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CHAPTER 4
Sharing information and working together

Summary

Whilst there was a commitment to information sharing from each of the key agencies involved in managing sex offenders, there was considerable room for improvement in information sharing practice. Information relevant to assessing and managing risk often took too long to reach the prison holding the offender. Too many social work files in prison and in the community were disorganised and contained duplicate records. Health professionals were inconsistently sharing information and getting involved in the ICM and MAPPA processes. Their important contribution to assessing and managing risk was missing in many instances.

We considered that responsible authorities in local areas should implement strategic management boards to oversee the performance and governance of the MAPPA and to plan future developments.

Formal and informal networks between practitioners and services supported this information sharing. The Integrated Case Management system had improved information sharing between agencies while the offender was in prison. Prison social workers alerted community-based agencies to the imminent release of prisoners who posed a risk to children.

The electronic sharing of information through the ViSOR and prison service PR2 ²²systems was irregular, with especially serious issues around social work access to and use of ViSOR. This issue required urgent action.

4.1 A number of recent policy and guidance documents have addressed the issue of information sharing . Circular SEJD 15/2005 ²³ from the then Scottish Executive stated that data sharing:

'…is at the heart of measures to protect the public from the risks posed by sex offenders.'

4.2 The circular lists a number of reasons for sharing information including the protection of children; preventing, detecting and reporting crime; assessing and managing the risks posed by offenders; and determining the offender's suitability for parole. It provides a framework for developing local information and sharing protocols between agencies at local and national levels. It notes that all agencies involved in the management of sex offenders have signed a national concordat and have agreed to share relevant information, with the presumption that they will share information unless there is a good reason not to do so.

4.3 The Management of Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 ²⁴ requires responsible authorities in the area of a local authority to jointly establish arrangements, including information sharing, for the assessment and management of risks posed by sex offenders and serious violent offenders. The national guidance for MAPPAs (2008) restates the principles and procedures for information sharing set out in Circular SEJD 15/2005, making clear that they apply to the new Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements.

4.4 Offenders have legitimate rights to privacy and protection of their personal information. Data protection legislation affords exemption from restrictions on sharing where this is necessary to reduce the risk of offences being committed. However, information sharing should be managed carefully, and always be justifiable against the requirement that it is directly connected to the prevention of offending. Specific provisions also apply to the confidentiality of medical information and records, although health services may disclose such data where doing so may prevent harm to others.

Types of information

4.5 Relevant information takes a number of forms. Information about offending includes details about the current offence, and the offender's previous convictions. This data is in the indictment, in witness statements, in the trial judge's report and in the criminal history system ( CHS) database located with the Scottish Police Services Authority ( SPSA). The Violent and Sex Offender Register ( ViSOR) contained a range of information about the offender that helped to assess and monitor the level of risk the offender poses.

4.6 Social enquiry and other reports contain information about offending and about the offender's circumstances including risk assessment information. As described earlier in this report, social workers, police, prison staff, psychologists, and psychiatrists undertake a range of risk assessments at different points of the offender's sentence and in the community.

4.7 Other types of information arise from the records of discussions and meetings between agencies, for example:

• ICM meetings
• MAPPA meetings
• Child protection conferences
• Pre-release meetings

4.8 Records of these meetings are an important source of information about the offender and any decisions taken about their management.

Findings

Prison records

4.9 Prompt receipt of information when a prisoner enters custody is important to allow accurate initial and subsequent planning. There was evidence that this was not occurring consistently.

4.10 In a number of the prison records examined, inspectors found missing information such as trial judges reports, sentence planning documents, ICM documents and risk assessment documents. It was unusual to find a record of activity by community-based social workers, such as of visits to the prisoner or his family.

4.11 Almost one-half of the files we reviewed had no trial judge's report. Some were subject to a significant time gap between the trial and the addition of the report to the prisoner's records. One report arrived three years after the admission of the prisoner, and another only one month before liberation. Another was only available two years after the start of a prisoner's sentence.

