| THREE - CHECKS ON UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTS |
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| This section summarises the range
of mechanisms identified in the six jurisdictions which regulate the power
of unicameral parliaments and the executives drawn from them. The countries
with the check are indicated in brackets after each heading. The checks
fall into three categories: |
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| 1. Constitutional Framework. |
| This category covers the major
aspects of constitutional design which place checks on the powers of the
branches of government, such as a federal or quasi-federal system, or an
entrenched constitution. |
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| 2. Parliamentary Design and
Procedure |
| This category covers the design
and procedures of the Parliament, such as the provision of committees for
scrutiny of legislation. |
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| 3. External Checks. |
| This category includes the range
of other factors which play a role in keeping parliament and the executive
honest and accountable. They range from the office of the Ombudsman through
to the existence of an effective media and informed public debate. |
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| 1 - Constitutional Framework |
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| Proportional Representation
(Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand) |
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| A proportional representation
system has three beneficial aspects which enhance the checks on a unicameral
parliament: |
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| 1. The list allows for a wider
spread of candidates. |
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| A proportional representation
system which uses a list to distribute seats to ensure proportionality also
allows the possibility of putting up candidates who are not interested in
campaigning for a constituency and who otherwise might not stand for election.
One of the alleged strengths of an appointed upper house is the ability
to appoint people to the legislature who would not stand for election. The
list arrangement has the potential to emulate this aspect. The quality of
this check is highly sensitive to the rules for the drawing up of lists,
the approach of the parties to the system, and how in particular the minority
parties select list candidates, given that they are the most likely list
candidates to be elected. |
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| 2. Tends to Produce Coalition
Governments. |
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| The tendency of proportional
representation systems to produce coalition governments is not a certainty.
However, the current political spread in Scotland suggests that the Scottish
Parliament is unlikely to be dominated by a single majority party, with
the consequential need for either a formal coalition or a minority government
supported by another party or parties. The lack of an overall majority is
a factor which should help to increase the importance of the Parliament
in the system of government, enhancing its ability to provide a meaningful
check on the Executive, both in passing legislation generally and in scrutiny
of government measures in committee. |
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| In terms of a check on the power
of the parliament itself, an electoral system which tends to avoid the parliament
being captured by a majority, also means that the powers of the parliament
are constrained by the fact that no one party can act unilaterally in abuse
of its powers. |
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| The utility of a proportional
representation system as a check on the powers of the parliament and the
executive is heavily dependent on the behaviour of the parties themselves.
Proportional representation can produce coalition governments of significant
stability, as in Germany and Italy. The post-war history of Italy shows
that these can lead to as much abuse and corruption as long lasting one
party government. An electoral system on its own cannot necessarily curb
abuse; it must always be assessed in terms of the political practices and
culture of the jurisdiction. |
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| 3. increased democratic legitimacy. |
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| Regardless of whether proportional
representation produces a majority in the parliament or not, it still has
the advantage of providing democratic legitimacy to the parliament by ensuring
that the distribution of seats in the parliament more accurately reflects
voters' preferences. Maintenance of democratic legitimacy is important as
it helps support a culture of confidence in the parliament, which can be
eroded when large portions of the electorate feel disenfranchised. |
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| Number of Members (Sweden,
Denmark, New Zealand, Quebec) |
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| From a logistical point of view
a larger Parliament allows for a better functioning committee system. It
ensures that there are sufficient parliamentarians to staff conanittees
and that members do not have to divide their time between a range of committees.
A larger chamber is |
| in this respect a way of compensating
for the members lost by the absence of a second chamber. |
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| Defence of the Constitution
and Human Rights |
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| Protection of basic human rights
and constitutional provisions falls into two broad categories: |
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| 1. Protection of the Functional
Elements of a Democratic System. |
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| The functional elements of representative
democracy range from basic elements of the system, |
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| e.g. the requirement for regular
elections, to associated aspects, such as freedom of political communication
and access to accurate information about the performance of government.
These are important human rights which help to underpin the working of democracy.
