Identifying The Solutions

• Most landowners were at pains to point out that there were only a handful of bad landowners, and indeed relatively few specific examples of problems were cited to the Group (though often these were in fragile areas); but a number of responses took the line that as a matter of principle land ownership should be more widely distributed (though only one or two favoured expropriation to achieve this);
• There was broad agreement that no action should be taken to prohibit or limit
• corporate ownership (many respondents pointed out that there were often good reasons in terms of tax efficiency for using this structure, and that community trusts and other worthwhile bodies would be hit by such a prohibition) but there should be means of ensuring that the ownership is not a secret;
• foreign ownership (which most respondents saw as irrelevant and/or racist and a number pointed out that the resulting inflow of capital was very welcome in the Scottish economy) but such owners should be more responsive to local views;
• absentee ownership (most respondents - including some absentee owners - said that a resident owner was much to be preferred wherever possible, but then went on to recognise the impracticability of any sort of ban) but such owners should have accessible local representation;
• landholdings, with the Forestry Commission and Scottish Natural Heritage the most often cited; a few respondents (land agents/landowners) took the view that there was no case for public sector landholding on a continuing basis but most felt that the landholdings of public bodies should not be reduced, but that such bodies should be more responsive to local views and generate more employment for local people;
• Much more concern was expressed about the single-mindedness of some NGOs, with the RSPB most often cited; here again however the overall consensus was that their landholdings should not be reduced, but that such bodies should be more responsive to local views and generate more employment for local people;
• Strong views were expressed about the Crown Estate: while many respondents (mainly but not solely landowners/land agents) acknowledged that the Crown Estate is an exemplary land manager, nonetheless a wide range of respondents thought that the Scottish Executive should press for a change to the remit of the Crown Estate to give more weight to the Government’s rural development objectives; and a similarly wide range of respondents also suggested that the Crown Estate Commissioners should be accountable to the Scottish Parliament;
• Many local organisations, local authorities and individuals favoured the provision of increased support (eg advice, training and finance) to tackle problems faced by those considering community ownership; and those outwith the Highlands and Islands area called for Community Land Unit equivalents throughout Scotland, but many landowners and particularly land agents expressed doubts about the propriety of public funding going to benefit a small number of individuals and about the longer-term financial viability of some/all of such ventures and suggested that it would be best to wait and evaluate the current projects before committing significant further investment in this way; there was a broad consensus however that it was crucial that the whole community was completely committed to the venture if it was to be successful;
• There was no consensus at all in relation to taxation matters: many individuals and local authorities strongly supported the reintroduction of sporting rates; equally, virtually all landowners and land agents argued strongly against this as leading to lower local employment; there were also a number of calls for exploring land value taxation;
• Many local authorities and individuals confirmed that there are barriers to acquiring small units of land in rural areas for housing and development, though landowners and land agents by and large did not think so; most respondents cited planning constraints as the main factor, and some also mentioned lack of economic viability and (the least cited barrier) landlord reluctance;
• A number of responses called for powers to provide land for smallholdings, mostly on essentially social grounds;
• The responses - particularly from local authorities and public bodies - suggested that a clearer Ministerial steer on the use of compulsory purchase powers should be given, and also that there would be benefits from streamlining the compulsory purchase process;
• Most landowners and land agents would prefer no increase in public sector intervention in land sales, though some of them recognise, as do most other respondents, that some change is needed to allow for the public interest to be properly reflected; there is most support for the proposal that time should be allowed for the assessment of the public interest in major sales, with the relevant properties identified in advance through a (some suggest local authority-held) register; some respondents would also want there to be a right of pre-emption in such cases; and a number of respondents suggest that a new quango should be set up to regulate all or some land sales.

• more local involvement, greater commitment and accountability by private landowners in rural Scotland;
• more scope for community ownership and management of local land where this can be sustainable;
• more scope for releasing land for housing and local development where this is sustainable and secures the retention and if possible the expansion of fragile rural communities;
• more scope for smallholdings supporting a wide range of land-based and other economic activity where this is sustainable and secures the retention and if possible the expansion of fragile rural communities;
• about the same level of ownership by public bodies, but with more local involvement and accountability and more employment of local people;
• more local involvement and accountability and more employment of local people by non-Governmental organisations who own land in rural Scotland.

Vision for the future

Possible legislation and other action to achieve this

LO2 Introduce time for the assessment of the public interest in strategic sales.

