| |
| Other social partnership mechanisms |
| |
- There are also regional Economic Councils
and over a hundred other institutions through which unions and employers
are consulted. The most prominent of these are the Prices Commission,
the board of the National Bank and the sectoral councils.
- Occasionally the CEC meets with the National
Labour Council which deals with social policy and industrial relations
on those issues that are not exclusively economic.
- There have been tripartite summit meetings
at which the Prime Minister and senior ministers related to economic
and social policy attend along with the leaders of the three major unions,
the employers' organisations and farmers. These include:
- The Social and Economic Conferences
(1970, 1980-81)
- The Employment Conferences (1972-73,
1976-77)
- Although union officials are not permitted
to hold political office simultaneously they have access to the government
via their associated parties (FTGB with the Socialists, CSC with the
Christian Democrats). This access is closed when the aligned party is
not in government.
- Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
informal agreements are struck in secret, elements of which may find
their way into legislation.
|
| |
| 2.5 Switzerland |
| |
| Article 32: pre-legislative
consultation |
| |
| The social partners are extensively
involved in the making of Swiss economic policy. The most prominent form
of involvement is through participation in the law making process in accordance
with article 32 of the 1947 Constitution: |
| |
| The appropriate economic organisations
are to be heard before the laws are made |
| |
| The Trade Unions (especially
the socialist SGB - the largest union confederation), the Confederation
of Swiss Industry (Vorort), and other business interests such as banks,
and cantonal and municipal governments have a chance to influence economic
legislation at several stages of the legislative process: |
| |
| Stage 1: The initial drafting
of a bill by the bureaucracy normally reflects or anticipates the positions
of all the major affected social and economic groups. |
| |
| Stage 2: The draft is
revised and elaborated by an expert commission, this generally determines
the overall shape of the final legislation. These commissions, which
may be permanent or ad hoc, include trade union representatives (normally
the 5GB who hold 60% of union seats on commissions), government officials,
representatives of business interests (especially the Vorort) and other
levels of government. In general the employers have more seats than the
Trade Unions. |
| |
| The implicit aim is to formulate
texts that embody compromise between the interests of all those involved,
which means agreement is needed from the representatives before the process
can go any further. However, due to their poor representation and comparative
lack of resources, union influence is often limited to marginal changes
to the employers proposals. |
| |
| Stage 3: Trade unions
and other groups are also able to submit written opinions in the
more formal notification procedure (Vernehmlassungsfahren), although
this generally results in only marginal alterations to the legislative proposal. |
| |
| Stage 4: Final revision
by the government. |
| |
| Stage 5: The bill goes
to Parliament Parliamentary commissions and discussions generally have only
a minor effect on the legislative content since the MPs are generally the
same people who represented economic and social groups in the previous stages
(Socialist MPs, for example, are also often union officials). |
| |
| The Parliamentary commissions
are generally only decisive if the preparliamentary commissions have not
reached a compromise. Even then the unions or employers can influence the
bills through their affiliated MPs. |
| |
| The Referendum Threat |
| |
| Consensus is a particular priority
because if one major group is left unsatisfied it may call for a referendum
on the legislation. This is a significant threat since only 50,000 signatures
are necessary to force a popular vote. Referendums on government proposals
not supported by all the important political and economic groups are rarely
carried. Therefore the threat to call a referendum amounts to a form of
veto - in essence the government must gain agreement from the unions and
the employers for the legislation to go forward. |
| |
| The scope of policies where this
threat is realistic is limited to tax, trade and labour market issues. Monetary
policy is the concern of the central bank and large private banks. The budget
is not open to referendum, therefore union agreement is not essential but
is usually |
| heard. It should also be noted
that many of economic tasks are carried out by the cantons, and so only
around a third of government finances are administered by the Federal government. |
| |
| 2.6 Germany |
| |
| Generally government-union consultation
has been a fairly normal part of the policy making process. Points of access
for the main peak union confederation, the DGB, and other unions includes
occasional consultation by Federal Ministries on draft legislation and membership
of some ministerial advisory councils. |
| |
| Between 1967 and 1977 the most
prominent consultation between Government and the social partners was through
'Concerted Action'. This forum facilitated the exchange of economic information
to enable public authorities, trade unions and employers to co-ordinate
their actions with reference to price stability, employment and economic
growth. Its members included the Economic Minister and staff, employers
representatives and union leaders, the Departments of Finance and Labour,
the Bundesbank, the Federal Cartel office and the Council of experts and
representatives from commerce, small businesses and farmers. Over time however,
Concerted Action increasingly became little more than a talking shop and
after 1977 more was achieved through 'informal' meetings between the Chancellor
and smaller groups of unionists and employers. |
| |
| Since 1982 the CDU has restricted
union input in matters of economic policy to informal discussions between
leaders and ministers. Meetings between the Chancellor and the DGB are less
regular and largely for show. |
| |
| Following unification in 1990,
Chancellor Kohl held discussions with the unions and employers over the
reconstruction of the new East German Länder, especially its industrial
sector. The main concern of the unions was wage convergence between east
and west. The employers organisations had little influence in the east but
their involvement and agreement added legitimacy. In 1992 the Federal Government
and opposition parties, Land governments, the unions and employers took
part in negotiations that resulted in the Solidarity Pact of March 1993.
