

**SCOTLAND'S
FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE
CONTINGENCY PLAN**

Scottish Executive
May 2004

Contents

Page

Foreword	
Section 1	Disease Response Assumptions
Section 2	Command and Control – Disease Management in Scotland
Section 3	ERAD Headquarters Structures
Section 4	Field Operations
Section 5	Communication
Section 6	Resources

Annexes

Policy

B.	Measures Applying in Surveillance and Protection Zones
I.	Disease Control Tools
C.	Biosecurity – Advice for Farmers and Those Keeping Livestock
D.	Access and Foot and Mouth Disease
	D(i) Access Outside a Foot and Mouth Infected Area
	D(ii) Model Risk Assessment Form
	D(iii) Official Signage for Closure of Footpaths
H.	Disposal
	H (i) Disposal Policy
	H (ii) Hierarchy of Preferred Disposal Options

Operational

L.	Key Event / Action Flowchart
A.	Forms
F.	Role of Regional Operations Director
G.	Local Plans
E.	Resources for Local Disease Control Centre
N.	Agenda Template
	N(i) Disease Strategy Group Initial meeting
	N(ii) Disease Strategy Group Standard meeting
	N(iii) Birdtable Meeting

General

J.	Key Contacts
K.	Organisation Charts
M.	Stocking Densities
O.	Useful Websites
P.	Glossary

FOREWORD

1. This revised Scottish Executive Contingency Plan is for use in the event of an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). The Plan is written in such a way as to be capable of dealing with a major disease outbreak which could be spread widely across Scotland. The Plan operates within the structure provided by the existing EU-approved GB Contingency Plan and has been produced within the context of the international obligations associated with disease control.

2. The European Union requires that an initial stamping out policy be undertaken to control FMD. This requirement has a significant impact on the contents of the Plan. The publication in October 2003 of a new Directive for the control of FMD has provided a revised framework in which a range of options can be used to control the disease. Emergency vaccination is one of these options and the Directive gives it much greater prominence, codifying the way it should be used, the treatment of products from vaccinated animals, and how a Member State using vaccination can return to disease free status. The Contingency Plan contains a guide to vaccination and the many factors which must be taken into account before a decision is made and a programme implemented. A contract is in place to provide a vaccination resource to assist the SVS.

3. The Plan sets out the over-arching framework which the Scottish Executive will put into place, which maximises flexibility and can be adjusted to take account of the scale of any FMD outbreak and other circumstances that are specific to the control and eradication of the disease. The Plan allows the Executive to respond immediately to all aspects of a disease situation and identifies the key policy and operational responses which are likely to be introduced as a consequence of a major disease outbreak.

4. The Plan is about process and structure. Detailed aspects of the veterinary response are covered in the State Veterinary Service VIPER instructions. Recognising the complex nature of infectious disease and the need for different control measures, an additional Contingency Plan is being developed for Newcastle Disease/Avian Influenza Diseases.

Context

5. The commitments established in this Plan recognise the serious effects animal diseases such as FMD can have on animal welfare and the viability of many farms and businesses in the rural and wider economy. It also reflects the fact that agriculture is an important factor in the economic and social sustainability of many rural areas. The plan highlights how the wider impact of a disease outbreak will be taken into consideration and contribute to the strategic decision making process. However the focus of the plan is on the control and eradication of disease and as such the wider issues are not covered in any great depth.

6. This Plan is a “living document” and will be subject to regular and ongoing review by the Executive, with input from the Animal Health and Welfare stakeholder group. Exercises will be undertaken to test the effectiveness of National and Local Plans in a disease outbreak, and familiarity with roles and systems that will be used (e.g. Disease Control System). Stakeholders have been, and will continue to be, involved in these exercises.

Legislative Basis

The legislative basis under which Scottish Ministers will act is, predominantly, the FMD Order 1983 (Statutory Instrument 1983 No. 1950), as amended. A key requirement in the event of the first case of confirmed disease will be the introduction of the Infected Area measures best suited to the circumstances prevailing at the time. Thus, a new Scottish Statutory Instrument (Order), amending the 1983 Order, would be needed immediately. Scottish Ministers would also use the powers conferred in the Animal Health Act 1981: such as section 1 (general power of Ministers to make orders); section 7 (cleansing and disinfection); section 8(1) (movement generally); section 17(1) (powers as to infected places and areas); and section 23 (orders as to infected places and areas). Any premises in or partly in the Infected Area would be deemed to be wholly within that area. The legislation would apply to all premises in the Infected Area where animals are or have been kept within a period of 56 days (the time period within which disease may be confirmed retrospectively¹) before the declaration. This will occur by means of a separate Order mentioned in the next paragraph. A “domestic dwelling” would not be exempt if animals were or had been kept there.

The separate FMD Order specifying the exact boundaries of the Infected Area where very strict disease control (biosecurity) measures would apply would also be required immediately. Once this second Order was, in legal terms, “made” by or on behalf of the Minister, it would be placed on the SEERAD website so that anyone could check the precise area details.

A breach of a provision of an Order or a Regulation of a local authority made under the Animal Health Act 1981 counts as an offence – see sections 73 and 75 of the Act. The latter section refers to fines and imprisonment terms.

Part of GB response

7. The Plan is specific to Scotland, reflecting the fact that animal health matters are devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive, with Scotland’s Minister for Environment and Rural Development leading any Scottish response. However, recognising that GB is a single epidemiological unit, that there is a single GB SVS and that there needs to be strong co-ordination and co-operation in responding to contagious diseases, the Plan dovetails with the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)’s Contingency Plan² and links up with measures taken by the Welsh Assembly Government.³ This linkage is important to facilitate prompt communication and co-ordination in any disease situation. It also offers scope for exploiting the potential economies of scale in the use of some resources.

8. This Plan provides a disease control framework specific to the Scottish situation. The key differences to the DEFRA plan are in the command and control framework, and the links into the Local Plans which exist for each of Scotland’s five Animal Health Divisions⁴. The main differences at the local level are in the role of the Regional Operations Director and the more extensive set of disposal options.

¹ See section 63 of the 1981 Act

² <http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/fmd/contingency/contingency.pdf>

³ <http://www.footandmouth.wales.gov.uk/scripts/index.asp>

⁴ <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/about/ERADRA/LAH/00015721/AHOMAP.aspx>

Links to Local Plans

9. The Scottish Plan links directly with the individual Local Contingency Plans that have been drawn up for each of the five Animal Health Divisional Offices in Scotland. Further details on the Local Plans are provided in Annex G. The Local Plans are extremely important as it is at the local level that the disease would have to be fought, controlled and eradicated. The Local Plans draw on support from key agencies e.g. Local Authorities (who also have emergency plans in place) and also look to include local stakeholders.

Learning Lessons

10. The Scottish Plan draws on the operational lessons learned from the 2001 outbreak and takes account of the recommendations contained in the Executive's internal Inquiry into the SEERAD response and the recommendations of the independent Inquiries into FMD. One of the key themes emerging was that of Emergency preparedness. SEERAD's response to these Inquiries committed the Executive to a higher level of Preparedness to combat any animal disease outbreak (<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/fmdr.pdf>).

11. A key lesson of the 2001 outbreak was the important role that can be played by other agencies and stakeholders, and by the wider Executive. The Plan seeks to explain the role of these other agencies, and highlight the type of contribution they can make – particularly in terms of communications. To make sure these resources are fully utilised, the Executive has created a Communications Strategy which identifies the optimum information channels between the Executive and stakeholders. It explains in detail the action the Executive will take in a disease emergency, and describes key priorities and contacts. Both the contingency plan and the communications strategy are tested during national and local exercises. The most recent national exercise, held in September 2003, helped identify a number of issues which have been addressed in this Plan's revision.

Changes to previous version

12. A number of changes have been made to the previous version of the Plan dated February 2003.

- **Re-focussing of Disease Containment Measures.** In order to simplify the existing concept of disease protection/surveillance the Executive has developed a policy which replaces the concept of a Restricted Infected Area with a single classification of Infected Area with the option of implementing additional biosecurity provisions around particular 'hotspots'. Further details are provided in annex B.
- **Communications.** The plan reflects the Executive's Communication Strategy, shortly to be consulted on. Appropriate links are made to the Communication Strategy, for example, templates for News Releases.
- **EU FMD Directive.** The Directive gives minimum measures that any Member State (MS) would be expected to adopt in an outbreak, but allows MSs to take further action provided this has been cleared with the Standing Committee on Animal Health and the Food Chain. The new Directive spells out movement controls in greater detail than in the earlier Directive. It specifies measures to be applied in the supply chain

for meat and milk and other products which arise in the Protection, Surveillance and Vaccination Zones. The Directive attaches greater importance to vaccination as a potential disease control tool.

Contact Point

This Contingency Plan is subject to regular review and any comment or questions relating to its content and ongoing development should be sent to:

Animal Health and Welfare Strategy, Planning and Exotics Branch
Room 345a
Pentland House
Robb's Loan
Edinburgh
EH14 1TY
ahwcontingencyplanning@scotland.gsi.gov.uk

SECTION 1 - DISEASE RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS

13. This section outlines the general principles that are likely to be adopted in the event of an outbreak of FMD. These are in line with the recently adopted EU FMD Directive 85/2003 which forms the framework for response to FMD for all Member States of the EU. The Plan concentrates on the processes which will follow *confirmation* of disease. Confirmation of the first case will be made by the UK Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) on the basis of laboratory testing.

- Susceptible animals are defined under the 1983 FMD Order (as amended) meaning cattle, sheep, goats and all other ruminating animals, swines and elephants which are capable of being infected with FMD.
- All premises with a suspect case will be served with Form A (see Annex A) restrictions, which prohibit movements off the premises.
- Where FMD cannot be ruled out and diagnostic samples are taken, Form C (see Annex A) will be signed by the SVS. This will prohibit movement of susceptible animals within an 8km radius of the suspected premises.
- If FMD is confirmed, a Statutory Order will be signed establishing an Infected Area, which covers an area with a minimum 10km radius surrounding the Infected Premises (IP). In EU terminology, the Infected Area can be subdivided into a Protection Zone (PZ), which is made up of an area with a minimum 3km radius immediately around the Infected Premises, and a Surveillance Zone (SZ), which is made up of the area falling within the remaining 7km.

Principles

- **Susceptible animals on infected premises will be slaughtered.**

14. This stamping out policy is a reflection of the EU obligations to which the UK is subject through the FMD Directive. These EU rules recognise the fact that FMD is a disease which inflicts serious damage, both in terms of animal welfare and to the economy of the area in which an outbreak is situated. The “culling out” of infected premises is the most effective way of halting the spread of FMD.

- **On laboratory confirmation of an outbreak of FMD anywhere in GB, a livestock movement ban will be introduced immediately.**

15. In principle, and depending on the nature and scale of the virus spread, the movement ban would be introduced for an initial period, normally of 7 days, as a precautionary measure and would be kept under constant review to minimise disruption to the industry. Limited movements under licence may be permitted to avoid animal welfare problems.

16. A consequence of the introduction of the livestock movement ban will be that auction markets cease to operate. However, it is possible that some livestock will either be in a lairage or on their way to market. In such an eventuality these animals may either be sent back to their original holding, direct to slaughter or held at market. Auction markets should ensure, where possible, that robust contingency plans are in place allowing for the holding of animals if necessary until such time as a course of action is agreed. Any movements will be subject to a SVS veterinary risk assessment. This would also apply to animals that were in the process of being exported.

- **In line with EU legislation a ban will be imposed on export of red meat and meat (and some dairy) products.**
- **Heightened biosecurity measures will be introduced in the Infected Area.**

17. A key disease control tool is the enforcement of a number of stringent biosecurity provisions within an Infected Area to cut down the risk of disease spreading by animal or mechanical means, for example through cleansing and disinfection of people, vehicles and machinery moving on and off livestock farms. Such a regime, which concentrated on effective measures to cut down the risk of disease spreading by animal or mechanical means, would be introduced in Scotland throughout the Infected Area. In addition, compulsory fixed cleansing and disinfection points *may* be put in place on all exit routes to ‘hot spot’ areas, where there are a number of affected but small in size farms close to each other, or a situation of high density pig population.

18. As the disease control measures take effect and the risk of disease spread lessens, on veterinary advice some of the biosecurity related controls may be eased either throughout the Infected Area or in part of the Area. (Annex B provides more details and Annex C gives biosecurity advice for use in a disease situation, to support the existing Biosecurity Code of Practice (<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/crw1-00.asp>).

- **The countryside will be kept open and a presumption in favour of access will be maintained (other than in the Infected Area).**

19. In the event of a disease outbreak there will be a presumption in favour of access outside the Infected Area(s), unless a risk assessment agreed by the Local Authority and relevant Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM) suggests otherwise. Annex D provides details of the access policy, guidance for farmers and the model risk assessment which should be used. The whole of the Infected Area would be closed to access (see also Annex B), reopening again as quickly as possible, subject to further risk assessment.

- **The Armed Forces will be informed immediately of any outbreak but will only be called upon if the outbreak is of such a size that the existing resources are not sufficient.**

20. Army Headquarters (Scotland) will be contacted and informed about any outbreak. Discussions will be held on their possible future involvement should additional logistical support be needed. In such an eventuality the Executive will make a formal request to the UK Government for military aid.

