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15. THE GLASGOW CITY COUNCIL INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINE OF KERELAW STAFF
15.1 As described in Chapter 7, the setting up of the joint investigation followed the Millerston investigation and the continued emergence of allegations. The police were informed following the June meeting referred to at paragraphs 7.19 and 7.20. Separate historical allegations had also been raised and brought to police attention. The investigation team was "joint" in recognition that Kerelaw provided both education and care, and that education and social work needed to work together, although its composition and its investigatory work became heavily weighted towards social work experience.
15.2 An officer was chosen to lead the investigation who was not currently part of the HQ Children and Families team, but was considered to have the policy and analytical background to carry out the work. This officer also had a trade union background, and had in the early 1990s been lead trade union officer in a number of joint management/trade union investigations under Strathclyde Regional Council's conduct and competence procedures.
15.3 After the lead official was identified in the Summer of 2004, the remit - to investigate current and historical allegations of abuse - was agreed at Director level. The team was asked to consider the issues which had emerged from the Millerston investigation, including the inappropriate use of restraint. There were also health and safety issues. The initial timescale was estimated at 3 to 6 months. In the event they were only wound up only in 2008. The lead officer liaised with the officer who led the Millerston investigation to draw together the concerns that had emerged. Previous fact-findings at Kerelaw were also scrutinised. As the investigations got under way, more than 20 staff had been transferred or suspended, including managers.
Investigation team
15.4 Over the 3 years of the investigation 12 people were involved in the team for varying periods of time, in addition to the lead officer. The initial team of 6 was put in place between August and November 2004 and 6 more joined in the Spring of 2005. One of the original 6 was from the Education Department. The rest of the team comprised a mix of staff with experience in residential child care, child protection, fieldwork, criminal justice and human resources. They were all at the level of first line manager or above. The team were off-line from their substantive posts for the period of their involvement, which varied from a few months to 3 years, and were managed by the lead officer, who in turn reported direct to the Director of Social Work.
15.5 Some people have criticised the investigation team as not having the necessary experience of residential child care to allow them fully to understand Kerelaw's role. However, the team did include officers with direct experience of residential care and external management. As the investigation progressed, the benefit of having more people from a fieldwork background was recognised, and this was achieved as new team members were recruited. In particular, officers with child protection experience were sought out and invited to join the team.
15.6 A number of the team had previous experience of carrying out fact-findings and had previously been trained in interviewing. Some had been trained in investigative interviewing in child protection. The whole team was trained in Glasgow City Council's disciplinary process. The team asked for, and was given, training in TCI. In interviews with the Inquiry, members expressed varying levels of confidence in how well prepared they were for their role in the investigation. All acknowledged the work was different from anything else they had ever been involved in before. This was largely due to the number and seriousness of the allegations and the sheer volume of information to be gathered and considered. Another difference was that, unlike most fact-findings, this was about a group of people, not one individual, and although many complaints were relatively recent, it included historical allegations.
Support for the investigation team
15.7 The nature of the work posed challenges around supporting investigators in their task. One came from a background in HR, but functioned as any other team member. While this officer was able to assist the team on matters of process, another person from HR had to be allocated to provide HR advice and support. The team was able to consult other HR staff for advice about communications with employees, questions which could be asked at fact-findings, and what could and could not be put in reports. The team was able to call on the Council's legal services for advice on matters of law.
15.8 As investigations were confidential, and as they were outside their normal reporting arrangements, team members were unable to talk even informally to non-team colleagues, and this meant a degree of isolation as they carried out their work. Some were shocked at what they heard from young people and from some staff members, and told us this had an emotional impact on them personally. Despite that, no special support was offered to team members when they moved on after the investigation. We were told that confidential employee counselling was available to them in the same way as it was to all Council staff. Some of the team were able to seek out other support, but it was clear to the Inquiry that others still feel they should have been formally debriefed at the end. A number of them continue to be affected and might have benefited from the opportunity to talk about their experience. Some ex-members of the investigation team, like a number of former Kerelaw employees, told us that being interviewed by the Inquiry was the first opportunity to do so and the only debrief they had.
Working as a team
15.9 The Inquiry learned that the expansion of the team through the addition of 6 new members in 2005 exposed some divisions, both physically and in perspective. The new team members were based in another room in a different part of the building. The original team were already fully engaged in the work of the investigation and new members appear to have had some difficulty in becoming fully absorbed. Some who gave evidence to the Inquiry suggested that they functioned as two separate teams during the remainder of the investigation. Some of the newer members told the Inquiry that they had approached their remit with open minds but were surprised to find existing team members already convinced of the culpability of Kerelaw staff. This may be explained by what the initial investigations had yielded up to that stage, and there does seem to have been some open discussion within the wider team about differences of perspective: for example on how far certain practice was deliberately abusive or the result of poor management and insufficient supervision and support. We formed the impression that the differences were never fully resolved.
