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This chapter considers how the force plans, manages and improves its processes in support of its policy and strategy.
6.1 Resource Allocation
6.1.1 Just as the Scottish Executive is leading discussions on how to allocate monies with a focus on present needs rather than a historic position so too is Central Scotland Police looking at how to allocate monies in force. There is a Resource Management Project in being and HMIC will be interested to monitor developments at the next Review Inspection. The current but ageing TRACE computer system is set to be replaced and the intention is that the new system will be capable of readily producing management information.
6.1.2 At present HMIC found that activity analysis was somewhat piecemeal and management were not regularly presented with information about demands so that deployment decisions could be made on a well informed basis. An example of this was the very limited information about automatic alarm calls. Consistently the vast majority are said to be false alarms (generally set off in error by occupiers or a system fault) but there is no hard management data routinely available. HMIC suggests that activity analysis is routinely undertaken across force functions and is used to inform policy and deployment decisions.
6.1.3 HMIC has found a similar situation in other forces about the level of false automatic alarms and believes this a matter which requires attention at a national level. A letter to this effect has been sent to the Secretary of the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland.
6.2 Responding to Demand
6.2.1 It was noted that police officers are still responsible for the hand delivery of thousands of witness citations each year in the force area. It was reported that 12,000 citations had been processed last year in the Falkirk police office alone. This not only places an administrative burden on office staff, but the hand-delivery of these citations by a police officer amounts to a very significant diversion of police officer time. Nationally there are schemes piloting postal service. HMIC believes development and implementation of such an approach is too slow and has raised this with the Scottish Executive.
6.2.2 The execution of warrants was found to be another significant drain on police resources. There were 682 live warrants on file at Falkirk police office on one of the days of the inspection. This was after robust handling of non-enforceable warrants returned to the court by the office manager. A number of recent warrants initiatives had also taken place. The area commander was "negotiating" the execution of over 200 fixed penalty warrants.
6.2.3. The issue is not confined to Falkirk, or indeed to Central Scotland Police. In Stirling, during a warrants operation, the area commander had estimated the cost of executing a warrant at £130. An approach by the force to Stirling Council recommending the use of civil recovery for means enquiry warrants, as happens in other parts of Scotland, received a positive response from the council and this is likely to proceed. To date the other two councils have resisted this suggestion.
6.2.4 The level of warrants, for apprehension and means enquiry, issued across Scotland is considerable and in each force area represents a significant call on police resources. This issue might be described as a "hardy perennial" but HMIC considers it merits further consideration by all relevant agencies in the Criminal Justice System to seek a more efficient solution than the present situation.
6.3 Intelligence
6.3.1 HMIC found in the course of this inspection that the force has taken some positive steps in its approach to the handling of intelligence. However, there are some aspects which appear uncoordinated and some further attention in this area is still required.
6.3.2 The recent establishment of a force intelligence bureau is regarded by HMIC as a positive move by the force to address the many current changes involving the use of intelligence and surveillance by the police. The bureau, which comprises two detective constables, falls under the line management of the detective chief inspector and the detective inspector, support services. A detective sergeant responsible for the force identification branch has day to day management of the unit.
6.3.3 The trained support staff analyst who previously worked in the force intelligence office moved to the crime management unit when the force intelligence bureau was established.
6.3.4 Although the introduction of the new guidelines on intelligence and the impact of human rights legislation has been fully recognised by the officers within the bureau, HMIC noted that the force intelligence bureau had not been represented on the force working group which addressed issues raised by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Given the impact which this continues to have on all aspects of intelligence, it seems anomalous that the bureau was not involved in the work of this group. Members of the bureau are to give presentations on the new procedures to a wide range of other officers.
6.3.5 Although it was said that an officer from the force intelligence bureau would attend a briefing for a major crime or major incident, it is not practice for these officers to attend routine briefings. There are at present no plans to introduce service level agreements for the service provided by the bureau to command areas and departments. The introduction of an action plan and objectives for the force intelligence bureau would assist in setting clearer direction for the bureau.
