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4.1 A full security audit had been undertaken by the SPS Security Audit Team during June 1998 and work was ongoing throughout the establishment to meet its recommendations. There had been no escapes of 'A', 'B' or 'C' category prisoners since the last formal inspection in 1996.
4.2 The security and intelligence department operated from a well equipped and highly organised unit close to the Residential and Work areas. A security manual specific to the needs of the establishment had been produced by the Security staff, which was being cross-referenced to procedures manuals for all areas. This represented a major step forward in the way security was being managed at a local level.
4.3 The standard of intelligence gathering and analysis by the Security department had continued to develop and was making a significant contribution to the orderly operation of the prison. It had also encouraged strong and effective cross-functional co-operation within the establishment and also externally with the Police.
4.4 A system of local security auditing was in place. Audits were conducted on a monthly basis and included a monitoring process to ensure compliance with procedures.
4.5 Excellent liaison between the Security Unit and other departments had been established. Acknowledgements were provided to staff on receipt of information, regular briefings were supplied to managers for dissemination as appropriate and a monthly security/intelligence report was published for all staff to read. The format, layout and content of this document was imaginative and effective in communicating key messages. This was the best example we have seen and we commend it to other establishments.
4.6 However, records of searching were incomplete and a review of the available information suggested that the programme of area searches was behind schedule. We were also concerned about exercise arrangements for 'B' Hall and have written separately to the Governor on this matter.
4.7 Contingency plans were comprehensive and up to date, having been reviewed as part of the establishment's preparation for Year 2000. Elements of the plans were reviewed on a monthly basis and any necessary changes were notified to the appropriate areas for action.
4.8 A purpose-built Orderly Room was located in the Segregation Unit. This was well fitted out and was operating in ways consistent with the SPS Orderly Room Procedures and Guidance Manual.
4.9 The number of discipline reports had remained steady over the period 1998-1999 at an average 3.6 reports per day. An examination of the Register of Punishments indicated that prisoners were being dealt with fairly and in a consistent manner. Likewise, the manner in which the Orderly Room was conducted was open and consistent with the principles of natural justice.
4.10 The Control Room was located above the Gate and could be accessed from the Gate Lodge and the Administration corridor. Temperature, ventilation and the general layout were perceived to be good by the two staff who were employed in the area. They had responsibility for monitoring a bank of 24 CCTV cameras, all of a differing quality and function; co-ordination of all vehicle communications; answering three telephone lines; management of two internal radio channels; control of the pager system; and the issuing of mobile phones. Co-ordination of a response in an emergency was also the operators' responsibility. Additionally, after 1700hrs the main switchboard for the establishment was answered by staff in this area. Operators were also responsible for monitoring the geophone system and ensuring that any alarms were properly investigated. Clearly, the range and number of activities was substantial and this should be borne in mind before any further equipment is installed. An alternative means of manning the establishment telephone system after 1700hrs should also be considered as a matter of priority.
4.11 The Gatehouse was part of the main Administration block and the recent addition of a prisoners' visitor entry system had significantly reduced the congestion in the vestibule area. The delivery of parcels and packages was also being managed more effectively and this prevented articles lying in the main entry area while awaiting collection.
4.12 The staffing level was two Officers with a third member of staff being located in the vestibule. Staff working within the Gatehouse had divided the duties into logical work groupings but their efficiency was hampered by the layout of the area. When seated at the computer that controls the locking and unlocking of the doors and gates, the Officer had physically to leave the position on each occasion the telephone rang or the numbers board/Gate log book required updating.
4.13 All round visibility was difficult. This was caused by the bank of six CCTV camera screens being located to the side as opposed to the front of the operator. The layout also created difficulties in seeing visitors at the front door.
4.14 A number of issues regarding security standards were brought to the Governor's attention. Additionally, staff on duty complained regarding the lack of proper training that had been provided prior to them being posted into the area.
4.15 The visitors' entrance vestibule, which had been created as part of the welcome improvements to the visits area, housed a baggage scanner and walk through metal detector.
