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Tayside Police Primary Inspection 2002
5. Processes
Professional Standards
5.1 In Tayside Police, the Deputy Chief Constable has overall responsibility
for managing the Complaints and Conduct portfolio. The Professional Standards
Department, headed by a superintendent, deals with complaints against the police
and misconduct allegations. There are three inspectors within the department
who perform the 'investigating officer' roles and normally deal with complaints
that disclose more serious and/or criminal conduct. An administrative assistant
provides support to the Department. All complaints involving serious misconduct
or alleging criminal conduct are reported to the Deputy Chief Constable.
5.2 Complaints that disclose minor or trivial misconduct are dealt with
at division. Divisional Commanders are responsible for the management of enquiries
into these complaints, determine a finding and disposal and then correspond
appropriately with the complainer. The complaint is registered and recorded
with the Professional Standards Department and upon completion of the enquiry
is passed to the Department and signed off by the Deputy Chief Constable. This
includes locally conciliated complaints. Conciliation, normally performed by
inspectors, is encouraged in all minor misconduct complaints. During the inspection,
HM Lay Inspector and a staff officer viewed records relating to a number of
complaints both within the divisions and at force headquarters and were impressed
with the consistency of approach throughout the force both as regards responses
to complainers and action taken against officers. HMIC supports such centralised
control over complaints aiming to provide a consistency of approach. The staffing
structure of the department is shown at Figure 9 below.
Figure 9: Professional Standards Organisational
Chart

5.3 All information in relation to complaints, misconduct cases and civil
actions is maintained on the Centurion computer system located within the Department.
This includes monitoring of the time taken to conduct investigations. Senior
and middle management are provided with complaint information on a monthly basis.
It is also published monthly in the 'Force Bulletin' (internal publication)
which is available to all staff. An office manager has recently been appointed
to the Department. Part of the role will be to develop meaningful analysis of
complaints trends which will be fed back to divisions, departments and training
staff. The force recognises that the management information previously supplied
in respect of police complaints has been fairly limited in scope and nature.
5.4 The force is confident that the computer database utilised
is capable of producing more worthwhile and helpful management information.
Centurion is currently being upgraded in England and Wales following which a
new Scottish upgraded version (used by a number of Scottish forces) will be
made available. It is hoped this will assist plans to produce and distribute
more meaningful management information and data analysis which will inform discussion
with departmental and divisional management teams. The monitoring of trends
and complaint pattern analysis has not taken place in any meaningful sense in
the past. The force acknowledges this weakness and the development is currently
regarded as a priority for the department. The force is also keen to disseminate
learning outcomes from complaint investigations. HMIC will be interested to
monitor the development and use of complaint management information at the next
review inspection.
Thematic Update
5.5 As part of the Inspection, HMIC invited the force to respond to progress
made towards implementing the recommendations made within the Thematic Inspection
Report 'A Fair Cop?'. Whilst a number of recommendations are being progressed
by ACPOS and remain pending, HM Lay Inspector was impressed with the progress
the force has made towards meeting the recommendations. In particular, as well
as the items detailed above, HM Inspectors noted the following:
- that leaflets explaining complaints procedures were available at a number
of stations;
- that a clear guidance document about the force's policy regarding complaints
was available on the force Intranet;
- that the police board acknowledged ease of access to complaint files;
- that final letters to complainers appeared objective, clear and comprehensible;
- that arrangements had been formalised for the investigation of complaints
by external forces;
- that all communications to police forces which infer an allegation of criminal
conduct or misconduct were recorded as complaints against the police;
- that the means by which the public can record a complaint against the police
were being expanded together with the means by which civilian staff and officers
can raise concerns over colleagues' conduct;
- that the force was maintaining records of costs incurred in individual complaints
(albeit it was noted costs recorded excluded some overhead costs) and that
the force had scheduled complaints investigation for early review under the
Best Value programme;
- that the force was fully compliant with the requirements of equal opportunities
in arrangements for the selection of personnel for complaints departments;
- that the force was taking steps to integrate procedures in relation to complaints
against officer and civilian staff;
- that the force maintained records of letters of appreciation as an indicator
of good service provision;
- that the force disseminated information about numbers of complaints together
with information about letters of appreciation throughout force staff.