- **The existing SVS resource will be enhanced to cope with the disease.**

21. The SVS maintains a database of Veterinary Personnel (Local Veterinary Inspectors) who are able to respond to any disease outbreak. Negotiations are currently underway to establish a firm contractual framework for LVIs including creation of a group of 100 LVIs with expertise not only in disease diagnosis and control but also in management of control programmes.

- **In the immediate response to a disease outbreak in Scotland, a Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) will be established and a Regional Operations Director (ROD) will be appointed.**

22. The LDCC will be established by the local DVM at a level capable of coping with a minimum of 10 infected premises simultaneously. The size of the LDCC will be adjusted according to the scale of the outbreak with the ROD providing appropriate assistance. The veterinary response will be governed by the SVS Standing Instructions. See Annex E for Guidance on resources required for a LDCC and Annex F for the Role of the ROD.

- **Rendering or incineration of carcasses will be the preferred disposal method and any decision will be made on the basis of appropriate veterinary and other professional advice.**

23. The 2001 outbreak showed that disposal was a key component of any successful disease control and eradication operation. It is to be expected that this situation will also be true of any future outbreak and a preferred hierarchy of choice for carcass disposal is:

- Commercial Incineration
- Rendering
- Landfill
- Burning
- Burial (on farm or mass)

24. The choice of these options will take account of local circumstances and will be considered as part of local planning. The Local Plans will be considered at the strategic level by the Scottish Executive, to ensure that appropriate linkages are being made in disposal options. The priority will be to avoid the build up of carcasses and associated risks to public and animal health and the environment. The DVM will retain discretionary authority for the way in which animals are disposed of, particularly in the very early stages of an outbreak, while appropriate arrangements are being put in place. (At this point pyre burning may be the most appropriate disposal route, subject to proper risk assessment of the site). In practice, the options available for disposal will depend on the scale of the outbreak. It may also be the case that in more remote locations, given transport distances and the probability of dispersal of airborne combustion products, burning cannot be discounted as the best practicable option. Annex H provides further information on the Executive's disposal policy and outlines different disposal options.

25. Disposal is a significant priority and will be facilitated by the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) at the SVS HQ in London, which will provide logistical support. Disposal issues will be regularly reviewed by the Disease Strategy Group⁵ in conjunction with regulatory bodies e.g. Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Food Standards Agency (FSA), and other Stakeholders.

- **Emergency Vaccination will be considered alongside other disease control strategies but will not be an alternative to the culling of animals on infected premises.**

⁵ Disease Strategy Group: A group established to co-ordinate and manage the Scottish disease control response. Further details available in section 2 Command and Control Disease Management in Scotland

26. EU Directive 2003/85/EC sets out clearly that the basic control strategy will be the culling of susceptible species on infected and dangerous contact premises. If further action is required by the epidemiological situation, emergency vaccination will be considered as a potential policy option. The use of emergency vaccination is governed by the Directive and there are potential international trade implications which would emerge under the international rules of the Office Internationale des Epizootes (OIE). Annex I gives details of the different disease control strategies available and sets out a framework for decision making.

- **Stakeholders will be fully involved from the first stages of an outbreak. They will have an important role in helping communicate disease control and other issues to their membership, and their views back to the Department.**

27. As sections 3 and 4 outline, stakeholders will have a key role in assisting the Scottish response to any disease outbreak. Specific stakeholder groups will be established to inform decisions on disease control and access. Annex J lists key stakeholders and other key agencies, and contact details. In addition to informing the Executive about situations affecting their members and operating as a sounding board to inform policy decisions, stakeholders will have an important role in communicating disease control related issues to their members.

SECTION 2 - COMMAND AND CONTROL DISEASE MANAGEMENT IN SCOTLAND

28. This section describes the overarching command and control systems, which will be put in place to manage any Scotland wide disease control activity. Annex K illustrates the overall management structure, which will be introduced in the event of a FMD outbreak in GB.

Disease Strategy Group

On notification of any case of FMD in GB the Scottish Minister for Environment and Rural Development will be informed and a **Disease Strategy Group (DSG)** will be created. The DSG will report to the Minister, and will meet in Pentland House, with phone links to the LDCC as appropriate.

Role:

To co-ordinate and manage the Scottish disease control response, taking account of local conditions, farming practices in Scotland, and other potential impacts on the Scottish economy.

Membership:

Head of SEERAD

Head of Food and Agriculture Group

CVO Scotland

Chief Agricultural Officer (CAO)

Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Division

Regional Operations Director (ROD) (based in the field)

Head of Veterinary Services (HVS) (based in the field)

(In the event that the army is operationally involved the army commander will become a DSG member)

The Group will liaise closely, as appropriate, with other interests e.g. SEERAD Environment Group, Scottish Executive Health Department (SEHD), FSA, SEPA.

The FMD Strategy Unit in the Animal Health Division will provide secretariat support.

A flow chart of key actions is attached at Annex L.

National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)

On notification of an outbreak of FMD in GB the NDCC will be established and based at the SVS HQ in Page Street, London.

Role:

The logistical support for any Scottish disease control effort will be managed from the NDCC. It will implement an agreed GB disease control framework.

Membership:

The NDCC is composed of various “cells”, each with clear operational responsibility, for certain areas. For full details, see the DEFRA Contingency Plan. Liaison Officers from the policy side of the Executive and SVS in Scotland will be based at the NDCC to ensure that Scotland’s situation and Scottish policy are fully reflected in all decision making.

Disease Control Stakeholder Group

Alongside the creation of the DSG, regular meetings will also be held with stakeholders and key agencies, at Pentland House.

Role (Stakeholder group):

To provide a sounding board to inform policy decisions being taken.

To provide stakeholders with a mechanism for directly communicating with the Department.

Role (individuals):

To help keep their members informed.

To alert the Executive to any particular issues they may be facing.

Membership:

National Farmers Union Scotland (NFU Scotland)

Scottish Landowners Federation (SLF)

SEPA

British Veterinary Association

Scottish Association of Meat Wholesalers (SAMW)

Road Haulage Association (RHA)

Quality Meat Scotland (QMS)

National Beef Association (NBA)

National Sheep Association (NSA)

Institute of Auctioneers and Appraisers in Scotland (IAAS)

Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA)

Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty of Animals (SSPCA)

Scottish Crofting Foundation

Police

Initial focus: to explain the current disease position.

Each stakeholder will be limited to a maximum of two representatives per meeting (contact details are included in Annex J).

Sub-groups may be considered to address specific issues e.g. movement controls.

Local Disease Control Centre: Management Control Team

Established initially by the DVM but later taken over by the ROD. This Team will meet daily or at greater or lesser frequency as determined by the disease situation.

Role:

To enable an integrated management and control response at local level to deal with disease control measures by the inclusion of key enforcement agencies of local and central Government and others

Responsibilities:

Each representative will bring specific expertise and the ability to mobilise resources from the parent organisation. They will have a forum to raise issues and a means of keeping their parent organisations informed of the current situation.

Membership:

Regional Operations Director (ROD)

Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM)

Principal Agricultural Officer (PAO)

Local Authorities (e.g. Emergency Planning Officer and Head of Animal Health and Welfare function)

Police

SEPA

Local Stakeholder Group

Established by the ROD. Meetings will be held with local stakeholders and agencies as required.

Role:

To ensure that developments in local operations are communicated to all relevant parties.

To allow input from all relevant parties to inform local decisions.

Membership:

To be determined locally in consultation with the ROD and the DVM, but where appropriate may include:

Police

SEPA

Consultant in public health

NFU Scotland

Scottish Landowners Federation (SLF)

Institute of Auctioneers and Appraisers in Scotland (IAAS)

Road Haulage

Scottish Milk Forum

Ramblers Association

Scottish Crofting Foundation*

Disposal Industry

SAC Disease Surveillance Centre

Local Authority

Deer Commission/ Forestry Commission/ Scottish Natural

Heritage*

SAC Farm and Rural Business Development Offices

* if appropriate to the infected area

Access Group

Initial meeting chaired by the Head of the FMD Strategy Unit. Thereafter chairmanship transfers to the Scottish Executive Countryside and Natural Heritage Division. Regular meetings of the Access Group will generally be held in Pentland House. The Access group reports to the DSG.

Role:

To consider access issues and inform members of how access policy is implemented and communicated.

Membership (the following agencies will be invited to attend):

NFU Scotland	Scottish Landowners Federation (SLF)
COSLA	Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH)
Scottish Crofters Foundation	National Trust for Scotland
VisitScotland	Historic Scotland
Ramblers Association	John Muir Trust
Utility Companies	National Parks Board
Crown Estates	Forest Enterprise
British Horse Society	Sportscotland
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)	

Economic Impact Group

Recognising that an outbreak of FMD can have implications for the wider rural economy, the Head of SEERAD Analytical Services Division will consider creating an Economic Impact Assessment Group. This would report to Scottish Ministers.

Role:

To inform any process of immediate hardship relief and longer term recovery.

Membership:

Scottish Executive	ERAD Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department Tourism Group Local Government Finance Group
External	Enterprise Networks Visitscotland COSLA Employment Service Scottish Agricultural College (SAC)

Other members would be co-opted as appropriate and links would also be established to the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise.

Links to other Agricultural Departments, Whitehall Departments and European Union

Reflecting the principles outlined in the SEERAD/DEFRA/SVS Concordat, which recognises the importance of close co-ordination and communication in responding to notifiable diseases within a single epidemiological unit. The GB approach allows the development of significant specialist veterinary support from the SVS Headquarters. A policy **Liaison Officer** (Band C level) will be despatched to the NDCC on confirmation of a GB outbreak. A veterinary Liaison Officer from the SVS in Scotland may also attend the NDCC, to ensure that an agreed GB disease control framework is established. The **Head of Food and Agriculture Group**, or other senior officials, will attend appropriate Whitehall meetings,

In addition the **Scottish Executive European Union Office** will keep in contact with the EU Institutions, on the position in Scotland, in co-ordination with the UK's Permanent Representation to the EU.

SECTION 3 – ERAD HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURES

29. This section describes how the disease control decisions will be implemented in Scotland at the national policy level and on the ground.

30. On identification of a FMD outbreak anywhere in GB, the Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Division will establish 2 units – FMD Strategy Unit and FMD Operational Policy Unit, details of which are provided below:

FMD Strategy Unit

Headed by the existing Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy and Planning Branch.

Role:

To ensure that key interests inside the Executive (e.g. Environment Group, Tourism Group, Public health policy, Press Office) and outside (e.g. FSA, SEPA, stakeholders) are kept fully informed of developments; to support the general management of disease control related policy.

Responsibilities:

Secretariat

- General support to the DSG and Stakeholder Group.
- Dissemination of notes of meetings/instructions.

Personnel: C1, B1

Communications

- Dissemination of policy to public/farmers/media.
- Quick and effective communication to those in the field.
- Departmental and Inter-departmental liaison.
- Stakeholder liaison.
- Parliamentary Statements.
- Parliamentary Questions.
- Briefing.
- Contact point for enquiries from agencies and stakeholders.
- Creation and management of a Helpline.
- Creation and management of an FMD website.
- Dealing with FMD related correspondence (Ministerial and Official).
- Handling national policy issues which develop during the response to the outbreak and its aftermath.
- Co-ordinating a response to any legal appeals against the Executive's handling of FMD (e.g. over culling powers) in conjunction with the Office of the Solicitor to the Scottish Executive (OSSE).

Personnel: C1, 2 B2, 2 B1, Press Officer

Access

- Policy lead on access.
- Attend Access Forum.

Personnel: C1 & B1 Access, Vet support

The Unit includes dedicated **FMD Press Officer, Communications Co-ordinator** and an **Access Officer** seconded from SE Environment Group. These roles are described in more depth in the communication strategy.

FMD Operational Policy Unit

Headed by the existing Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Policy Branch.

Role:

Managing the operational side, and in particular legislation.

Responsibilities:

Legislation Team

- Responsible for producing various Statutory Instruments and Secondary Legislation which need to be created to support the Executive's response.
- Supported by a dedicated Solicitor (who would also be available to other Units dealing with FMD – e.g. the Strategy Unit in responding to any Judicial Reviews) .
- A local authority enforcement/trading standards officer may be brought in as an advisor on the practical aspects of enforcing legislation.

Personnel: B3, B1, Solicitor

Movements Team

- Responsible for devising and implementing movement regimes.
- Works alongside Legislation Team.
- Responsible for policy in Scotland relating to animal movements.
- Includes Agriculture Staff and veterinary input.
- Communication with SEERAD Area Offices, Agricultural Census Branch in SEERAD, Other Government Departments, stakeholders, Local Authorities, police,.
- Liaison with licensing and recording units (SAMU).

Personnel: C1, 1 PAO, SAO, SEGIS, Information Systems Division, Vet support, B2, B1

Compensation Policy Team

- To provide a link between SEERAD and DEFRA.
- Introduce appropriate secondary legislation (in conjunction with Legislation Team).
- Responsible for policy in Scotland relating to compensation.
- Liaison with valuers.
- Co-ordinate the administration of compensation claims in Scotland.

(DEFRA are responsible for compensation payments, but policy liaison and oversight will be required).

