Report on HM Prison Noranside

HM Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland 1998

4. MAJOR CUSTODY ISSUES

Governor’s Briefing

4.1 At the beginning of our inspection the Governor, who had been in post for over a year, described the key issues affecting the establishment as follows:-

4.1.1 Prisoner Selection. A rigorous prisoner selection procedure continued to be fundamental to the successful operation of the prison.

4.1.2 Drugs. At the time when MDT had been introduced to the establishment, there had been an increase in the number of absconds. This had since reduced but comparatively high levels of drug misuse were still a problem. (This is discussed in more detail at paragraphs 4.4-22.)

4.1.3 Care. Priority for the delivery of social work services had shifted to meeting statutory responsibilities, leading to an increase in parole-related work (see paragraphs 6.58-64). Nursing cover was inadequate to meet future demands (see also paragraphs 8.13-18).

4.1.4 Opportunity. By this stage in their sentence, prisoners should have changed their behaviour as a result of work undertaken in closed prisons. Open prisons should provide opportunities to consolidate and demonstrate socially responsible behaviour and attitudes.

4.1.5 Value for Money. Management were focusing on improving efficiency through increased productivity and reduced running costs.

Comment

Prisoner Selection

4.2 The selection criterion which applies to open prisons allows for a degree of overlap in sentence length, which meant that the population at Noranside was made up of both short term prisoners who did not qualify for parole and LTPs, including lifers. Inevitably, tensions arose because of the different conditions which applied to each prisoner group. (For example, we were told of two prisoners, one an LTP serving over four years and one a short term prisoner, who had been charged with the same breach of discipline. Both had received the same punishment award at the Orderly Room but the LTP had then been the subject of a report to the Parole Board which resulted in his parole date being withdrawn.) We offer no comment on this, other than to express the view that such tensions would not exist were short term prisoners to be held in HMP Castle Huntly and LTPs in Noranside and HMP Penninghame.

4.3 We recognise and endorse the need for selection processes for open prisons to be careful and considered. It is unclear, however, whether suitable prisoners are being identified and prepared for transfer to open conditions at the earliest appropriate stage of their sentence. This results in open prisons operating under capacity, which not only has an impact on running costs but also contributes to overcrowding in other places and to frustration among prisoners who are keen to progress (and to be seen to progress) to open conditions.

Drugs

4.4 The 1994 Inspection Report had made very little reference to drug abuse but on this occasion, in addition to the Governor’s remarks there was evidence, from a variety of sources, that a high percentage of the prisoners had engaged in illicit drug abuse at some point in their sentence. It was also clear from MDT results that many continued to indulge in drug misuse either in the establishment or whilst on home leave.

4.5 Over half the misconduct reports for the last year had been related to drug misuse, whilst seven out of the eight absconds since February 1997 had taken place just prior to the receipt of positive MDT results, though there had been only one abscond since January 1998. However, in the 12 months prior to our inspection, out of a total of 50 prisoners returned to closed conditions, 37 had been as a result of drug misuse or related activities.

Drug Strategy

4.6 The establishment’s drug strategy was based on the following elements:-

(i) Deterrence - Mandatory Drug Testing

4.7 MDT took place in an area within the Administration block. The facilities had been well designed and provided a clinical but non-threatening environment in which to carry out the necessary procedures. These were supervised by Officers who carried out this work in addition to their core duties.

4.8 The MDT Unit operated seven days a week though there were some days, particularly at week-ends, when this could not be achieved due to other demands being made on staff. On average, up to 30 prisoners were tested each month. In addition to the 10% random test group, this included those being tested prior to going on home leave, those suspected by staff of abusing drugs and those undergoing frequent testing (due to having previously tested positive).

4.9 The results of this testing showed an annual average of 14% positive. In the six months prior to our inspection the average had continued at 14%, though the actual range had been between 8 and 24%. The substances most frequently found in the urine of those testing positive had been related to opiates.

4.10 We were impressed by the layout and design of the MDT Unit and by the way that the tests were organised. All staff had been trained in the appropriate procedures and we were satisfied that the relevant documentation and records were being maintained.

4.11 We were advised, however, that the hours worked by the establishment’s nurse meant that it could be difficult for MDT staff to obtain, at the time they required it, information about any medication that might be being prescribed to a prisoner. This is an issue that must be addressed and is discussed in more detail at paragraphs 8.13-18.

(ii) Education

4.12 Drug Education courses were available mainly by referral from the prison’s medical services or through the frequent drug testing programme. During 1997-98 a total of five courses, each of four days, had been delivered to a total of 50 prisoners. Over that same period, six Residential staff had co-ordinated and facilitated the delivery of individual counselling sessions led by the Harm Reduction Centre, an external agency based in Dundee. In total, 60 such sessions had been delivered to 35 prisoners.

