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HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland

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The investigation of complaints against the police in Scotland

Part II

1. Systems in Other Common Law Jurisdictions

To inform the wider debate, and to place on record factual information relating to other jurisdictions, this part of the report will briefly lay out some of the approaches taken to police complaint investigation in parts of the world with legal systems based on principles comparable to those which apply in Scotland.

Introduction

1.1 The formal powers and role of HMIC are largely confined to the efficient management and effective performance of police forces in Scotland and in consequence this inspection has focused mainly on how police performance can be developed within the parameters of the existing law. However, in the course of the consultation undertaken by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary during the inspection, many bodies and individuals have made suggestions for reform based on practice and structures apparently used elsewhere in the world. In particular, countries which share a similar legal and policing heritage to Scotland have been identified as operating police complaints systems which have different characteristics from those described in Part I of this report.

1.2 Accordingly, it was felt appropriate to consider the international experience and examine systems being used in other jurisdictions. The methodology adopted has been that of a widespread literature review analysed with the benefit of the professional experience that exists within HMIC. Comment is made where appropriate in a manner intended to be fair and impartial and with the intention of enabling any wider debate to be better informed.

Spectrum of Complaints Systems

1.3 HMIC has found it helpful to consider police complaints systems in the context of a complaints spectrum. At one end, complete self regulation will exist, where the police service is the sole organisation and arbiter involved in a police complaints system. In contrast to this, the other end of the spectrum would involve the complete handling and full investigation of police misconduct allegations by a body external and unconnected to the police service. Thus, between wholly internal regulation at one extreme and external investigation and regulation at the other, it should be possible to place any police complaints system somewhere within the spectrum. In many ways the spectrum may be generic and might equally be applied to any complaints system such as that relating to solicitors or medical practitioners, whose self-regulatory complaints systems have recently been subjected to critical debate.

1.4 The diagram below gives an illustration of the complaints spectrum with a number of positions identified and depicted on that spectrum. Towards the internal regulation end of the spectrum, there exists investigation by the police with some form of external oversight. Further along there is a combination of police investigation and external oversight, with perhaps external investigation from another body for specified matters or areas.

1.5 This method of analysis may be useful in considering the police complaints systems of other jurisdictions and indeed that of Scotland in order to form a view of where each might be placed. In the common law jurisdictions, it is probably fair to assert that, in their purest form, neither extremity exists in practice. It is important to state this, as it underlines the fact that a hybrid of self regulation, oversight and independent investigation exists in all systems, regardless of what claims of total independence may be made.

1.6 In particular, wholly independent investigation would involve significant practical challenges and consequences. To remove the police from any investigative role would require that appropriate investigative powers be invested in another newly created body. Powers of arrest, detention, search and surveillance would be required as would the establishment of scientific support and specialist functions, such as search teams and expertise in ballistics and the use of firearms. Such an organisation would need a clear command structure, a 24 hour response capability and be subject to some form of democratic accountability. If it was to have total primacy in respect of criminal allegations there would need to be a change in the role of the Crown which may involve constitutional amendment. To be successful it would have to be resourced and empowered in a way which would effectively turn it into a form of "police force" in its own right, with a headquarters and offices throughout Scotland, sufficient to allow coverage of the remote areas. Such an organisation would itself need to be subject to a suitable complaints system to provide redress for anyone who alleged the organisation's powers had been exceeded or abused.

1.7 It is fair to record that during interviews with HMIC there were few advocates of such an arrangement, even among the strongest critics of the existing system. A number of parties did however advance ideas for providing more obvious independent oversight of complaint investigation, possibly based on some models operating in other countries. Any reform proposed, however, must demonstrate that it is both more effective and offers greater value, both in substance and perception, than that which the existing system in Scotland provides through the combined effect of the procurator fiscal service, HMIC and police authorities. Before any major legislative changes are undertaken it may be worth considering whether an improved and more transparent application of the existing system would provide the degree of visible independent oversight that some parties demand. Whether or not such an approach is acceptable, it could be argued that reforming and improving the existing arrangements should be achievable in the short to medium term without prejudice to any measures which may be desirable in the longer term. In the view of HMIC it would be a matter for regret if the legitimate and continuing debate on the legal framework for complaint investigation in any way delayed the quick and effective measures which are recommended in Part I of this report as a means of strengthening the existing structure.