Personnel: B3, 2 B1

Disease monitoring Team

- Provide support to both the rest of the Policy Unit, and the Operations Unit, in producing up to date maps illustrating the disease situation.

Personnel: SEGIS mapping support, IS Division

Staffing

Core membership of Units:	provided by the Animal Health and Welfare Division
Additional technical input:	provided from Agriculture Staff and veterinary colleagues
Additional admin input:	provided from elsewhere within the Executive

31. A series of daily meetings will be scheduled to take place across the Command and Control Disease Management Structures. Birdtable meetings form part of this schedule and are to be held at regular intervals throughout each day. Representatives from the main headquarters disease control teams, Agricultural Staff, Press Office, and CAP Management and Agricultural Policy Divisions will attend. Lasting approximately 30 minutes these meetings will provide a forum for immediate concerns / key points of information to be raised and corrective action identified. A draft Birdtable meeting agenda is detailed in Annex N(iii).

Schedule of Meetings

	07:30-08:00	08:00-08:30	09:30-10:00	10:00-11:30	11:30-12:00	12:00-12:30	14:00-15:00	15:30-16:00	16:15-17:15	18:00	19:00-19:30	21:00
Strategic (NDCC)	Birdtable			Emergency Direction Group		Birdtable	RODs Teleconference		Emergency Direction Group	Receive RODs Sitrep	Birdtable	NDCC Report Compiled and Circulated
Pentland House		Birdtable	DSG	11 am stakeholder Meeting (Frequency to be agreed)		Birdtable	Access stakeholder Mtg – Freq to be agreed	DSG		Birdtable		
Operational (LDCC)		Birdtable	Daily Management Control Meeting			stakeholder Mtg (Freq to be agreed) Birdtable	RODs Teleconference		Birdtable	Send SitReps to HQ/NDCC		

Veterinary Unit

The expertise of the Veterinary Unit will be fundamental to the Executive's response to a FMD outbreak. Policy decisions will be based on veterinary risk assessments.

Role:

The CVO Scotland will provide veterinary advice to Ministers and Officials on FMD control in Scotland. The Veterinary Unit will provide veterinary expertise to inform all policy decisions.

Pentland House Agricultural Staff

Agricultural staff have technical expertise in livestock farming and will be vital in informing policy decisions.

Role:

To provide advice and support to the DSG, Ministers and Policy and Strategy Units.
To provide the link between the Agricultural Offices and Headquarters.

Responsibility for the initial production of the Infected Area map(s) remain with SVS Headquarters, Page Street, London, but in close consultation with SVS staff in Pentland House, Agricultural Staff and Animal Health and Welfare Division. There will be a requirement for Agricultural staff to produce related maps for a variety of purposes, for example, Press Office, Web page and letters to farmers. Agricultural staff will draw on the expertise of CAP Management and Drawing Office staff for mapping duties. In an extensive outbreak, it is likely that licence to slaughter and movement licence schemes will be introduced. One of the key responsibilities of the Agricultural Staff will be facilitating these.

Movement Licences

- The Agricultural Staff will work with the Operations Unit to draw up licences, and guidelines for how they should be used. They will co-operate closely with CAPM Division, so that traceability issues are taken into account.
- Area Offices to receive applications and issue licences.

Slaughter Licences

- The Agricultural Staff will work with the Operations Unit to draw up licences, and guidelines for how they should be used. They will also issue these licences from HQ.

Licences in all cases

- These will be issued by the SVS, since they are based on welfare considerations, and will be co-ordinated from the LDCC.

SECTION 4 - FIELD OPERATIONS

32. This section provides an overview of roles and responsibilities in the field. These will be subject to some variation according to local circumstances and will be outlined in more depth in Local Plans, alongside the roles of other public sector agencies e.g. Police, Local Authorities and SEPA. Further information on the contents of Local Plans is outlined in Annex G.

Veterinary Response

Role:

The SVS will be the lead organisation in all aspects of disease control. Further information on SVS role is available in Local Plans.

Head of Veterinary Services (HVS)

Role:

The Head of Veterinary Services will be responsible for directing the veterinary field response in support of Scottish Executive policy, liaising directly with the ROD, DVM and Management Control Team in the LDCCs

Regional Operations Director

Role:

To support the veterinary response as led by the DVM. To co-ordinate all local agencies, to ensure the interests of Scottish Ministers are met in the execution of policy, and to form a link between the DSG and operations on the ground.

(For details of the role and responsibilities of the ROD, see Annex F).

Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM)

Role:

To manage the local veterinary response and more generally (in conjunction with the ROD) the entire local disease control operation.

Responsibilities:

- Initially call together the LDCC Management Control Team for briefing pending the arrival of the ROD.
- Plan the initial Infected Area action, including biosecurity measures, pending the arrival of the ROD.
- Establish the SVS LDCC and field teams.
- Ensure immediate valuation, slaughter and disposal on the initial infected premises pending the arrival of the ROD.
- Advise the Director (Defra) of Procurement of the need to implement procurement initiatives.

Local Agricultural Staff

Role:

The PAO and his staff will provide professional agricultural and administrative support to the DVM and ROD.

Vital role in liaising with the local farming community.

Responsibilities:

- Assessment of applications for, and issue of, Movement Licences.
- Manning of local Helplines.
- Providing resources for the finance function.
- Preparation, issue and delivery of Forms D and E.
- Technical duties in support of Vets at culls, e.g. organising/accompanying valuers.
- Logistical management of Infected Area operations.

Local Authorities

Role:

- Key role in establishing the LDCC (in conjunction with the ROD and DVM).
- Liaison with the local community.
- Role in enforcing the Infected Area regime and all other disease enforcement issues; including supporting aspects of licensing essential animal movements.
- Responding to applications to close land (in consultation with the DVM).
- Emergency Planning support.
- Providing information on use and location of private drinking water supplies.

Local Authorities will be a core element of the disease control response and their responsibilities, particularly in terms of liaising with local communities, will be determined by matters arising at the time.

Police

Role:

The Police have a key role in the enforcement and logistical side of various aspects of the disease control response.

Responsibilities:

- Enforcement of movement controls and patrolling Infected Area.
- Enforcement of access restrictions.
- Stopping vehicles transporting animals, and checking licenses.

SEPA

Role:

Provide relevant environmental expertise and support with respect to the disease control response.

Responsibilities:

- Advice on siting and operation of Cleanse and Disinfection points in the Infected Area, and the disposal of waste from infected premises e.g. used disinfectant, veterinary medicines, feedstuffs, livestock slurries and animal manures etc.
- Advice on the disposal of abattoir and lairage wastes.
- Input into the animal carcass disposal policy.
- Prior assessment of all proposed burning or burial sites.
- Advice on the use of authorised incinerators, rendering plant and landfill sites for carcass disposal.
- Monitoring of environmental quality and impacts of disease control policy, as appropriate.

SCOTTISH SPCA

Role:

To provide a uniformed presence to assist with animal welfare functions as directed by the Regional Operations Director.

Responsibilities

- Assistance with monitoring compliance with movement licences including accompanying vehicles on request.
- Provide independent welfare audit on request by the SVS.

Armed Forces

If the scale of the outbreak is such that existing resources are not able to cope, assistance will be sought from the Armed Forces.

Role:

If they become involved, it is expected that their role will be in the provision of logistical assistance and support to the ROD and DVM.

SE Press Officer

A **SE Press Officer** will be located in the LDCC.

Role:

- Liaison with the local media.
- Co-ordination with the ROD, DVM and PAO and Head of Press FMD Team.
- Co-ordination on media issues with other agencies and stakeholders e.g. Local Authority, SEPA, Police.

SECTION 5 – COMMUNICATION

33. Communications is an area where key lessons emerged from the experiences of the 2001 FMD outbreak and further points were noted in the FMD Inquiry Reports, which highlight the importance of communications in successful disease control. The Scottish Executive commissioned independent consultants to produce a report containing recommendations for a Communications Strategy to use alongside this Contingency Plan in the event of another FMD outbreak.

34. Key features of the communications strategy include:

- Detailed course of action for each stage of an outbreak (suspect, confirmed, ongoing)
- Clear description of the policy position on the naming of locations
- Definitions of roles and responsibilities with job descriptions for key players
- Description of tools and infrastructures used to disseminate information effectively
- A communication Matrix, identifying a wide range of audiences, the information each will require and the best channel of communication with them

35. It is expected that in addition to the national level Communications Strategy, communications issues will also be addressed in Local Contingency Plans. For more details on communications, see the SE Animal Disease Control Communications Strategy, which will be published in Spring 2004.

Internal

36. The FMD Strategy Unit will be responsible for ensuring that Scottish policy is effectively communicated. For this reason a role has been created for a Communications Co-ordinator, who will be responsible for overseeing the effective dissemination of accurate information both internally and externally. A priority will be to ensure that the staff in the field are fully aware of policy, but it will also be vital that appropriate communication is undertaken with other parts of the Scottish Executive, particularly Environment, Health, Enterprise and Tourism colleagues to ensure that the disease control work is fully joined up with any work on its wider impact.

Veterinary Emergency instructions

37. Where a specific Scottish delivery plan is developed and instructions need to be issued to veterinary field staff; this will be done through existing channels by the SVS Headquarters staff. Similarly any veterinary instructions which do not apply in Scotland will not be directly issued to Scottish field staff but will be copied to DVMs for information.

SECTION 6 - RESOURCES

38. In devising this Plan the Scottish Executive has made a commitment that additional resources will be made available from elsewhere within the Executive and its Agencies to support the Environment and Rural Affairs Department in its lead Department role. The Executive is working to develop an Emergency Cadre of staff who can be identified and quickly released to help with the Executive response in any emergency situation, such as an outbreak of animal disease.

39. Part of this strategy means that staff working in an intense policy area will be rotated as appropriate to ensure that they are not overburdened to the detriment of their health. This is a key element from the lessons learnt from 2001 outbreak, and reflects army policy.

LDCCs

40. The Scottish Executive is responsible for providing the LDCC infrastructure and locations will be identified in Local Contingency Plans. In the first instance this will be established with the capacity of responding simultaneously to 10 Infected Premises and will be adjusted to meet the circumstances at the time.

41. The DVM will set up a LDCC when disease is confirmed. DVMs will identify and regularly review the availability of potential LDCCs. They will also maintain information on suppliers and contractors should temporary accommodation be required and ensure access to telephone / IT equipment. The Executive will also be prepared to deploy and connect its own communications infrastructure at immediate notice. (Details on locations and capacity requirements of LDCCs are detailed in Annex E).

IT Infrastructure

42. The main computer system for FMD control is fmd-DCS. This is currently operating only for training purposes but will be made active in the event of a disease emergency. DVMs will ensure that all their AHO staff are familiar with the functionality of the DCS, requesting training from SVS IT Unit as appropriate. Work is in hand to ensure adequate access to DCS from the Executive's SCOTS system and it will also be made available to operational partners who require access.

Procurement

43. The Animal Health budget responsible for funding disease control strategy is held by DEFRA on a GB basis. This reflects the need for co-ordinated action within a single epidemiological unit and the ability to exploit economies of scale in procurement. As such, operational procurement will be co-ordinated with DEFRA and will take advantage of various call-off contracts which have been established as part of GB-wide contingency planning arrangements.

44. The Defra Procurement and Contracts Division (PCD) will provide a team to operate at operational level from 72 hours or sooner, in a declared emergency, to manage all of the procurement activities at a local level. These will include a Commercial Manager (Procurement), Contracts Manager, Purchasing Manager, Quantity Surveyor, Field Store

Manager and Field Manager (Procurement). Forensic accountants will be engaged prior to receipt and approval of supplier/contractor invoices and will be responsible for the certification, verification and evaluation of these invoices.

45. The ROD/ DVMs will ensure that PCD have been contacted at the suspect case stage, so that the appropriate resources can be placed on standby. Sources of supply for personnel have been identified by PCD and these resources can be called upon in the event of a notifiable disease outbreak or other emergency situation. Best practice guidance is available to Animal Health Divisional Offices which will provide support until Procurement staff arrive and will include guidance covering the triggering of contingency contracts; authorisation and use of emergency purchase orders and procurement cards; and contract management and letting.

Contracts

46. Defra PCD are, and will be responsible for ensuring that robust, value for money contracts are let and mobilised for goods, services and works requirements including their contract management and forensic examination. These contracts will be let on a regional and local basis, in consultation with local animal health offices, and supply contingency arrangements to meet all foreseeable requirements of an emergency or notifiable disease outbreak. All Suppliers will be vetted and will be subject to regular review.

47. These contracts and arrangements will include but not be limited to slaughter and disposal, shepherds, gatherers and ancillary equipment; carcass pick-up; preliminary C&D including detoxification units; slurry treatments, management and disposal; lagoon and environmental protection measures; electrical works and technical services associated with discrete supply chains, e.g. dairy engineers. Details of contingency contracts will be held locally (at each Animal Health Divisional office) and centrally (PCD).

48. A supplementary list of suppliers will be kept in Animal Health Offices as a back-up to the contingency contracts already in place, and these are likely to be engaged where a notifiable disease cannot be confined either in scale or geographically.

49. These lists include, for each AHDO, a list of transport companies indicating the number and type of vehicles that the companies have available for immediate use together with the companies' ability to scale up supply within defined timescales.

