| ONE - INTRODUCTION |
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| Introduction |
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| There will be a Scottish Parliament.
It will be unicameral and have 129 members. The First Minister and the other
Ministers will be drawn from it. |
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| This report arises out of an
apprehension that a parliament with just one chamber is flawed. The report
is not concerned with the relative merits of bicameral and unicameral Systems.
It is a survey of six unicameral parliaments to see how well, or otherwise,
they work. |
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| The report has two principal
conclusions. First that the question of checks and balances needs to be
addressed by considering the dynamic relationship between the parliament
and the executive, particularly when the executive is controlled by a majority
in the parliament. Second, that the effectiveness of a parliament is a question
of overall design, of which the presence of a second chamber is just one
of many elements. |
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| Good govemance requires a vital
political culture and respect for democratic institutions. Badly designed
unicameral parliaments can produce bad government. Parliaments need to be
designed to ensure they are a constant, credible and legitimate check on
government. Where they fail to provide that check a culture of corruption
and abuse can flourish. Queensland, a jurisdiction which abolished its upper
house (which itself was ineffective) and did not introduce constitutional
reforms to improve the quality of the Parliament, was rocked in the 1980s
by a culture of sleaze that led to four National Party ministers and a former
police commissioner being jailed for corruption and related offences. |
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| Another of the parliaments studied,
British Columbia, prior to the significant reforms of the last decade or
so was dominated by one party or another for significant periods of time.
Until change began to occur in 1972, the Parliament was called for only
a few weeks a year and opposition members were not even given permanent
office space, making it almost impossible to carry out the task of scrutinising
the government. |
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| On the other hand, well designed
unicameral systems can produce good government. The two Scandinavian jurisdictions
studied, Denmark and Sweden moved to unicameralism at the same |
| time as introducing a range of
other constitutional and parliamentary reforms. These two jurisdictions
have enjoyed well functioning parliaments, providing balanced checks on
the powers of the majorities in their parliaments and their executives. |
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| Comparative Approach |
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| The parliaments examined are
those in: New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, the Australian State of Queensland
and the Canadian Provinces of Quebec and British Colombia. They range from
parliaments which are similar to the Scottish Parliament in terms of size
and position within the constitutional system (for example the sub-national
Parliament of the Australian State of Queensland) to dissimilar in size
and constitutional position terms (the Swedish Parliament). The former are
chosen for their more direct applicability, the latter because aspects of
their structure and operation are particularly instructive. |
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| The parliaments chosen represent
European and Commonwealth countries, and national and sub-national levels.
Five out of the six Parliaments began as bicameral legislatures, but all
have abolished their second chambers in relatively recent times. The survey
is not intended to represent a comprehensive overview of unicameral systems.
Its purpose is to provide a range of comparative examples from which lessons
may be drawn in designing the unicameral system in Scotland. |
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| Each jurisdiction has its unique
features and the underlying principle must be to ensure that the constitutional
architecture designed for Scotland, is architecture appropriate to the whole
context of govemance in Scotland. Constitutional arrangements need to be
framed to suit the political behaviour in the jurisdiction concerned and
regular reviews of the system's efficacy are worthwhile to take into account
changing political circumstances. |
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| Structure of the Report |
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| This report contains four parts,
an executive summary and a bibliography. Part I is this Introduction. |
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| Part II contains the overviews
of the six parliaments, including: |
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1. an overview of the jurisdiction:
- description of the electoral process,
- political composition of the parliament,
- term of the parliament, its powers and
procedures,
- relationship of the executive to the parliament,
- reasons the parliament was established
with one chamber, or if there has been a change from bicameral to unicameral,
the reasons for the change,
- if there has been a change from bicameralism
to unicameralism, the steps taken, if any, to alter the structure and
operation of the remaining chamber.
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2. A brief summary of the checks
(legal and political) within the jurisdiction's constitutional framework
on the powers of the parliament and its relationship to the executive with
particular reference to five key areas:
- passage of legislation
- scrutiny of the executive
- defence of the constitution and human
rights
- redress of grievances
- other protections against the abuse of
power.
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| Part III draws together the check
and balance functions outlined in respect of each parliament and places
them into three categories: |
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| 1. Constitutional Design |
| 2. Parliamentary Design and Procedure |
| 3. External Checks |
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| Part IV considers the measures
contained in the Scotland Bill 1997 in terms of the three categories set
out in section III |
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| Part IV concludes with an assessment
of the viability of the unicameral nature of the Scottish Parliament as
currently proposed. |
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