| LIST
OF FIAG'S RECOMMENDATIONS |
| Terminology |
| 1. In
future, Government accounting should use simple language
and community understood terms. |
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| BUDGETARY
PROCEDURES |
| 2. The
Scottish Parliament should adopt an annual procedure to
scrutinise and approve the expenditure proposals of the
Executive. |
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| Committees |
| 3. The
Scottish Parliament should use a structure based on 3
Committee types. These are: Subject Committee, the
Finance Committee and the Audit Committee. |
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| Parliamentary
Consideration |
| 4. The whole
Parliament should have the opportunity to scrutinise
Budget Proposals and Budget amendments. The Subject and
Finance Committee might also play an important role in
scrutiny of the Executive's main budget proposals prior
to consideration by the Plenary. |
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| 5. It should
also be open to members to use forms of questions or
enquiries although it is acknowledged that this is
probably more effective in calling the Government to
account in relation to policy questions than for
specialised financial scrutiny. |
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| Parliamentary
controls through budget procedures |
| 6. The
Scottish Parliament should adopt broad principles as
follows: |
- budget approval
should be by way of primary legislation;
- there should be no
expenditure without appropriation legislation;
- revised budgets are
produced to reflect adjustments;
- no undue reliance on
Budget approvals for providing underlying powers
to undertake functions;
- an absolute (cash)
limit to spending;
- annuality of agreed
budget sums (but with arrangements to provide
sensible carry forward);
- separate authority
needed for overspends;
- emergency spending
subject to Parliament's authority;
- no release of funds
without legislative authority; and
- Parliamentary
authority is required to apply receipts.
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| 7. There
should be a presumption that the flexibility to carry
forward savings from one financial year to another should
be passed to programme managers in order to influence
management behaviour. |
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| 8. FIAG
supports a regime (approved by the Parliament) which
enables programme managers to retain current receipts to
add to programme expenditure. A procedure will be
required to decide which receipts should be available to
sustain increased expenditure and which should be
surrendered. Capital receipts above certain limits to be
decided should be controlled. |
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| Three
Stage Framework |
| 9. FIAG
recommends a 3 Stage framework for budgeting approval:
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- Stage 1 _ A
discussion of future strategy and priorities with
public input through subject Committees. Debate
to be supported by the Executive's publication of
an annual report by 20 April setting out budget
proposals for the year immediately ahead and
provisional plans for two further years. The
report should also cover policy objectives and
some assessment of performance against past
objectives.
- Stage 2 -
Consideration of draft budget proposals by the
Executive taking account of the outcome of
Committees' considerations at Stage 1. Parliament
would have the option of proposing an alternative
budget, not involving more money in total than
the Executive's proposals. This would not be
binding on the Executive.
- Stage 3 -
Consideration of the Executive's final budget
proposals leading to approval or rejection by the
Parliament by the start of the financial year.
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| Budget
Documentation |
| 10. Budgets
are formal procedures but are nevertheless necessary in
terms of securing the Parliament's formal authority for
expenditure and as a means for checking the regularity of
payments, etc. |
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| 11. Budgets
should follow the internal structure of the Scottish
Administration and hence align with Accountable Officer
responsibilities. |
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| 12. The
ambit is a useful concept and should be retained.
However, FIAG recommends that this part of a Budget
should be known as its "Scope" as this is a
term which is more commonly understood. |
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| 13. The
Budget spending proposals should cover all expenditure by
the Executive which the Parliament has to approve, rather
than all public expenditure in Scotland. |
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| 14. These
proposals should also include, after consultation with
the Parliament, expenditure which the Parliament has to
approve but is not formally for the Executive to propose
- notably expenditure by the Parliament itself and
expenditure on judges' salaries. |
| 15. The
Executive should also report to the Parliament on the
levels or expected levels of other public expenditure in
Scotland, including expenditure decisions by local
authorities, expenditure by Parliament and judges'
salaries. |
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| 16. Each
Budget proposal should be accompanied by a narrative (ie
a financial memorandum) explaining the objectives which
would set out proposed outputs and expected outcomes. |
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| 17. Budgets
should be disaggregated to a lower level than that
required by the Parliament for the purposes of financial
control. |
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| Interim
spending approval |
| 18. The
Scottish Parliament should be invited to adopt an interim
budget approval procedure to be used if the Parliament
did not formally approve the Budget before the start of
the financial year. |
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| In-year
changes |
| 19. The
Parliament should adopt arrangements that balance in-year
flexibility for managers with Parliamentary control. |
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| 20. Budget
amendments should: |
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- be simpler to
understand;
- provide more
opportunities to present Budget amendments to
Parliament if required;
- provide monitoring
information in relation to expenditure; and
- provide better
dovetailing between control mechanisms and
statutory approvals.
