« Previous | Contents | Next »
Listen
CHAPTER 3
Managing risk
Summary
One-third of social work supervision plans for sex offenders we reviewed were not good enough and home visits and unannounced visits to sex offenders by social workers were not occurring as set out in those plans. Social work planning for serious violent offenders was generally of a poor standard, with two-thirds having no risk management content of any kind on record.
The police were entering supervision plans consistently on the ViSOR database, but the detail in these varied between MAPPA areas. Social work files often contained separate supervision plans for sex offenders. There was potential in the ViSOR database to create one unified supervision and management plan for sex offenders, and in future for serious violent offenders too.
We concluded that the MAPPA had improved how agencies worked together and made joint decisions about how to manage sex offenders. Generally, police and social work services were committed to this joint work, and there was evidence of positive contributions from housing services. The Integrated Case Management system in prisons had improved the way agencies worked together during the prison term and immediately before release.
There were aspects of practice that required improvement. For instance, in our sample of prison records, in one-half of instances the prisoner had not had an annual ICM case conference. Some practitioners were unclear about the relationship between assessing risk and risk management, uncertain about how the former influenced the latter.
Staff involved in managing high risk of serious harm offenders often found the work stressful, demanding and challenging. Social workers and police officers were acutely conscious that their role had a significant bearing on public safety. Many staff considered that their agencies could do more to support them in their work.
There were gaps in the supervision of high risk of harm prisoners granted home leave or an external work placement, and we considered that this required remedial action.
The need to manage risk
3.1 Managing risk effectively involves minimising the potential for serious harm arising from the behaviour of sex offenders and violent offenders who pose a high risk of serious harm. It entails anticipating the scenarios where risk of harm is likely to be most prevalent and putting in place appropriate safeguards to protect against them. The main responsibility for this lay with local authorities, the police, and the Scottish Prison Service. Other organisations were involved, including voluntary organisations and health services.
3.2 Managing risk well means using risk assessment information to make appropriate plans to help prevent further offending. Those plans should be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time bound (SMART). The plans should detail who is responsible for carrying out specified tasks and be clear about systems for reviewing and monitoring progress.
3.3 For the purpose of this inspection, risk management planning and delivery covered the duration of the prisoner's sentence and time spent on licence in the community.
Risk management policy and guidance
3.4 The Scottish Government had published a number of documents giving practice advice on risk management. These included the social work National Standards for Throughcare (revised 1998), SWSI guidance on risk management (2002), guidance on Integrated Case Management (2006), guidance on the implementation of MAPPA (2006), guidance on Orders for Lifelong Restriction (2006), and guidance on the management of temporary leave from prison (2007). There was also a range of local guidance and protocols that related to risk management. The most important of these, now largely subsumed within MAPPA, related to the management of sex offenders.
Findings
Prison-based risk planning and management
3.5 The ' ICM Practice Manual (2007)' 17 described new arrangements for integrating the work of agencies and managing prisoners through their sentences. These arrangements provided for the sharing of relevant information about prisoners to manage the risks and needs of offenders in prison and to prepare them for release.
3.6 ICM case conferences were the forums in which staff shared risk assessments and planned for the offender's liberation. These case conferences ought to take place at regular scheduled points in the prisoner's sentence 18. . Despite there always having been adequate time before liberation to hold a pre-release case conference, this did not always happen, or it did not happen within the correct timescale. Some of the files we reviewed contained evidence of the operation of the sentence management approach that predated ICM, and the transition between these two systems may partially explain some of these deficits.
3.7 One-half of the offenders reviewed in the inspection of prison records had not been the subject of an annual ICM case conference. Of these, two had no allocated community-based social worker.No detailed information was available for the others.
3.8 A range of professionals attended case conferences and there was an appropriate focus on risk in most instances. Prison ICM co-ordinators chaired all case conferences and in each observed conference the prisoner attended as did prison and community-based social workers.
3.9 The quality of the chairing of observed case conferences varied. Some were unfocused and, in some instances, did not examine important information about risk well enough. This raised questions about the effectiveness of the training given to prison staff to chair multi-disciplinary meetings dealing with complex information.