LO3 Make more explicit Government support for use of compulsory purchase powers as a last resort to acquire land where this will assist implementation of local plans or other strategies.

LO4 Regulate all (or major) land sales.

LO5 Abolish national non-domestic rate relief on sporting estates.

LO6 Reduce or abolish national non-domestic rate relief on agriculture and forestry.

LO7 Introduce land value taxation.

LO9 Introduce community right to buy at market value.

LO12 Introduce compulsory leasing of land.

LO14 Encourage increased Crown Estate accountability in Scotland.

More local involvement, greater commitment and accountability by private landowners in rural Scotland.

Encourage private owners to be more locally accountable eg by setting up local liaison committees with a right to be consulted; and to be available or have accessible local representation. This could be promoted on a non-legislative basis as part of a code of good practice: such a code might perhaps be given teeth eg by defining compliance with the code as grounds for access to some public assistance. Putting this on a statutory basis would also be a possibility.

A non-statutory code of practice would not require legislation. The scope for making access to public assistance conditional on compliance would depend in each case on the relevant legislative basis: at minimum, secondary legislation would probably be needed in most cases to amend the relevant rules. The rules for some EC-funded schemes would not allow such conditions to be applied; for others, appropriate criteria would have to be negotiated with the EC. If on a statutory basis, new primary legislation would be needed. Giving local liaison committees any right of veto over landowners’ plans would interfere with the individuals’ rights to use property as they choose and (unless suitably compensated for) might make for ECHR difficulties. There could be significant difficulties in defining (a) which landowners are "absent" (tax-related or electoral roll?); (b) what was meant by "local" representation (based on residency?); and (c) what was meant by "representation" (what functions would such a person be authorised to perform?).

If on a non-statutory basis, the main need would be for development and promotion of the code. If non-statutory but with teeth, there would need to be arrangements for checking compliance prior to any decision on public assistance. If on a statutory basis, as well as mechanisms to check compliance and complaints machinery, penalty arrangements and appeals machinery would be needed.

A non-statutory approach would involve minimal costs. Adding teeth would require compliance-checking and appeals machinery which would add to the costs of administering public assistance. If statutory, the costs of the necessary enforcement/complaints/appeals arrangements would be significant. Whether statutory or non-statutory, landowners would face some extra costs, and compensation might be sought.

• Would send the right signal to landowners about what is expected of them.
• Would provide local point of contact and could increase local employment.
• If non-legislative, could be implemented without delay.

• Additional constraint on estate business and some extra resource costs for landowners.
• Legislation would be difficult to define and to enforce.
• If legislative, costs of underpinning bureaucracy.

Probably yes as non-statutory code, perhaps backed up where possible by access to public assistance; probably not as legislation.

More local involvement, greater commitment and accountability by private landowners in rural Scotland.

Introduce time for the assessment of the public interest in strategic sales, eg by requiring public notice to be given of forthcoming sale of properties which have previously been identified in local plans as of significant public interest and a minimum period (say 30 days) between notice to sell and closing date, with power for Government to intervene where a significant public interest is identified: either to impose a further period of delay (say a further 30 days) to closing date to allow for a public interest bid on the open market, or to effect a compulsory purchase in the public interest.

New primary legislation would be required. The more limited the time periods for delay, the more limited the interference with an individual’s right to dispose of property as and when wished, and the less likelihood of ECHR difficulties in the event of inadequate compensation. Clear definition of which property transfers would be covered might be difficult, unless previously defined on a register of strategic land in which there was a public interest. And that in turn raises difficulties in defining what is meant by "significant public interest".

The most straightforward approach would be to define in advance which properties were of public interest, most plausibly linked to the community planning process. There would need to be suitable consultation processes, an appeals process, and also regular updating.

Cost of establishing and then maintaining register would require extra resources. There might also be some cost implications for sellers and buyers.

• Would allow more systematic intervention in the public interest.
• Basis for and prospects of intervention would be clearer to sellers and buyers.
• Disadvantages
• Would interfere to some extent with individual’s right to dispose of property as and when wished.
• Some risk of ECHR difficulties if landowners inadequately compensated for constraint on present freedoms.
• Additional bureaucracy.
• Costs of establishing and maintaining register.

Probably yes: this would deal with a significant failing in existing arrangements

More local involvement, greater commitment and accountability by private landowners in rural Scotland.

