer at the time of inspection and it was not known when that shortfall would be remedied. The effect was that whilst the unit was achieving the required monthly target of 10% for random testing, it was unable to keep up with the demand for testing on grounds of reasonable suspicion.

5.20 We were impressed with the way Unit staff were carrying out their duties, though their rooms were very cramped. Our overall impression, however, was that given the large throughput of prisoners at Barlinnie, they were only managing to skim the surface; were extra resources to become available, testing at the Reception stage would be extremely helpful.

Drug Addictions Worker

5.21 A full-time addictions worker was based in the Social Work Department and was involved in one to one counselling as well as group work. He actively encouraged links with families of drug abusers and appropriate outside agencies. He had also been involved in helping produce an initial programme for the Drug Rehabilitation Unit (DRU) (see paragraphs 5.23-24) and had run two groups for prisoners who were HIV positive, with assistance being provided by one of the Chaplains. In addition, he led drug addiction groups in all the Halls (except ‘C’ Hall where a colleague had responsibility). Those groups met weekly, with Discipline staff also making a contribution. Referrals were received from Hall staff or as a result of MDT as well as via requests from prisoners themselves. Individuals were then assessed using standardised questionnaires prior to their entry either into groups or for one to one counselling. Normally there were between 40 and 50 prisoners involved at any one time.

Comment

5.22 It was apparent that though the drug addictions worker had worked extremely hard, there was a lack of central co-ordination and consistency within this vital area of work, though the opening of a Drug Rehabilitation Unit should improve this shortcoming. The potential input from outside drug agencies also needs to be further exploited.

Drug Rehabilitation Unit

5.23 The residential DRU was to be housed in the same building as the MDT unit. The area in question had previously been used as part of the Barlinnie Special Unit and consisted of 10 cells, a well equipped kitchen and various rooms suitable for group work and one to one counselling and interviews. Supervisors and supporting staff had been identified to run the unit but at the time of inspection they had not all been released from present duties.

5.24 It was proposed that over a four week period, the unit would provide a rolling drug rehabilitation programme for those who had tested positive by MDT and who were regarded as suitable following assessment. Other candidates would come from volunteers, also after assessment. On completion of the drug reduction programme, it was proposed that individuals would be transferred to a drug free section of the newly renovated ‘D’ Hall for a period of 16 weeks, a time limiting factor which meant that this initiative would be most beneficial for prisoners who were coming to the end of their sentence. It was also the intention to foster links with the communities into which prisoners were due to be released, including links to anti-addiction agencies which operated in the prisoners’ home areas, and with their families.

Drug Addiction Clinic

5.25 The Drug Addiction Clinic (DAC) was based on the upper floor of the area designated for the DRU. It consisted of two rooms suitable for group work or interviews, an office, a kitchen area and toilet facilities. It was the intention that staffing of the DAC and DRU would consist of three Supervisors and eight Officers. At the time of our inspection it had only been possible to appoint two out of the three Supervisors.

5.26 Each Hall ran its own drug addiction group supported by the drug addictions worker who was based in the Social Work Department. Part of the role of the DAC would, therefore, be to act as a central body which could co-ordinate the work which was going on in Halls. However, at the time of inspection its main role was the assessment of prisoners who tested positive under the MDT programme. Where prisoners had shown a commitment to addressing their drug taking habits, they were offered the opportunity to join a central group which operated under the supervision of the staff of the DAC. Here they entered a six week programme consisting of 23 hours per week. During their period in that programme, contacts were made with local communities and where appropriate, with families. Groups were run by the prisoners themselves with staff acting as facilitators.

Comment

5.27 At the time of the inspection the programme had been running for two months and approximately 70 prisoners had completed the programme, though it was still too early to assess its effectiveness. The Supervisors working in the DAC were doing their best with enthusiasm in difficult circumstances, but would benefit from further training. The Clinic would also benefit from the provision of a computer with access to SPIN and other software packages.

Alcohol

5.28 Alcohol is rarely a major custody issue in prison because of the difficulties in prisoners obtaining regular - and of course - bulky supplies. Nevertheless, it appeared to our team that Barlinnie was having to process more than its fair share of prisoners with alcohol problems - over 50% of admissions - and for that reason we have included a detailed description of this aspect.

5.29 The Barlinnie Addiction Project (BAP) had previously helped prisoners deal with a range of addiction problems including alcoholism but that unit had been run down and the service had now been put out to tender. At the time of inspection, the services were being provided temporarily by one Counsellor who had previously been a member of BAP.

5.30 The current service was on offer to both convicted and remand prisoners; those who wished to take advantage of the service could self-refer, but prisoners could also be referred by staff in the Health Centre, the Social Work Unit or from the Halls. All counselling sessions were on a one-to-one basis with each session lasting one hour. Post release was also considered and arrangements were made for representatives of outside organisations to meet prisoners in the establishment in order to help break down barriers.

5.31 Two members of staff in the Remand Hall had also recently been appointed as Alcohol Liaison Officers, a service which it was hoped might be extended to other Halls.