Sweden has entrenched key functional elements of the democratic system,
for instance, it has had specially protected freedom of the press legislation
for close to two hundred years. |
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| 2. Protection of Substantive
Human Rights. |
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| This category covers such rights
as the right to a fair trial or the right to privacy i.e. rights which have
a direct impact on individuals, not rights which are directly connected
to the workings of the democratic system. |
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| The balance between politically
oriented and judicially oriented methods for protection of these two categories
of constitutional provisions varies across jurisdictions. Broadly the protections
also fall into two categories: |
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| 1. Politically Orientated
(All jurisdictions) |
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| This method is identified with
countries, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom which traditionally have
sought to protect human rights through the operation of the democratic system.
The methods may vary, but tend to involve such things as pre-legislative
scrutiny of legislation to avoid bills contrary to constitutional principle
being passed. Where incompatibility is found subsequently in a court case
these typically stop short of allowing the Court to overturn the legislation
on constitutional grounds. The fast track legislation process in the UK
Human Rights Bill 1998, set in process by a declaration of incompatibility,
is a recent hybrid example of this method. |
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| 2. Judicially Orientated (All
jurisdictions) |
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| Judicially orientated methods
principally involve the courts having the power to strike down legislation
that they find breaches constitutional provisions. Swedish courts have started
to develop this procedure. United Kingdom legislation will be subject to
the halfway house of declarations of incompatibility under the Human Rights
Act. But Scottish legislation which breaches a provision of the Scotland
Bill 1998 (effectively Scotland's Constitution) or the European Convention
on Human Rights, will be liable to be struck down. |
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- The number of members a unicameral parliament
has has a bearing on its ability to function well as a legislature.
The Scottish Parliament's 129 members should allow for an appropriate
range of permanent committees.
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| Special Commissions of Inquiry
(All jurisdictions) |
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| A general power in parliaments
to set up independent commissions of inquiry has been significant in some
jurisdictions, the notable case being Queensland where an inquiry led to
the jailing of a Police Commissioner and four State cabinet Ministers, and
brought to an end a prolonged period of one party rule. |
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| Recall (British Columbia) |
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| This procedure which allows voters
to dismiss a member of parliament between elections is a potentially potent
check on parliament in so far as it increases the accountability of individual
parliamentarians to the electorate. |
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| Initiative (British Columbia,
New Zealand) |
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| This measure allows citizens
some input into the legislative agenda, either to propose new measures or
overturn old ones. It may be limited to certain types of legislation, for
instance excluding financial bills, and may provide for binding or non-binding
referenda. |
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| Constitutional Arrangements
Unique to the Jurisdictions History (All jurisdictions) |
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| The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti
o Waitangi in New Zealand, or the case law concerning indigenous title in
Australia are examples of arrangements unique to the jurisdiction's constitutional
history. They are important within their jurisdiction because they constitute
basic elements of the constitutional order. Due to their historical nature
they may also have a valence which even if they are not strictly enforceable
(as in the case of the Treaty of Waitangi in certain instances) can have
significant political effect in terms of constraining the powers of the
jurisdictions' parliament and executive. In some cases the constraint can
also turn out to have hard legal consequences as the Queensland government
found in respect of the Mabo case. |
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| Distinction Between Legislature
and Executive (All jurisdictions) |
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| All the jurisdictions surveyed
draw the members of their executives from their parliament. This has an
impact on the dynamic of the separation of executive and legislative power.