Make more explicit Government support for use of compulsory purchase powers as a last resort to acquire land where this will assist implementation of local plans or other strategies.

No legislation required.

This could be readily effected by Ministerial letter. It would make administration clearer, and therefore easier. Up-to-date local plans would be necessary as a basis for action.

There could be additional costs in terms of administration, dealing with legal challenge and compensation. There would also be some cost implications for landowners.

• Would help remedy current uncertainties.
• Could be implemented without legislation.

• Need for very clear statement of the basis on which any compulsory purchase action would be founded.
• Might cut across partnership working at local level.

Probably yes: would send out new Government message (though at a cost).

More local involvement, greater commitment and accountability by private landowners in rural Scotland.

Regulate all (or major) land sales, for example by requiring that a permit is obtained before transferring land of more than a specified extent, or located in particular geographical areas. There are various possible mechanisms for administering this: central government; Land Commission on Crofters Commission model; body on Monopolies and Mergers Commission model.

New primary legislation would be needed to create new powers of regulation; possibly to set up a new body; and as appropriate transfer powers from existing bodies eg Land Court, Lands Tribunal. The legislation would need to set general criteria for deciding whether or not to grant permission. Such new powers would represent a significant limitation on existing ownership arrangements, and in the absence of suitable compensation there would be likely to be ECHR difficulties.

If the remit was extended to all sales of more than a specified extent, the volume of work would be formidable; and compliance costs for buyers/sellers would be immense unless the specified extent was set high (in which case sellers would be likely to get around the limit by temporarily breaking the estate into units below the limit). If the remit was limited to strategic/major sales, the burden would be more limited, but there would be likely to be definition problems and pressures for evasion. Also, there could be policing difficulties: for example, what could be done if a non-approved buyer simply moved in? One possibility might be to tie approval to the recording of title.

Significant extra administration costs, depending on scale of remit. There would also be significant cost implications for sellers and buyers.

• Would allow more systematic intervention in the public interest.

• Would interfere with individual’s right to dispose of property as and when wished.
• Significant risks of ECHR difficulties if landowners inadequately compensated for constraint on present freedoms.
• Would involve interference with all land sales in the chosen category, rather than measures which focus on specific cases where there is a positive reason for public sector intervention.
• Significant additional bureaucracy.
• Significant administration costs.

Probably not: it would probably be cheaper and just as effective to deploy targeted measures to deal with those specific cases where there is a positive reason for public sector intervention.

More local involvement, greater commitment and accountability by private landowners in rural Scotland.

Abolish national non-domestic rate relief on sporting estates.

Amendment to Local Government (Scotland) legislation.

It would be necessary to update details of sporting rights discontinued 3 years ago; enter and maintain entries in valuation roll; increase in volume of rating appeals from occupiers of land not previously rateable.

Not known but rates on sporting rights yielded around £2 to £3 million annually prior to their abolition in 1994. There would be some extra administration costs. There would also be some cost implications for landowners.

• Broader land tax base.
• Would reduce the price of sporting land by an unspecified degree.

• Possible adverse impact on employment.
• Possible adverse implications for investment eg in management and conservation measures.

Maybe: though the financial yield would be relatively small, it would send a powerful signal of Government intent.

More local involvement, greater commitment and accountability by private landowners in rural Scotland.

Reduce or abolish national non-domestic rate relief on agriculture and forestry.

Amendment to Local Government (Scotland) legislation.

Assessors would need to assess rateable value on all land in Scotland and enter and maintain entries in valuation rolls. An increase in the volume of rating appeals from occupiers of land not previously rateable should be expected.

Net cost to Scottish agriculture (after reduction on income tax on reduced profits) £108 million (gross cost £143 million); gross cost to private forestry in Scotland £2.3 million (publicly owned forestry £1.6 million). There would be extra administration costs for local government. There would also be some cost implications for landowners.

• Would finance the local tax base.
• More equitable.

• Could encourage intensification of agriculture.
• Might discourage forestry development.
• Would require large initial valuation exercise followed by continuing maintenance of register to accommodate transfers of/improvements to/degradation of land.

• Valuation anomalies on urban fringes.
• Difficulties of valuing forests.

Maybe, but not yet: more study needed.

More local involvement, greater commitment and accountability by private landowners in rural Scotland.

Introduce land value taxation.

Would require amendment of the tax-raising powers of the Scottish Parliament to allow for replacement of Council Tax/Uniform Business Rate.