Procurement by the Scottish Executive

50. Procurement of goods and services required for administrative support (including accommodation, furniture, personnel and utilities) is the responsibility of the Scottish Executive. SE Procurement Division will liaise with the ROD to ensure that these are procured in line with Scottish Executive policy. Consultation between DEFRA's PCD and Scottish Executive Procurement Division would be undertaken as necessary.

Serological capacity

51. A serosurveillance facility run by the Scottish Agricultural College is available at Dumfries. In the event of a disease outbreak within the GB, diagnostic samples would only go to Pirbright/Veterinary Laboratories Agency which are the National Reference

Laboratories. The Dumfries facility is designed to handle low risk samples associated with serosurveillance operations.

52. When undertaking serosurveillance exercises within Scotland samples would initially go to the Dumfries facility and only then be sent to laboratories in England if there was a shortage of capacity. Where the disease outbreak occurred in other parts of the GB the serosurveillance facility at Dumfries would be put on standby and would be ready to be used for processing samples in the event of a shortfall in the laboratory capacity local to the outbreak.

ANNEX A

FORM A and FORM C

FORM A - Notice declaring infected place

FORM B - Withdrawal of notice declaring infected place (Form A)

Web link to Form B

<http://intranet.defra.gsi.gov.uk/v1p3r/Common/Forms/FM31.pdf>

FORM C - Certificate of suspected disease

FORM D - Notice to owner or person in charge of animals exposed to infection or to occupier of premises where such animals are or have been situated, imposing restrictions

Web link to Form D

<http://intranet.defra.gsi.gov.uk/v1p3r/Common/Forms/FM37A.pdf>

External version: web link to all forms
Internal version: add in paper versions of all forms

ANNEX B

MEASURES APPLYING IN SURVEILLANCE AND PROTECTION ZONES

Introduction and Outline

53. When disease is first confirmed, measures to contain and severely limit any spread of virus either by animal or other (eg vehicles) means will be implemented immediately in an area not less than 10 km surrounding the Infected Premises (IP). As set out in EC Legislation the boundaries should use natural defining features, e.g. roads, rivers, railways, footpaths. The Infected Area will be expanded as necessary in response to any further cases of confirmed disease and the perimeter will always be at least 10 km from the nearest IP. Normally, these disease containment or biosecurity related measures applicable to the Infected Area(s) will continue until 21 days after the last outbreak in that particular area. Other measures may work on a different timescale.

Main Infected Area (biosecurity) Measures

54. The main measures can be summarised:

Mandatory

- A footbath containing an approved disinfectant and a cleansing and disinfection (C&D) point placed at the entrances to all livestock farms.
- Thorough cleansing and disinfection of people, vehicles and machinery moving on and off livestock farms will apply. It is important to note that arable machinery will require licensing and C&D when moving to or from livestock farms.
- Stringent animal movement controls will apply, i.e. no movements of animals except under licence to slaughter or on extreme welfare grounds. Livestock can be moved through the Infected Area by motorway, trunk road or railway, provided that the animals are not unloaded within the Infected Area.
- No unlicensed contact between animals from different premises.
- Licensing of silage, straw, milk, and disposal of slurry will apply.
- Enforcement patrols will ensure the implementation of Infected Area measures
- Access rights and Rights of Way through and within the Infected Area will be closed. SEERAD will provide explanatory leaflets.

Discretionary

- Manned C&D units will be placed at the entrances to all dairy and pig farms 24 hours daily, resources permitting; otherwise subject to veterinary risk assessment.
- Milk tankers, designated for use exclusively in the Infected Area, accompanied by SVS or SEERAD officials in the area, to ensure thorough C & D on and off premises.
- Option of SEERAD officials accompanying slurry tankers to ensure thorough C&D on and off farms.
- Feed lorries (accompanied by mobile C&D teams to carry out and ensure thorough C&D on and off farms) to go to only one farm in each visit to the Infected Area, resources permitting; otherwise subject to veterinary risk assessment.

- Based on veterinary advice, mandatory C&D stations for all vehicles may be established on all exit routes from the Infected Area. For health and safety reasons, there are no C&D points on major trunk routes. C&D points would be sited on the side roads accessing major routes.

Local Management and Co-ordination

55. Successful management of FMD controls depends on the co-operation of all the agencies involved. To achieve this co-operation, a LDCC Management Control Team will be set up immediately when FMD is confirmed. It will comprise the DVM, ROD, PAO, Local Authorities (LAs), Police, and SEPA. Others, such as the army or fire brigade, may be co-opted for specific projects as the need arises. Normally this group will meet in the LDCC twice a day in the initial phase and will themselves determine the required frequency thereafter. Where more than one Local Authority or police force is involved all will be expected to participate. The LDCC Management Control Team would be expected to liaise on all FMD issues including Infected Area (biosecurity) issues.

56. In consultation with the LDCC Management Control Team, the ROD will set up a local stakeholders group, specifically to address Infected Area issues. Membership could include industry representatives, the Community Council, as well as some local individuals with business or other interests which might not be represented otherwise (e.g. forestry, fish farms, tourism, schools, church). The stakeholder group would meet as frequently as desired in the early phase of an outbreak and then possibly weekly, but this would be determined in light of the circumstances.

Division of Responsibilities

The key partners in the operation of an Infected Area are:

57. **SEERAD** Pentland House will ensure the legislative base and, with the NDCC in London, produce the formal maps defining the Infected Area and update this in response to the developing circumstances. Through the LDCC, the ROD will arrange for the notification of all public utilities, feed companies, dairies and milk collection companies, and others who may regularly visit farms in the area and for a press release for public information. Local radio will also be used where possible. Through the LDCC all licence issues will be undertaken. The ROD will arrange, on the advice of the DVM and resources permitting, for disinfectant teams to be placed at the entrances to all dairy and pig farms; for the setting up of mobile C&D Units, and for disinfectant points, including footbaths, to be sited at the entrances to all other livestock farms. He/she will enlist the help of the Local Authority in setting up and manning these teams.

58. The **State Veterinary Service** will provide advice and guidance to the other agencies when and where required. The SVS will provide and train personnel, and quality assure the biosecurity operations in the Infected Area.

59. Considerable **Local Authority and Roads Department** input will be required in identifying all exit points from the Infected Area and in identifying suitable sites where – if deemed necessary - roadside C&D stations would be set up. Such a decision would be on the advice of the DVM. The operation of these C&D stations would involve labour and

supervision in addition to the supply and servicing of equipment. Local Authorities will also have a role in informing those in the area, e.g. Community Councils, schools, etc., in monitoring and enforcing the legislative requirements, and in supporting aspects of licensing essential animal movements.. The **Local Authority Authorised Officers/Animal Health Inspectors** will be involved in ensuring that the community follows the necessary biosecurity measures (including banning recreational access to the countryside and the use of rights of way) with, if necessary, a view to prosecutions.

60. The **Police** have a key role in traffic flow and logistical advice in setting up any C&D stations, in patrolling within the Infected Area to ensure compliance and checking for licences where appropriate.

61. **SEPA** has a major role in advising on the siting and operation of any C&D stations where a number of aspects, such as disinfectant run off, may be an issue.

62. **NFU Scotland** will have a major role in helping to communicate information to the industry.

Resources

63. If recommended by the DVM, Local Authorities would be expected to equip and man any disinfection roadside stations. The number of disinfection stations would be identified with the help of the Roads/Highways Department and Police and would depend on the extent of the Infected Area and the number of roads exiting. A team of 2 or 3 for each station is suggested, and each station would require to be manned 24 hours for the duration of the biosecurity related restrictions, thus requiring staff rotas or shifts. Thus, a direct labour force or rapid recruitment of staff would be required. Equipment would include road warning signs, disinfection equipment such as power washers, water supply (possibly bowsers), water tankers to refill bowsers, disinfectant supply (citric acid), arc lights for night operation, traffic lights, generators, shelters for staff, toilet, equipment & chemical store, means to collect or contain run-off, and mobile telephones. It is recommended that Local Authorities draw up a comprehensive list of requirements in liaison with the local DVM and consider means of delivering this in their Local Plan. Local Authorities may also be asked to help, on the advice of the DVM, with supply of manpower and equipment for C&D stations at dairy and pig farm entrances and mobile C&D units to perform other biosecurity functions such as accompanying feed lorries in the Infected Area. There is a need to keep records of all visitors to livestock farms and those passing through manned roadside C&D stations so that any claims for damage may subsequently be addressed.

64. Local Authorities would also be responsible for all enforcement issues and required to participate in the LDCC Management Control Team and to consider what other local issues would need to be addressed e.g. local publicity/liaison, helpline etc.

65. Depending on the size of the Infected Area, the police should normally expect to have at least one patrol car operating within the Area to give visibility to the operation and to challenge any agricultural vehicle moving without a licence. In addition, a senior officer should participate in the LDCC Management Control Team.

66. SEPA should have at least one officer involved in FMD operations providing advice on all aspects, including Infected Area operations, through the LDCC Management Control Team.

ANNEX C

BIOSECURITY ADVICE FOR FARMERS AND THOSE KEEPING LIVESTOCK

67. In the event of a new outbreak of FMD anywhere in Great Britain, the following information will be widely distributed by the Scottish Executive and displayed on the Executive's website. The Executive has developed a Biosecurity Code detailing measures to be taken as a matter of routine to guard against FMD. For details of this, as well as advice for use during an outbreak, see the Biosecurity website, which will be regularly updated in the event of FMD (<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/about/erad/rah/00015721/biosecurity.aspx>).

68. IF YOU SUSPECT THAT YOUR ANIMAL(S) HAS FMD, ISOLATE IT/THEM AND STOP ALL LIVESTOCK MOVEMENT. CONTACT YOUR LOCAL ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICE IMMEDIATELY:

Ayr; Tel: 01292 268525

Galashiels; Tel: 01896 758806

Perth; Tel: 01738 602211

Inverurie; Tel: 01467 626300

Inverness; Tel: 01463 253098

Key Information

69. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is caused by a highly infectious virus and among farm stock, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and deer are susceptible. Elephants, camelids, hedgehogs, rats and any wild cloven-footed animals can also contract it.

70. FMD can be spread by:

- Direct contact with an infected animal.
- Airborne spread from an infected animal.
- Indirectly by infected material carried on vehicles' tyres and wheel arches and on machinery. The meaning of vehicles in this instance includes pick-ups, quad bikes, tractors, combines, trailers, any delivery vehicles, milk tankers, feed and fertiliser lorries.
- The virus can also be spread via persons (e.g. hands, hair, boots), clothing, sheepdogs, scavenging animals, vermin, and any other equipment.

Clinical signs of FMD

71. Quickly recognising clinical signs of FMD in livestock is vital to controlling the disease and preventing it from spreading.

72. In cattle and pigs the signs of disease are usually readily seen. Sheep do not always show obvious clinical signs of FMD.

Sheep

There is a chance that some sheep in your flock, or single sheep, may be infected without you realising it. Look out for these signs:

- Blister(s) in the dental pad (upper gum).
- Sheep may show lameness and the feet may be hot to the touch.
- Loss of appetite.
- Sudden death in young lambs.
- Whitening and blisters on the coronary band (top of hoof). These may be small and covered with hair. If the blisters have burst, hair may be damp and bacterial infection may be present.
- Abortions.
- Blisters around the mouth are rare, but be aware.

Cattle

- Temperature increase of 2-3°C.
- Loss of appetite.
- Reduced milk yield.
- Lameness with the presence of painful lesions on the feet, making the animal uncomfortable and causing it to shift its weight. Feet feel hot to the touch. Cattle may flick feet as if a stone is lodged.
- Drooling saliva and chomping of jaws.
- Nasal discharge.
- Lesions and areas of whitening in the mouth which can develop into fluid-filled blisters on the tongue.
- The presence of blisters on the teats.

Pigs

- Temperature increase of 2-3°C.
- Loss of appetite.
- Huddling together.
- Lameness, feet feel hot to the touch and unwillingness to stand.
- Hunching their backs if made to move.
- Development of white lesions and blisters on the coronary band (top of hoof) and snout.

Stopping the spread of FMD

73. Stringent biosecurity measures can help to avoid disease occurring or spreading to other animals. It is important to apply the biosecurity precautions that suit your farm.

Look for early signs of disease

74. Carry out regular inspections of your animals. Make sure that they are properly restrained and that there is enough light to examine their mouth, feet and teats and check temperatures.

Deal with sheep last

75. Signs of FMD in sheep can be more difficult to spot. These animals are a major threat to other stock, as you would not know whether you are spreading infection from your sheep.

Keep Livestock separate

76.

- At the first sign of disease, isolate sick animals and stop all livestock movement.
- Keep fencing in good repair. Stop nose to nose contact of your animals with your neighbours' animals. Well maintained electric fencing or a wide unbroken hedge, ditch or similar, are suggested solutions. Where possible, try to keep an empty field, watercourse, wood or road between your livestock and anybody else's.
- Avoid putting cattle on pasture that has been grazed by sheep for at least 6 weeks. Ask your vet for advice.
- Keep new animals separate from your livestock for 20 days. This allows FMD symptoms to develop and tests to be carried out without endangering other animals.

Keep yourself clean

77.