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| Executive discretion in relation to
in-year changes |
| 21. The
Executive should be allowed reasonable discretion to
transfer funds with appropriate internal controls but
they should be subject to the Parliament being informed
of transfers on a regular basis and not just when
accounts are prepared as now. |
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| 22. Budget
transfers should be allowed between sections or subheads
of a Departmental Budget but not between Departmental
Budgets. |
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| 23.
Departments should be allowed to automatically transfer
up to 15% of receiving subheads or £50m whichever is the
lesser. |
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| 24. The
system for budget transfers should be reviewed in 2002. |
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| Primary
versus Secondary Legislation
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| 25. FIAG
recommends Standing Orders are developed to enable
financial legislation to be passed more quickly than is
normally the case eg by limiting opportunities for
non-Government amendments. |
| 26. In
addition: |
- the Executive should
give as much information as early as possible on
proposals for use of the tax varying power;
- amendments by MSPs
should be restricted to expenditure proposals
(and should not include revenue or taxes);
- budget approval
should be made using primary legislation; and
- in the event of
Parliament rejecting the entire budget, fresh
proposals must be brought forward before the
expiry of the interim spending approval.
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| ACCOUNTING
ARRANGEMENTS |
| 27. The
Scottish Parliament should adopt resource accounting and
budgeting. |
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| 28. Resource
budgeting should be implemented one year earlier than the
Whitehall model as far as is practicable. |
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| 29. The
Scottish Administration should provide a clear
explanation, perhaps in a supporting memorandum of how
the numbers in accounts differ from those that would have
appeared in the old style cash accounts and how they
relate to the (cash) sum paid into the Scottish
Consolidated Fund by the UK Government. |
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| Style
and presentation of accounts |
| 30. Accounts
should be produced to cover all Government expenditure in
Scotland. |
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| 31. In
addition, separate work should be undertaken to distil
these into more accessible versions. |
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| 32. A
comparison with the previous financial year should be
provided. This should be wide-ranging and cover financial
and performance information. |
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| 33.
Performance reporting will be an important part of
resource accounting; and annual reports should be
important. These should set out overall commentary on: |
- the overall budget
strategy;
- the nature and
objectives of each main programme;
- the outturns in
previous years, including assessments of output
and performance against objectives as well as
financial outturns;
- the plans for the
year ahead, as approved by Parliament; and
- the provisional plans
for the two subsequent years.
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| 34. FIAG
recommends that separate volumes should be issued for
each of the Executive's spending Departments. |
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| Timing
issues |
| 35. The
Scottish Parliament should set a statutory deadline of 31
December by which the preceding year's accounts must be
published. Departments and the Auditor General might be
invited to make progress against a target. |
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| 36.