15.10 The one education representative, who was part of the team for about a year, dealt with allegations against 2 teachers and then went back to his substantive post. Both of the cases proceeded to the discipline stage. We were told that allegations which came to light about teachers at a later date were passed on to the Education Department. There were no further disciplinary outcomes for teachers, but we were told that some teaching staff were called to the Education Department for discussions and some were referred to DWCL and GTCS. In that regard, the investigation did not seem to the Inquiry to have been as all- embracing as it should have been.
Working with the police
15.11 There was no joint investigation with the police, contrary to the expectations of some people in Glasgow City Council. The internal investigations and the police inquiry took place in parallel. There were regular formal meetings for sharing of information, and a great deal of informal contact between the police and the internal investigators. To some of the latter it felt like a joint investigation. To others it clearly did not, and there was frustration that they were not working jointly in a manner to which some had been accustomed in child protection cases. The Inquiry was told that the deciding factor in there being two investigations, rather than one joint one, was due to the historical nature of the initial allegations which had come to police attention separately, and that for the police it was not a child protection investigation into an immediate risk.
15.12 There was confusion among some team members about the relationship with the police and the mechanism for working together. Social workers are accustomed to passing information to the police where they believe a crime has been committed, and letting them investigate and make decisions about putting the case to the Procurator Fiscal. However, the range of allegations leading to referrals by the internal investigators to the police became very wide and led internal investigators to believe that many were not pursued, as the police focused mainly on the "high tariff" - ie largely sexual - allegations. In fact, the police did investigate and report a broad range of criminal allegations, both of a sexual and non-sexual nature, to the Procurator Fiscal. All reported allegations were treated seriously and investigated by the Procurator Fiscal, before being reported to Crown Counsel, who considered the full facts and circumstances of each individual case before making a decision.
15.13 As more and more people were named in interviews with witnesses and the net began to widen, it is understandable that the team might find it difficult to decide what should and should not be passed on to the police. An open debate as to whether investigators were uncovering crimes or poor practice might have been useful. On the other hand, it would have been risky for the Council to decide that any particular case did not warrant informing the police. Statements to the police were not shared with Council investigators and for the latter to make a judgement as to whether an individual against whom allegations had been made was probably guilty of no more than poor practice might not have been borne out by information available to, or obtainable by, the police.
15.14 The police were clear that their Inquiry took priority, and a consequence of that was that at one point they required all the records and moved them to Ayr police station. The internal investigation team then had to consult them there. The flow of information became a problem and accessing witnesses, itself a time-consuming task, became more complicated. The fact that there were two different investigations was confusing for many former residents. Some witnesses did not want to speak to Council investigators after they had spoken to the police, as they saw no reason to tell their story twice, in their view to satisfy a bureaucratic process. The Inquiry was also told that, after being notified by the Fiscal of decisions not to proceed with the cases in relation to which they had given police statements, some former residents became even more reluctant to speak to investigators from the Council, as they concluded that they had not been believed. The Inquiry considers that the separate nature of the two respective investigations lengthened the process and made it harder for the Council investigators to obtain statements from potential witnesses to abuse.
Time taken for investigations and disciplinary action
15.15 Glasgow City Council has been criticised for being both too eager to pursue disciplinary action against individuals, and at the same time for being too slow to complete the process. Initially, there would certainly have been pressure on the team to get on with their investigations and to decide on recommendations for disciplinary action. The fact that by the time the investigation started in 2004, over 20 people were already suspended or transferred, would alone have led to considerable pressure to move forward quickly. But moving the investigations forward as quickly as had been hoped was complicated by the volume of allegations which emerged as witnesses were tracked down and interviewed, and also by the police investigation.
15.16 Although there were 3 different District Procurators Fiscal in overall charge between 2004 and 2007, the Crown Office has maintained that the dedicated team of staff in the Procurator Fiscal's office who were preparing these cases were unaffected by these changes. The prosecution position is that the Crown worked as quickly as possible both to clarify matters for individuals and in relation to allowing the Council to proceed with its own processes. In the event, most of the cases did not result in prosecution but, as late as the Summer of 2007, the Glasgow Report was referring to 5 cases still being outstanding. The Inquiry established with the Fiscal in 2008 that in fact no cases remained outstanding and understands that letters were sent to the individuals concerned or their legal representatives to inform them of that.