Provisions included government commitments to abandon planned legislation
to permit employers in the East to pay below-Contract wages, and to increase
the budget of the Treuhandanstalt (a temporary body to ensure fair
prices for eastern industries) to enable it to place greater emphasis on
restructuring firms, rather than closing them down. |
| |
| Many social partnership arrangements
work more powerfully at Lander level. The Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag,
for example, is the umbrella organisation for 96 regional and local level
chambers of commerce. The Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie is the umbrella
organisation for 35 employers' organisations. It has 16 regional organisations
in all federal states. It should be noted that of the 192 presidents and
executive directors involved in the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag
there were only 5 women. Likewise, among the presidents of the 35 five member
organisations of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie there was only
one woman. |
| |
| 2.7 France |
| |
| Since 1947 France has had an
Economic and Social Council and this was included in the Constitution
of 1958. The Council has a fairly broad composition: it incorporates 231
members: partly appointed by Government (including representatives of economic,
social and cultural life) and socio-professional organisations. It is consulted
by Government and Parliament on most major policy questions and has its
own initiative. |
| |
| The Council's role is, however,
essentially advisory vis-ā-vis government and parliaments and has no role
in 'social dialogue' i.e. collective bargaining agreements. So although
the institutional arrangements in France at both a national and regional
level in France appear to promote social partnership Compston has argued
that these forums tend to be fairly detached from the policy process. Union
participation in national economic policy making is generally very low and
the Government has kept the unions at arm, s length. Some renewed importance
was given at the beginning of Mitterrand Presidency in 1981, but little
thereafter. Between 1988 and 1993 there was more regular consultation under
the Socialists but no agreements were reached. This pattern has continued
with the current Chirac Government. Despite frequent strike action, direct
consultation with the unions tends to be narrow and restricted. |
| |
| 2.8 Ireland |
| |
| National Economic and Social
Council (NESC) |
| |
| The NESC replaced the National
Industrial Economic Council (NIEC) in 1973 as a similar consultative body
but with a broader remit to discuss the development of the national economy
and social justice. More specifically it was directed to focus on unemployment,
economic growth, equity of income and wealth, regional development, and
the social and environmental implications of growth. |
| |
| In 1984 membership was fixed
at 25, consisting of representatives from unions, employers, farmers; plus
6 experts and one representative from each of the departments of Finance,
Labour, and Industry and Commerce. |
| |
| In 1987 Haughey returned to power
and used the advice of the NESC as the basis for a strategy to link wage
settlements with government policy. This resulted in the 3 year 'Programme
for National Recovery' agreed in 1987 between the government, business,
unions and farmers. This included more substantial agreements than the National
Under-standings of the 1970s on tax, employment creation, social equity.
Its progress was monitored by the tripartite Central Review Committee. Its
success was demonstrated by the fact that it was succeeded in 1991 by a
similarly wide ranging agreement - The 'Programme for Economic and Social
Progress'. |
| |
| The economic and social policy
of the Irish Government is also supported by policy advice the work of National
Economic and Social Forum (NESF) and the National Competitiveness Council.
Since 1992, the Irish National Organisation for the Unemployed (INOU) and
the national Women's Council have had representation as the 'third strand'
along with other interests (youth, elderly, disadvantaged, people with disability,
environmental interests and academics) in the National Economic and Social
Forum |
| (NESF). |
| |
| 2.9 The Nordic Model: Sweden, Denmark, Norway |
| |
| The Nordic countries have tended
to have a close affinity between the social partners and the political parties,
particularly with regard to the links between the trade unions and their
respective Labour Parties. As the dominance of these parties in government
has declined access to decision-making has reduced. However, the advanced
system of worker participation at a company level and the emphasis upon
social dialogue, consensus-building and employment pacts has meant that
collective bargaining rather than legislation has been utilised. |
| |
| Sweden has long been known for
allowing both unions and business to be involved in policy making in order
to secure the consent of all important groups in the shaping of public policy.
Union participation is noticeably higher under a Social Democrat government,
therefore both social partners were widely consulted between 1970 and 1991.