Table 4: Complaints
| |
2000-2001
|
2001-2002
|
|
Number of complaint cases outstanding at end of previous year
|
23
|
53
|
|
Total complaint cases received during the year
|
152
|
348
|
|
Total complaint cases disposed during the year
|
123
|
322
|
|
Number of complaint cases standing over at end of year
|
53
|
79
|
|
Total complaint allegations disposed
|
171
|
380
|
|
Number of complainers dissatisfied with outcome
|
1
|
3
|
5.6 The number of complaint cases recorded for the year is 348 which is
an increase of 196 (129%) on the previous year. New nationally agreed recording
procedures have now been introduced following HMIC's recommendation in 'A Fair
Cop?' that all communications with police forces which infer an allegation of
criminal behaviour or misconduct by police officers be recorded as complaints
against the police for statistical purposes. This includes minor misconduct
complaints which have been dealt with locally. All such complaints have been
recorded as formal complaints from April 2001. HMIC will monitor this change
of recording procedure across Scotland in future inspections.
5.7 In addition, 2000-2001 was the first year in which the Accounts Commission
collected data in respect of number of complaints per 100 police officers. This
indicator provides information on the number of complaints received from any
person against on-duty police officers where there is inference that professional
or criminal misconduct has occurred. Overall there were 1418 complaints made
against police officers across Scotland during 2000-2001. This averages at 10
complaints per 100 police officers. In Tayside Police the figure is 13.14 complaints
per 100 officers. For the year 2001-2002 the figure rises to 30.7 for Tayside
Police.
5.8 On 1 April 2001, the responsibility for Data Protection issues within
the force transferred from Strategic Management Services to the Professional
Standards Department. The roles of Professional Standards, Data Protection,
Information Security and the Audit Section are complementary and in essence
all relate to ensuring that members of the organisation conduct themselves in
accordance with the policies, procedures, guidelines and accepted practices.
5.9 The force recognises that the achievement of force goals and a continual
improvement in performance standards requires routine auditing and monitoring
of processes and procedures. It is recognised that this auditing role has to
date not been achieved with any consistency or effectiveness. A principal role
of the Department therefore, will be the auditing of information systems. Compliance
with policy and procedures will fall to Internal Audit and Inspection. As such,
the Department has been extended to include a Data Protection Officer (vacant),
an Information Security Officer (vacant), a Disclosure Officer and three Audit
Officers. The force has experienced difficulty in attracting a skilled Data
Protection Officer and the intention is now to appoint a trainee officer and
develop the necessary skills accordingly.
5.10 As a result of these vacancies, one of the inspectors is removed from
investigating officer duties to perform a data protection and information security
role. This obviously impacts on the complaints workload of the two remaining
investigating officers with the potential for an increase in the number of complaints
being passed to divisions for inquiry. On average, 85% of complaints are investigated
by officers of the Professional Standards Department. The force will wish to
pursue with vigour the recruitment of suitable individuals to the above-mentioned
vacant posts.
5.11 Each of the full-time Investigating Officers within the Department
has responsibility for liaising with the three territorial divisions. This is
intended to provide the divisions with a designated point of contact for advice
or information concerning complaints or the complaints process. In addition,
the Head of Department has attended Divisional management meetings in the past
and it is the intention to formalise this arrangement, a move which HMIC would
support.
5.12 Internally, a Force Working Group on complaints is chaired by the Head
of Professional Standards Department. Membership includes the Police Federation,
Unions, Welfare Department and Human Resource Services. As regards external
liaison, the Deputy Chief Constable and Head of Department meet with the Regional
Procurator Fiscal on a regular basis to discuss matters of mutual concern. This
includes a six-monthly meeting attended by the Deputy Chief Constables and Heads
of Department from Fife and Central Scotland Police.