6.3.6 One of the issues still to be resolved in the force from the time of the last inspection is the role of local intelligence officers. At the time of the review inspection of the force in 1998, there were fifteen officers within local command units carrying out the role of part-time local intelligence officers. There was only one such full-time post and that was in Alloa.
6.3.7 HMIC recommended at that time that the role of the local intelligence officer in Alloa should be reviewed to consider if such a post could be extended throughout the force, thereby reducing the need for part-time local intelligence officers, (1998 Review Inspection Report, recommendation 5). It was recognised that the ability of the part-time officers to produce high quality intelligence was restricted by their part-time status and lack of training.
6.3.8 The situation continued however until the recent introduction of new guidelines which places stricter controls on the handling of intelligence. The role of the part-time officers has now ceased. The full-time local intelligence officer based at Alloa is now the only post carrying out the role of local intelligence officer.
6.3.9 HMIC found that the approach to intelligence was different within crime management units in the three command areas. The local intelligence officer at Alloa shares an office with the drugs action co-ordinator which is situated next to the crime management unit. Both officers work closely with the two crime management unit officers, forming on occasions, a pro-active team, which was not a feature in other areas. This is discussed further in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.6.9. Elsewhere, there was no evidence of field intelligence work being carried out by local staff.
6.3.10 Outwith the force intelligence bureau and the drugs unit, there were three intelligence analyst posts in the force at the time of the inspection, two located in Falkirk and Stirling command areas and one in the traffic department. There was no analyst at Alloa. The traffic department post is held by a traffic patrol officer who also undertakes patrol and motorcycle duties on a part-time or relief basis. Traffic officers however spoke positively of the analyst's post. In command areas there was some concern that the lack of a pro-active capability to act on intelligence packages did not always encourage full use of the analyst's role. It seems ironic that the one area, (Alloa), which does field a pro-active team is the only area without an analyst to assist in the production of target packages and other intelligence activity.
6.3.11 There was some speculation that the introduction of a new force surveillance unit will increase the capacity to address target packages produced by the crime management units. However, it seems likely that the new surveillance unit will undertake higher level operations than currently envisaged within some areas of the force.
6.3.12 Officers from around the force commented on the frequency with which the force's computerised intelligence system breaks down. It was also highlighted that the system had been withdrawn from a large number of computer terminals when an upgrade to the system took place. The upgraded version has still to be restored and many officers remarked on the restricted access they now have to the system. The force needs to address this situation to maintain officers' familiarity with the system and to avoid the submission of intelligence being impacted adversely.
6.3.13 To address those aspects of intelligence where a more co-ordinated approach would benefit the force, the introduction of a cohesive and co-ordinated intelligence strategy is recommended. This would also assist in ensuring direction and understanding among staff and maximise the benefits of intelligence-led policing in all aspects of the force's work.
6.3.14 To achieve this, HMIC recommends that the force appoints a Director of Intelligence and develops a strategy to direct and co-ordinate the acquisition and use of intelligence within the force in accordance with national guidelines. The role of a director of intelligence should be consistent with a "head of profession" approach. While the rank to undertake this role is a matter for the force to decide, HMIC, as indicated in Chapter 1 above, (paragraph 1.1.10), emphasises the importance of such a post having the necessary authority to implement the forcewide direction and co-ordination which is fundamental to effective intelligence-led policing.
Recommendation 3
MIC recommends that the force appoints a Director of Intelligence
and develops a strategy to direct and co-ordinate the acquisition and use of
intelligence within the force in accordance with national guidelines.
6.4 Financial Investigation
6.4.1 At the time of this inspection, a thematic inspection on asset confiscation in Scotland was already underway. That inspection of all forces, has shown, generally, that financial investigation is not receiving the priority it requires for effective seizure of assets. That is the position in Central Scotland too but HMIC is confident that the designation of a Director of Intelligence (see paragraph 6.4.14) will lead to a change in emphasis.