4.12 When a prisoner returned to custody on recall, his information did not always follow him promptly. For example, one prisoner had returned to custody but all records remained in another prison for four days after admission. Another prisoner returned to custody did not have a warrant or healthcare record as these remained in the liberating prison for two weeks before transfer to the correct establishment.

Electronic prisoner records

4.13 Useful information for the management of high risk of harm offenders was available on PR2, although there were variations between establishments in the use of the system. In one establishment, ICM case conference minutes were not on PR2 but on a separate database held by the ICM co-ordinator. Other prisons entered some ICM information on PR2 (for example case conference minutes), but not all prisons recorded plans for release to the community. We were concerned to find that the PR2 domain for identifying sex offenders was incomplete in half of the records we examined.

4.14 Reports on prisoners who attended offence related programmes were sometimes available in prisoner files but not on PR2. Staff in one establishment had placed post-programme reports on PR2, but SPS headquarters had asked that they stop this practice and await the outcome of a prisoner's challenge to the practice. Not all information from ICM meetings was in the relevant PR2 domain.

4.15 There was still a general over reliance on separate paper-based records, often to the detriment of information available on PR2. Failure to enter data electronically meant that data was not readily available when the offender moved prison or came back to prison following recall. Prison-based social workers reported a shortage of PR2 computers within their departments, which made it difficult for them to make appropriate updates to prisoner records. They said this made it difficult for them to share information as effectively as possible, and contribute to management decisions. We noted that the minutes from Risk Management Group meetings were not always on PR2.

Integrated case management

4.16 There was evidence that ICM was making a positive impact in bringing together the professionals necessary for effective high risk of harm offender management. As well as prison-based staff, regular attendees at meetings included:

• police officers from offender management units;
• housing services sex offender liaison officers from the offender's home area;
• community-based supervising social workers;
• community health professionals; and
• voluntary organisations providing post-release housing support.

Sharing health information in prison

4.17 We concluded that there was room for improvement in the sharing of relevant mental health information between prison-based and community health services. We noted that a number of prisoners had a history of mental ill-health before coming into prison. In some instances, the courts had obtained pre-sentence psychiatric reports. Prison staff had also identified a number of other prisoners as having mental health problems at their admission interview.

4.18 In only one prison was there evidence of a prisoner giving permission for the sharing of their health information. In the majority of prison health records, there was no evidence that health services sought explicit consent to share relevant information with other agencies. In one case, a post-release condition on a prisoner's licence required a community psychiatric assessment, but there was no evidence that prison-based health services had passed the information on to colleagues in the community.

4.19 All relevant agencies should work together to improve the sharing of health information that is relevant for public protection.

Prison social work files

4.20 Most of the prison social work files reviewed were not organised effectively. Some key information was difficult to find. Document duplication was common.

4.21 The social work files indicated that the ICM process had generated a significant improvement in the quality and quantity of information shared between prison officers and prison based social workers. For example, social workers now received information about prisoner participation in programmes.

4.22 There was also an improvement in the sharing of information between agencies in the prison and agencies in the community. We saw purposeful efforts to communicate effectively. For example, we saw evidence of the statutory notifications about the possible or actual release of a Schedule 1 offender, and there was evidence of practice to keep community-based social workers informed about prison transfers.

4.23 Information in social work files showed prisoner referrals to Risk Management Groups, but there was no information in the files about the outcomes from these referrals.

4.24 Information in prison-based social work files should be comprehensive, organised effectively, and shared with others who need access to it.

The Violent and Sex Offender Register ( ViSOR)

4.25 The ViSOR database enabled the relevant authorities across the UK to input and view critical information about sexual and violent offenders. In Scotland, the implementation of ViSOR covered only sex offenders at the time of the inspection, although we were aware that there were some areas piloting a very small number of violent offender records on the database. ViSOR is presently available to the police, social work authorities, and the SPS.

4.26 While the eight Scottish Police forces used ViSOR well, there were serious problems in the way other agencies accessed it. Security requirements meant that standalone terminals had to be in a secure room. This often made practitioner access difficult, and it was impossible to cut and paste relevant data from social work information systems onto ViSOR. In SPS, only headquarters had access to a ViSOR terminal. The intention was that individual establishments would send their intelligence and other file information to headquarters for entry onto ViSOR.