- The virus can survive on surfaces such as hands, hair, boots and clothing.
- If all your animals are at one location, keep a set of clothing or overalls to wear when working with them. If your livestock are at several locations, keep separate clothing/overalls for each group. Clothing should be washed at the hottest temperature for the material, before being worn near a different group of animals.
- Remove any mud or dung from footwear before applying approved disinfectant. Brush hard in the direction of the tread. Make sure that disinfectant footbaths are kept clean and that disinfectant is changed regularly. Keep footbaths covered so that rain does not dilute the disinfectant.
- After handling animals, clean and then disinfect clothing, footwear and equipment and wash your hands with soap and water.
- If returning from other livestock or a livestock farm away from your farm, you must change your clothes and footwear before you visit your own animals.

Keep the farm secure

78.

- Provide cleaning and disinfectant materials (brush, hose, water, disinfectant and, if possible, a pressure washer) for all visitors/workers on arrival and departure and have protective clothing/footwear/disposable gloves available for on-farm use.

- Make sure your boundaries are secure. Stray animals could carry infection to or from your stock. Pests and vermin can spread disease. Ensure that feed is securely stored to avoid unwanted vermin activity.
- Dissuade callers from having contact with livestock. Display notices directing callers to the farmhouse or office first.
- Clearly identify buildings where your animals are housed and ask people to keep out. Risk assessments by veterinary and scientific experts advise that walkers who have had no contact with livestock pose a small risk in spreading FMD. However, access will be closed if disease is confirmed – throughout the infected area only.

Keep unnecessary vehicles away

79.

- Infected material can be carried anywhere on the vehicle or its load, as well as on the driver's hands, clothes or footwear.
- Encourage visitors to park at a safe point outside the farm's entrance. Have a cleaning and disinfecting point at the farm's entrance/exit points for visitors to clean and then disinfect footwear and equipment. If a vehicle has to come onto your farm the vehicle must be thoroughly cleaned and then disinfected and, if possible, parked away from livestock.

Clean and disinfect

80.

- All vehicles and trailers must be cleaned and then disinfected before entering and leaving your farm. Firstly, use water to wash off all mud before applying disinfectant. If the vehicle is dirty, disinfectant will not kill the virus. Ensure that hard to reach areas, for example, the wheels and wheel arches are properly cleaned.
- Make sure the inside of the vehicle is cleaned as well, including the foot wells, pedals and mats. Clean all areas used for carrying other things such as feed, bedding or equipment.

Avoid visiting other farms

81.

- Visiting other farms risks spreading the disease. If this is unavoidable, follow the cleaning and disinfecting advice. Relief milkers, stockmen and contractors should follow all these precautions.
- Take as little onto the farm as possible and, if you can, wear boots and clothing supplied by your neighbour. Your dog could be carrying infective material on its fur or feet, so it is best left at home.
- Avoid driving through dung, slurry or manure on the road. If any material falls from your vehicle then, if possible, sweep it off the road so other vehicles, people or animals cannot pick it up and cause the disease to spread further.

82. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICE. AN ON-CALL 24-HOUR SERVICE IS PROVIDED FOR EMERGENCIES.

ANNEX D(i)

ACCESS OUTSIDE A FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE INFECTED AREA

Guidance on Risk

83. The only people and/or their modes of transport (e.g. bicycles) who risk spreading FMD are those who have direct or close contact with infected farms or farms incubating FMD. Infected farms are put under statutory restrictions and access to and from them is limited to essential visitors and essential vehicles only – when strict disease prevention measures (biosecurity) must be observed.

84. Risks of disease being spread by those seeking recreational access to the countryside are very small, and can be eliminated by avoiding direct contact between people and/or vehicles (including bicycles) where livestock are kept or have been in the last 28 days. There is no reason to close access to land in areas outwith the Infected Area. People visiting areas of the countryside outside an Infected Area will be asked to follow the general biosecurity advice later in this chapter.

85. However, landowners/farmers in close proximity to an Infected Area or those who have strong reasons to believe they will be exposed to higher risks, have recourse to suggest that their land is closed. In any such case, the landowner/farmer must complete a risk assessment that demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Local Authority Access Officer and the Divisional Veterinary Manager, that the proposed closure is justified. Subject to central guidance from Scottish Ministers, and only with the agreement of the Divisional Veterinary Manager and Scottish Ministers, can the Local Authority sanction closure outside an Infected Area. Closure should be specific and time limited. Any such closures should also be notified formally to Scottish Ministers (Pentland House FMD Strategy Unit) and will be published on the Scottish Executive FMD website. The public can therefore assume that where there is no official closure then the situation is ‘access as normal’. Information for the public or farmers on these risks and the model risk assessment form are in this chapter and in Annex D (ii).

Responsibility

86. Access policy in a disease situation will be directed by the Executive’s Disease Strategy Group, due to its importance to disease control and the need for veterinary input. The Executive’s Environment Group (who take the lead in access policy) will provide staff to manage access policy in an FMD emergency, reporting to the Head of the FMD Strategy Unit in Pentland House. This person will liaise with Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) about establishing a Disease Access Forum, initially under the chairmanship of the Executive, bringing together key representatives from public bodies and other organisations with an interest in recreational access to provide information and discuss issues relating to access outwith the Infected Area. Local Authorities will wish to draw upon advice from smaller local access forums in their locality and feed information from these groups into the Disease Access Forum.

87. Implementation of access policy on the ground will be the responsibility of the Local Authorities. They will have the power to sanction closures of land outwith the Infected Area but only after approval by Scottish Ministers (see above). The Executive plans to develop a recognised official sign which can be adapted locally to add the relevant Local Authority

logo. This will allow for consistency across the country and will provide clear advice to the public on the closure of land. Local Authority websites should contain details of all official closures in their area. All closures must be specific and time limited and notified to Scottish Ministers. Local Authorities should ensure that a balanced and consistent approach is being taken. The Executive and Local Authority websites will also be supported by information in the local and national press. Furthermore, teletext and ceefax could be another source for obtaining access information.

Legislation

88. Upon confirmation of FMD, a statutory Order will be made granting powers to Local Authorities to permit official closures of land where a risk assessment, agreed by the Local Authority Access Officer and DVM/Scottish Ministers, shows that it is justified.

Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003

89. Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 establishes rights of responsible access to land and inland water for recreation, passage and other purposes. The emphasis of Part 1 of the Act is on the local management of access. A duty is placed on local authorities to assert, protect and keep open and free from obstruction any route or means by which access rights are exercised. In the event of an outbreak of a disease such as FMD however these powers are over-riden, within the RIA, by FMD related legislation. Local Authorities, in conjunction with local access forums, will continue to have a role in resolving local issues with veterinary advice being disseminated via the Disease Access Forum. If, however, landowners prevent or deter access rights by putting up signs in areas outwith the RIA, local authorities can serve notices on landowners to remove signs or if necessary they can remove the signs.

Part 1 of the Act will not be implemented until the Scottish Outdoor Access Code has been approved by both Ministers and the Parliament. This is expected to be in the second half of 2004. The Code provides guidance on the rights and responsibilities of access.

Communication

90. Guidance on risks associated with FMD and access must be issued to farmers, emphasising the presumption in favour of access outwith the Infected Area and outlining restrictions and the procedure for official closure if deemed necessary. In addition, guidance will be issued to all major access bodies and stakeholders giving the same information via the Disease Access Forum. All stakeholders and tourism-related bodies should consider how best to disseminate the message within their organisations and to their customers. To protect the rural economy, it should be stressed wherever possible that the countryside is 'open' and that in land outside Infected Areas (and any land which is officially closed), tourism and other activities can carry on as usual.

General Biosecurity Advice

91. During an FMD outbreak, people using the countryside in areas that are open (i.e. outwith the Infected Area) will be asked to follow the biosecurity advice below on each visit to the countryside:

92. Biosecurity is the responsibility of everybody – it means ways in which farmers, other owners of farm animals, and people who live, work, visit and enjoy the countryside can reduce the risk of FMD occurring or spreading to other animals.

93. If you have handled cattle, sheep, goats, pigs or farmed deer in the last 7 days please stay off all other farm land.

- start your walk or ride, etc. with clean equipment, footwear and clothing;
- park your car away from livestock;
- use disinfectant baths where provided;
- observe official notices;
- avoid farm steadings and yards;
- do not approach, touch, feed or handle livestock;
- leave gates as you find it; (Note this reflects both the Biosecurity and the Access Code; keep dogs on a lead at all times – dogs run the risk of disturbing and dispersing other animals and wildlife and can be attracted by dung;
- do not leave waste or scraps of food or litter; and
- clean and, if possibly, disinfect⁶ your vehicle between visits to the countryside. Pay particular attention to areas which are hard to clean/not immediately visible, for example, wheel arches. Thoroughly clean and then, if possible, disinfect all footwear, clothing, bicycles, etc., after each use.

Information on Risk outside an Infected Area

Origin of visitors

94. Walkers or ramblers pose a very low risk of spreading FMD; the only people who carry any real risk of spreading FMD are those from infected farms or farms that are incubating disease. People who pass close to the Infected Area on roads are unlikely to pick up the virus. Those, with livestock interests, who come to the Non-Infected Area from an Infected Area should reduce any risk of disease transfer by changing into fresh, clean clothing and footwear, and thoroughly clean and then disinfect their vehicles on leaving the Infected Area (including pressure washing of the underside, wheelarches, wheels and tyres.) Livestock farmers should ensure that all visitors are following biosecurity guidance to ensure that disease is not brought on or taken off their farm or land.

Animals in fields

95. Any small risk that exists outside an Infected Area can be avoided by limiting direct contact between people/vehicles/bikes and livestock. Access onto land that holds animals where the chance of direct contact is low, or onto land that might in the near future hold animals, poses low risk. Mud or dung infected with the virus would have to be deposited by a walker and then ingested by an animal while the virus was still active. The likelihood of oral transmission to grazing animals is further reduced because there needs to be a high dose of infection by the oral route for ruminants (i.e. ingesting infected soil or dung). In the summer,

⁶ Approved disinfectants that can be used to reduce the risk of disease occurring or spreading include Antec (different brands, with different concentrations required, e.g. Antec Virkon S), FAM 30 and Biocid 30. A list of suppliers is available from your local Animal Health Office: **Ayr**; Tel: 01292 268525; **Galashiels**; Tel: 01896 758806; **Perth**; Tel: 01738 602211; **Inverurie**; Tel: 01467 626300 and **Inverness**; Tel: 01463 253098.

the survival time of the virus in the environment declines markedly. Paths through enclosed ground, holding animals at such densities that direct contact is likely, should be diverted or a temporary fence erected.

Livestock roaming on the open hill

96. Livestock on the open hillside tend to shy away from human contact and so are less likely to come into contact with infected mud or dung. It is important that visitors to the countryside adhere to biosecurity guidance and pay attention to official (local authority) closure signs. The risk of spreading disease is low outwith the Infected Area. However, considerable care should be taken if moving from an Infected Area into a Non- Infected Area to prevent disease transfer.

Deer roaming on the open hill

97. Although deer can become carriers of FMD, in the open they tend to flee from walkers and do not often mix with other livestock. Therefore, there is a low risk of them spreading disease to other species.

Areas with unfenced roads

98. In some parts of the country, it is common agricultural practice for animals to have the freedom to roam over large areas of open grazing, which may include unfenced roads. In the event of a disease outbreak in, for example, a crofting area, animals will be enclosed and stringent biosecurity measures will be in place within the Infected Area. These actions will help to reduce the risk of virus being transferred from the Infected Area via mud or dung on vehicles, people, etc to Non-Infected areas. Furthermore, the risk of disease being brought into a crofting county from an Infected Area elsewhere should also be minimised by biosecurity measures, which will be in force in Infected Areas.

ANNEX D(ii)

MODEL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM

FMD RISK ASSESSMENT RELATING TO PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE

Local Authorities can only close land or footpaths outwith the Infected Area restrictions if they provide a risk assessment which satisfies themselves, the Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM) and Scottish Ministers that there is a FMD related risk factor that cannot be mitigated and which requires official closure.

This risk assessment form is provided for farmers, crofters and landowners as the basis for demonstrating risk to the Local Authority and applies to all applications for closure.

If a site or property can be divided into management compartments according to use and/or degree of risk this may enable separate assessments to be carried out for each area. However, all areas should be assessed at the same time if possible.

Any closure signs without formal and legal authority may bring the official risk-assessment based system into disrepute.