1.8 In the discussion which follows a number of systems in countries comparable to Scotland are briefly considered, before some concluding remarks are presented.

England and Wales

1.9 In the case of the Police Complaints Authority (E & W) we are grateful to Ms Molly Meacher the acting chair of the authority, for affording the time to be interviewed and for providing access to her staff and additional background material.

1.10 The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) was established in England and Wales under Section 83 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which abolished the Police Complaints Board and established the PCA. The PCA has powers to supervise the investigation of complaints against police officers and is required to supervise any complaint involving death or serious injury, with discretion to supervise any other complaint if deemed to be in the public interest.

1.11 In the wake of the 1981 disorders in Brixton, South London, the Home Secretary appointed the Rt Hon Lord Scarman to conduct an inquiry into the disturbances. Lord Scarman's report, published in November 1981, included within its many recommendations, a proposal for radical reform of the system for handling complaints against the police. Lord Scarman concluded that the system for investigating complaints was not accepted among significant sections of the population. He found:

• A lack of confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the procedure. It was alleged that people felt investigations would not be conducted or judged fairly and objectively and that the complainants would risk being subjected to harassment and intimidation by the police as a result
• The procedures were slow and cumbersome in handling minor complaints
• Letters sent to complainants informing them of the outcome of their complaints were often unhelpful
• Problems resulting from the "double jeopardy" rule. Generally disciplinary action could not be taken against police officers if the Director of Public Prosecutions had decided there was insufficient evidence for a criminal charge.

1.12 Lord Scarman acknowledged the dilemma of whether complaint investigations should be carried out by the police or by an independent body. He also acknowledged that public confidence could be improved by using independent investigators, but conceded that in the vast majority of cases which had come before the police complaints board, a 'thorough and fair investigation had been made by the police into the complainants' allegations'.

1.13 Scarman put forward two possible plans:

• A system of independent investigation for all complaints; or
• Lay supervision of the more serious complaints by a police complaints authority.

1.14 Hence on 29 April 1985, after Parliament had rejected the idea of creating an independent body to investigate complaints, the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) was formed under the statutory authority of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984.

The Authority and its responsibilities

1.15 The PCA is a 'body corporate', with the chairman appointed by Her Majesty the Queen. The current authority has 10 members and a deputy chair appointed by the Home Secretary, complemented by a staff of 60 civil servants. The authority, which manages in excess of 10,000 cases each year, has an annual budget of £3.4 million.

1.16 The authority has three basic functions:

• To supervise the investigation of the most serious complaints against police officers;
• To supervise investigations into non-complaint matters voluntarily referred by police forces because of their potential gravity; and
• To review the outcome of every investigation, whether supervised or not, and to decide whether any officer should face a disciplinary hearing.

How the PCA works

1.17 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 requires that a complaint must be recorded by a force whose officers have been complained about before an investigation can begin. The complaint must be about the conduct of a serving officer and may not relate to the direction or control of the force. The legislation does provide for less serious complaints to be resolved informally and it has been assessed that between 30% and 40% of recorded complaints are dealt with in this manner.

1.18 The legislation also defines the type of complaint which must be referred to the authority for possible supervision. Most frequently this would relate to cases of alleged serious criminal conduct, such as death, serious injury or corruption. The authority must supervise the investigation of all complaints relating to a death or serious injury. In all other cases referred to them it is for the authority to decide whether or not to supervise. They may also call in for supervision any complaint not referred to them. An example of when a force may refer a non-complaint matter for supervision would be where an officer may have committed an offence which raises grave or exceptional circumstances, such as shooting incidents, or deaths in custody.

1.19 When supervision is directed, the authority must approve the appointment of the investigating officer. It may also impose any requirements which it believes to be necessary for the proper conduct of the investigation with the objective of ensuring that the investigation is thorough, impartial and effective.

1.20 Whether the investigation has been supervised or not the final report is submitted to the deputy or assistant chief constable of the force concerned or the deputy assistant commissioner in respect of the Metropolitan Police. That individual must consider whether the report indicates that an officer may have committed a criminal offence and if so, whether they should be charged. If a criminal offence is alleged then the case is normally submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for decision. The PCA also has the power to direct that a case is formally submitted to the CPS even though the chief officer has decided not to do so. A chief officer must thereafter submit a report to the PCA specifying whether or not disciplinary charges are to be brought and if not the reasons for that decision. The authority is then responsible for reviewing the whole case and decides whether or not to accept the force's position. If it disagrees, the authority has the power to recommend or, if necessary, direct that a misconduct hearing be held.