5.13 In addition, the Deputy Chief Constable and Head of Department meet
on a quarterly basis with Tayside Joint Police Board Complaints Sub Committee.
The Board's responsibilities in respect of complaints are largely discharged
through this sub committee. The committee meets on a quarterly basis and local
elected members are provided with a resumé of all closed complaints cases,
including service delivery issues, since the last meeting and are invited to
select files at random for examination, which they do at each meeting. Councillors
are invited to discuss the level and nature of current complaints with the DCC
and senior members of the Department. During the inspection, HMCIC and HM Lay
Inspector met with members of the Joint Board and discussed police complaints.
In general, members were impressed by the professional and thorough manner in
which complaints against the police were investigated.
5.14 At the time of inspection, the Head of Department
was drafting a strategy document for the Department outlining objectives for
the forthcoming year 2002-2003. In addition, Action Plans for each section of
the Department (Complaints and Conduct, Integrity and Information) are also
being produced in support of the strategy. Once the Department Strategy Document
and Strategic Action Plans are in place, a new Policy Document will also be
introduced setting out force policy on complaints, conduct, and information.
HMIC will be interested to assess progress at the next review inspection.
5.15 The Department provides inputs to a number of training courses within
force, including Induction Course, Probationer Training and Tutor Constables.
Indeed, training issues form a standing item on the agenda of all quarterly
Departmental meetings. Further training in the skills of first line management
is currently being planned in force specifically for sergeants and inspectors.
Current force policy and operational guidance in respect of complaints against
the police are available to staff on the force Intranet. In addition, guidance
materials for investigation procedures and misconduct hearings are also available.
5.16 Previously, the chair of Misconduct Hearings was restricted to Assistant
Chief Constable and Chief Superintendents. However, in order to expose superintendents
to the process, some have recently undertaken the chair's role. Training in
this respect has been limited to misconduct hearing seminars at the Scottish
Police College but the force is keen to participate in training sessions now
being conducted in other forces such as Grampian and Strathclyde Police. Superintendents
who have not had the opportunity to chair a misconduct hearing can participate
as assessors and observers. A guidance document has been produced for the chair
although no good practice guidelines are available. The force is keen to participate
in the sharing of good practice currently being progressed through ACPOS Personnel
and Training Standing Committee, Conduct and Discipline Sub Committee. In addition,
decisions of misconduct hearings have not been circulated routinely to superintendents.
Such information would be invaluable in providing guidance on how other presiding
officers have disposed of similar cases. It is important for the credibility
of the misconduct process that chairs and assessors at misconduct hearings are
making their decisions against some consistent benchmarks. The force may wish
to consider circulating to superintending ranks the decisions reached at misconduct
hearings with reference to a short précis of the incident in each case
to ensure consistency of outcomes in cases that proceed to misconduct hearings.
Care and Custody of Prisoners
Organisation
5.17 The four main custody handling facilities within the force are situated
at Central Divisional Headquarters, Dundee, Western Divisional Headquarters,
Perth, and in Eastern Division at Arbroath and at the Headquarters in Forfar.
These provide 24-hour custody facilities that are augmented by a number of smaller
stations throughout the force, which provide temporary detention facilities.
5.18 The staffing of custody facilities within the force varies between
divisions and, to an extent, is dependent upon the numbers of prisoners processed.
5.19 A custody inspector at Dundee manages and oversees the custody staff
at Central Divisional Headquarters. This is not an exclusive custody role as
the post holder also undertakes operational duties. At Dundee also, there is
a custody sergeant on each group to supervise prisoner care. The sergeant is
supported by a station constable and support staff custody assistants for both
male and female prisoners.
5.20 At Perth, there is a custody sergeant and station constable on each
group and at Forfar and Arbroath there is a station constable responsible for
custody reception and care with the operational group sergeant providing supervision.
Divisional duty inspectors are responsible for overseeing custody of prisoners.