PROPERTY/SITE	Site/Compartment	Ref No	File No
Description of Site (Tick all categories that apply) House / castle / monument... Garden... Park... Countryside... Farmland... Woodland... Mountain / moorland... Loch/ River... Coast... <i>Note, only access to farmland containing livestock poses significant risk.</i>			
Recreational Activities			
Farming activities (Tick all categories that apply) Enclosed livestock ... Hill grazing ... Other (Specify):			
	HAZARD	NO	YES
			MITIGATION
			EXPLAIN WHY MITIGATION NOT POSSIBLE
1.	Location:		
	Are there any specific issues relating to location that would increase risk of FMD transmission?		
	Comments and mitigating action proposed:		
2.	Livestock:	NO	YES
i)	Paths cross enclosed fields with		Re-route access

	stock <i>Note: Where there is a low density of stock – less risk.</i>			Move stock Temporary fencing Signs	
ia)	Unfenced ground adjacent to roads <i>Note: Where there is a low density of stock – less risk.</i>			Where occasional high density of stock e.g. feeding times – move car parks, signs, temporary fencing	
ii)	Livestock on open hill?			Follow Scottish Outdoor Access Code	
iii)	Are livestock fed on open hill adjacent to access?			Follow Scottish Outdoor Access Code	
iv)	Do they habitually approach visitors?			Follow Scottish Outdoor Access Code	
v)	Do footpaths cross steadings on livestock farms? <i>Note, if animals housed, less risk.</i>			Re-route access	
Comments and mitigating action proposed:					
3.	Presence of wild deer, and goats	NO	YES		
i)	Are any of these present?			Follow Scottish Outdoor Access Code: keep to paths, keep dog on lead, minimise disturbance	
Comments and mitigating action proposed:					
4.	Vehicular Access	NO	YES		
i)	Shared with farm traffic?			Separate; disinfectant mats	
ii)	In crofting areas, do livestock have access to car parks and habitually gather in them?			Provide cleaning/disinfectant facility	
Comments and mitigating action proposed:					
5.	Visitors	NO	YES		
i)	Do they have dogs or horses?			Advise dogs kept on short lead, follow equine protocol	
ii)	Do they drop litter, are there litter bins?			Provide litterbins and empty them on a daily basis	
Comments and mitigating action proposed:					
Summary of mitigating action required:					

<p>Consultation with (who spoken to and responses):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Local Farmers b. Neighbours c. Local Community d. Divisional Veterinary Manager
<p>Please list concerns raised, by whom, and record what action(s) is proposed to meet those concerns:</p>
<p>Overall Recommendation for opening/closure:</p>

Assessor's Signature:

Date:

Designation:

DVM's Comments and Recommendation(s):

DVM's Signature:

Date:

Authorised in SEERAD HQ by:

Date:

Valid until:

Review Date:

ANNEX D(iii)

OFFICIAL SIGNAGE FOR CLOSURE OF FOOTPATHS

Foot and Mouth Disease Infected Area

This LAND is closed to recreational access

In exercise of powers conferred by the Animal
Health Act 1981, superseding Part 1 of the
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003

<LA Logo>



SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE

ANNEX E

RESOURCES FOR LOCAL DISEASE CONTROL CENTRE

99. This Annex outlines what needs to be considered when identifying a LDCC location and what resources are required to make it operational.

100. Location of a LDCC will be determined by a number of factors including:

- Location of the outbreak and potential for spread
- Availability of accommodation
- Road network to and from location
- Car parking
- Main services (particularly power and telephone line capacity).

101. The requirements set out below will also have a bearing on where the LDCC is established. All these factors will be considered by the DVMs in conjunction with other local agencies, and this will be reflected in the Local Plans. Initially it may be decided to establish the LDCC at the Animal Health Office. It must be recognised that given that the size of the 5 Scottish Animal Health Divisions there can be no certainty that a LDCC will be located in the same Council area as the outbreak.

Capacity requirements:

102.

- Main LDCC floor – open plan (guide 6,000 sq ft / 600 sq m)
- Briefing room for up to 150 people
- Individual meeting rooms, media briefing rooms, and offices (guide 6-8 rooms)
- Laboratory facilities and secure sample handling room
- Facility to clean, disinfect and dry protective clothing
- Storage for chemicals and other stores with direct access to loading/unloading area (guide 1,000 sq ft / 100 sq m)
- Secure storage for guns, ammunition, and medicines (guide 400 sq ft / 40 sq m)
- Stationery store and registry
- File server/communications room
- Canteen and rest area; toilets and showers
- Perimeter fence or boundary wall for site security
- Biosecurity points at building entries and vehicle wash in car park
- Car parking (guide 400-500 vehicles).

Staffing requirements:

103. Tackling an outbreak of 10 cases of FMD would require significant numbers of staff from a number of different disciplines. The experience of the last outbreak would suggest that staff numbers of the following order would be required for a major outbreak, with numbers dependent on circumstances of the outbreak and procedures employed.

- Around 150 vets – drawn from SVS resources and TVIs.
- Around 150 S/AHOs – again drawn from SVS resources.
- Approximately 200-250 field and office staff for Infected Area enforcement - based on staff enforcing movement restrictions on all roads into Infected Area and requirements to accompany milk tankers, etc.
- Approximately 100 administrative staff – including existing Animal Health Office staff, to be drawn from Executive resources.
- Around 10 procurement (depends on the scale of the outbreak) staff – drawn from Defra PCD sources of supply, supported by a small administrative team.

104. Significant staff resources are required at the beginning of an outbreak, with a tendency towards over rather than under staffing. The resources can then be built up or wound down as the outbreak develops or subsides.

Communication requirements:

105.

- PCs and printers (approximately 300 for a fully staffed LDCC dealing with a major outbreak)
- Internal cabling
- Sufficient telephone lines
- Prodigious power supply
- File server(s)
- GIS machines, software and plotters (number dependent on size of outbreak).

Facilities management requirements:

106.

- Site security
- Canteen operation (including very early/late operations)
- Laundry service
- Building maintenance and cleaning.

ANNEX F

ROLE OF REGIONAL OPERATIONS DIRECTOR (ROD)

107. A ROD will be appointed whose principal role will be co-ordination of all local agencies and input into the Disease Strategy Group. The ROD will manage all non-veterinary aspects of the LDCC. The ROD will work alongside the local DVM and will report to the DSG.

108. A ROD will be pre-identified and deployed immediately FMD is suspected. The precise deployment will be sensitive to the circumstances at the time.

Role:

To protect the interests of Scottish Ministers in the execution of policy and decisions taken by the DSG.

To provide the link between the DSG and operations on the ground, and to ensure decisions taken by the DSG are implemented on the ground.

To establish the LDCC and ensure that all non-veterinary assistance required by the DVM is provided.

Responsibilities:

- Establish LDCC: ensure suitable accommodation, communication infrastructure, and personnel in place. (In liaison with DVM and Local Authority).
- Allocation of non-veterinary staff to all necessary functions.
- Administrative support to DVM and oversee the following areas:
 - disease control measures (e.g. Infected Area)
 - cleansing and disinfection (logistics)
 - valuation of stock and other items for which compensation may be paid
 - disposal programme (logistics including transport and routes)
 - slaughter or vaccination (logistics)
 - personnel issues
 - financial arrangements
 - general procurement of resources
 - information technology
 - communications.
- Liaison with local Stakeholders, Local Authorities, Police and contractors.
- General trouble shooting.
- Media liaison.
- Liaise with core disposal stakeholders to consider issues surrounding using burning and burial as disposal options.
Includes: SE Environment Division, SE Health Division, SE Lawyers, SEPA, Local Authority, FSA, Vet, Hauliers, Emergency Planning, [Army].
- In addition, ensure that SEPA is consulted about environmental impacts of e.g. C&D burial.
- Ensure systems in place to capture financial data in relation to culling and disposal.
- To meet at least once a year with the local DVMs.

109. The ROD will establish the local **LDCC Management Control Team** comprising all relevant local regulating bodies that will meet on a daily basis. (See Section 2).

110. He will also establish a **local Stakeholders group**. (See Section 2).

111. If there is more than one outbreak in Scotland, each LDCC will have a ROD assigned to it. One of the RODs will be appointed as ROD Scotland.

Additional ROD Scotland Responsibilities:

- Establish links with local RODs - set up systems to share information and identify pinch points/share best practice/provide support.
- Provide input into DSG relating to operational policy, feed policy decisions out to RODs (ROD Scotland will be the ROD representative on the DSG).
- Liaise with NDCC Disposal team as and when required to maximise efficiency of disposal.
- Negotiate in Scotland or liaise with NDCC Procurement Cell to ensure access to Renderers/incinerators/landfill sites/hauliers in line with GB contracts and agree capacities/day and cost.

112. In the event of a single centre outbreak, the ROD automatically takes on the ROD Scotland responsibilities.

Timing

113. The ROD has responsibility for ensuring that decisions taken by the DSG are put into effect, working as necessary with SVS personnel, agricultural staff, Local Authorities, regulators, contractors, local Community representatives and other relevant Stakeholders. The ROD will ensure that suitable accommodation and communication infrastructure is in place quickly, which is why it is important for him to be deployed as soon as there is suspicion of a disease outbreak.

114. The relationship between the DVM and the ROD is critical to the success of the handling of an outbreak. It is for the ROD to ensure that the DVM receives whatever administrative support is required and to establish appropriate disposal routes for slaughtered animals, taking into account DSG policy on disposal options.

Day 1 Tasks

- Travel to Animal Health Office closest to outbreak
- Establish LDCC Management Control Team to review critical roles and functions, including Infected Area arrangements (for membership see Section 2)
- Mobilise transport contractor from approved list
- Ensure sufficient slaughter teams and other personnel and equipment to meet slaughter targets
- Investigate disposal routes
- Establish contact with NDCC
- Establish contact with Scottish Executive Press Office
- Assess what supporting resources will be required
- Report to DSG outlining Day 2 priorities.

115. It is likely that the ROD will very quickly require support following his initial deployment. At the very minimum, within a matter of days of taking up the position, it is likely he will require the support of:

- 1 Deputy ROD (at C1 level)
- 1 Finance Manager
- Press Desk support
- 1 Personnel Manager (depending on size of LDCC)
- Assorted Administrative support (2 B2, 2 A3, 2 A1)

116. The provision of suitable accommodation and IT support should already be in hand through Local Contingency Plans. However, it is important for the ROD to ensure that he is satisfied with those arrangements once on the ground. An important aspect of the ROD support structure is the need to capture information that will be needed following the outbreak.

117. If and when military involvement commences, the ROD will liaise with the army commander to ensure that Army personnel are appropriately used and that there is mutual agreement as to what will be expected of them.

Other Scottish Executive Services

118. The ROD will want to ensure that he organises instant access to relevant specialist skills within the Scottish Executive. These include Personnel, IT, Finance and accountancy services, statistical support, Estates Services, Purchasing and Contracts, Quantity Surveyors, Waste Management Engineers, Registry expertise, etc. These should be called upon as necessary when dealing with the consequences and problems of eliminating the disease.

Communications

119. There are wider communications issues that the ROD is required to address. Communication to DSG and NDCC, Ministers, MPs and MSPs, and to the media, the local community and its representatives (Councillors and Community Councillors), members of the public, and others who express interest or concern about the operations.

Visits

120. The ROD/deputy ROD will be expected to arrange and accommodate visits by national politicians and others.

ANNEX G

ANIMAL HEALTH DIVISION LOCAL PLANS

121. Local plans outline the management and administrative structures that need to be put in place on the ground to deal with the practical aspects of the disease outbreak, the roles of local agencies and the actions that need to be taken in the event of disease. They should include references to HQ contacts, but will be produced to suit local circumstances. Each DVM will facilitate the development of these plans in conjunction with appropriate local agencies.

122. Some local agencies such as Local Authorities, will also formulate their own internal response plans, detailing: who their representative on the LDCC would be, internal communications, mobilisation of resources to cover their responsibilities, maintenance of normal services in addition to the extra duties disease control may bring.

Links to National level:

123. Once plans have been agreed at the local level they are reviewed at the Scottish level to ensure consistency and identification of potential strategic linkages/ issues. (The role of the Executive is to facilitate the delivery of Local Plans).

Stakeholder input:

124. The LDCC Management Control Team co-ordinates a Local Stakeholder Group of public sector agencies (who have been traditionally involved in animal health contingency planning) and other local stakeholders. For membership, see Section 2. Local Plans are reviewed annually in consultation with stakeholders.

Local Plan Contents

125. Local Animal Health Office plans should include the following:

- Actions to be taken by or instructed by Veterinary staff on suspicion of disease, including:
 - Serving of Form A/D and establishment of restricted area.
 - First contact communications on reasonable suspicion of disease.
 - Epidemiological tracings.
 - Procedure on confirmation of infection for valuation, slaughter, disposal and cleansing and disinfection.
- Breakdown of responsibilities of SVS, ROD, SEERAD Agricultural Staff, SEPA, Local Authority and Police.
- Instructions for location, establishment and operation of LDCC and establishment of LDCC Management Control Team (see section 2), comprising DVM, ROD, PAO, Local Authority, Police, and SEPA and the Army if involved.
- Sample forms and licences.
- Lists of contacts.
- Maps of Marts and Showgrounds.
- Potential local sites suitable for mass pyres or burial sites, and nearest renderers, incinerators and engineered landfill sites.
- Organisation charts.

- Outline of daily/weekly meetings between key organisations in emergency situations.
- Establishment of Infected Area biosecurity controls and responsibilities for enforcement.
- Specific sites identified for LDCC – to meet necessary requirements. It is likely that the LDCC will need to be located close to the Animal Health Divisional Office which may mean it is located in a different Council area to the outbreak. However, it should be located close to the outbreak wherever possible.
- Lists of Contingency Contracts, and Supplementary List are available.

Roles of main parties in Local Plans

126. The **SVS** implement disease control measures. **Local Police** and the relevant **Local Authority** assist the SVS by undertaking enforcement responsibilities. The **ROD** will establish the LDCC in liaison with the **DVM** and **Local Authority**. Due to the extensive and unique nature of the ROD role, it is set out separately in Annex F.