1.21 A significant number of completed investigations do not justify formal misconduct hearings, but simple management action. The outcomes, whether warnings or admonishments, are monitored and in certain cases become a matter of record. At the conclusion of an investigation PCA members are responsible for informing the complainants and chief officer of the force concerned of the outcome and setting out the reasons for reaching decisions.

New developments

1.22 On 1 April 1999 new police misconduct procedures were introduced in England and Wales. The key changes designed to modernise and reform police discipline procedures included:

• Introducing the civil standard of proof at disciplinary hearings
• Allowing an officer acquitted in a criminal court to be disciplined for a like offence
• A fast track procedure, with full rights of appeal, to deal swiftly with officers caught committing serious criminal offences. Cases will be heard within 6 weeks of being identified, in advance of criminal proceedings
• Formal procedures for dealing with unsatisfactory performance. Chief constables will be able to require an officer to resign where efficiency cannot be brought up to standard
• Racist language or behaviour would be a breach of the new code of conduct and in many cases would result in dismissal.

1.23 A number of changes have been made concerning the misconduct hearing procedures, with further consideration of specific issues about disciplinary sanctions and penalties currently underway. The principal features of the new English Regulations compare closely with The Police (Conduct) (Scotland) Regulations 1996. The civil standard of proof, where judgement is reached on a "balance of probabilities" has long applied in Scotland.

1.24 During HMIC's meeting with the PCA it was understood that the new procedures were still in their infancy and that it was too early to make an assessment of their impact. The responsibilities and power of the PCA are currently subject to a further review arising from the recommendations from the report on the inquiry following the death of Stephen Lawrence.

1.25 HMIC has considered the strengths and weaknesses of the system in England and Wales and considers that the following characteristics are particularly relevant.

Strengths

• Provides independent lay oversight of both criminal and misconduct investigations and verification that a proper enquiry has taken place
• Enables analysis and feedback at national level.

Weaknesses

• Has no direct investigative role. Case workers are not trained investigators, they do not undertake enquiries nor do they interview complainers or witnesses. Any change in this position would have major resource implications. In Scotland complainers, witnesses and police officers are precognosed by the procurator fiscal. It is recognised however that the fiscal service has no locus in complaints which do not allege criminal behaviour.
• The PCA is one of a number of agencies which have a locus in serious cases and this can inhibit a clear perception of single ownership and responsibility. For example, in the case of a death in custody the police, the coroner, the Crown Prosecution Service and the PCA would all have a statutory role in the investigation and determination of the case. In Scotland the procurator fiscal has primacy and would investigate all aspects prior to a Fatal Accident Inquiry.

1.26 In September 1999 the management consultants KPMG presented a report to the Home Office on the first phase of a feasibility study on developing an independent system for investigating complaints against the police. The study had been commissioned in response to a Home Office Committee Report on Complaints and Discipline in February 1998 and as a result of Recommendation 58 of the report on the inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence. KPMG reported that successive changes in the system, including the introduction of independent supervision in the form of, firstly, the Police Complaints Board followed by the Police Complaints Authority, had failed to offer a solution to widely held concerns about the complaints system in England and Wales. KPMG recommended that two models described in their report should be taken forward for detailed design. Both models were described as offering significantly enhanced levels of independence in the investigation of complaints. The draft final report of that study is now complete and KPMG has reported to the Home Office with its recommendations. The report was still being considered at the time of this inspection. The Home Secretary is due to report on the Home Office response to the report on the inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence in April 2000 and it is anticipated that a consultation period will then be announced regarding the future of the police complaints system in England and Wales.

Republic of Ireland

1.27 The Garda Siochana Complaints Board (GSCB) was established by legislation in 1986.

1.28 The complaints systems in the Republic of Ireland is overseen by the Garda Complaints Board which has 9 members. The Chairman and at least 3 other colleagues must be qualified lawyers of at least 10 years' standing and all members hold office for a 5 year term. The Garda Complaints Board has a staff of 16, operates from one office in Dublin and has an annual budget of £0.5 million (Irish punts).