Observations from Inspection
5.21 During the course of the inspection, HM Lay Inspector and a staff officer
examined the four main custody facilities and a number of cells at the smaller
stations. A number of good practice areas were discerned. In particular all
custody areas were clean, and all regular staff had received training and were
clearly committed to custody welfare.
5.22 In addition, civilian staff are employed where this enables officers
to be released to other duties. Also, appropriate equipment was available for
officers and prisoners at the major stations including 'Ampel probes', ligature
cutters, first aid kits, DNA test kits, body fluid test kits, suicide suits,
blankets. Washing facilities were also available at the majority of custody
areas with care having been taken to achieve a balance between safety and privacy
for prisoners. It was also noted the magnetic discs that have previously been
identified by HMIC as an example of good practice were in regular use to fix
to cell doors as an aid in identifying vulnerable prisoners. Further, 'Livescan'
was available at some stations, and regularly used.
5.23 HM Inspectors also observed that records showed that upon hourly and
more frequent checks prisoners were roused and a verbal response recorded. In
addition, it was found that the force sought to advise prisoners of availability
of arrest referral schemes, albeit unfortunately demand for places could not
easily be met.
5.24 However, the detention and care of prisoners is now a specialised process
and it was noted that there were areas that require review. In particular:
Custody Care Guidance Policy and Practice
5.25 HMIC noted that a detailed Guidance Manual covering all aspects of
force policy regarding custody care was available and regularly updated on the
force Intranet. However, at the charge bars of custody areas visited there were
hard copies of Guidance Manuals of various ages that did not contain up-to-date
guidance.
5.26 In addition, staff interviewed commented that it was proving increasingly
difficult to implement the up to date force policies due to the increasing numbers
of duties placed on them without commensurate increase in staffing numbers.
For example policy required staff to fingerprint many prisoners via Livescan,
take samples for DNA testing and conduct more frequent prisoner checks which,
in turn, took additional time due to the necessity to obtain verbal responses.
5.27 Further, whilst force policy required that staff had received training
and use of same sex staff for prisoner searches, not all custody areas had trained
female custody care staff. Also, force policy stipulates that refresher training
will be undertaken on an annual basis but at the time of inspection this had
yet to be formalised and monitored within set timescales so that many members
of staff had received only initial training.
Custody Records
5.28 Processing of prisoners is currently performed utilising a computerised
custody recording system and by means of a paper-based system (Admin 51 form).
Use of the computerised and paper systems leads to duplication especially where
prisoners are transferred. However, even where prisoners remained within custody
areas benefiting from a computerised recording system there was a degree of
duplication with staff entering prisoner's details on the computer system and
completing paper custody records with much of the same information. For example,
it was explained to HMIC that paper records are required to record details of
visits to prisoners contemporaneously with such visits and to provide a more
robust method of recording the vulnerability assessment and care of persons
in custody.
5.29 Noting such practices, having viewed the computer system and from discussion
with relevant staff; HMIC discerned the view that the computerised custody recording
system does not fully meet the needs of the force in the processing and recording
of subsequent detention of prisoners.
5.30 HMIC also noted that prisoners assessed as 'vulnerable' or 'special
risk' had their details recorded on paper using Special Risk Prisoner forms
(Admin 19) that are highlighted in red and that while these forms were readily
available at police offices, photocopies were being used at one station.
5.31 In addition, it was noted that the integrity of paper-based records
were compromised. Paper records were not pre-printed with sequential custody
record numbers.
5.32 HMIC understands that the responsibility for ensuring the accuracy
and integrity of custody records will fall to the Professional Standards Department.
However, at the time of the inspection it remained the case that audit of custody
records had only taken place on an ad hoc basis and there was no formalised
procedure in place for regular audits.
Reception, Access, and Interview Areas
5.33 A number of risks to health and safety were noted in these common areas
during the inspection.
- Whilst proper safety equipment was generally available, it was not always
consistently available or neatly stored behind the charge bar leading to difficulties
locating it.
- There appeared to be risks for custody staff whilst working behind reception
desks because they were largely unprotected by screens or desk design.