4.27 Although information sharing about sex offenders was generally appropriate, in two-thirds of sex offender files there was no evidence that criminal justice social work practitioners had used ViSOR effectively to facilitate information exchange. We considered that this was not due to inherent failings in ViSOR, but to the difficulties described in this section.

4.28 Though ViSOR had the potential to enhance the recording and sharing of relevant information, the problems with its implementation across agency boundaries were so serious that, in some places, they had effectively rendered the system unusable as a collective tool for sharing information and managing risk. We considered that this problematic situation required urgent attention.

4.29 It is Scottish Government policy ²⁵ that serious violent offenders will in future be included on ViSOR and managed in MAPPA, although there is no set date for this to occur. The MAPPA guidance defines violent offenders as those convicted on indictment of an offence inferring personal violence, and subject to statutory supervision in the community. Such offenders
will not have to register with the police in the way that sex offenders do, and the main responsibility to enter and manage their data on ViSOR is therefore likely to rest with social work services as the agency providing supervision. We considered that the serious problems with social work services access to ViSOR will require resolution before social work services can take on this task effectively.

Community-based social work records

4.30 One-third of the community-based social work case files reviewed were not well ordered and not easy to access. A variety of problems existed, including missing or misfiled information; repeated filing of the same document; no clear format to constitute a clear action or risk management plan; difficulties in finding MAPPA minutes; and an absence of chronological histories.

4.31 There was a wide range of practices in terms of how local social work areas dealt with the storage of MAPPA minutes in particular. These were sensitive documents. Some social work services kept these filed separately in cabinets, away from the main social work file, while others put the minutes in a sealed envelope in the social work file. Others were located in a special section of the case file marked as 'confidential'. The ViSOR database stored MAPPA minutes, but access to this system for agencies other than police was too often difficult, as described above.

Police records

4.32 Most files were clear and contained relevant information. There were some evident gaps in data, including basic information about the time the offender had been in prison and there was typically little or no information from the ICM process.

4.33 The ViSOR database held risk assessment outcomes, minutes and records of agreed actions from the MAPPA process, and these data were readily accessible to officers and their supervisors. Risk management plans on ViSOR were clear and contained details of each agency's contribution. We considered that the police were able to use ViSOR purposefully, highlighting the positive potential of this database when used effectively.

4.34 There was limited evidence of police holding or sharing information about violent offenders, or of them receiving such from other agencies. There were no national policies or procedures in place to allow for and govern such information exchanges.

Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements

4.35 The MAPPA applied only to sex offenders and restricted patients - serious violent offenders were not yet part of the process. In general, the introduction of MAPPA had facilitated structured, purposeful, information sharing, and had formalised and strengthened links between the police and local authority social work and housing services. Other organisations also provided essential information to the MAPPA process, including SPS, health services, and voluntary organisations.

4.36 MAPPA attendees told us that information that they expected to receive from prisons was sometimes missing. The extent to which health services contributed to MAPPA also varied considerably across Scotland. We learned that forensic mental health services were more likely to engage and to provide appropriate information, while general practitioners were typically more reluctant to share information.

4.37 There was also an issue around the right representation of health professionals at MAPPA meetings. These meetings required attendees to be as familiar with the case and to have sufficient seniority to be able to represent their organisation effectively. We heard that this did not always happen when health service staff attended MAPPA meetings. Some health boards had identified single points of contact for MAPPA and we thought this was positive.

4.38 Voluntary sector organisations attended MAPPA meetings in some areas, but not in others, relying instead on good relationships with partners to obtain and provide information necessary for the management of risk. This was an area of inconsistency.

4.39 We were aware that there was no consistent approach to the strategic oversight or governance of the MAPPA process. Each area had made its own local arrangements. There were MAPPA co-ordinators appointed to every Community Justice Authority ( CJA) area, but there were variations in their role in supporting the MAPPA process. There was a national MAPPA coordinator, but this post held no line management responsibility for the MAPPA
co-ordinators.