1.29 Those complaining to the Garda Complaints Board must have some locus to do so by being either directly affected by or a witness to the conduct of a police officer. Complaints must be lodged within 6 months and the Garda Complaints Board has the power to exclude a complaint if it is considered frivolous or vexatious. Interestingly, police officers themselves cannot make complaints and the Garda Complaints Board cannot itself initiate a complaint.

1.30 Admissibility of a complaint is a matter for the Garda Complaints Board and thereafter investigations are carried out by the Garda, although the Board does have power of direction. This initial investigation must be completed within 30 days or, alternatively, an interim report submitted. After receiving a complaint, the Garda Complaints Board will instruct the Garda Commissioner to consider the complaint and investigate if necessary. For minor cases, the Garda Commissioner is entitled to seek informal resolution provided both the complainer and officer involved agree. Any resolution agreed must be notified to the Garda Complaints Board.

1.31 On completion of an investigation report, the police submit their report to the Chief Executive of the Garda Complaints Board who considers the report's terms, and issues a written recommendation to the full Board. Should the investigation report suggest a criminal offence, the matter must be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions in the Republic of Ireland. If a minor disciplinary matter is identified, the Garda Complaints Board can refer the case back to the Garda Commissioner to deal with by informal advice, admonishment or warning. For more serious disciplinary matters, the Garda Complaints Board will refer the matter to the Police Complaints Tribunal comprising of 2 members appointed from the Garda Complaints Board and one appointed by the Garda Commissioner, of at least Chief Superintendent rank.

1.32 Such disciplinary tribunals are private and legalistic in format, using the adversarial system and adopting the balance of probabilities as the standard of proof. Thereafter, the tribunal decides on guilt and punishment, with a final right of appeal to the Garda Police Appeals Boards comprised of a former judge and 2 others.

1.33 Statistically, the experience in the Republic of Ireland is an interesting one given the demographic and social similarities to Scotland. Critics of the Scottish system often highlight the low level of prosecutions and convictions against police officers as evidence of the need for change. In this regard, it is noteworthy to consider some comparative experience.

1.34 During 1998, for example, 1,400 complaints in total were received by the Garda Complaints Board. All complaints which contained allegations of criminality were investigated and thereafter submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions. In 1998, the Irish DPP instructed prosecution proceedings against Garda officers in respect of 9 separate complaints. Previously, the highest number of prosecutions in any one year had been 3. Historically, the prosecution rate against Garda officers has been low. In 1994 the Irish DPP did not direct any prosecutions from the 98 cases considered.

1.35 By contrast in Scotland, 1,114 allegations of a criminal offence were passed to the Crown in the year 1997/98 for consideration and investigation by the regional procurators fiscal. Criminal proceedings were taken in 23 cases, resulting in 2 convictions.

New Zealand

1.36 The Police Complaints Authority of New Zealand has also been put forward by a number of groups with whom HMIC has consulted as being worthy of consideration. As with the Republic of Ireland, New Zealand also has broad similarities to Scotland, with a population of approximately 3.7 million and a police service of around 8,500 officers. Along with the shared legal and social history this makes New Zealand a jurisdiction with which Scotland could reasonably draw comparisons.

1.37 Through legislation in 1988 a Police Complaints Authority was established in New Zealand. Despite its title, the authority is in fact an individual, being a senior barrister or solicitor. Appointed by government, the authority is a full time appointee, with a deputy and just 3 investigators.

1.38 The authority can receive complaints directly alleging misconduct or neglect of duty, while all complaints made to the Police Commissioner must be notified to the authority. In addition, the authority is granted a power to "call-in" cases in which death or serious injury is involved and all such cases are automatically notified to them. Establishing an increasingly pro-active role, the authority sees itself as incident based as opposed to merely complaint based.

1.39 The approach of the New Zealand Police Complaints Authority can best be summarised through the 5 general methods by which it can consider a complaint:

• Investigate the complaint itself. This is a power only occasionally used, although available at any stage of a complaint.
• Supervise a police investigation. This is considered to be a joint investigation, although given the authority's limited staff the authority more realistically performs an oversight role.
• Monitor cases investigated by the police.
• Allocate a case for formal police resolution.
• Decide no action is required by the authority or the police.

1.40 Any complainer not satisfied with the outcome of a police investigation, whether or not the investigation was instructed or overseen by the authority, is entitled to refer the matter to the authority for review.