4.16 The segregation unit was situated at the west end of the prison and could be reached from the corridor leading to Glenesk Hall. This facility, which opened in January 2000, had 14 ordinary cells and one silent cell. The standard of accommodation was excellent and all cells had power and in-cell sanitation. Showers and toilets were available outwith the cells. Other facilities included a fitness room and small library.
4.17 The average stay was likely to be two to three months. On admission, there was an assessment period of one week, which informed the development of an agreed management plan and involved all staff and the prisoner concerned. At the time of our visit, there were 10 prisoners in the unit.
4.18 Great emphasis was placed on joint decision-making and efforts were made to encourage good communication between staff on different shifts. This included a daily group meeting, regular and frequent updating of prisoner narratives and a display board that detailed prisoners' activities for that day. Opportunities existed for the prisoners to have use of a TV, radio and exercise equipment, if their behaviour warranted this.
4.19 Admission of visitors was controlled by Unit staff. The Unit routine had also been developed and was managed by the group of three managers and 12 staff, who had been selected to work in the area. This, coupled with the deliberate drive towards good communication, provided a regime that offered consistency and stability. As a result, the general atmosphere and relationships between staff and prisoners were positive.
4.20 The unit had its own exercise area, which could be easily supervised by staff inside the building. However, the windows designed for observation provided 2-way vision, which meant that prisoners on exercise could watch any activity taking place inside the unit. Consideration should be given to the installation of one-way glass to resolve this.
4.21 Reception facilities and procedures had been the subject of criticism at the time of our formal inspection in 1996. It was, therefore, most encouraging to note the remarkable improvements in the new reception area, which replaced the previously dilapidated and ad hoc buildings and expedient practices.
4.22 The building was clean, spacious and bright and had been designed to support modern practices and work flows. Statutory and security requirements were being fully met, including the management of warrants, access to showers, telephone and meals. The number of prisoners employed in the area had been reduced to four but a high standard of cleanliness was being maintained. Communications and liaison with police, health care, administration and social workers - including court-based staff - was generally very good. Relationships with health care staff were particularly effective. Prisoners in the area to whom we spoke said that they were fully aware of what was taking place and what would be happening next.
4.23 The Ethnic Minorities Liaison Officer (EMLO) (see also paragraphs 5.96-100) was informed of the admission of a prisoner from an ethnic minority and follow up procedures were in place. We were surprised to be told, however, that whereas previously some instructions in a language other than English had been developed locally for such prisoners, these had been superseded by instructions that had not yet been issued from SPS Headquarters.
4.24 Further improvement is possible via better management of the work flow. At present, prisoners are transferred from Edinburgh to other establishments between Monday and Friday, which is the period of peak activity and the highest demand for staffing resources, compared to the weekends when there are very few prisoner movements. This is due in part to the perception that such transfers must be medically examined within 24 hours of reception, which is normally the case for prisoners received directly from the courts. For transfers between establishments, however, the Rules require that, other than where there is some apparent cause for concern, prisoners should be seen within 72 hours of arrival at the new prison. Greater flexibility, co-ordination and co-operation between sending and receiving establishments would allow a better balance between workloads and availability of staffing resources.
4.25 Information about the Complaints Procedure (CP) Scheme was provided as part of the prisoners' induction programme and the CP forms were available on request in each residential area. For cases involving confidential access to the Governor or MO, an envelope was also provided and we were satisfied that such cases were being dealt with in accordance with the correct procedures. Records of forms issued were being maintained in each area, with those records then being collated before being submitted to SPS HQ. We examined a sample selection of forms that had been submitted and were satisfied with the level of response being provided and the timescales in which the forms were being processed.
4.26 One of the Hall Supervisors had responsibility for co-ordinating the procedures for cases that went to the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) stage and there was a hearing every week. These were normally chaired by the Duty Manager with the other members being drawn from staff not directly involved in the relevant cases. Again, we were satisfied with the arrangements that were in place.