- There appeared to be a risk of injury to staff and prisoners because (cup)
hooks used to hang paper custody records outside cells were sited at head
height, fire extinguishers, that must be loose for safety, were poorly sited
in movement corridors, and furniture and other equipment was not securely
fixed within interview rooms.
- Although there were storage facilities within custody areas, prisoners'
shoes and jackets were placed outside cells both presenting a potential health
and safety risk and compromising the safekeeping of such property.
- In Dundee, the largest custody area, staff expressed concern about excessive
heat and a lack of ventilation.
- Whilst the planned provision of radio panic alarms that may be attached
to the belts of custody, and other staff in Dundee was noted, it was observed
that generally provision of panic alarms for staff use was inconsistent. In
some stations none existed whilst in others the alarm press was not easily
identifiable.
- Only one observation cell was available, at Dundee. Officers elsewhere may
therefore be obliged to watch prisoners unprotected through an open cell door.
5.34 HMIC also noted that in some stations, there was a lack of privacy
between public counter areas and incoming custody areas. In addition, that the
siting and design of the observation cell at Dundee meant that prisoner privacy
was compromised. It was located directly opposite the staff room used by male
and female staff, and the CCTV camera was sited to allow a clear view of the
toilet to be transmitted. In other stations, clear escape routes were observed.
CCTV
5.35 The provision of video and audio coverage is a positive development
as it provides protection to public and police alike as well as increasing confidence
in custody arrangements at police stations. HMIC was therefore pleased to note
that CCTV coverage had been improved within the force area since the date of
the last inspection. However, it remained limited. Many areas (for example the
full stairway at Dundee, many external entrances and cell corridors), remained
without cover. Moreover, sound recording was not generally available.
5.36 The Inspectors also examined the security and storage of the CCTV tapes
at each location. In all cases tapes were retained within unlocked cupboards
within the bar area compromising the value and integrity of the CCTV systems.
Staff Uniforms
5.37 HMIC noted that in contrast to civilian and officer staff elsewhere
in the force, the uniform worn by the custody assistants did not display any
indication of status or role. This may lead to confusion of identification.
Meals
5.38 In Arbroath officers had saved a meal from the local hotel for HMIC
to view. The Inspectors were advised that such meals were consistently rejected
and indeed thrown around cell areas leading to cleaning work, yet requests to
vary the supply source had not been acted upon.
5.39 To address the issues contained in this section, HMIC recommends that
the force review its arrangements for the custody and care of prisoners paying
particular attention to matters of custody management, health and safety and
staff training.
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Recommendation 11
To address the issues contained in this section, HMIC recommends that
the force review its arrangements for the custody and care of prisoners
paying particular attention to matters of custody management, health and
safety and staff training.
|
Improvements
5.40 At the last Primary Inspection of Tayside Police in 1999, a suggestion
was made that the force should review the manner and quality of service delivery
at the public counter at Central Division Headquarters, Dundee. HM Lay Inspector
and staff officer were able to view plans for the upgrading of the public counter
and noted that it incorporates improvements to the custody reception/charge
bar area at Dundee and that the building work is to commence shortly. Plans
for improvements to custody and public counter areas at Perth were also seen
and it was noted that external partners praised the force for proposals to upgrade
interview facilities. HMIC welcomes these proposals to improve accommodation
as these changes will benefit staff and members of the public. However, practically,
it appears the plans will not overcome the ventilation needs at Dundee that
impact on the efficiency of custody areas and the health and safety of police
officers, support staff and persons in custody.
Lay Visitor Scheme
5.41 HMIC has previously encouraged Scottish forces to
adopt Lay Visitor Schemes the members of which report to Police Boards on the
manner in which arrested and detained persons are received and treated in police
custody. The force has recognised the value in having such an independent lay
custody visitor scheme and the Chief Constable submitted a report to the Tayside
Joint Police Board in January 2002 recommending the establishment of such a
scheme within the force area. Approval has been given and steps will be taken
to recruit and train scheme members in the near future. HMIC welcomes this development
and will be interested to monitor progress of the scheme at the next review
inspection.
