4. Security, Discipline and Control

Security and Control

4.1 A full SPS security audit was scheduled to take place shortly after our inspection. However, from what we were able to see, systems and procedures appeared to be reasonably comprehensive. Nevertheless, a number of minor security issues were noted and have been raised in a letter to the Governor and SPS HQ.

4.2 There had been two escapes in the twelve months prior to our inspection, both of them by Category B prisoners. Each had occurred during escorts to local hospitals and full investigations had subsequently taken place.

4.3 An examination of the Security Category review procedures indicated that they were being carried out satisfactorily.

4.4 Security checks and cell searching records were up to date and were being given the appropriate priority, whilst rub down searches were being carried out as necessary. Special cell searches were also carried out either on suspicion or on receipt of specific information; in this respect, the Security Intelligence Liaison Unit was invaluable in providing intelligence and ensuring that appropriate action was being taken to prevent breaches of security. We were satisfied that any illegal substances seized as a result of its operations were being disposed of in accordance with SPS policy.

4.5 We considered that the control of the movement of prisoners to and from work places was appropriate, but we noted inconsistencies elsewhere and especially within the accommodation blocks. We noted, for instance, that access to showers and telephones was restricted by allowing only a small number out of cell at any one time yet during indoor exercise periods, up to 90 prisoners could be unlocked and exercising on the landings. It appeared to us that, on occasions, the level of control being enforced by staff was imbalanced and given the somewhat limited regime opportunities which existed within the establishment, we believe this is a matter which should be kept under review.

Control and Restraint

4.6 The establishment’s state of readiness to respond to an incident appeared to be satisfactory. We also examined the procedures for Control and Restraint (C & R) training and noted that two full time instructors had recently been appointed. We were, however, concerned about the storage of equipment and have raised this matter separately with the Governor.

Orderly Room

4.7 We observed the Orderly Room procedures, which were being undertaken by the Deputy Governor, and were satisfied that indiscipline reports were being dealt with in a fair and consistent manner. Since our last inspection, there had been an increase in the number of prisoners being dealt with in the Orderly Room and it was clear that this was directly related to the introduction of MDT. However, punishments appeared to be consistent with the seriousness of the offence and we noted that those prisoners found with illegal substances were invariably referred to the police. Record keeping procedures were of a high standard.

4.8 Discipline within the prison appeared to be good and the interaction which was observed between staff and prisoners seemed to be reasonable. In fact, many prisoners endorsed the observation that relationships were positive though there was some criticism about a lack of consistency between the two staff divisions (see paragraph 10.6).

Separate Cells

4.9 A purpose built Segregation Unit, which had a maximum capacity of 18, plus one silent cell, was located between ‘A’ and ‘E’ Halls and had appropriate sanitation, washing and telephone facilities together with a small exercise area. Plans were also well advanced to include an indoor fitness area where prisoners could have the use of an exercise bicycle and a treadmill during periods of inclement weather.

4.10 At the time of inspection eleven prisoners were located in the Unit, all of them being held under the terms of Prison Rule 80. We were satisfied that appropriate authority had been received in all cases.

4.11 Staff facilities included an office, toilet and shower and cooking equipment. Closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras were also in constant use, whilst protective clothing and equipment were readily available.

Contingency Plans

4.12 Our examination of the establishment’s Contingency Plans indicated that they were comprehensive and up to date. The distribution and location of the plans were also appropriate and we noted the intention to make them locally more widely available through the IT network.

4.13 In addition, we noted the establishment’s involvement with a Contingency Planning Liaison Group whose membership included Strathclyde Police, Strathclyde Fire Brigade, the Scottish Ambulance Service, Glasgow City Emergency Planning Department and Glasgow Health Board’s Planning Officer. A draft joint contingency plan had been developed which should help reduce the risk of misunderstanding between the various agencies in any future incident. We consider this development to be an excellent example of good practice and one which could usefully be taken up by other (large) SPS establishments.

Escorting Arrangements

4.14 All escorts were managed and undertaken by the Movements Group which consisted of three Supervisors and 29 staff who were involved in the regular movement of prisoners to many other SPS establishments throughout Scotland. The Movements Group was also responsible for escorting prisoners to Courts outwith Glasgow as well as for hospital appointments, emergency admissions to hospital, compassionate visits and police Identity Parades.

Comment

4.15 The strength of each escort was determined by a risk assessment procedure; handcuffs and closet chains were issued on all occasions and written instructions were given to every Officer. Additionally, verbal guidance was given by one of the Supervisors who personally despatched each escort.

Gate

4.16 The Gate consisted of separate pedestrian/vehicle entries and a separate entrance for prisoners’ visitors. It was of relatively modern design and allowed staff appropriate observation backed up by a CCTV system which monitored all movements. An upgrading of the electronic locking systems was scheduled to take place in the near future.

Comment

4.17 With an average of over 340 visitors per day, the pedestrian entry was well controlled. Identification and purpose of visit were determined and records of all entries were being maintained. A walk-through metal detector was installed in the pedestrian waiting room but its use appeared to be restricted to visiting agents and social workers. No routine X-ray examination of baggage or parcels was taking place but we were informed that this would be addressed as part of a planned refurbishment of the area - see paragraph 5.1.2.

4.18 The Gate was extremely busy in controlling the access of SPS, police and contractors’ vehicles. However, it was noted that considerable efforts had been made to reduce the number of movements in order to minimise the risks to security; as a result of better co-ordination of deliveries and closer liaison with the police, the number of vehicle movements had been reduced from a monthly average of 970 to 420. Other establishments would do well to follow Barlinnie’s example.