4.27 In overall terms, we were satisfied with the arrangements for the administration of the CP Scheme and with prisoners' access to the forms. We were, however, surprised to note that these records started when the forms were issued rather than when a completed form was formally submitted. Given the number of forms that prisoners take but never actually submit, there did seem to be some wasted effort in this system. We have, therefore, written to the Governor suggesting that there should be a review of the record-keeping system.
4.28 The Fire Precautions Officer (FPO) had been appointed to that role in June 2000 and was supported by three Deputies. All of the team had received the appropriate training at the Scottish Fire Services School at Gullane. The FPO was supposed to have one day a week for these duties but in reality he was given much less than that, mainly as a result of staff shortages within the establishment. The FPO was a member of the local Health and Safety (H & S) Committee.
4.29 He had established excellent relationships with the local Fire Brigade, who made regular familiarisation visits to the prison. Special training exercises, involving staff from the Brigade, had also been arranged with use being made of the empty 'C' Hall to add reality to the situation. The Brigade was notified on every occasion that a fire occurred and a special pack was held for them at the Gate.
4.30 The local fire procedures had recently been updated and widely circulated and every member of staff had signed to confirm that they had read and understood that document. We were pleased to note that there was an ongoing programme of fire evacuation drills covering every area of the Prison and involving staff and prisoners. Debriefs were held after every such exercise to learn from any mistakes that occurred. This was an item of best practice that we commend to other establishments.
4.31 The FPO had designed a form that identified the various fire appliances in every area of the establishment, and every week each of those areas had to sign those forms and return them to the FPO to confirm that the appliances had been checked. Any deficiencies identified as a result of that system were then attended to by the Estates team.
4.32 Short Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA) had recently been installed at strategic points throughout the establishment, following a recent exercise to train staff in its use. There was also an ongoing programme to provide the necessary refresher training for staff. To assist in that training, the FPO had recently purchased a smoke machine and again, use was being made of 'C' Hall. We were advised, however, that because of staff shortages, there were often problems about getting Operations staff for these training exercises. Other forms of fire prevention training were also being provided on an ongoing basis and the FPO had obtained some specialist videos for that purpose.
4.33 In 1999, the Prison had been formally inspected by HM Fire Inspectorate and we were pleased to note that most of the items highlighted in the report of that inspection had been attended to. The Estates team were aware of the items that still required attention. We noted that a number of other projects had recently been undertaken, including the provision of new escape lighting and fire exit signs. At the time of our visit, work was ongoing to install fire escapes in 'A' and Forth Halls and an integrated smoke detection system was in the process of being installed. The FPO had also undertaken risk assessments of all areas of the prison, with some areas now due for re-assessment.
4.34 We were impressed with the commitment and enthusiasm of the FPO, whilst the relationships that had been established with the local Fire Brigade are of great benefit to the Prison. The efforts that were being made to ensure that staff of all grades and disciplines were made aware of fire safety measures were also commendable. However, we were concerned about the amount of time that was being made available for this important task and whilst we commend his efforts, it was disappointing to learn that the FPO often came in on his days off to ensure that his tasks were being properly undertaken. Given the size of the prison and the number of people who are there on a daily basis, we are firmly of the view that there should be a greater commitment on the part of senior management to this task. We suggest, therefore, that the FPO should be guaranteed time off every week from his principal tasks to undertake this vital function.
4.35 We question whether the effort and expenditure involved in SDBA training provides value for money, given the proximity and speed of response of the local Fire Brigade. We suggest, therefore, that this matter should be reconsidered.
4.36 An H & S Officer had been appointed in 1998 and significant work had taken place in the production of a local Safety Manual, due to be issued to all staff in November 2000. The H & S Committee, whose membership was drawn from all functional areas throughout the establishment, held meetings every two months. The agenda did not include any analysis of key accident statistics, while the non-recording of some accidents meant that the published record of safety may have been misleading. Additionally, the time taken to investigate accidents was normally longer than the five days stipulated in SPS guidelines.
4.37 A team had been set up specifically to manage the risk assessment process in all areas. Training in risk assessment had been provided to staff, as had the "Working Safely" course. However, although a target figure for attendance had been set at 380 staff by April 2001, only 20% of that total had completed the training at the time of our inspection.
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