3.10 Case conferences also regularly highlighted whether there were adequate resources to address identified needs. Waiting lists for some programmes, including the Violence Prevention Programme ( VPP), were as long as two years. Some prisoners who might have benefited from these programmes could not access them before release.
3.11 Evidence from file reading and fieldwork showed that the ICM process had improved the links and working relationships between social workers and prison officers. Moreover, social work risk assessments had increasingly influenced the prison based decision-making process. The quality of risk management plans had also improved significantly since the introduction of ICM.
Risk Management Groups
3.12 All prisons inspected had a Risk Management Group ( RMG) in place, convened to manage those deemed as presenting a very high risk of serious offending or requiring complex management, or both. A senior prison manager chaired these groups, and consistent attendees were prison psychologists and prison social workers. Attendance of other professionals varied by prison, but in no instance did a health representative attend. Prisoners attendance at these meetings also varied. We found significant inconsistency
in who attended risk management groups.
3.13 There was also inconsistency in the criteria for referral to the Risk Management Group from ICM meetings. In some instances, referrals were inappropriate. We noted also that the referral rates to the RMG varied considerably across the prison estate. There was a duplication of effort and blurring of boundaries between Risk Management Group responsibilities and the ICM processes, which ought to be clearer.
Interventions
3.14 More than two-thirds of prisoners in the sample had not undertaken offence-focused programmed interventions in prison. This included the Sex Offender Treatment Programme ( SOTP), alcohol awareness, and anger management. Some offenders who had completed programmes had it as a condition of their release licences that they continue offence focused work in the community.
3.15 A number of prisoners declined to participate in any offence-related work, and there was no compulsion on prisoners to accept programmes to address their offending behaviour.
3.16 Files identified two prisoners as requiring the Violence Prevention Programme ( VPP), which is a programme to address serious violent behaviour. However, because the waiting list was so long the requirement to attend the programme was in the offender's release licence, but this was impossible to fulfil as a condition because the VPP was not available in any community location.
3.17 Offenders with drug problems were more likely to have community support organised by prison health or addiction services than were offenders with alcohol problems. Most prisoners we reviewed had an identified alcohol or substance misuse problem on admission to prison. Almost half had alcohol or addictions counselling identified as a condition of their licence. Where the licence had identified the need for alcohol counselling in the community, there was no evidence that healthcare or addictions teams in the prison had arranged for this, which was not the case for offenders with drug problems.
Community-based risk planning and management
Sex offenders
3.18 In the files we reviewed, one-third of social work supervision and risk management plans were adequate or poor. This was too high a proportion for such a potentially high-risk group of offenders. Almost all the sex offenders in our sample had a risk management plan in place. In most instances, the police had contributed to the plan, and in almost one-half, housing services had contributed. Two-thirds of plans had a clear framework for reviewing progress. The same number set out the tasks that external agencies would carry out. Over half did not provide for any social work unannounced home visits to the offender.
3.19 In approximately three-quarters of files, sex offenders had ten or more contacts with their supervising social worker over the preceding six-month period. However, the number of unannounced visits was very low and one-third of offenders had not had a home visit in the preceding six months. We considered that this performance was not good enough given risks presented by the offenders in our sample.
3.20 Social workers and police officers had held informal discussions outside formal meetings in one-half of files. In almost every case, there was evidence that agencies had considered concerns about child or adult protection.
3.21 We noted that the ViSOR database held risk management plans for sex offenders, input by the police following MAPPA meetings. There were variations in the level of detail that the different MAPPA areas recorded in these plans. We considered that ViSOR provided opportunities for all agencies to share one comprehensive supervision and risk management plan. It will not be possible to fully realise the potential of ViSOR in this regard until the resolution of very significant difficulties with social work and prison access to the ViSOR database. We comment further on this in Chapter 4.
Violent offenders
3.22 In the files we reviewed, two-thirds of serious violent offenders had no risk management content in their supervision plan. In almost every case, the police did not contribute to violent offender plans. Weaknesses in plans included an insufficient focus onrisk, poor contingency planning, and little partner agency involvement. Plans were too general and not focused on managing risk .
3.23 Levels of contact between supervisors and violent offenders were less than with sex offenders, with under half having ten or more contacts with their supervisor over the preceding six months. Plans did not incorporate unannounced visits. There was evidence of informal police and social work contact in only three files.