This would require completion of Scottish Land Register; mechanisms for repeated assessment would be necessary; reorganisation of local authority financing would also be necessary when other taxes were replaced. There would be considerable scope for disputes over valuation, particularly of very large estates. A common Scottish tax rate might require a redistribution mechanism.

Administration costs of scheme are at present difficult to estimate. Best guess: quinquennial cost similar to initial Council Tax and UBR assessments. There would also be cost implications for landowners.

• Lump-sum tax would encourage efficient use of land.
• Would encourage development of unused land.
• Would provide automatic adjustment for external effects eg improved transport links increase taxable values.
• Compensation for land use restrictions eg listing, Sites of Special Scientific Interest through lower tax ratings; might reduce incentives to not declare "heritage benefits".
• Public goods would be funded by beneficiaries.
• Simpler to administer as all land taxed at same rate.
• Easier to collect.
• Might encourage break-up of large estates as unproductive areas sold off.
• Would increase tax base as unoccupied property included; more so if agricultural land too.

• Fall in market value of property for current owners.
• Tax would be regressive in terms of income, particularly for elderly.
• Might encourage consolidation of properties rather than break-up, depending on assessment method (particularly if assessing only complete properties and not subdivisions).
• Increased taxes on agricultural land.
• Disincentive for landlords to invest in infrastructure.
• Low density properties and small dwellings would be penalised.
• Annual tax unsuited to forest properties where cash flow is irregular.

Maybe, but not yet: a lot more study needed.

More scope for community ownership and management of local land.

Provide advice and support (including an enhanced Land Fund) for those considering community ownership or management.

No legislation would be required as regards Highlands and Islands Enterprise, whose Community Land Unit is already delivering this sort of support (including capital fund to support land purchases); Scottish Enterprise however is not yet active in this field, although it is expected to contribute to the tackling of social exclusion in areas of particular need, all within its overall aim of promoting economic growth. Some Scottish Enterprise advice and assistance would be possible, but direct financial support for land acquisition where the aim was social rather than economic might require primary legislation to widen the terms of its remit in the Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990.

Increased priority for this could be readily effected for Highlands and Islands Enterprise by Ministerial letter, plus agreed adjustment to Highlands and Islands Enterprise corporate plan. Some minor staffing up and adjustment of resources would be required. For Scottish Enterprise, the same, once the legislative position was clarified.

Some extra resources would be required, the extent of which would largely depend on the scale of the enhanced Land Fund.

• Would send the right signal.
• Could be implemented immediately for Highlands and Islands Enterprise.

• Possible need to legislate as regards Scottish Enterprise remit.
• Extra resource costs.

Probably yes: important to provide effective support for those considering community ownership or management.

More scope for community ownership and management of local land.

Introduce community right to buy at market value. Such arrangements might be applied to an estate - or part of an estate - which had previously been identified as of significant public interest.

New primary legislation would be required. Such legislation would have a major impact on existing property rights (inevitably with implications of ECHR difficulties unless suitably compensated for). There would be significant difficulties in defining boundaries (would it be possible to buy part rather than all of the estate?) and who would be part of the community (all currently living on the property for X years or more?) which would have the right to buy.

There would need to be a specific definition in the case of each relevant estate of which members of the local community (all or a minimum number?) would have the right to trigger the right to buy provisions. The processes for canvassing and balloting would have to be scrupulously controlled (on the model of housing association changes?). Unless there was access to resources for the capital cost of purchase, the legislation would be unlikely to be much used.

The capital costs of exercising such right to buy would be massive, and Government support would be likely to be sought.

• Would greatly empower communities.
• Would effect rapid change in pattern of land ownership.

• Difficulties in defining boundaries and communities who would have the right to buy.
• Landowners might prefer properties on their estates to be empty rather than tenanted so as to minimise threat.
• Significant risk of ECHR difficulties if landowners inadequately compensated for constraint on present freedoms.
• Expensive if (as would seem likely) purchase costs sought from Government.

Probably yes: there are significant legal difficulties and potential costs which need to be considered, but the desired benefit could not necessarily be achieved sloely through the proposal at LO2 for introducing time for the assessment of the public interest in stratecic sales.

More scope for releasing land for housing and local development where this is sustainable and secures the retention and if possible the expansion of fragile rural communities.