Suicide

5.32 Since mid-1993 there had been 15 deaths in custody, as follows:-

5.33 By way of comparison, throughout the SPS there had been 15 fatalities from all causes in 1995-96.

5.34 Specifically as regards suicide, in the three years preceding our 1993 formal inspection there had been four fatalities. However, as shown above, there had been 13 over the subsequent three years, the majority having been among prisoners on remand. It is believed that drug related problems were often a common factor.

5.35 We were impressed with the psychiatrist’s approach to suicide risk assessment and its management; medical and nursing staff had also made a considerable contribution. The co-ordination and development of strategy was through the Suicide Risk Management Group (SRMG), which met every two months and which had a central role in monitoring and auditing the methods and work undertaken to prevent suicide. It was chaired by the Deputy Governor and included medical, psychiatric and nursing representatives as well as Chaplains. It received reports of meetings of the Critical Incident Groups (see paragraph 5.36.3) at which the events surrounding suicides or para suicides were analysed. Additionally, reports of the actions taken on the recommendations of the Critical Incident Groups were also received.

5.36 The general approach to suicide risk management was as follows:-

5.36.1 There was a triage screening system in place at Reception which was dependent on a skilled nursing team which carried out structured interviews with all newly admitted prisoners. Those causing concern were referred to the doctor who was on duty in this area.

5.36.2 Named nurses were allocated to each Hall and had their own nursing station, which enabled them to establish closer contact with prisoners. This allowed for the monitoring of prisoners who were considered to be at risk.

5.36.3 In the event of a suicide or parasuicide, a Critical Incident Group was set up to examine all the factors involved, following which a report was submitted to the SRMG along with recommendations. The decisions and resulting actions were then audited.

5.36.4 Nurse practitioners from the Mental Health Team - see paragraph 8.23 - had recently started attending Glasgow Sheriff Court each day to identify those prisoners who might be a suicide risk if admitted to prison.

5.36.5 Whenever a potentially suicidal prisoner could not be managed in the Hall, he was admitted to the Health Centre.

5.37 At the time of inspection there were three prisoners on Strict Suicide Supervision; one was on Intermediate Supervision whilst 17 were on Basic Supervision. A further 198 prisoners were on Medical Observation.

Comment

5.38 Appropriate procedures had been put in place to reduce the risk of suicide within the establishment and had gone some way to identify and monitor those who were at greatest risk. Work was in hand to develop indicators which would further refine the current strategy. However, if the nurses are to be fully effective they must be able to spend as much time as possible at their nursing station and in contact with prisoners. (See also paragraphs 8.16-22.) They must also be able to work more closely with Discipline Staff.

5.39 The use of nurse practitioners in Court to identify prisoners at risk is highly commendable and the effectiveness of that scheme should be closely monitored for use by other establishments.

5.40 We gained an impression - but no more than that - that suicide was still seen as essentially being a Health Centre staff problem, whereas we believe that a means must be found to focus every member of staff’s attention on this aspect. For example, a wider distribution of post incident analysis might be one way of achieving this - though obviously a means of overcoming patient confidentiality would have to be found.

Drug/Mental Health Coordination

5.41 Barlinnie’s awesome prisoner throughput, with its heavy proportion of drug and alcohol abusers together with the high number of suicides among an unusually transient population, highlighted the fact that management and staff were having to deal with what were essentially community problems, often for only a matter of days or weeks. In addition, they did not always have the appropriate medical and other records to deal with these matters - especially among very short stay admissions. In parallel, we noted the increasing interest shown by Greater Glasgow Health Board in the management of drug abusers involved in its methadone programme whilst in Barlinnie. We also encountered a considerable number of voluntary agencies concerned with the return of drug abusers to the community - though they were tending to operate in isolation. This led us to the general observation that both Barlinnie Management and Greater Glasgow Health Authorities have common interests in increasing their liaison and working practices.

5.42 In particular, the increasing numbers of abusers and those with mental health problems (which in some cases result in tragic deaths both inside and outside the prison) led us to the conclusion that more innovative methods for coordinating the treatment of individuals during and after their stay in Barlinnie ought to be found. It is in everyone’s interest that prison should be seen as an opportunity for continuous treatment. The use, for example, of Community Psychiatric Nurses (CPN) to work within the prison as well as in the community would be a very basic and practical step forward in the management of vulnerable prisoners as well as the large number of prisoners with addiction problems. However, joint negotiation over their funding would be required (see also paragraph 8.37).

Violence

5.43 Statistics for the twelve months prior to our inspection were as follows:-

Comment

5.44 The growing number of serious assaults is a considerable cause for concern - and it is probable that a number of these would be related to drug feuds. On the other hand, in this particular respect Barlinnie compares well with Edinburgh, Perth and other large establishments.

Boredom

5.45 The most frequent observation which we received from unconvicted and convicted prisoners - whether they were short or long termers - was that they were bored, especially at the week-ends (or as one LTP wryly observed "I’ve slept my life away in this place"). Statements such as these were rarely offered in complaint - rather they came over along the lines of "that is how you expect life at Barlinnie to be". It appeared that there was a greater acceptance among prisoners at Barlinnie and possibly a few members of staff, that that was what the regime was about and that little could be done about it, attitudes which had possibly been reinforced by years of chronic overcrowding.