3.24 For more than half of the violent offenders we reviewed, we did not find purposeful action recorded to address or mitigate the adult or child protection risks we considered possible in the circumstances as described in the file. Better risk of harm assessment would have helped identify who was at risk and what the risk was, informing actions to address the risk. We considered that this reflected a generally underdeveloped focus on assessing the risk of serious harm to the public posed by sex offenders or violent offenders.
Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
Background and planned developments
3.25 The MAPPA guidance sets out three categories, three levels, and three stages. The three categories are registered sex offenders, violent offenders, and 'other' offenders 19. The three levels are Level 1: ordinary risk management, Level 2: local interagency risk management and Level 3: multi-agency public protection panels. The three stages are Stage 1: MAPPA notification, Stage 2: MAPPA referral and Stage 3: MAPPA deregistration.
3.26 Staff spoke positively of the benefits that MAPPA had brought, notably their experience of more effective multi-agency working in relation to offender management and public protection. Some police officers and social work practitioners were concerned about the planned eventual extension of MAPPA to include violent offenders because of the resource and capacity constraints discussed in Chapter 4 of this report. We heard that the MAPPA were staff and resource intensive. Staff expressed concern about the number of offenders who would require risk management if MAPPA expanded to include violent offenders.
3.27 Previous SWIA inspections of criminal justice social work services 20 generally found that violent offender supervision was too often not strong enough. There needed to be more effective risk assessment and risk management. Whilst such offenders did receive supervision, this was often at minimum standards of intensity and frequency of contact. This inspection echoes those earlier findings. Bringing serious violent offenders within the MAPPA will require a step change in the capacity of social work and partner agencies to manage the risks they pose.
Arrangements in prison
3.28 Prisons demonstrated an appropriate focus on the legislation governing MAPPA and most deployed managers with the relevant decision-making authority to MAPPA meetings in the community.
3.29 Certain prisoners may be eligible for temporary release prior to their liberation. This could be in a work placement, on home leave, or both. If granted (unescorted) home leave, some prisoners could be in the community for as long as one week per month. Prison governors consider whether the risks posed by the prisoner are manageable in the community, making this judgement in consultation with social work and other relevant agencies. The MAPPA guidance also reiterates this responsibility. Social workers assess the suitability of the prisoner's plans for home leave, but typically do not have contact with the prisoner during the home leave period. Police contact with these prisoners is even more limited.
3.30 Prison authorities completed risk management plans to cover home leave, but these plans did not have the same degree of multi-agency contribution as final release plans. There was no requirement on the responsible authorities to convene a MAPPA meeting or draw up a risk management plan for offenders on temporary release. Scottish Government officials were considering this issue with responsible agencies. We considered that every sex offender and serious violent offender on home leave should have an appropriate multi-agency risk management plan in place covering the term of his or her temporary release from custody.
Arrangements in the community
3.31 The 2008 MAPPA annual reports showed inconsistencies across the country. For example, the percentages of offenders managed at either level 1 or level 2 showed variances of up to 20% between areas. The reasons for these variations are not clear. The MAPPA guidance provided a framework for allocating a MAPPA level to every sex offender. These were complex judgements and there was significant evidence that staff did not find the guidance sufficiently clear. We were aware that the MAPPA guidance had already undergone several iterations and while some staff told us that it had improved with each version, many still wanted clearer guidance that focused on practice.
3.32 We also found evidence that strategic oversight of MAPPA varied between areas. Practitioners and managers who attended our consultation event said that there was little effective monitoring of performance, dissemination of learning, or sharing of good practice.
3.33 Psychologists and psychiatrists typically did not attend MAPPA meetings. Some areas were piloting ways to improve their attendance. For instance, one MAPPA area had arranged for forensic mental health service clinicians to attend all MAPPA level 2 and level 3 meetings. We also found another two areas piloting professional clinical support to risk assessors and managers. We considered that such arrangements had the potential to improve the quality of risk assessment and management, and merited systematic review with a view towards disseminating good practice across all MAPPA areas.