In particular, much economic policy was made through agreements between
government and the blue collar union federation, the LO. After 1991 the
new liberal government dismantled a lot of the consultative machinery in
a shift away from corporatism. Union representatives were expelled from
most committees, commissions, and agencies following the voluntary withdrawal
of the business representatives. Although LO leaders occasionally met ministers
in 1992 and 1993, this was rare and the White Collar TCO federation had
more access through the Liberal party. |
| |
| A similar process can be seen
in Denmark and Norway where the existence of Social Democratic and Labour
governments leads to an increase in union influence, and similar extensive
networks of consultation. The connections between the unions and the Danish
Social Democratic and the Norwegian Labour parties extend to representation
on each other's governing bodies. An especially important basis for economic
policy in Denmark was the frequent meetings of a forum composed of the Social
Democratic PM, senior ministers and LO leaders. Legislation was often only
submitted to the Folketing after it had LO approval. Contact lessened noticeably
during the Liberal governments (82-87) though the government would seek
some approval for major economic policy. In 1993, the return to power of
a Social Democrat-led coalition meant union participation rose again. |
| |
| In Norway, high level consultation
on economic policy takes place through the tripartite Contact Committee
(established 1962). It is similar m purpose and structure to the German
'Concerted Action' group. It aims to find common ground between the government,
unions and employers on economic policy and collective bargaining. The Contact
Committee meets several times a year, before and during wage negotiations
and remains an important part of the consultative process. Government membership
of the Contact Committee consisted of the Prime Minister, the Ministers
of Finance, Agriculture, Consumer Affairs and Government Administration.
The social partners are represented by delegations from the LO, the peak
employers federation the NHO, as well as representatives for farmers and
fishermen. The LO is still regularly consulted on many areas of economic
policy through the Contact Committee and other informal channels under Liberal
governments. Since 1988 the Labour government's economic programme has been
based on a tripartite consensus strategy agreed by the social partners,
partly based on an informal bargain whereby unions adopt wage restraint
in return for government steps to expand the economy. In this respect there
is more of a common understanding than any explicit agreements. It is clear
however that it is the government that takes the initiative in making concessions
to achieve union or employer consent |
| |
| Figure 14: Social Partnership Mechanisms in Sweden,
Denmark and Norway |
| |
| |
| Summary of Issues |
| |
| The partnership arrangements
discussed in the case studies above are summarised in Figure 15. The
nature of social partnership between state, capital and labour are influenced,
however, by a range of factors beyond institutional arrangements. In Austria,
for example, social partnership is shaped more by a deep-rooted culture
of con-sensual decision-making than a complex of superficial institutions.
In the Nordic countries the success of social partnership - in terms of
making legislation formed on the basis of agreement between government,
employers and unions - has depended largely upon the extensive involvement
of these groups with particular political parties. SF).social partnership
mechanisms have to be constructed in a manner appropriate to the specific
cultural, social and economic situation that prevails. Statutory corporatist
institutions can support and encourage social partnerships but they will
not necessarily deliver industrial peace. Wider social partnerships, which
play a greater role in the development of general social capital and tend
to utilise existing local networks, may be of more benefit in the broad
promotion of consensus. |
| |
| Throughout these case studies
the lack of attention that corporatist arrangements tend to pay to equal
opportunities has been evident. The domination of traditional social partner-ship
arrangements by white men has significant impact upon the kinds of issues
that are discussed, and the kinds of solutions that are sought.
The consensus apparent in Austria between employers and employees has tended
to reinforce traditional gender patterns to the extent that the relationship
between women and the social partners is described as a 'non-relation'.
Similar patterns can be found within the European Union social partners,
who play a significant policy-making role through the structures and processes
of the social dialogue. The social dialogue endorsed by the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992 involves meetings of the peak organisations of capital and labour
in Europe, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the Union of Industrial
and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Centre
for Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP). In addition social dialogue
takes places at sectoral level through federations of employers' and unions
in specific industrial sectors. However, research has shown that |
| women are seriously under represented
in leadership and decision-making roles in these social partner organisations.
Black and minority ethnic women are double excluded.31 |
| |
| Cynthia Cockburn, who has conducted
research on women in the social dialogue, could find little data on the
European level employer organisations such as sectoral employer federations,
and even less interest in issues of representation. She holds out little
prospect for change in the foreseeable future. An Action Plan was adopted
by the ETUC that involves targets for improving representation together
with training that emphasises the need to adopt an overall 'gender perspective
".32 However, Cockburn notes that progress has been slow.