6.4.2 The force does not have a centralised Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) and although a number of officers from different departments have attended the Asset Confiscation Course at the Scottish Police College, only one has practical experience of asset confiscation. There is no trained financial analyst within the force and financial investigation does not feature in force or departmental plans or strategies. Neither does it feature in the job descriptions of those officers conducting such investigations. The detective inspector responsible for financial investigation within the force is not the line manager of the officers trained to conduct financial investigations and benefit might be gained by some structural adjustment to address how such investigations are currently allocated and conducted. It was found that the confidence of some of the officers trained to conduct such investigations was impacted by their lack of practical experience. A more rigorous approach to such investigations by the force should ensure a greater spread of experience.
6.4.3 HMIC also suggests that the force should consider formalising methods of:
This will be an aspect to be covered in the next Review Inspection.
6.5 Crime Management
6.5.1 The force has three crime management units, one in each command area. Each operates slightly differently including the staffing arrangements discussed elsewhere in this report, particularly in respect of the use of analysts. (see paragraph 6.4.10).
6.5.2 In Stirling the crime management unit consists of a detective sergeant, one support staff intelligence analyst, one detective constable crime analyst, two full-time members of support staff on a "report direct" desk and a temporary detective constable. At the time of the inspection an officer in this unit was found to be processing all cheque and credit card cases in the force on an overtime basis. This task had belonged to the force's Fraud Unit and HMIC was informed that it is shortly to be returned to Fraud Unit staff.
6.5.3 The "report direct" desk operates in Stirling between the hours of 7 am to 9 pm weekdays and 7 am to 3 pm at weekends. In Falkirk, it operates on a very restricted basis and in Alloa there is no "report direct" desk in operation.
6.5.4 This "report direct" concept involves members of the public reporting a crime making direct telephone contact or being referred to the desk by a control room operator or station assistant. The "report direct" officer records the crime and assesses whether a police officer should attend. It is not a crime screening system in that all crimes are recorded by the desk officer. If it is a serious crime or of a character which requires the immediate attendance of an officer, the desk officer records the crime and directs an officer to make immediate enquiries or take other action at the locus.
6.5.5 Desk officers also manage the allocation of work to scenes of crime officers. Scenes of crime officers report back to the desk officer who then updates the crime report with details.
6.5.6 At Stirling, crime management unit staff "manage" over 20% of recorded crime in the command area. This involves the selection of certain crimes by the detective sergeant who then supervises the investigation of these crimes and the updating of associated reports. Letters are sent from the crime management unit to the victims of the crimes, informing them of the action being taken and providing a reference number and general advice. As well as managing the enquiries into these crimes, the detective sergeant and other staff will examine recent crimes to identify patterns. Where it is considered likely that a series of crimes has been committed by the same individual or team, these will be "merged" to identify this. Series of this nature often form the subjects of "target packages" which are then issued to CID or uniform officers for further investigation.
6.5.7 Other "packages" issued by the crime management unit may suggest a suspect for certain crimes, based on intelligence. Where DNA or fingerprints found at the crime scene are identified to an individual, a "package" is prepared to ensure a comprehensive approach to the investigation and detention.
6.5.8 In Falkirk, the crime management unit is overseen by the local crime manager, a detective inspector. A detective sergeant is responsible for the co-ordination of responses to local crimes, the selection of those which will be "managed" by the unit and for the supervision of staff which includes a detective constable and a support staff analyst and an administrative assistant. There is a "report direct" facility but only between the hours of 8 am to 10 am. The unit produces a daily crime bulletin each morning which sergeants in the command area use for briefings. These identify local crime series and highlight current intelligence. In addition, a weekly briefing pack is prepared and circulated by the unit which includes local crime figures, detection figures and intelligence submissions for each local command unit. A list of active local criminals is also maintained by the crime management unit. The drugs action co-ordinator is located close to the crime management unit and liaises closely with staff.
