SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE

• Whether a parliament should have a second chamber is just one aspect of parliamentary design. The presence or absence of a second chamber cannot determine whether a parliament will be an effective democratic institution. Unicameral parliaments can be effective if well designed, ineffective if badly designed.
• A Parliament's procedural arrangements can themselves obviate the need for a second chamber. A comprehensive committee system can take care of the second chamber review function, while the electoral system and a bill of rights can cater for the constitutional watchdog role.
• The issue of checks and balances in respect of a unicameral parliament also involves the parliament's relationship to the executive. The relationship is a dynamic one, partly governed by the legal structure of the system and partly by the political culture.

• The electoral system plays a role in the effectiveness of a unicameral parliament. Proportional representation is likely to enhance the Parliament's democratic legitimacy, and its authority in relation to the Scottish Executive.
• The quasi-federal relationship between Westminster and the Scottish parliament will provide a check on the power of Scottish Parliament, as each government will be alert to the jurisdictional limits of the other.
• Westminster will remain the ultimate guardian of the Scottish Constitution, power to amend the Scotland Act not being within the Scottish Parliament's competence. This is a significant check on the Parliament because it means, inter alia, that the Parliament cannot amend such constitutional provisions as its term or the electoral process.
• A bill of rights provides a check on the power of a unicameral parliament. The Scottish Parliament will be governed by the European Convention on Human Rights.
• The number of members in a unicameral parliament has an important bearing on its ability to function well as a legislature. The Scottish Parliament's 129 members should allow for an appropriate range of permanent committees.

• The Scottish Parliament should have a comprehensive committee system, following broadly the subject areas of the Scottish Executive. Committees should review all bills and have the power to initiate investigations within their subject area and report to the parliament.
• There should be a special committee or set of committees to scrutinise budget and financial matters.
• Pre-assent scrutiny of bills to check they are within the Parliament's competence will be carried out by a number of bodies and will assist in ensuring the Parliament passes well considered legislation.
• A system allowing for parliamentary questions to Ministers should be included in the standing orders.
• The Presiding Officer will have an important role in assessing bills to check they are within the Parliament's competence.
• Some jurisdictions give a minority in their parliaments special procedural rights to halt bills or refer them to referendum. This practice could be kept in mind as an additional check on the powers of the Scottish Parliament, if in the future further checks were considered desirable.

• Administrative accountability mechanisms are important. Scotland will have in this respect:
• an Ombudsman on the United Kingdom model
• a strong audit requirement.

• The Scotland Bill provides a wide range of checks and balances found in other unicameral parliaments, or, in relation to parliamentary committees, the expectation that they will be developed. In addition the Bill contains a number of novel checks, such as the Secretary of State's powers and the Law Officers' powers to refer legislation to the Privy Council for a ruling on vires.
• The comprehensive range of checks present in the Scotland Bill obviate the need for a second chamber as part of the parliamentary design.
• Given the novelty of the arrangements, and the need to see how the system works in practice, it would be prudent to provide for two review mechanisms:

1. A Scottish Parliamentary Committee with an ongoing constitutional review function along the lines of the Swedish Committee on the Constitution, or the similar parliamentary committee in Queensland, and

2. an independent review commission in Scotland meeting in five years time to consider the role of the Scottish Parliament in the evolving scheme of Scotland's and the United Kingdom's constitutional architecture.