(iii) Addiction Counselling

4.13 There was a five member Staff Drug Team, one of whom, in addition to other duties within the establishment, acted as co-ordinator. Having previously acted in the role of deputy co-ordinator, the individual concerned had a good deal of experience of working with prisoners in this area. Referrals to the team came either through the sentence planning process or via the Social Work Unit.

4.14 Members of the team were expected to carry out interviews with those prisoners who had been referred to them and this was done using a structured interview form, which had been designed by a member of the team. Following each interview, an action plan was drawn up which involved an identification of the individual needs of each prisoner and possible ways of meeting them. Since about four out of every five admissions had a history associated with drug abuse in one way or another, the referral rate was quite high.

4.15 One of the main ways in which the team sought to help prisoners was to put them in touch with outside agencies, preferably in their local area. In this way, it attempted to provide support for the prisoners on release and the team saw itself very much in a facilitating role in that it organised the initial contacts though under that arrangement it was then left to each individual to continue the contact with the relevant outside agency.

4.16 In addition to this work, the team was involved in organising Health Awareness Courses which were obligatory for all new prisoners and lasted 2| days. The prisoners were given the opportunity to select the modules for the course in which they were involved and the contributions to the course came from outside agencies as well as prison staff. However, whilst much of the outside support was currently being given freely, there were indications that this might change in future.

4.17 The Staff Drug Team was also involved in the MDT process, since those who tested positive were expected to be interviewed by one of the team.

Comment

4.18 We acknowledge that the open nature of the grounds and the prison’s regime make it extremely difficult to control the supply of drugs. But given that an essential element of the admission criteria to Noranside is that prisoners have to establish through drug testing procedures that they are drug free prior to transfer, it was disappointing to learn that in the first year of MDT, opiates had accounted for 54 of the 88 positive test results. Unfortunately, that trend appeared to be continuing; in the six months since February 1998, opiates had accounted for 24 of the 34 positive tests. Also, out of 33 tests carried out under the frequent test programme since MDT was introduced, only four had turned out to be negative. This suggested that the individuals concerned were neither addressing their misuse problems nor had any intention of changing their behaviour. However, it is interesting to note that tests on prisoners which were made just prior to their home leave rarely produced a positive result.

4.19 These factors do, therefore, raise the issue of incentives and the value of allowing any prisoner to remain at Noranside after testing positive for the use of illegal substances. At present a ‘two strikes and out’ policy applies, whereas we recommend that prisoners in Noranside and at all other open prisons who test positive for drug misuse should be returned immediately to closed conditions, especially when Class ‘A’ drugs are involved.

4.20 That said, some form of continuing support is required within the prison, though we do not consider it appropriate for open prisons to provide programmes for prisoners to address drug misuse, given the criterion that they should be drug free by the time they get there. We therefore recommend that in open prisons, the focus of work with prisoners who have had addiction problems should be on relapse prevention rather than intervention.

4.21 One of the ways in which such a policy could be implemented effectively would be through the Staff Drug Team, though we did have some concerns that at present, it was not functioning properly as a team. A brief analysis of their interview forms indicated that these were mainly being carried out by the co-ordinator, with some assistance coming from only one other Officer. We also formed the impression that the team did not meet as a group on a regular basis. We concluded, therefore, that only lip-service was being paid to a team approach to drug addiction work in Noranside and that this was reducing the effectiveness of the work being undertaken. Also, no protocols or guidelines existed for the work of the team. Consideration should, therefore, be given to an urgent review of the way that the Staff Drug Team operates.

4.22 Consideration will also need to be given to the likely requirement for some funding to support the input from outside agencies who play such an important part in the Health Awareness Course.

Suicide

4.23 The establishment has been fortunate in that it had not suffered a suicide since it had become an open prison. Nevertheless, the SPS’s revised suicide risk management strategy - Act to Care (ACT) - had recently been introduced and in keeping with this strategy, a local co-ordinator had been appointed. We were advised that staff had undergone the appropriate training to implement the strategy and it appeared that all were adapting well to their new roles.

4.24 The co-ordinator had identified what he saw as the high risk time for Noranside prisoners - i.e. the period immediately after they returned from leave, no matter how short that leave might have been. To that end, he was making sure that prisoners were carefully observed on their return to the prison for any signs that they might be at risk of self harm.

Comment

4.25 From our observations, the management of suicide risk was being carried out in a sensible and sensitive way. Staff had correctly identified the high risk time and had introduced a system which sought to identify anyone at risk of self harm during that period.

4.26 We were, however, concerned that the hours currently worked by the nurse practitioner could have an impact on the successful operation of the ACT strategy - for example, his ability to call a case conference within 24 hours of a prisoner being identified as potentially at risk.