1.41 As a matter of policy, the authority appears to have focused its attention on areas of particular public concern, such as police vehicle accidents or complaints involving minority groups such as Maoris. Importantly, the authority publishes annual reports seeking to focus attention on patterns or trends while any special reports on investigations are also published where possible. Such publications are seen as management information to be used to improve service delivery as much as reports on discipline and punishment.

1.42 Time limits are imposed upon the police in carrying out investigations and reporting to the authority. Two months are allowed for completion of an investigation and thereafter the authority can either accept the investigation or direct police to reconsider their suggested resolution. If necessary they can direct that an apparently closed investigation be re-opened. Where the Police Commissioner has proposed action in respect of a complaint, such as taking disciplinary measures, the authority must approve such a course of action or the Police Commissioner is then obliged to give reasons for any departure from the authority's position. Ultimately, the Police Complaints Authority can inform the Attorney General and Minister for Justice of any non-compliance by the Police Commissioner should it be so required.

1.43 To date, HMIC has been unable to obtain information on budget and costs. At face value the New Zealand system offers the benefit of independent analysis on an annual basis. In terms of independent investigation it appears to offer less strength than the procurator fiscal service in Scotland.

New South Wales, Australia

1.44 Complaints against the police in New South Wales are dealt with by 3 separate bodies. The police service of New South Wales, the ombudsman and the independent Commission against Corruption all have locus to consider certain police complaints. The Corruption Commission, by definition, focuses on complaints of corruption while the New South Wales ombudsman has responsibility for complaints about all public bodies as well as the police. The Ombudsman role is confined to ensuring police investigations and complaints management are efficient and responsive and focuses mainly on process.

1.45 Complaints can be received by either the police or the ombudsman and those received by the police must be notified to the ombudsman. In determining how to approach a complaint, the ombudsman decides the method to be adopted. Conciliation by the police can be instructed, or a preliminary investigation or full investigation by the police or ombudsman may be undertaken. Importantly, the ombudsman also has the power to decide that the complaint can be discontinued. It is interesting that 30-40% of cases each year are declined by the New South Wales ombudsman at the outset because of insufficient evidence, triviality or vexatiousness.

1.46 Although the ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations directly, it is a power rarely used because of lack of resources. Accordingly, the New South Wales ombudsman primarily provides a monitoring and oversight function in respect of the police investigation into complaints.

1.47 The police service of New South Wales has a key role in the complaints system. Regional internal affairs departments exist as locally based investigative bodies while a central professional integrity branch investigates complaints and corruption concerning centralised agencies and departments. The ombudsman primarily provides an oversight role to the police investigations. As discussed above, a power to investigate lies with the ombudsman although it has been rarely used. The complexities of the police complaint arrangements in New South Wales make it difficult to undertake any meaningful analysis of cost.

1.48 In regard to feedback and the provision of information, an annual report is prepared by the ombudsman and this report is made to Parliament. The responsibilities of the ombudsman extend to other public bodies with about half the complaints considered by the ombudsman relating to police complaints.

1.49 In common with a number of systems which aspire to deliver independent investigation, the role of the New South Wales ombudsman appears to have evolved into one of oversight. The procurator fiscal service in Scotland appears to offer a greater level of independent investigation.

Queensland, Australia

1.50 Complaints against the police in Queensland are under the control of the Criminal Justice Commission. The Commission is a sophisticated inter-disciplinary structure, with responsibilities beyond police complaints or policing. There are 5 divisions responsible for corruption prevention, official misconduct, witness protection, research, and intelligence. Each has an overarching function within the criminal justice system in Queensland and no comparable body exists in this country. The commission's annual overall budget is around $24 million (Australian dollars).

1.51 Established in 1990, the Commission seeks to provide independent investigation of police complaints within a state comprising a population of around 3.5 million and approximately 6,000 police officers, about half the size of the Scottish Police Service. Under the direction of a Chairman and 4 part time commissioners appointed by Parliament, the commission has a total staff of over 250. The handling of police complaints accounts for approximately 50% of the commission's staff and 75% of its annual budget.