Executive Agency and (Scottish) Departmental Resource
Accounts should be produced at the earlier possible date,
ahead of the Consolidated Resource Account. |
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| 37. An
interim report should be provided to the Parliament in
May containing performance management information in
relation to the financial year which will have just drawn
to a close. The intention is that this information would
inform the Scottish Parliament's consideration of
resource allocation decisions throughout the early
summer. This could be incorporated into the Annual Report
that sets out the Executive's budget plans for the
financial year ahead. |
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| ACCOUNTABILITY |
| 38. The
Scottish Parliament should set up a similar system to
that of "Accounting Officers" as used at by the
UK Parliament. Senior officials within the Scottish
Administration should be designated as "Accountable
Officers". This term reflects more accurately the
role such individuals would have in being accountable to
the Parliament for the actions of the Scottish
Administration. (Although the term "Accounting
Officer" is well understood in Government circles it
tends to indicate a more specialist financial role and is
hence somewhat misleading to the lay person.) FIAG
recommends that the head of the Scottish Administration
is automatically designated as Principal Accountable
Officer on appointment. He or she should then be
responsible for appointing other Accountable Officers
throughout the rest of the Administration. These
officials could then be required to account for the
actions of the Administration both to the Audit Committee
and to any subject Committee considering a value for
money report produced by the AGS. |
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| 39. FIAG
recommends a mechanism whereby Committees are able to
liaise with the Administration to ensure that, in
addition to or instead of the Accountable Officer
concerned, other relevant officials can be called to give
evidence. |
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| 40. The
system of accountability should be seen as a way of
promoting a free flow of information between Parliament
and the Administration and the sharing of good practice
should be an integral part of the process. |
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| AUDIT
ARRANGEMENTS |
| Role
of Committees in relation to audit |
| 41. Vfm
issues should be dealt with by the Audit Committee, on
Subject Committee or a combination of the two as is
appropriate. |
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| 42. The
Auditor General should co-ordinate the programme and (as
set out in statute), consult as appropriate. |
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| 43.
Recommendations of Committee should not be binding on the
Executive but the Executive should be required to publish
a response within a specified timescale (FIAG recommends
two months) and should be required to report progress on
the actions that have been agreed. |
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| Statutory
audit of financial statements |
| 44. The
Scottish Parliament should be invited to set out in
statute equivalent arrangements (to those at Westminster)
for the audit of financial statements, together with a
timetable for their presentation. |
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| Audit
of Regularity and Propriety
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| 45. The
Scottish Parliament should be invited to set out in
statute a role for the Auditor General for Scotland in
examining issues of regularity and propriety in public
expenditure. |
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| Performance
Management |
| 46. The
auditor's new role should include the validation of
performance measures within the context of financial
audit and vfm work. |
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| 47. Auditors
should be entitled to comment whether indicators that
have been set are appropriate and complete in relation to
policy objectives but they should not set indicators. |
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| Audit
Approach |
| 48. The AGS
should be invited to continue the development of good
practice in public audit in Scotland. |
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| Rights
of access |
| 49. The
Scottish Parliament should be invited to legislate to
afford the AGS an explicit right to require explanation
as well as the right of access to documents of the
Scottish Administration. |
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| 50. Existing
audit arrangements for public bodies receiving grants
from Ministers should be made more consistent by making
the AGS or his appointee the statutory auditor for
executive NDPBs, where this is within the competence of
the Scottish Parliament. |
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| 51. There
should be a statutory right of access for the AGS to all
public bodies receiving funds directly or indirectly from
the Scottish Consolidated Fund including public sector
companies, with the exception of local authorities for
whom separate arrangements should continue to apply. |
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| 52.
Legislation should provide a consistent statutory right
of access to the AGS to all local spending bodies,
subject to any body being significantly dependent for its
income from public funds or statutory levies. |
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| 53. When
access to the records of contractors is required, this
should be agreed during contract negotiations. |
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| Delivery
of audit functions |
| 54. The
Parliament should continue an audit arrangement which
integrates financial audit and VFM. |
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| 55. The
current staff of NAO in Scotland and the Accounts
Commission should be merged to form one audit delivery
agency, Audit Scotland. |
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| 56. The
Auditor General's role should encompass the
responsibilities of the Chief Executive of Audit
Scotland. |
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| 57. There
should be safeguards to protect the legitimate and
distinctive interest of the Accounts Commission and the
Controller of Audit. |
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| 58. There
should be a single central support service unit, separate
from Audit Scotland, reporting to the AGS, the Accounts
Commission and the Controller of Audit. Either party
would be able to withdraw from this arrangement if they
had concerns about the unit's independence or
effectiveness. |
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| 59. FIAG
recommends a working group to look at the issues
involving in setting up Audit Scotland. The early
appointment of the AGS would help this process. |
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| Appointment
of the Auditor General for Scotland |
| 60. The AGS
should be appointed as early as possible. |
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| 61.
