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3.1 As is our normal practice on inspections, we did not carry out a full security audit. We understand that an audit was carried out prior to the prison opening but in the light of current experience of physical security systems and the actual running of the prison by staff with prisoners in residence, we suggest that there would be merit in an updated exercise being undertaken by the SPS Security Audit Team. We did, however, identify a number of areas that we believe are worthy of comment.
3.2 In a recent survey carried out by PPS at Kilmarnock – see Annex 2 - 88% of the 132 prisoners who responded said that they felt safe, whilst 89% recorded that they felt safer than in other SPS prisons. We were initially a little surprised at these findings because we felt that the low staffing levels – see paragraphs 9.50 and 13.6 - would reduce the level of supervision on the living units. However, the prisoners we interviewed told us that the presence of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras at strategic points gave them confidence.
3.3 The physical security of the establishment was of a high level with reasonable quality equipment and since the prison had opened, there had been no escapes.
3.4 It was proving difficult on occasion to confirm the roll of the prison at meal times and lock-ups. We also noted some concerns about the shift patterns and working conditions in the Communications Room, which are discussed in more detail at paragraphs 3.22-25.
3.5 Appropriate emphasis was being given to searching, including the provision of a dedicated searching team. However, some family visitors and legal representatives felt that the amount of searching on entry to the prison was excessive and in some cases duplicated. Part of the reason for such thorough searching at the Gate may well have its origins in the terms of the contract. For example, there was no penalty for finding unauthorised items at the initial points of search but performance points, which could lead to financial penalties, would be awarded for smuggled in items, other than drugs, subsequently found inside the prison. We felt that this contractual clause could be a disincentive for searchers to find unauthorised articles during searches in other parts of the prison, though we were reassured by staff that this did not deter them in any way. We were, however, surprised to learn that staff believed that performance points were incurred for finding illicit drugs and associated paraphernalia within the establishment, which was not the case and we have written to the Director suggesting that this issue should be clarified.
3.6 Staff were being provided with a good level of security information based on intelligence, including a handbook for all staff and a regular monthly security bulletin. Special bulletins were also being published as and when required.
3.7 Staff designated to provide an initial response to incidents were issued with personal alarms and we were very impressed with staff response times to incidents that occurred. General staff alarms had also been installed in working areas throughout the establishment, though in a number of instances we were concerned to note the height at which they had been located. Staff reassured us that they were able to reach them – though some staff found this easier than others. We have, however, written to the Director suggesting that all obstacles (such as tables) should be moved from positions immediately in front of these alarms.
3.8 The Security Manager told us that his was a singleton post and that he had no nominated deputy to cover his absences. He felt this was a weakness in his department, as there was a potential for lack of continuity and inconsistency. We agreed with that view and suggest that a Deputy Security Manager should be appointed.
3.9 The segregation unit was a discreet area of the prison but linked to other parts by a secure passageway. It comprised 14 ordinary cells and two 'silent' cells, both of which had camera cover. The standard of accommodation was good and although some redecorating was necessary, plans for this were in hand. All ordinary cells had duvets and in-cell sanitation. Prisoners were not allowed their own property, except for underwear, socks and trainers.
3.10 Indicative staffing levels for this area are described in the contract for operating the prison, though we noted that these levels were not always in place. We suggest, therefore, that appropriate staffing levels in the segregation unit should be maintained.
3.11 The main corridor was subject to CCTV cover. There were two exercise yards and we were pleased to note the provision of additional clothing, such as donkey jackets and all-weather anoraks, for issue to prisoners during inclement weather.
3.12 Records were kept of the regime for prisoners in relation to showers, exercise or telephone calls. There was also a day room where prisoners could have association if their behaviour so warranted. We noted, however, that there was a 'blanket' decision to the effect that prisoners in the segregation unit could not attend chapel services. We suggest that this ruling should be reviewed so that decisions are made on an individual basis, taking account of different circumstances.
3.13 There were two prisoners in the unit on the day we visited. Both were interviewed and neither had any complaints about their treatment.
3.14 Under the terms of the contract, orderly room adjudications were carried out by the Controller or Deputy Controller, both of whom were SPS Managers on secondment rather than PPS employees. We observed adjudications on two days, on each occasion carried out by the Deputy Controller, and were satisfied that they were being undertaken fairly and in one case, with considerable compassion.
3.15 Our only concern was the high number of adjudications – i.e. over 3,000 since the prison opened and 14 on one of the days we observed. (By comparison, at HMP Perth, which is about the same size and has a similar prisoner mix, there was only half that number of misconduct reports over the same period.) There may be many reasons for this high number, including the inexperience of staff in dealing with prisoners, but one obvious reason was that in the early days of operating the prison, prisoners had on occasion been placed on up to four or five reports arising from a single incident. That said, adjudications were still taking up a significant amount of the Controller's time and we suggest that the current system of analysis of adjudication information should be extended so that any problem areas can be identified and rectified.
3.16 Contingency plans had been drawn up which detailed the philosophy, procedures, roles and responsibilities for dealing with major incidents. The plans, which were the result of joint planning with the SPS and the emergency services, were subject to a rolling, formal review to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. Individual plans were also subject to testing every two months to maintain familiarity with procedures, as part of a programme of continuous improvement.
3.17 Detailed, integrated plans that made good use of checklists had also been produced to deal with a range of less serious operational emergencies.
3.18 The Gate area consisted of separate pedestrian/vehicle entries and a separate entrance for prisoners' visitors. However, whilst the whole complex was of modern design, it was cramped, especially in the pedestrian vestibule which housed an x-ray scanning machine.
3.19 Access was controlled by interlocking sliding doors, which were operated from the Gate. A number of staff and vehicle drivers were randomly selected for rub-down searching but we were concerned about some of the searching arrangements, as well as with the system for issuing receipts for money handed in for prisoners. We raised these matters with the Director and were pleased to note that steps were quickly taken to address them.
3.20 A random check of key bunches against the key register showed these to be in order. We also undertook a night visit and were satisfied that access arrangements were in accordance with written procedures.
3.21 Detailed statistics were maintained on the volume of traffic through the Gate in order to improve security procedures, to restrict the number of vehicles entering the establishment unnecessarily so that staff time spent on searching vehicles could be reduced and to minimise the likelihood of escape. Reports were also compiled about the number of visitors to the establishment, including prisoners' visitors and solicitors, to ensure that performance standards specified in the operating contract were being achieved.
3.22 The Communications Room was located above the Gate, with access controlled by the use of an electronic locking system. Monitoring of the establishment's extensive CCTV surveillance equipment and control of the radio net were the key functions co-ordinated from this area, as was the control of a number of electronically operated doors.
3.23 The satellite tracking system for prison vehicles was also monitored from this area. This system provided real time monitoring of prisoner escorts, which enabled staff in the Communications Room to identify precisely the location of all vehicles at any point in time. We therefore recommend that this is a system that the SPS should consider introducing more widely.
3.24 Given the amount of electronic equipment to be monitored or controlled from the Communications Room, we were disappointed to note how small and cramped the room was. We noted that it was proving difficult to maintain an even temperature and staff spoke of the room being either oppressively hot or uncomfortably cold, in spite of the air conditioning system.
3.25 Staff were being deployed to the Communications Room for very long shifts, yet the layout of the room did not appear to provide as ergonomic or safe a working environment as would have been expected in such a modern construction. We recommend, therefore, that the working conditions are significantly improved as a matter of urgency. We also had some major concerns about fire safety in this part of the building, which are discussed in more detail at paragraph 7.27.
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