Forfar High Court
5.42 An issue which arose during the inspection concerned the policing of
Forfar High Court. HMIC has previously made comment about the extensive use
of police officers for the escorting of prisoners and their use in courts. While
HMIC recognises the importance of the security and dignity of courts for the
effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System, the validity of the current arrangements
necessitating abstracting police officers from their core duties of patrol remains
a serious issue.
5.43 The policing of a particular trial at Forfar High Court was brought
to the attention of HMIC highlighting the significant resourcing implications
the trial necessitated. In March 2001 two males were arrested for a murder in
Aberdeen. The trial was first called at Inverness High Court in July 2001 but
was relocated to Stonehaven and Aberdeen before being moved to Forfar. The trial
was first called at Forfar on 7 December 2001 and concluded with a unanimous
verdict of guilty on 28 March 2002.
5.44 During the period of the trial at Forfar, one of the accused dismissed
five senior counsel. The court sat at Forfar for 62 days, 39 of them with a
jury. The two accused required to be separated at all times during the trial
and many of the witnesses, who were reluctant to give evidence, had to be brought
to the court from custody. This obviously added to the already significant resource
demands placed upon Eastern Division of Tayside Police and the force is of the
view that it undoubtedly impacted substantially on police service provision
throughout Angus.
5.45 Six police officers were required within the court on a daily basis.
In addition, there were significant demands for prisoner escort duties to transfer
prisoners from Aberdeen, Perth and Cornton Vale prisons to the High Court at
Forfar.
5.46 The resourcing implications to police this trial were substantial.
For example, the divisional planning sergeant spent four hours per day attending
to arrangements (248 hours). An average of six police officers were required
for the 62 days (372 police officer days) with an average of 16 hours per day
overtime worked (992 hours). Two police vans were used daily to transport the
accused and previously mentioned witnesses averaging 180 miles per day (11,160
miles). The responsibility for transporting prisoners rests with the force accommodating
the court. However, in these exceptional circumstances, Grampian Police assisted
on many occasions transferring prisoners from Aberdeen.
5.47 Officers of the Special Constabulary were also utilised in support
of regular officers during the trial. Their contribution was some 170 days duty
between them, a commendable effort. HMIC recognises the very valuable service
provided by officers of the Special Constabulary on this occasion, another example
of the substantial support provided to the regular service by Special Constables
throughout Scotland.
5.48 HMIC has long argued that the routine use of police officers escorting
prisoners and performing court duties is not core business for police forces.
In response to earlier concerns, the Scottish Executive established a working
group comprising representatives of the Executive, the Crown, the Scottish Police
Service and the Scottish Prison Service. In January 2002, the Deputy First Minister
announced that a number of proposals were being progressed in this area to relieve
police officers of prisoner escort and custody duties with proposals for limited
extension of support staff powers.
5.49 HMIC welcomes the progress that has been made in this regard.
Call Management
5.50 In 1999 the completion of the Force Control Room Project resulted in
a refurbished Force Control Room with new technology, including the Command
and Control application, CAPTOR, GIS mapping and CCTV. From that time, issues
impacting upon call management arrangements, including changes in management
structure, have required the force to centralise switchboard facilities, rationalise
staff, facilitate the separation of dispatch from call handling by employing
a 'temporary' pool of call takers, and locate Eastern Division control within
the Force Control Room. HMIC notes these developments and welcomes the decision
of the Chief Constable to rationalise its management structure. A salient feature
of these changes has been the overarching priority for the force to define its
call handling strategy. This is addressed in the development of a Virtual Contact
Centre (paragraph 5.21).