4.40 Practitioners and managers told us that there was little effective monitoring of performance, dissemination of learning, or sharing of good practice. Local MAPPA areas should develop better systems to monitor the quality of their operations and decisions. Some MAPPA areas had implemented strategic boards to oversee and guide their operation, and we considered that all areas should do this.

Integrated working arrangements

4.41 In some localities, there had been attempts to physically co-locate staff from different agencies for the purposes of sex offender management, and those working in such settings were generally positive about the benefits of this integration. They said that co-location had resulted in an enhancement of their joint capacity to assess and manage offenders in joint and integrated ways. We concluded that a national review of interagency working practices would yield useful information about good practice, which would be helpful to local areas in improving and developing their arrangements.

4.42 In 2008, HMICS published a thematic inspection of the police response to domestic abuse ²⁶. That report has clear linkage with our current findings, highlighting deficits in the strategic approach to public protection initiatives, and in recruitment, training, awareness, staff support, and information and communication technology. Throughout Scotland, police forces and partner agencies were developing or considering public protection units or structures. It is important that this progress maintains a consistent strategic approach in the response to the range of crime types that typically involve serious violence and victimisation, and risk of serious harm to the public.

Child and adult protection services

4.43 While there was some evidence that MAPPA shared information appropriately with child and adult protection systems, no national guidance set out how MAPPA co-ordinators and adult and child protection services should liaise.

Housing

4.44 The Management of Offenders etc. (Scotland) Act, 2005 placed a duty to co-operate on agencies in addition to the police, social work and the SPS. These other agencies included local authority housing services and registered social landlords ( RSL). The National Accommodation Strategy for Sex Offenders ²⁷ emphasised the importance of cooperating in the sharing of information.

4.45 A good picture emerged from our evidence about information sharing between housing services and partner agencies in MAPPA, especially where the local authority or voluntary sector provided the accommodation. There was less clarity about what information agencies could share with registered social landlords ( RSL), although the MAPPA guidance made it clear that they should be fully involved.

Community Justice Authorities

4.46 The Management of Offenders etc. Scotland Act, 2005 introduced Community Justice Authorities ( CJAs). These were to 'reduce reoffending' in their local areas by involving all of the key agencies and partners in delivering a collaborative CJA plan. There were eight CJAs in Scotland. The MAPPA areas aligned with the CJA areas, but the CJAs themselves had no responsibility for MAPPA. Practitioners and police officers were unclear about the role, function and relevance of the CJAs to their work with sex offenders and serious violent offenders. We agreed that the relationship of the CJAs to MAPPA was confusing and required clarification.

The offender

4.47 Offenders attended supervision reviews that discussed their behaviour, circumstances and levels of risk. When we spoke with offenders in the community, we noted that many did not fully understand the risk assessment process and its conclusions for them. This was particularly true of the violent offender group, for whom risk assessment practice was highly variable and where there was generally a lesser focus on offending behaviour. We considered that communicating effectively with offenders about the risks they posed was an important part of risk management. Offenders should be able to understand the reasons underlying their supervision, including the reasons for intrusive actions such as unannounced visits and home visits. Recommendations for Scottish Ministers

• That Scottish Ministers co-ordinate action to ensure that prisons receive information timeously when an offender commences a sentence for a serious violent or sex offence.
• That Scottish Ministers promote the effective integration of health services in MAPPA, in order that the information they hold and their expertise can contribute better to improved offender management.
• That Scottish Ministers undertake a national review of joint and integrated working practices in place between police, social work services and other relevant agencies, including co-located units, in order to identify and disseminate good practice.

Recommendations for Scottish Ministers and agencies

• That Scottish Ministers and agencies develop and implement formal protocols for information sharing between agencies about serious violent offenders.
• That Scottish Ministers, the National Policing Improvement Agency ( NPIA) and responsible authorities urgently address the reasons underlying the poor use of the ViSOR database by agencies other than police.

Recommendations for agencies

• That MAPPA 'responsible authorities' establish local strategic boards to oversee the performance management and quality of local MAPPA operations and plan for the future improvement and development of the system.

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