6.5.9 In the Clackmannanshire command area, the crime management unit is staffed by two detective constables. These officers manage reports of crime in a similar manner to the other crime management units and produce target packages. They do not have administrative support or the assistance of an analyst. These officers, with the consent of their supervisors, have a pro-active approach, undertaking field intelligence or pursuing target packages, once their administrative crime management duties are complete for the day. The two officers also have a close working relationship with the local intelligence officer and the drugs action co-ordinator for the command area, both of whom are located in the next office, and these four officers often work together as a team to address a variety of crime issues within their area.
6.5.10 In addition, crime management unit officers also produce special crime or intelligence bulletins relating to their command areas. The force's crime management units have been subject to a recent best value service review, the results of which were still being compiled at the time of the inspection. This will be examined at the next review inspection.
6.6 Crime Reporting/Recording
6.6.1 Academic research continues to show that not all crime is reported to the police. There are a whole variety of factors contributing to this position. It seems likely that the gap between crime reported to the police and crime reported in public surveys is closing. One reason is the increasing reports to police of incidents of 'domestic violence' and 'racial abuse' where increasing public confidence in the police handling of these matters and more robust police action is having a positive effect. Central Scotland has a good track record in both these areas of criminality in recent years with good systems in place.
6.6.2 HMIC consistently points out the limitations of recorded crime figures and why care is needed with their interpretation. (See HMIC Annual Report 1998/9 paragraph 7 for a fuller comment). However it remains important that forces accurately record the crimes reported to them. This is important for operations (intelligence and action), public confidence in reporting incidents, demonstration of need for financial purposes and the opportunity for year on year comparisons which can be part of efficiency and effectiveness measures.
6.6.3 In Central Scotland Police HMIC found that not all crimes were being recorded accurately and timeously. Given the limited sampling undertaken by HMIC and the difficulties posed in tracking incidents easily through the computer systems it has not been possible to quantify the under reporting. For the most part the crimes involved are likely to be at the 'lower end of seriousness' in the scale of crime although each is important and of concern to the victims. In a number of more serious cases reports were being made to the Procurator Fiscal for advice and a crime record was not being made.
6.6.4 Evidence was found that reports of crime were logged 'for information only' but not recorded in the crime recording system. Some victims were being asked to 'confirm' that the report was not expected to be followed through into a crime report. Central Scotland have reported a 100% (or near 100%) detection rate for rape offences in recent years but it appears that only detected cases are being recorded. Other cases (and this can also apply to some indecency cases) are being reported to the Procurator Fiscal on a memorandum asking for advice on whether an offence has been established. Of course whether a crime has been committed and whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute are two separate issues, albeit closely connected.
6.6.5 In the situations briefly described above Central Scotland Police were making a record of the complaint and taking action but the crimes were not appearing in the crime recording system. Central Scotland may consider that some clarification of the recording rules is necessary but HMIC recommends that early action is taken to ensure that all reports of crime are properly recorded as a crime at the point of reporting and, following investigation, the appropriate disposal authorised.
Recommendation 4
HMIC recommends that early action is taken to ensure that all
reports of crime are properly recorded as a crime at the point of reporting
and, following investigation, the appropriate disposal authorised.
6.7 Information Technology and Communications
6.7.1 In the 1998 Review Inspection Report HMIC observed that it was necessary for the force to ensure strategic references to radio, networks and telephony in supporting strategies (paragraph 4.3). This inspection found that these strategies have still to be fully developed.
6.7.2 In respect of training HMIC found that the force had carried out a comprehensive training needs analysis in 1998 resulting in a detailed profile of each officer's training needs in relation to IT. As training is completed, officers' profiles are updated. With only one IT trainer in the force however, there is a need for prioritisation and this is achieved through consultation between the training department and area commanders.
6.7.3 The system used to record the IT training needs of officers has considerable potential for wider application and could be adapted to reflect an officer's training needs generally or to display the skills profile of any individual member of staff.