DVM

- Disease control on infected premises and any pre-emptive cull premises.
- Serving of Form A.
- Diagnosis.
- Slaughter (undertaking or supervision of).
- Epidemiological tracing.
- Liaison with ROD over disposal of carcasses – set priorities for disposal.
- Supervision of Cleansing and Disinfection.
- Patrol visits.
- Liaison with Police and Local Authority to ensure awareness of infected area(s).
- Liaison with ROD and Local Authority to establish LDCC.
- Provision advice on issue of local movement licences to Agricultural Staff/Local Authority.
- Agree official closures of land with Local Authority.
- Liaison with DEFRA's Procurement and Contracts Division.

Local Agricultural Staff

- Provide resources to support LDCC – personnel for helplines, admin, communication (with Pentland House, Farmers, Stakeholders etc.) and office equipment.
- Serving of Form D notifications on behalf of DVM where required.
- Provide logistical assistance in valuation, culling, disposal and C&D operations as required under direction of ROD or DVM.
- Advising of restrictions locally to farmers and to the local population.
- Mapping of IP's and restricted zones and communication of this to Pentland House.
- Providing support to DVM in liaising with farmers.
- Provide administrative support in LDCC as required under direction of ROD/DVM.
- In liaison with Local Authority, provide administration for granting and enforcing movement and mart licence requirements.
- Provide general agricultural advice to DVM as required.
- Support to ROD in establishing financial structure needed.

Local Authority

- In liaison with Agricultural Staff, provide administration for granting and enforcing movement licence requirements.
- Liaise with DVM and ROD over establishment of LDCC – assist in provision of suitable accommodation and communication infrastructure.
- Assist DVM and ROD in procurement of resources.
- Check compliance with disease control measures (i.e. Dairies).
- Assist police at vehicle check points.
- Advising of restrictions locally to farmers and to the local population.
- With agreement of DVM, approve official closures of land and advertise them.

Police

- Enforce movement controls.
- Prevent public access to infected premises and officially closed pathways/land.
- Public order and traffic control.
- Stopping and checking vehicles transporting animals – seize suspected disease cases if confirmed by SVS.
- Serving of Form D notifications on behalf of DVM where required.
- Advising farmers of restrictions if required.

Army

If brought in, the Army would will provide logistical support for the disposal operation and the Officer in charge on the ground will liaise with the DVM and ROD over roles and priorities.

ANNEX H(i)

DISPOSAL

Disposal Policy

127. This Annex sets out disposal policy and how this disposal will be carried out in Scotland, and links into Local Plans which will identify disposal routes locally.

128. All culled animals have to be disposed of:

- within a reasonable timescale
- under official supervision
- in such a way that there is no risk of spreading FMD
- minimising any environmental or health effects.

Hierarchy

129. Disposal will be allocated according to a hierarchy of preference, which takes account of environmental and public health considerations of the options:

- Commercial Incineration
- Rendering
- Licensed Landfill
- Burning
- Burial (on farm or mass)

130. However not all options will be available or appropriate in every circumstance depending on demand, geography, capacity, veterinary and local considerations. Geographical proximity may not guarantee one option over another. Whenever possible, the hierarchy should be observed and rendering or incineration employed if at all practical. However we must recognise that the need to dispose of large numbers of carcasses in a short space of time may mean resorting to landfill, burning and burial. In addition, given the remoteness of some locations, and therefore the transport times and the dispersal of air, burning may be the best method of dealing with some carcasses.

131. Each Animal Health Office will consider the availability of appropriate areas in their territory where disposal sites may be found, as part of their local contingency planning arrangements. Things to consider when identifying burning and burial options (both on farm and mass), including requirements for authorisations and risk assessments, are detailed in the Department of Health and Environment Agency (EA) guidelines.

Allocation across GB

132. Disposal will be considered strategically on a GB basis, and material will be allocated to disposal plants taking into account the situation across GB. There is therefore flexibility to make sure that GB can successfully dispose of all its waste material in the most appropriate place. Within the agreed framework, Scottish material will take priority in Scottish disposal facilities. These arrangements will ensure that the best use is made of the available resource.

133. The NDCC will co-ordinate disposal logistics, and the ROD will liaise with the NDCC to agree the use of facilities.

Key Roles

134. Disposal policy will be determined centrally by the **DSG** (inviting Environment Group and SEHD to the group to attend meetings as appropriate). Disposal of carcasses will be prioritised by the **DVM**, and in the first instance of disease, for speed, the DVM will activate the disposal mechanisms. Once in place, the **ROD** will co-ordinate disposal activity, liaising as appropriate with the NDCC.

Contracts

135. Incineration: agreement in principle has been obtained with nine large animal incinerator operators in England, Scotland and Wales. Contingent arrangements are in place and will be reviewed on an annual basis.

136. Rendering: a call-off agreement with a major rendering company has been arranged. Additional capacity will be arranged in the event of a major outbreak. Biosecurity protocols are being agreed with rendering companies.

137. Landfill: structured agreements and national operational protocols are being developed in conjunction with licensed landfill sites. Powers of Direction may have to be used in an emergency situation. SEPA will be consulted about the use of landfill capacity.

Disposal of other materials

138. Waste products such as slurry from cleansing and disinfection procedures, and ash from burning, will also need to be disposed of. The disposal of slurry is covered by chapter 3 the VIPER⁷ veterinary instructions, to be followed by the SVS in the event of a FMD outbreak. Ash from burning carcasses, if this option is used, will have to be buried in a suitable location, either on-site or at a suitable landfill site. As such it will be covered by the GB protocol on landfill which is currently being drawn up in agreement with the Environmental Services Agency (ESA), EA, SEPA, DEFRA, SEERAD and the Welsh Assembly Government.

Records

139. The ROD will ensure that systems are in place to accurately record relevant details of animals culled and disposal data. Disposal statistics for each LDCC will be entered into DCS and/or Scots and will form part of the Daily SITREP sent by the ROD to the DSG and the NDCC.

Transport

140. Transport will be procured locally and tasked by a transport manager located in the LDCC or at the Scottish SVS HQ. Transport considerations will be co-ordinated at the national level, and the ROD will link into these transport operations as required.

⁷ <http://intranet.defra.gsi.gov.uk/v1p3r/Chapters/chap03/LDCC/Field%20Operations/Guidance%20-%20Cleansing%20and%20Disinfection.htm>

ANNEX H(ii)

HIERARCHY OF PREFERRED DISPOSAL OPTIONS

1. INCINERATION

- Upon confirmation of first case the DVM should contact the Rural Payments Agency (RPA) and they will organise and advise on disposal options. The DVM will be responsible for managing and organising the transport provision for the first 48 hours, until the NDCC disposal manager and the national and regional transport managers are appointed. For subsequent cases, the DMV should then contact 24-hour transport line and order vehicles to transport carcasses to agreed incineration or rendering disposal outlet. If these options are not available then the DVM should consider on farm burning or burial.

2. RENDERING

- As for incineration.

3. LANDFILL

- See Appendix H(iii) for contact details for Scottish Landfill Sites.
- Ministers have powers to direct waste to landfill, however it would be preferable to agree in advance capacities with Landfill operators. This issue will be clarified in the GB protocol which is currently being drawn up in agreement with the ESA, EA, SEPA, DEFRA, SEERAD and the Welsh Assembly Government.

4. BURNING

DVM has the discretion to burn on-farm in the event of incineration and rendering not being practical. This would only be used in exceptional circumstances. He will follow the November 2001 guidance issued by the Department of Health in finding a site to burn on farm.

<http://www.fmd-enviroimpact.scieh.scot.nhs.uk/Background/monitoringprog.htm>

- Animal Health Offices should have a number of sites identified in the Local Plans that are suitable for large-scale pyres. These sites should meet the criteria set out in the annex in terms of both location and construction.
- Before large scale burning is used as an option, this must be agreed by the DSG, who will consult first with the relevant Department/Agency eg Environment Group, SEHD, SEPA, Local Authorities (others likely to be affected, as well as the one in which the site is situated), FSA, water companies, local fire service and relevant utility companies. The considerations of the local community will also be taken into account. All local burn sites must be approved by the Local Authority and SEPA.

- Locally the ROD, SEPA and the FSA will consider what measures need to be taken by way of preparation, assessment, method, management, monitoring and restitution, drawing on Department of Health and EA guidelines.
- Consideration should be given by the ROD (in consultation with SEPA/FSA) to burn materials to be used - including use of accelerants (method).
- Local Plans should also identify where necessary materials can be procured locally and details of local contractors and consultants.

141. These are the key points of the Department of Health guidelines on considerations for siting of pyres:

- Locate more than 2kms from local population centres for small pyres (250 cattle a day) and 4kms for large sites (1000 cattle a day).
- Carry out a risk assessment for water and air effects.
- Inform public on health effects where pyres have to be located close to houses (stay indoors, close windows etc.).
- Ensure pyre risk assessed by local fire service.
- Source clean fuel (ie no tyres or railway sleepers).
- Ensure the person responsible for operating the fire understands their responsibilities in respect of minimising effects on the public through the consideration of such factors as wind direction and fire temperature.
- Consider at an early stage options for ash disposal.

5. BURIAL

- Small scale on-farm burial may be necessary where all other options in the hierarchy are unavailable. SEPA must agree to the suitability of the land for burial before this option is pursued.
- Animal Health Offices will identify appropriate areas in their territory where larger disposal sites may be found, as part of their Local Contingency Plan. SEPA, the Scottish Water, the Local Authority, SEERAD Waste Management team and the local Agricultural Staff should be consulted in identification of site. SEPA should risk assess the site before it is used.
- Site location must also take into account local sensitivity to smell and noise production and must be accessible and have sufficient capacity.
- Local Plans should also identify where necessary materials can be procured locally and details of local contractors and consultants.
- DSG must agree use of large-scale burial as an option, and the local ROD in consultation with responsible agency (SEPA) will consider what measures need to be taken by way of assessment, preparation, method, management, monitoring and restitution. Consultants and/or SE Environment Group may be brought in with expertise in these functions to advise.
- During the 2001 outbreak SEAC advised that burial of cattle born after 1 August 1996 posed a very low risk of transmission of the BSE prion. SEAC should be consulted if burial of cattle is being considered, and the DSG and ROD(s) will take account of that advice when considering disposal options.

142. In all cases of burning or burial, consideration should be given to the need for monitoring of environmental and health impacts of the disposal method. There are a number of possible routes by which people might be exposed to pollutants arising from carcass disposal (via air, water, food etc.). To ensure that the attendant health risks for each of these are properly addressed, an appropriate, co-ordinated monitoring programme should be implemented. The SEHD will oversee the development and implementation of such a programme.

ANNEX I

DISEASE CONTROL TOOLS

EU legislation

143. EU legislation on FMD is set out in Directive 2003/85/EC (adopted in September 2003) under which the basic disease control strategy is the culling of all susceptible species on infected premises and dangerous contacts. The earlier this occurs after initial infection, the more likely that swift action will stop the spread of disease. However, if this fails to work, more rigorous action will be required and there are a range of options which would be considered once the particular circumstances of the outbreak have been established.

144. The EU does not allow routine vaccination. It envisages emergency vaccination taking place where an outbreak threatens to become extensive within a Member State or where other MS's are at risk. The decision to introduce emergency vaccination would normally be taken by the affected or threatened MS, although provision exists for the Commission to initiate discussion of a vaccination programme with an affected MS if it is posing a risk to others. The Directive also allows a vaccination programme to be carried out and agreement sought later if speed is paramount.

Emergency Vaccination

145. The new Directive has moved emergency vaccination to the forefront of potential control strategies. This position was supported by the Scottish Executive policy during negotiations on the Directive, given the importance of avoiding large scale slaughter. Its use is not however automatic, and will be considered along with other disease control options on the basis of the specific circumstances of each area, and on veterinary advice as to the epidemiology of the outbreak.

There are two main modes in which emergency vaccination could be used: 'suppressive', where the vaccinated animals would be subsequently killed and disposed of, or 'protective', where the vaccinated animals live out their economic lives and then enter the human food chain. It is Scottish Executive policy that protective vaccination is the preferred mode whenever circumstances allow.

Either of these modes of using emergency vaccination could have a number of geographical strategies associated with them.

- **Ring vaccination** is used to describe vaccination within a boundary drawn to circle an area of known infection. The size of the area covered would depend on geography, available human and vaccine resources, and assessment of the disease risk.
- **Firebreak** or **buffer** vaccination is when a zone is established between an area with disease and a disease-free area. The aim would be to create an area large enough to protect against spread of the virus around or through the 'firebreak' zone.

146. A very high proportion of the livestock within any vaccination area would need to be vaccinated to develop enough immunity to prevent the disease taking hold and spreading to clean areas. Before vaccination could be used it would be necessary to order the manufacture of sufficient doses of the vaccine. A vaccination resource has been contracted to provide and train teams of vaccinators. Tight controls would be needed on the borders of the vaccination area to reduce the risk of disease breaching the vaccination zones through movement of vehicles, animals and/or people. Following vaccination, a programme of blood testing would be needed to check that the disease had been contained in the vaccination zone, before progressive lifting of controls.