5.51 A single management structure now exists for control room functions
currently located at Perth, for Western Division and at Dundee, covering Central
and Eastern Division. The Head of Department for the 'Force Control Room' is
a Chief Inspector, who is accountable for performance in call management and
reports directly to the Assistant Chief Constable. Staffing arrangements are
shown at Figure 10. It was noted that in the given structure supervisory responsibility
is solely retained by police officers. Outwith controllers and handlers, a support
staff room co-ordinator provides for continuity of contact with support staff
in the Dundee control room and other departmental administrative duties. The
force may wish to consider if further developmental opportunities exist within
the control room environment for support staff, which may release police officers
for operational duties.
Figure 10: Force Control Room Organisational
Chart

5.52 The Force Control Room exists to:
- provide a Command and Control facility for Tayside Police;
- provide a Force-wide Switchboard facility for all incoming telephone calls;
- provide a 24-hour point of contact for citizens wishing to contact the police.
5.53 Urgent telephone calls, including all '999' calls are dealt with by
radio despatch operators and within Dundee call handlers deal with non-urgent
calls. HMIC noted that there is no protocol for taking a crime report over the
phone with force-wide policy directing police unit attendance to all crimes.
A graded response strategy is in place and is shown at Figure 11.
Figure 11: Call Prioritisation
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CALL PRIORITISATION
(1) PRIORITY 1 - IMMEDIATE ATTENDANCE
This level of priority would be applied where:
- The circumstances merit that all available units should attend, ie
potential major incident;
- There is danger to life;
- A crime is in progress and the perpetrator remains at or has recently
left the scene;
- A traffic accident occurs in which there is injury or significant
disruption to traffic;
- The caller is in extreme distress, even though other factors indicate
a lesser degree of response;
- The incident involves racially motivated behaviour, irrespective of
whatever racial or ethnic group is implicated;
- The call relates to a report of an automatic burglar/personal attack
alarm.
Response times in relation to 'IMMEDIATE' calls should be as soon as
possible but in any case within 10 minutes for urban areas and 20 minutes
for rural. Staff should note that the 'clock' begins from the time the
call is received at a Control Room and any delay in transmission has an
obvious knock-on effect on the ability of operational resources to meet
this constraint. Under such circumstances the level of delay should be
transmitted to the officer(s) attending and the possibility of sending
a better placed resource should be considered.
(2) PRIORITY 2 - ROUTINE ATTENDANCE
This level of response would be applied in all other cases, however,
the caller should be advised that the circumstance do not merit an immediate
response.
(3) PRIORITY 3 - SCHEDULED ATTENDANCE
This form of attendance would be considered where the complainer has
indicated that there is no requirement for an immediate response and would
be available to be seen by the police at a future date and time, and within
a suitable margin of opportunity.
(4) PRIORITY 4 - NO ACTION REQUIRED
This would be used where the complainer has no wish to be seen and the
matter can be suitably dealt with without sending resources.
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5.54 The Alarm Policy at present requires immediate response to alarm calls
but is presently under review and awaits revised ACPOS guidance understood to
be due for implementation in June 2002. HMIC would reiterate its concern over
the high level of false alarms in Scotland which results in inappropriate use
of police resources.
5.55 Contingency Plans for major incidents are held on the command and control
system and an Incident Room is available within the Force Control Room Suite.
It is understood that plans are tested in conjunction with Force Planning Officer
and are available to all staff through the command and control system and the
force Intranet. During the inspection HMIC took the opportunity to view the
CAPTOR contingency arrangements and access to contingency plans, generic and
specific, and were generally impressed by the logical manner in which the system
assisted the Duty Officer to respond to such events. Training exercises have
previously been undertaken, however no formal programme of routine 'exercise'
or discernable familiarisation training for operators was in place. This is
considered an omission, which should be addressed.
5.56 HMIC noted that CAPTOR provides the facility of an 'occurrence' button,
which can be used to bring to the attention of an operator information pertinent
to a call received, particularly useful in the event of repeat calls to a particular
address. As part of the desktop provision of IT systems, CAPTOR can also be
utilised with other Force IT applications, such as Intelligence and Firearms
Licensing. HMIC consider this to be an area of opportunity for proactively informing
attending officers of previous call history, such as in domestic abuse cases,
action taken or any risk factors that may prevail. It was understood that control
room staff have access to the INTEGRITY System which holds criminal intelligence
and firearms licensing though operators have only recently been trained in the
system. HMIC would encourage a full and proactive use of the information provided
by the force corporate database. The work in progress to develop a working practices
guide for call handlers and operators may usefully facilitate greater emphasis
being given to this area.