Recruitment should be through open competition. |
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| 62. The
criteria to be used in selecting the candidates should be
published and should be included in the advertisement and
particulars of the post. |
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| 63. A panel
should be appointed to deal with the matter. It should be
chaired by the Presiding Officer, who will appoint the
other members of the panel having regard to overall party
mix. The panel should include the respective chairs of
the Public Accounts Commission and the Audit Committee.
The Parliament should consider whether to include in its
arrangements for the appointment of independent assessors
to the panel. |
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| 64.
Selection procedures should reflect Nolan principles. |
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| 65. The
Parliament should set a salary for the AGS that is
commensurate with similar posts elsewhere in the UK. |
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| Public
Accounts Commission |
| 66. There
should be a Public Accounts Commission, which would
consist of Members of the Scottish Parliament. It would
have commissioning and funding responsibilities in
relation to public accounts. |
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| OTHER
ISSUES |
| Contingent
Liabilities |
| 67. There
should be a constraint on the Executive's ability to
enter into contingent liabilities, and the Scottish
Parliament may wish to consider a limit, above which
prior approval must be sought. It should be considerably
higher than Westminster precedent. |
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| Resource
consequences of policy legislation |
| 68. There
should be standing orders that would require the
Executive to provide, for all legislative proposals, as
full a statement as possible on their resource
implications, including timescales and margins of
uncertainty. The information should also distinguish the
implications for local government and compliance costs.
This statement should be developed and scrutinised as
part of the pre-legislative process. |
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| 69. Any
opposition or backbench amendments to policy Bills having
significant additional resource consequences should be
subject to a special scrutiny procedure. |
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| Temporary
spending power of the Executive |
| 70.
Parliament should make arrangements to set aside each
year, a reserve. This would consist of money that will be
held back to deal with any crises that arise. |
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| 71. The
Parliament should make arrangements for a Contingencies
Fund to cope with the need to spend money on areas where
there is no authority for expenditure. The Parliament's
fixed budget is distinct from the arrangement at
Westminster, and therefore, the Scottish Executive should
be limited in the amount of advance it can access and
also the time it has to report to Parliament and secure
approval. |
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| 72.
Normally, the Finance Committee (or sub-Committee/chair)
should ratify Contingencies Fund expenditure in advance
(except during the recess). |
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| 73. The use
of Contingencies Fund is to be disclosed, even if the
Scottish Parliament is in recess and a report made to the
Finance Committee as soon as possible. |
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| Scottish
Parliamentary Corporate Body
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| 74. FIAG
believes that it is in the public interest that the
Parliament designate an Accountable Officer in respect of
the SPCB expenditure. |
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| 75. FIAG
recommends that, in common with other Parliaments, there
should be some special procedures for determining how
much money the Parliament spends on its own
administration and on public audit. |
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| Monitoring
and control of administrative expenditure |
| 76. A single
administration budget should be established for all core
Departments' expenditure or administration. |
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| 77. For
information purposes, administration expenditure should
be disaggregated as far as possible to individual
Departments, with planned and actual expenditure shown in
their budgeting and reporting arrangements. |
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| 78. Distinct
business units, such as Executive Agencies, should have a
discrete budget with the Chief Officer of the body
concerned being accountable to the Parliament for that
budget. These organisations should have the discretion to
manage their budget within the overall limits set by
Parliament, subject to the general rules for switching
resources within a budget. They should in principle be
able to retain excess current receipts and use these to
finance any new expenditure, including expenditure on
administration. |
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| 79. The
Executive should bring forward detailed proposals for
internal controls over expenditure on administration, and
these should be reported to Parliament along with the
Executive's proposals for the use of delegations. |
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| Detailed
oversight of financial procedures |
| 80. FIAG
recommends detailed guidance is developed on financial
procedures. However, normally it should not be necessary
for the Parliament to be burdened with this. The Audit
Committee should nevertheless receive copies of all
guidance on which it could comment/amend if it chose. |
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| MSP
Training |
| 81. FIAG
recommends the SPCB develops a financial briefing package
which will enable new MSPs quickly to gain a thorough
understanding of how the Parliament's financial affairs
are likely to be managed. |