1.52 The Commission has extensive investigative powers, including the power to enter and search public buildings to inspect, seize or remove records and the authority to crave warrants for any other premises. It has subpoena powers and is also statutorily empowered to undertake surveillance. In general, serious misconduct and criminal investigations are conducted by the commission itself while less serious misconduct cases are investigated and resolved by the police, the commission performing a monitoring and review function. On completion of the investigation, referral is made to the Director of Public Prosecutions in regard to criminal matters while the Police Commissioner is given recommendations in respect of misconduct cases.

1.53 Procedural and managerial issues are also seen as being central to the Commission's role rather than focusing simply on individual failure and disciplinary action. Annual reports are made to Parliament which gives due regard to any procedural or structural recommendations made. In recent years, the Commission has been subjected to financial constraints which has apparently affected its operational resilience. The creation of the commission, as a new body, to undertake tasks such as investigating complaints involves considerable costs and this would clearly be a significant consideration in evaluating its worth.

1.54 On the face of it, the Queensland system offers a stronger example of independent investigation than some other systems although it needs to be noted that the resource implications are considerable.

Canada - Royal Canadian Mounted Police

1.55 Since 1988, complaints against officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have been dealt with by the Public Complaints Commission created by legislation. The Public Complaints Commission is empowered to conduct external and independent reviews of complaints made by members of the public regarding members of the RCMP in the execution of their duties. In addition, the Commission has the power to self-initiate complaints if it is considered to be in the public interest. Findings and recommendations are forwarded to the RCMP Commission as well as the Solicitor General of Canada. Again, an annual report is submitted to Parliament giving an overview of the complaints system and trends within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. As a Federal Agency within Canada, the RCMP is accountable to the Federal Government. HMIC has no information on cost, resourcing levels, or the extent to which independent oversight is achieved in practice.

Northern Ireland

1.56 In the unique social and political context of Northern Ireland, policing and police complaints have long been the subject of intense debate, most recently demonstrated after the report of the independent commission on policing for Northern Ireland, chaired by Mr Christopher Patten. In regard to police complaints, Dr Maurice Hayes was appointed in 1995 by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to conduct a review of the police complaints system in the province. He reported in 1997 and the majority of the proposals were introduced through the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, the fundamental recommendation being that a police ombudsman should be created, responsible to Parliament, with the duty to investigate complaints. Mrs Nuala O'Loan, a solicitor and legal academic, has recently been appointed as the first ombudsman.

1.57 The ombudsman will be a full-time post held by a senior legal figure, supported by a staff of investigators and administrators. It is envisaged that all complaints regarding police will initially be made through the ombudsman who should be the first filter for all complaint matters. Complaints essentially concerning force policy or instructions, rather than criminal or non criminal misconduct, will then be referred by the ombudsman to the chief constable. Criminal complaints will be investigated by the ombudsman and staff who will then report directly to the prosecuting authorities, in the case of Northern Ireland being the Director of Public Prosecutions.

1.58 Nevertheless, the police will, inevitably, retain a significant role in the system. The ombudsman will combine an investigative and oversight role, with many operational and administrative functions still being carried out by the police. In the report of 1997, Dr Hayes presents this point as follows:

"The metaphor might be of sale and lease back, where the ombudsman would take control of all complaints and as public confidence in the police developed and the system gained credibility the ombudsman could remit investigation to the police under supervision or subject to audit as appropriate."

1.59 The ombudsman will also be entitled to seek investigative assistance from the police. It is intended that the ombudsman would categorise complaints under 3 headings:

• Serious complaints, perhaps involving criminal action;
• Less serious but substantial complaints which could be remitted to the police for investigation and report, either supervised or unsupervised; and
• Quality of service complaints to be remitted to the police for informal resolution.

1.60 Dr Hayes originally envisaged that the ombudsman would have 2 deputies with a staff of around 30 and would operate from one main office. An annual report will be prepared by the ombudsman's office and submitted to Parliament.

1.61 The need to make the complaints system more accessible has also been acknowledged and initiatives such as readily available free-phone numbers, the use of "neutral" non police venues for discussion and greater marketing and public awareness of the police complaints system are all being considered. Interestingly, the ombudsman will have discretion to refuse or discontinue a complaint where there are reasonable grounds to believe it is malicious or vexatious.

1.62 HMIC understands that Dr Hayes' original estimate of the cost of the office, being around £2 million, has now trebled to an estimate of around £6 million. HMIC has recently been informed that the staff numbers are likely to be in excess of 100 and that the training and resource implications of the new office of ombudsman have been significant.

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