Streamline compulsory purchase powers to make acquisition of key sites as a last resort more effective, where this will assist implementation of local plans or other strategies.

Primary legislation would be required to amend and perhaps consolidate Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure)(Scotland) Act 1947; some or all of Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973; Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990; Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997.

Changes would require significant publicity, plus retraining of staff in new systems. There might also be capital cost implications. Up-to-date local plans would be necessary as a basis for action.

There could be additional costs in terms of administration, dealing with legal challenge and compensation.

• Boost to local development.
• Easier for local authorities and other bodies to plan budgets and development proposals.
• Reduction in bureaucracy.

• Streamlining arrangements might reduce owners’ rights.
• Dangerous to tamper with existing checks and balances.
• Could generate more challenges and legal action and thus cost more.
• Would raise much wider issues for compulsory purchase powers beyond the rural land context.

Probably yes, depending on the outcome of the comprehensive review of compulsory purchase and compensation legislation which has already started.

More scope for smallholdings supporting a wide range of land-based and other economic activity where this is sustainable and secures the retention and if possible the expansion of fragile rural communities.

Buy land on the open market for transfer to smallholders where there is opportunity and demand. An alternative approach would be to use extant land purchase powers to secure land for state owned smallholdings.

New legislation would not be required as regards Highlands and Islands Enterprise, but primary legislation might be needed for Scottish Enterprise to adjust its remit in the Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990. An alternative approach would be to deploy the powers still existing under the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act 1911, but this legislation is now very out of date, and would need to be revised through further primary legislation.

This could be effected by Ministerial letter to Highlands and Islands Enterprise and an appropriate adjustment to the Highlands and Islands Enterprise corporate plan, though the Scottish Enterprise position might take longer to implement. Using the 1911 Act approach would involve significant new administrative burdens for both central government and the Land Court, depending on scale of operation envisaged. The land use planning aspect of the land in question would have to be settled in advance of any action proposed and guided by an adopted local plan.

Resource costs of the alternative would be relatively minor. Some capital would be required to pump-prime the process, though on this model the focus would be on recovering costs wherever possible through on-sale. On the other hand, the costs of using the 1911 Act approach could be significant depending on the scale of operation envisaged. Capital costs of land purchase could be of the order of £10 million a year, only partially recouped over many years through future rents. Costs of administration would also be high.

• Would respond to demand for smallholdings.
• (Open market approach) Demonstration effect might lead to the private sector seeing the development potential.
• (Open market approach) Relatively low cost.
• (1911 Act approach) Would secure certainty of change.

• (Open market approach) Possible problems as regards Scottish Enterprise remit.
• (1911 Act approach) Difficult to avoid impression of unfair use of draconian powers.
• (1911 Act approach) Could be very costly.
• (1911 Act approach) High level of expenditure benefiting relatively few individuals.
• (1911 Act approach) Likely to be very bureaucratic.
• (1911 Act approach) Likely to involve numerous legal disputes.

Probably yes as regards the open market approach; probably not as regards 1911 Act approach.

More scope for smallholdings supporting a wide range of land-based and other economic activity where this is sustainable and secures the retention and if possible the expansion of fragile rural communities.

Introduce compulsory leasing of land, as an extra tool alongside compulsory purchase, to deal with extreme cases of underuse or misuse of land, and/or to facilitate sustainable rural development. The acquiring authority (Highlands and Islands Enterprise?) could acquire a lease on specified terms of particular land rather than the landowner’s whole rights.

Primary legislation would be required to amend the Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990, perhaps as proposed by the Highlands and Islands Development Board in 1978. Primary legislation to widen the terms of the remit of Scottish Enterprise might also be needed. Difficult questions would arise both as to the calculation of compensation and in determining the terms of the lease.

The 1978 HIDB proposals involved a complex process of consultations, firstly on proposals to designate particular areas, then on the creation of a Local Advisory Committee and a Technical Panel to draft a development plan, then on the final plan. Such processes would require considerable extra staffing resources for Highlands and Islands Enterprise/Scottish Enterprise and also for central government, and would also make significant demands of other parties such as local community bodies, institutional bodies such as NFUS, other public bodies such as Scottish Natural Heritage and local authorities.

This would depend on the scale of operation, but the direct administrative costs and the compliance costs for other parties could be significant. Compensation costs might also be significant.

• Would add an extra option, a step before compulsory purchase.
• Would provide opportunities for local communities to propose action where problems arise with the landowner.