5.57 A Self-Assessment exercise was carried out in the department in 2002.
As alluded to above, training was a key issue as were a number of detailed departmental
procedural matters. HMIC was pleased to note that the results from this exercise
were being progressed by means of an Action Plan.
5.58 CAPTOR can be interrogated, within the Department and externally, for
statistical information and analysis through the force management information
application known as the ProMis system. Table 5 provides headline statistics
which can be further disaggregated.
Table 5: Total Number of Incidents/Immediate Response Incidents
1997-2002
| |
1997-1998
|
1998-1999
|
1999-2000
|
2000-2001
|
2001-2002
|
|
All Incidents
|
177,222
|
179,024
|
182,426
|
179,575
|
173,157
|
|
Immediate Response Incidents
|
10,574
|
20,883
|
23,591
|
25,720
|
23,346
|
5.59 HMIC would encourage the use of the management information from the
CAPTOR system to monitor, analyse and manage the demands placed upon the force
and commends the inclusion of relevant data within the performance profiles
produced by the performance unit.
PNC Compliance Audit
5.60 A feature of all Primary Inspections is the police national computer
(PNC) compliance audit conducted by the Home Office Security Compliance Section
on behalf of HMIC. The results of the PNC audit have been reported separately
to the force. HMIC noted that the report contains three areas of good practice
and seven recommendations, which will be considered by HMIC at the review inspection.
5.61 During the Primary Inspection HMIC noted the breadth of responsibilities
currently retained within the Professional Standards Department for the audit
of force applications and the difficulties in adhering to an audit plan due
to resourcing and recruitment difficulties, recognised within the above audit.
Progress in this area will be examined at the review inspection.
Crime Management
5.62 Tayside Police have a devolved system in relation to 'detective' resources,
with locally-based investigative resources being under the command of divisional
commanders. Specific functions, namely the Identification Branch, the Force
Intelligence Branch incorporating the Force Intelligence Bureau and Special
Branch, Fraud Branch, Drugs/Surveillance Branch, Crime Management, incorporating
HOLMES, administration, crime prevention, community safety and the force drugs
co-ordinator, form centralised resources within the Headquarters Crime Management
structure. The Assistant Chief Constable has overall responsibility for the
performance of the HQ Crime Management Department.
Day-to-day responsibility rests with the Force Crime Co-ordinator.
Figure 12: Headquarters Crime Management
Organisational Chart

5.63 The role of the Detective Chief Superintendent had been the subject
of consideration prior to the inspection and a revised job description has placed
much more emphasis on a co-ordinating role across the force area. The post holder
is required to examine existing processes and disseminate good practice to ensure
consistency of effort across the Force area. The current post-holder has been
in place since January 2002. The deputy role, at superintendent rank remained
vacant at the time of inspection. Comments made in respect of crime management
are set in the context of a recent change in leadership within the department.
5.64 Headquarters Crime Management exists:
- To provide specialised support to the prevention, investigation and detection
of crime across the force area.
- To provide a co-ordinated response to crime across the force area, support
the investigation of serious crime and incidents.
- To provide strategy and policy in respect of crime issues and to contribute
to the achievement of local and national objectives.
5.65 An existing Crime Strategy, which was established in 1999, is acknowledged
as being in need of review, particularly in light of the force-wide adoption
and implementation of structures and processes contained within the National
Intelligence Model (see also Intelligence paragraph
5.81). HMIC acknowledges this intention and notes that full consideration
is to be given to crime reduction and community safety issues. This is an area
of significant importance to service delivery and overall force performance
and HMIC will review progress and impact at the next review inspection.
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