Decision making

147. It is for the Scottish Executive to decide whether an emergency vaccination campaign is to be undertaken in Scotland and how it is to be implemented. This will be in conjunction with the CVO (UK) who represents the UK (the Member State) on the EU Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, and will have regard to the risk to other Member States and the likelihood of the disease becoming widespread. The DSG would determine the scope (species) and extent (geographical and types of premises) of any emergency vaccination programme.

148. The decisions on when, where and how to deploy vaccination depend on a large number of factors. The Directive sets out criteria to be taken into account when considering a vaccination programme; these are however indicative rather than prescriptive, and veterinary and epidemiological judgement will always be the major factor in such decisions. With this in mind, it is possible to follow a structured decision making process.

149. The first point to establish is whether the disease can be eradicated by “stamping out” - culling on infected and dangerous contact premises (IPs and DCs). Factors to be assessed here include: strain of virus, transmission characteristics of virus, species affected, epidemiology of outbreaks, resource constraints and economic consequences (these will be informed by the results of a Cost Benefit Analysis on disease scenarios, expected at end of 2004).

150. If the disease can be controlled in this way, the disease strategy concentrates on the stamping out route. If not, the next step, in line with the Scottish Executive’s Response to the FMD Inquiries, is to consider vaccination:

- Within this option there are the technical issues such as epidemiological assessment of whether vaccination will suppress virus production before spread; the shape of the vaccination zone (which must be large enough to contain the spread of the virus and take account of airborne spread and natural barriers); production of enough of the relevant strain of vaccine; status of tests to differentiate infected from vaccinated animals (known as “non structural protein” or NSP tests).
- There are also economic/social issues such as the implications for export markets, public and industry acceptance of vaccination itself and of products from vaccinated animals, views of other Member States, costs of mounting the vaccination programme and any subsequent regionalisation as required by the Directive.
- Resource issues relate to availability of manpower to undertake the programme of vaccination and tagging, logistics of a cold chain supply to preserve the potency of the vaccine and data/IT support to ensure that reliable records are kept.

151. If, in the light of the above, the decision is taken to vaccinate, then the next step is to decide between protective and suppressive modes of vaccination (see above).

- Further issues to be examined here include pressure on slaughter and disposal capacity, the effect on regaining export status (3 months for suppressive and stamping out, 6 months for protective – assuming validation of differential NSP test), identification and records of vaccinated animals.
- Similar economic and social considerations as above, including the possibility of intense public scrutiny (as occurred in the Netherlands in 2001 when suppressive vaccination was used).

Any use of protective vaccination carries with it the need for post vaccination controls on the movements of vaccinated animals, and on the marketing of milk and meat from vaccinates. A three phase exit strategy, with the timing of the phases depending on the results of an extensive serological surveillance programme, is set out in detail in the Directive.

152. Consideration of strategies other than ‘vaccinate to live’ – protective vaccination – in no way implies that the Scottish Executive is moving away from the position set out in its Response to the main FMD Inquiries. However, as the criteria above demonstrate, the decision is a multifactorial one and ultimately will be governed by the circumstances of an actual outbreak.

153. If neither of these modes is deemed acceptable, then the option of vaccination must fall and extended culling strategies will be considered.

Extended culling strategies

154. The Directive allows for a preventive eradication programme to be undertaken where epidemiological or other evidence indicates, either at the stage of suspicion of disease or when it has been confirmed. The design of an extended cull programme, like that of a vaccination programme, will have the objective of getting ahead of the disease and will be governed by the circumstances at the time. Possible strategies could include a “firebreak” cull (analogous to firebreak vaccination above), culling on contiguous premises, or a cull of premises identified as higher risk. Choice of an extended culling strategy will depend critically on epidemiological information and may also be guided by mathematical modelling of the outbreak.

Implementation

155. At the direction of Scottish Ministers the SVS will manage the vaccination programme, which will require prompt action to put in place an implementation team. A GB contract is in place to provide the vaccination resource, the main features of which are:

- Recruitment and training of vets and vaccination personnel, up to 50 three-person teams.
- Establishment of vaccination centres.
- Identification of holdings and animals to be vaccinated.
- Carrying out the vaccination with regard to biosecurity and health and safety guidelines.
- Tagging of animals once vaccinated and capture of data for SVS records.

163. An extended cull would also be managed by the SVS with assistance from other operational partners, and in certain circumstances, the Army.

Annex J

KEY CONTACTS

Immediate Contacts

To be contacted when disease is suspected and confirmed or disproved. See Key Actions, Annex L.

Rob Morris	SEPA
Andrew Bachell	SNH
Daniel Gotts	SNH
Alan MacPherson	SNH
Alistair Greig	SAC
David Atkinson	SAC
Neil Murray	Police
Douglas Watt	Police
SEPA Emergency Planning room	
Donny Morrison	SEPA
James Withers	NFUS
Lydia Wilkie	FSA
Patrick Crowser	Scottish Crofting Foundation
HQ	Scottish Crofting Foundation
Kirk Hunter	Scottish Dairy Association

Divisional Veterinary Managers, Animal Health Offices and Agricultural Area Offices

Ayr

DVM: Graeme Cochrane

PAO/Officer in charge: Iain Matheson

Russell House
King Street
Ayr KA8 0BE
Tel: 01292 268525

PAO/Officer in charge: Paul Neison

161 Brooms Rd
Dumfries
DG1 3ES
Tel: 01389 255292

Galashiels

DVM: Sheilagh Brown

PAO/Officer in charge: Gregor Caldwell

Cotgreen Road
Tweedbank
Galashiels TD1 3SG
Tel: 01896 758806

PAO/Officer in charge: Ian Davidson

Cadzow Court
3 Wellhall Road
Hamilton ML3 9BG
Tel:01698281166

Perth

DVM: Norman Winter

PAO/Officer in charge: Duncan MacRae

Strathearn House
Broxden Business Park
Lamberkine Drive
Perth
PH1 1RZ
Tel: 01738 602 211

PAO/Officer in charge: Roy Paterson

Cameron House
Albany Street
Oban
PA34 4AE
01631 563071

Inverness

DVM: Charlie Moir

PAO/Officer in charge: John Brown

Longman House
28 Longman Road
Inverness IV1 1SF
Tel: 01463 253098

PAO/Officer in charge: David MacVicar

Estates Office
Portree
Isle of Skye
IV51 9DH
01478 612516

PAO/Officer in charge: Murdo MacKenzie

Ord Croft
Lairg
Sutherland
IV27 4AZ
01549 402167

PAO/Officer in charge: John Dingwall

10 Keith Street
Stornoway
Isle of Lewis
HS1 2QG
01851 702392

PAO/Officer in charge: Ken Wilson

Balivanich
Isle of Benbecula
HS7 5LA
01870 602346

Inverurie

DVM: Paddy Grant

PAO/Officer in charge: Peter Johnston

Thainstone Court
Inverurie
AB51 5YA
Tel: 01467 626300

PAO/Officer in charge: Frank McDougall

32 Reidhaven Street
Elgin
IV30 1QH

PAO/Officer in charge: Andy Geddes

Tankerness Lane
Kirkwall
Orkney
KW15 1AQ

PAO/Officer in charge: George Petrie

Charlotte House
Commercial Road
Lerwick
Shetland
ZE1 0HZ

PAO/Officer in charge: Stewart Johnston

Strathbeg House
Clarence Street
Thurso KW14 7JS

ANNEX K

ORGANISATION CHARTS

CHART 1

FMD Contingency Plan Structure




CHART 2

FMD CONTINGENCY PLAN STRUCTURE : DETAIL OF ANIMAL HEALTH DIVISION MAIN UNITS






CHART 3

FMD CONTINGENCY PLAN STRUCTURE : ASSOCIATED UNITS



ANNEX L

KEY EVENT/ACTION FLOW CHART



Stage 3

- Advise via press and stakeholders strict adherence to Biosecurity Code of Practice. Issue additional information on biosecurity to farmers, support industry and contractors directly affected.
- Establish Management structure under DSG as per contingency plan:
 - Strategy Unit
 - Operations Unit
 - Access Group
 - Economic Impact Assessment Group
- Alert Personnel and Emergency planning unit to potential need to activate Emergency Cadre of staff.
- Establish Stakeholder groups

Stage 4

- Policy group to establish communications channels and systems as per contingency plan, appoint Disposals Co-ordinator and consider timing of Ministerial Statement to Parliament.
- Compensation Team to establish links with local Animal Health Office and DEFRA and get systems in place for processing of claims and valuation/compensation policy, all as per contingency plan.
- Operations unit to liaise with stakeholder group, Vets and Agriculture Staff and put in place Licence to Slaughter Scheme and Movement licensing system as per contingency plan.
- Access group to liaise with Access forum to issue guidance to stakeholders and press on access and risk assessment – as per contingency plan.
- Economic Impact Assessment Group to advise Ministers on scale and nature of implications.
- DSG to consider:
 - Disposal policy
 - Zoning
 - Need to request logistical assistance from MOD.
 - Ongoing objectives for disease control and recovery and serological testing to support them

Stage 5 – Ongoing Disease Control and Recovery

- DSG Continue to manage ongoing Disease policy and eradication with supporting management structure. As disease in decline need to consider strategy for return to normal business and recovery of export markets.

ANNEX M

STOCKING DENSITIES

The maps highlight the stocking density of key livestock species in across Scotland. More detailed information is available as part of the SEERAD emergency planning arrangements but the maps provide a ready picture of the spread of animals around Scotland and where they are most concentrated.

ANNEX N(i)

AGENDA TEMPLATE

DSG Initial Meeting

1. Modus Operandum
2. Disease Situation
3. Immediate Deployment
4. Statutory Orders
5. Communication / Stakeholders
6. Resources
7. Follow up Arrangements
8. Involvement of Minister

ANNEX N(ii)

AGENDA TEMPLATE

DSG Standard Meeting

1. Action Points of [date] DSG meeting
2. Disease Update
3. Immediate Actions

ANNEX N(iii)

AGENDA TEMPLATE

Birdtable

1. Disease Update
2. Resources
3. Disposal
4. Communications
5. Access
6. Operational Policy
7. Licensing

ANNEX O

USEFUL WEBSITES

<http://www.food.gov.uk/>

<http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/fmd/contingency/contingency.pdf>

<http://www.footandmouth.wales.gov.uk/scripts/index.asp>

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/fmdr.pdf>

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/about/ERADRA/LAH/00015721/AHOMAP.aspx>

International Organisation of Epizootics http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm

Communication Strategy [**weblink to be inserted after consultation**]

Biosecurity Website <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/about/eradra/lah/00015721/biosecurity.aspx>

Biosecurity Code <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/crwl-00.asp>

Web link to Form B <http://intranet.defra.gsi.gov.uk/v1p3r/Common/Forms/FM31.pdf>

Web link to Form D <http://intranet.defra.gsi.gov.uk/v1p3r/Common/Forms/FM37A.pdf>

FMD Inquiries <http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/fmd/nav/report.htm>

http://www.ma.hw.ac.uk/RSE/enquiries/footandmouth/fm_mw.pdf

<http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/inquiry/>

SE Response <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/fmdr-00.asp>

ANNEX P

GLOSSARY

AHDO	Animal Health Divisional Office
AHO	Animal Health Officer
BCLO	Budget Centre Liaison Officer
BSU	Business Support Unit??
CAO	Chief Agricultural Officer
CAPM	Common Agricultural Policy Management
C&D	Cleansing and Disinfection
COSLA	Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
DCS	Disease Control System
DSG	Disease Strategy Group
DVM	Divisional Veterinary Manager
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (UK)
EA	Environment Agency
ERAD	Environment and Rural Affairs Department
ESA	Environmental Services Agency
EU	European Union
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FSA	Food Standards Agency
HVS	Head of Veterinary Services (SVS)
IAAS	Institute of Auctioneers and Appraisers Scotland
IP	Infected Premises
IS	Information Systems
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre
MSP	Member of Scottish Parliament
NBA	National Beef Association
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre (London)
NFU(S)	National Farmers Union (Scotland)
NSA	National Sheep Association
OGD	Other Government Department
OIE	Office International des Epizootes (Paris)
OSSE	Office of the Solicitor to the Scottish Executive
PAO	Principle Agricultural Officer
PCD	Procurement and Contracts Division (DEFRA)
QMS	Quality Meat Scotland
RHA	Road Hauliers Association
ROD	Regional Operations Director
RPA	Rural Payments Agency
SAC	Scottish Agricultural College
SAMU	Scottish Animal Movements Unit
SAO	Senior Agricultural Officer
SCOTS	The Executive's IT system
SE	Scottish Executive
SEAC	Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee
SEERAD	Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department
SEGIS	Scottish Executive Geographical Information System

SEHD	Scottish Executive Health Department
SEPA	Scottish Environment Protection Agency
SITREP	Situation Report
SLF	Scottish Landowners Federation
SNH	Scottish Natural Heritage
SPICe	Scottish Parliament Information Centre
SSPCA	Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
SVS	State Veterinary Service
TVI	Temporary Veterinary Inspector
VIPER	SVS Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines
FORM A	Notice declaring infected place
FORM B	Withdrawal of notice declaring infected place (Form A)
FORM C	Certificate of suspected disease
FORM D	Notice to owner or person in charge of animals exposed to infection or to occupier of premises where such animals are or have been situated, imposing restrictions