Her recent study suggests that, at sectoral level, men commonly make up
80 to 95 percent of the social dialogue delegates and that it is by no means
uncommon for women to be entirely absent. She asks: |
| |
| Where, then, are women in the
European social dialogue? I found them to be scarcely visible.33 |
| |
| She proposes sex-proportional
representation in mainstream decision-making bodies, accompanied by a strengthening
of women's structures. |
| |
| The experience of Sweden provides
a similar critique of traditional social partnership arrangements and demonstrates
methods through which corporatism can be made more representative. In Sweden
the corporatist circle has been much more closed than the parliamentary
arena and the under-representation of women has been more severe. During
recent years in which corporatism has declined, women's representation in
public bodies has risen. A study of the development of the proportion of
women in Commissions of Inquiry and the boards of central administration
show that the proportion of women has increased substantially since the
mid-eighties. In 1981 only 16 percent of the members of public inquiry commissions
were women, in 1992 this had risen to 28 percent. The study suggests that
one of the main reasons for the increase in women's representation is a
new gender sensitive policy in the recruitment process. The 'Every Other
Seat for a Woman' project came about on the initiative of cabinet minister
Anita Gradin because the government was dissatisfied with the prevailing
situation in which women's representation had increased in elected political
institutions but not in the commissions and boards of corporatist decision-making.
The Commission on Women's Representation confirmed that women were less
represented at the top levels of unions, employer's organisations and other
traditional interest organisations as these organisations rarely nominated
a woman to the public boards. |
| |
| The evaluation led to a whole
range of measures to improve the situation. First, every year the distribution
of women and men in public bodies has to be reported to parliament and thus
published in the public documents of parliament. Second, better co-ordination
between the ministries was implemented. Third, instead of legislation (quotas)
goals for the share of women were set up. The first goal was female
representation of at least 30 percent in 1992, then 40 percent by 1995 and
then 50 percent by 1998. So far the goals have been fulfilled, thus women's
representation has actually increased from around 16 to around 40 percent
in ten years. Bergqvist remarks: |
| |
| It is almost astonishing to see
how quickly and efficiently the suggested measures were decided and implemented.
In just a few years women's representation almost doubled in public commissions
and boards. Women politicians from all the different parties, as well as
women representatives from organised interests were in complete agreement
over this goal. The Commission on Women's Representation made the gender
dimension in corporatist arrangements visible. In the 1 1970s this had been
done in political parties and elected bodies, which had led to a strong
expansion of women in especially the more visible positions of political
office. In the 1980s and 1990s many of these women have been involved in
alliances to find strategies to change and enhance the conditions for women
to be fully integrated in all areas of political decision-making .34 |
| |
| With strong commitment to equality
and substantial political will, it appears to be possible to improve the
equal opportunities record of corporatist arrangements but without these
measures the lack of equal representation is a serious deficiency of traditional
social partnerships. The wider social partners included in the following
section tend to be slightly more representative of the population in this
regard. They also frequently focus directly on the problems of social exclusion. |
| |
| |
Main Union Representation
|
Main Employer Repre- sentation
|
Formal Consultation with Social
Partners?
|
Role of any formalised consultative
bodies
|
Consultation rate
|
| Austria |
ÖGB (high unionisation) |
Federal Chamber of the Economy |
Parity Commission (PC) Created by law 1957 |
Widely consulted on all economic and social issues in the
pre-drafting stage of legislation and at public hearings |
Regularly |
| Belgium |
FTGB, CSC (low unionisation) |
Federation of Belgian Com- panies + several other bodies |
Central Economic Council (CCE) Created by law 1948 |
Consulted by the government and Par liament on economic,
monetary and trade questions, and sectoral problems |
Often |
| France |
several bodies (low
unionisation) |
several bodies |
Economic and Social
Council Included in the 1958 Constitution |
Consulted by government
on proposals also may forward opinions on their own initiative |
Irregular |
| Germany |
DGB (medium level
of unionisation) |
several bodies |
mainly informal consultation |
|
Irregular |
| Ireland |
Irish Congress of
Trade Unions |
Irish Business and
Employers Confederation |
National Economic
and Social Council (NESC) Created by decree 1973 |
To advise the government
through the Prime Minister, on economic and social development |
Often |
| Netherlands |
FNV, CNV, MHP (low
unionisation) |
Federation of Netherlands
Industry and the Netherlands Christian Federation of Employers (plus several
other bodies) |
Social and Economic
Council (SER) Created by law 1950 |
Advises Government
and Parliament on all aspects of economic and social policy |
Often |
| Switzerland |
SGB |
Confederation of Swiss Industry (Vorort) |
Constitutional obligation of government to consult 'the appropriate
economic or- ganisations'. (1947 Art 32) |
|
Regularly |
| Sweden |
LO (high unionisation) |
Swedish Employers Association |
Mainly lobbying (Liberal government decorporatising) |
|
Regularly, if there is a Social Democratic majority |