One jurisdiction, Sweden, achieves a slightly sharper distinction between
legislature and executive |
| by drawing the ministry from
the Rikdsdag, but once selected, replacing the ministers as voting members
with substitute members. The Scottish Parliament will also have a novel
input in the make-up of the Scottish Ministry, in that the First Minister
must obtain the Parliament's approval of his or her Ministry before it is
confirmed. |
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| Federal Constitutions and
Quasi-Federal Arrangements (Queensland, Quebec, British Columbia) |
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| A federal system itself places
checks on the parliaments which operate within it. These include checks
inherent in the federal arrangement: i.e. the allocation of different powers
to different levels of government; and those connected to the substance
of the federal constitution, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The Scottish Parliament will be operating in a quasi-federal system,
in which one guardian of the Scottish Constitution will be the Parliament
at Westminster. Both types of federal system checks will apply to it: statutes
its passes will be challengeable if ultra vires and it will also
be constrained by the European Convention on Human Rights. |
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| Second Chambers (No jurisdictions) |
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| In two of the jurisdictions surveyed
problems encountered with their unicameral parliaments have led some to
suggest the re-introduction of a second house. However, both these jurisdictions
New Zealand and Queensland moved to unicameralism without any significant
consequential reforms, such as a change to the voting system or an improvement
in the parliamentary committee system. In New Zealand re-introduction of
a second chamber was suggested by the Prime Minster as an alternative to
changing to a proportional representation system. Since the change to MMP
there has been no impetus for a second house. In Queensland the calls for
a second house have also accompanied a range of other constitutional reforms,
including the possible introduction of a bill of rights. |
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| 2 - Parliamentary Design and Procedure |
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| Parliamentary Committees (All
jurisdictions) |
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| In all the jurisdictions surveyed
the existence of a comprehensive committee system both to review legislation
and initiate investigations of their own accord is a significant factor
in ensuring a legislature operates well as a check on the passage of new
laws and the review of current ones and government practices. |
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| Minority Procedural Rights
(Denmark, Sweden) |
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| In both Denmark and Sweden the
powers of the majority in the parliament are tempered by special procedural
rights in a minority of the parliament's members. Such a scheme would be
one way to maintain a check on the power of either a majority or a coalition
in a parliament elected by proportional representation. Minority rights
provide an effective check on both the majority in the parliament but also
on the government drawn from that majority. The matters in respect of which
a minority has special rights can be limited as appropriate, for example
to relate only to certain types of legislation. |
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| Provision for minority procedural
rights might require an amendment to the Scotland Bill: their provision
in Standing Orders might be said to amount to a derogation from the Parliament's
authority as currently formulated in the Bill. |
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| Pre-legislative Scrutiny (All
jurisdictions) |
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| Various types of pre-legislative
scrutiny are used in all the jurisdictions, from the specialised Law Council
in Sweden to the work of parliamentary committees. The Scotland Bill contains
a number of pre-legislative safeguards and in general such arrangements
are a useful factor in producing quality legislative outcomes. In some systems,
such as Quebec (the Jurists) or Sweden (the Law Council) there is also ongoing
scrutiny of legislation. |
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| Parliamentary Questions (All
jurisdictions) |
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| A classic executive accountability
mechanism in Westminster systems is provided by parliamentary questions
or special debates. Question times allow for the querying of ministers and
government members on government policy and assist the minority of the parliament
in keeping a check on the majority. |
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| Presiding Officers (Sweden
in particular, but all jurisdictions to some extent) |
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| A number of the jurisdictions
give the parliament's presiding officer a role in checking the constitutionality
of legislation and if necessary halting its passage. The Scottish Parliament's
Presiding Officer will have some significant oversight powers in relation
to checking that bills are within the Scottish Parliament's competence. |
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| 3 - External checks |
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| Ombudsman (All jurisdictions) |
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| This Swedish institution has
now permeated the world and appears in some form in all the jurisdictions.
A version of the Westminster model is required by the Scotland Bill. The
office provides for accountability of government administration on an individual
level. Some Ombudsmen can also launch investigations of their own initiative,
which introduces a further independent voice of review. |
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| Auditors (All jurisdictions) |
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| Auditors now perform two useful
accountability functions. First they carry out the classic financial audits
but also now can carry out wider ranging reviews of the economy, efficiency
and effectiveness of government programmes. As such they provide a further
check on the actions of the executive and associatedly the legislature which
establish the legislative framework for those programmes. |
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| Conclusion |
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| The parliaments which abolished
their upper houses and did not at the same time carry through other reforms
to introduce checks on the majority in the legislature (and the executive),
notably New Zealand, and Queensland, have all in recent years had to redress
this omission. This has included a range of measures such as, introduction
of proportional representation, parliamentary committees and Bills of Rights.
Parliaments such as Denmark and Sweden, which switched to unicameralism
and introduced reforms contemporaneously have not faced such problems. |
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