Links between the Parole and the MAPPA processes
3.34 There was an important interface between the MAPPA process and the role of the Parole Board in determining discretionary release and setting conditions for release licences. Parole Board members told us that when they received requests to vary release licence conditions, they had to be convinced that (a) there was a need for such measures, (b) that the measure itself was purposeful and (c) that it was not an unnecessarily punitive means of achieving its stated aim. In the Board's opinion, agencies did not always make this case well enough. We considered that responsible authorities should arrange appropriate training for their staff to ensure that they understand and consistently meet the needs of the Parole Board.
Staff deployment, training and support
3.35 Some police officers in offender management units had not undergone any formal selection process to determine their suitability for that role. We considered that the rigorous demands of managing sex offenders necessitated a more structured approach to recruitment to such teams.
3.36 Some police officers thought that those working in offender management units or in related areas, such as reviewing internet downloads, should receive specialist training and support. This would better equip them for the complex task of working with and managing sex offenders, which was challenging and required specialist skills. They pointed out that officers in other demanding roles received formal and professional training, debriefing and support.
3.37 Some practitioners were concerned about potentially having to defend their risk assessments in court, and in particular about possible legal challenges to their qualifications and experience to make such assessments. Recent judicial comments about the evidential weight of police risk assessments in civil proceedings to obtain a Sexual Offences Prevention Order tended to reinforce those concerns 21. Some practitioners suggested that members of the judiciary should have opportunities to learn about the limits and strengths
of the RM2000 and the SA07 and we agreed that this would be useful.
3.38 We saw evidence that police services occasionally redeployed officers from offender management units to help with other major enquiries or specialist roles. When this occurred, officers said that it increased the pressure on the remaining staff, and it could reduce the unit's capacity to manage offenders. We believe that police forces should have contingencies in place to ensure continuity after such redeployments.
3.39 Social workers and police officers were invariably conscious of their important function in protecting the community, and many said they experienced considerable stress. We concluded that supporting staff working in this area was a critical necessity, and there was evidence that considerable improvement was required.
3.40 Practitioners told us they thought that risk management practice could sometimes become too risk-averse, leading to more intensive practice than was necessary. This perception emphasised the need for effective and up-to-date risk assessment, particularly risk of harm assessment, and reinforced the well-established principle that intervention with offenders should be proportionate to the level of risk and need that they present.
Locating missing high risk of serious harm offenders
3.41 We were aware of recent occasions where offenders subject to sex offender registration failed to keep to the terms of their registration and went missing. In addition to these individuals there were over 28,000 people registered as wanted by Scottish law enforcement agencies on the Police National Computer ( PNC). We considered that it would be appropriate if there were a national unit in Scotland to coordinate the search for the most serious of these offenders. We were aware that ACPOS were discussing the potential for such a unit, and we considered that this would be a positive development.
Recommendations for Scottish Ministers
- That Scottish Ministers ensure that there is succinct, plain and unambiguous practical guidance for managers and practitioners on the MAPPA process.
- That Scottish Ministers ensure that when prisoners who present a high risk of serious harm have home leave or an external work placement, there is an effective and multi-agency risk management plan for the period that the offender is on these activities.
- That Scottish Ministers ensure that members of the judiciary considering risk assessments prepared by police and social work are familiar with the policy and procedures in place for such risk assessments and the strengths and limitations of the various risk assessment tools in use.
Recommendations for agencies
- That Chief Constables, the Scottish Prison Service, and Chief Social Work Officers ensure that sex offenders and serious violent offenders subject to supervision have an effective risk management plan tailored to their risk and needs.
- That the Scottish Prison Service connect the operation of the Risk Management Groups directly to the ICM framework. This would eliminate duplication and increase the coherence of the system.
- That the Scottish Prison Service develop a strategy for the more effective engagement of those prisoners who refuse to participate in a change programme, and ensure that ICM annual case conferences occur for every offender at the correct intervals.
- That Chief Constables, the Scottish Prison Service, and Chief Social Work Officers arrange appropriate training for their staff involved in MAPPA to ensure that they understand and consistently meet the needs of the Parole Board.
- That Chief Constables, the Scottish Prison Service, and Chief Social Work Officers formally select employees dealing with high-risk offenders, and ensure they receive an appropriate range of support, training and professional advice, including training on giving evidence in court.
« Previous | Contents | Next »