6.7.4 The force is aware that further investment in technology will be required in the future to assist the release of more staff to operational duties. Considerable work has been done in respect of resource management with a view to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of its existing resources in response to demands for service. Consideration is now being given to fundamental changes in how the force undertakes its core tasks and there is recognition of the need for more focused use of management information based on a more pro-active policing model.
6.7.5 The need for focused management information is not one which is peculiar to this force however. Indeed, evidence was found that the force is actively addressing important strategic issues such as centralised call handling and resource allocation (see paragraph 6.3.2)
Police National Computer (PNC) Security Audit
6.7.6 As part of the inspection, HMIC auditors conducted a PNC security compliance audit involving a wide range of data protection and information security issues. The audit revealed aspects of good practice in several areas. These included:
6.7.7 Areas where room for improvement was identified included:
Information Security Policy
6.7.8 The force's Information Security Policy (ISP), which includes a policy on disclosure was in draft form at the time of inspection. In order that staff are aware of security issues, and to avoid confusion regarding related policies, HMIC recommends that the force ISP should be finalised and distributed as soon as possible.*
*Postscript - The force has notified HMIC that since the inspection, the force ISP document, which replaces that introduced in 1994, has been finalised and published.
Recommendation 5
HMIC recommends that the force Information Security Policy (ISP)
should be finalised and distributed as soon as possible.
Audit
6.7.9 The annual volume of audits satisfies the requirements of the PNC compliance audit process. However, few local systems have been risk assessed and resource allocation might be unrealistic if auditing of other systems was to occur. The failure to conduct a formal risk assessment of other force data systems inhibits prioritisation and the identification of high/low risk areas. This could result in the force not deploying its audit resources in the areas which represent the highest risk. HMIC recommends therefore that the force carries out a formal risk assessment incorporating all data systems and applications, and prepares a strategic audit plan as stated in the Data Protection Audit Manual.
Recommendation 6
HMIC recommends that the force carries out a formal risk assessment
incorporating all data systems and applications and prepares a strategic audit
plan as stated in the Data Protection Audit Manual.
Training
6.7.10 There is only one IT training room in the force and PNC training is provided on an ad hoc basis due to limited access to the training facilities. There is a mechanism for prioritisation of courses but sometimes courses are planned at short notice or cancelled. HMIC suggests that training facilities are regularly reviewed to ensure that adequate arrangements are in place.
6.7.11 HMIC noted that there is no pass/fail marks associated with PNC training in force. Failure to establish a minimum level of proficiency before allowing or increasing PNC access may result in persons with inadequate skills having access to PNC data. HMIC suggests that all PNC users should be required to have successfully passed a formal competency test before being allowed access to live PNC data.
Logical Access Procedures
6.7.12 There is some concern over the security of logical access procedures to PNC via SCRO. Security arrangements in relation to SCRO differ from those for PNC and are not compliant with the PNC Code of Connections. There is a risk that if these arrangements are not secure, unauthorised access may be gained to PNC and subsequent misuse of data may occur. HMIC suggests that the standards in the Code of Connections are used as a basis for logical access procedures.
6.7.13 A detailed report on these issues, including the above recommendations, has been sent direct to the force.
6.8 Project Management
6.8.1 At the time of the 1998 Review Inspection, the force was introducing a new project management methodology, Successful Project Management (SPM) to aid business planning. HMIC cautioned that care should be taken that this did not conflict with initiatives which required the application of PRINCE (Projects in Controlled Environments) methodology (Review Inspection Report, 1998, paragraph 1.12). In respect of the methodology's application to the management of IT projects, Paragraph 4.5 of the same report highlighted the concern that sight should not be lost of the fact that PRINCE methodology is the mandated project management tool of the Scottish Police Information Strategy (SPIS). This inspection found that the force continues to use the SPM methodology in preference to PRINCE.
6.8.2 Paragraph 4.6 of the same report stated that the introduction of the Successful Project Management (SPM) methodology and establishment of a project office within the IT unit would be revisited at the next primary inspection. It was found that the SPM methodology continues to be that favoured by the force.
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