• Possible problems as regards Scottish Enterprise remit.
• Landowners might regard compulsory leasing as a worse option than compulsory purchase, since it would involve continued involvement without any transfer of capital.
• Process would seem to be complex and time-consuming.
• Resource costs, depending on scale of operation.
• Compliance costs for other interested parties.
• Compensation costs might be significant.

Probably not: difficulties seem to greatly outweigh the possible benefits.

About the same level of ownership by public bodies, but with more local involvement and accountability and more employment of local people.

Issue guidance letters from Ministers to public bodies to require community involvement in management of all public estates eg by setting up local liaison committees and maximising employment of local people.

No legislation required.

This could be readily effected by Ministerial letters to all public bodies, plus adjustment to their corporate plans. The process of identifying appropriate community involvement and working with local communities to put such arrangements in place would be likely to be time-consuming and some staffing up would be required. This could only apply to public bodies responsible for devolved matters, therefore not to non-devolved bodies such as the Ministry of Defence (who could however choose to adopt the same approach on a voluntary basis).

There would be some extra resource costs of community liaison.

• Would send a powerful signal of Government intent.
• Would help to deal with recurrent criticisms of public bodies, and position public bodies as exemplars of best practice.
• Could be implemented immediately.

• Some extra resource costs for public bodies.
• Might slow down decision-taking.

Probably yes: it is important that public bodies are model landowners.

About the same level of ownership by public bodies, but with more local involvement and accountability and more employment of local people.

Encourage increased Crown Estate accountability in Scotland. There are a range of approaches which could be pursued: seeking to make the Crown Estate more formally or informally accountable to the Scottish Parliament, seeking change to the Crown Estate remit, or encouraging the Crown Estate to adopt voluntarily a similar approach as other public bodies in Scotland and to play a constructive role in partnership within Rural Partnerships and with bodies such as Scottish Enterprise/Highlands and Islands Enterprise and Scottish Homes and local authorities.

The Crown is reserved, and the Crown Estate Commissioners are included in that reservation. This does not reserve the land and property of the Crown Estate, so the Crown Estate in Scotland will be subject to any provisions the Scottish Parliament chooses to make in respect of devolved matters eg planning. But the current powers of direction over the Crown Estate Commissioners which the Secretary of State for Scotland shares with the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not pass to the Scottish Executive and so the Scottish Executive could not direct the Crown Estate Commissioners to be more accountable to the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Executive could argue the case for such amendment, but any decision to legislate to effect such a change would be for the UK Government. Similarly, any legislation to change the constitution of the Crown Estate would be for the UK Parliament. The Scottish Executive could argue the case for such amendment, but the decision would be for the UK Government. However the Crown Estate could voluntarily increase its accountability to the Scottish Parliament eg by providing MSPs with separate data on its Scottish operations and by offering to appear before committees; and to adopt a similar approach as other public bodies in Scotland.

Any such changes would require the Crown Estate to modify its procedures to some extent.

Any change in the Crown Estate’s remit which gave less weight to income generation would be likely to reduce overall income to the Exchequer.

• Changes would help to reduce current dissatisfaction in Scotland about the Crown Estate.
• Changes would result in the Crown Estate being more in line with other public bodies in Scotland.

• Legislation a matter for Westminster.

Probably yes: the Crown Estate should probably be encouraged voluntarily to increase its accountability to the Scottish Parliament eg by providing MSPs with separate data on its Scottish operations and offering to appear before committees, and to adopt a similar approach as other public bodies in Scotland and work where appropriate in partnership within Rural Partnerships and with local authorities and other public bodies.

More local involvement and accountability and more employment of local people by non-Governmental organisations who own land in rural Scotland.

Encourage non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) to secure community involvement eg by settingup local liaison committees; and to maximise employment of local people by asking them to adopt voluntarily the same approach as public bodies in Scotland.

No legislation required.

The process of identifying appropriate community involvement and working with local communities to put such arrangements in place might be time-consuming.

NGOs would face some extra costs for community liaison, and compensation might be sought.

• Would help to deal with recurrent criticisms of NGOs.
• Would bring NGOs into line with public bodies in Scotland as exemplars of best practice.
• Could be implemented without legislation.

• Some extra resource costs for NGOs.
• Might slow down decision-taking.

Probably yes: NGOs are likely to wish to be exemplars of best practice, like public bodies in Scotland.