15.17 Despite that, we heard from one individual who claimed in 2008 that he still had not heard whether or not he was to face Court proceedings. The Crown Office position is that, while the Crown does not routinely intimate decisions to take no proceedings in such cases, the Fiscal always endeavours to respond quickly to enquiries. The wording of the letter which said that no proceedings would be taken on the basis of information available, left a number of people unsure as to what might happen in the future. The Crown Office told the Inquiry that this careful wording is necessary in light of established case law that an unequivocal statement by the prosecutor that there are to be no proceedings will bar any proceedings at a later date, even if new and compelling evidence comes to light. The Inquiry was told that the terms of the letters follow long-established practice, designed to avoid excluding the possibility of subsequent evidence emerging which might provide a sufficiency of evidence, where none had existed previously. We understand that, but a consequence was that there remained much anxiety in the minds in some of those against whom allegations had been made and investigated.
15.18 It appears that the investigation team felt under some pressure to enable the Council to move to disciplinary action, where this was indicated, without undue delay. However, we found no evidence of political pressure on investigators, or pressure by senior management in the Council, to achieve particular disciplinary outcomes, although we are sure that there will have been concern at the highest levels to ensure that there would be no accusations of cover-up. We were told that the political instruction to the Director of Social Work was "to get in there and sort things out". Senior management evidence to the Inquiry was that the priority was to establish facts.
15.19 A countervailing pressure on investigators was the need to be as thorough as possible. As the investigation continued, more and more names of potential witnesses, both staff and former residents, emerged. Tracking down former residents was to prove a lengthy task. A particular problem for investigators was how to achieve a balance between tracking down more and more witnesses to build up evidence, and "drawing a line" under individual cases one way or another in order to minimise delays. The team leader reported progress in her regular meetings with the Director of Social Work and it was largely up to her, consulting as necessary with HR, to decide whether there was enough evidence to recommend proceeding to disciplinary action. Where such action followed, the relevant team member would be the lead witness in the Council's case against the individual concerned.
15.20 Although disciplinary action was taken against a number of individuals before the police investigations were concluded, the time taken in both the disciplinary and police processes led to many people being suspended from their posts for very long periods of time, in some cases for up to 3 years. We were told by many of the ex-Kerelaw staff we interviewed that they were suspended and then went for weeks and months without any contact from Glasgow City Council. A number told us they had been warned not to speak to anyone else from Kerelaw in the meantime, which meant that they felt very isolated, sometimes for a long time.
15.21 Despite the regular progress meetings involving the team leader and the Director of Social Work, we were not aware that an opportunity was taken for the investigation team and the latter to take a step back from time to time to take stock of what was happening. As the size of the investigation grew, it might have helped for the Council to reflect on developments and give consideration to speeding up the process. That might have been done by seeking support from other Departments within the Council or from Social Work Departments in other local authorities, or by buying in additional HR advice It might have had the added advantage of increasing the expertise in disciplinary procedures, on which we shall say more below.
Conduct of the investigations
15.22 A number of witnesses to the Inquiry were angry that members of the team had uncovered and were reinvestigating allegations that had previously been investigated and dealt with. Glasgow City Council's disciplinary procedures are explicit that expired warnings from previous disciplinary hearings will be expunged from the employee's record. Union representatives successfully argued in some cases that, where investigations in the past had led to disciplinary hearings, such cases should not be reopened. By extension, previous investigations that did not result in disciplinary action should not have been revisited either.
15.23 However, others argued that, as investigations were for the first time "joining the dots", it was appropriate to take account of any history of allegations, particularly where it appeared to investigators that previous fact-findings had led to unsatisfactory outcomes. This would rectify what they saw as failures of management and supervision in the past. This issue was not wholly resolved. The fact that there had been investigations of allegations of physical abuse over a number of years, with a core of individuals apparently involved, did contribute to building a picture of a culture at Kerelaw which was unsatisfactory, but it became rather more problematic when used to build up a case for disciplinary action against specific individuals.
15.24 Many former employees of Kerelaw and their families have asserted that Glasgow City Council's investigation was a "witch hunt" in which staff were scapegoated and treated unfairly. None of the ex-Kerelaw staff we spoke to who had been involved in the investigation felt that they had been treated fairly by the fact-finding and disciplinary processes, apart from one who said he had no complaints. This overwhelmingly negative commentary may not be surprising in the case of those facing allegations. However, the numbers include not only those who were the subject of allegations but also those whose sole involvement was to be interviewed and called as witnesses in relation to allegations against others.
15.25 A common complaint from individuals who gave evidence to the Inquiry was that they were not told about the allegations against them until they attended the fact-finding interview. Even then, they argued, the information provided about allegations was often too vague to answer adequately. Sometimes they could not recognise the incident at all or identify the alleged victim or anyone else who was involved. The response by those involved in the investigations was that a fact-finding is just that, so that establishing exactly what the allegation amounts to can be an important first step. Some of those investigated complained that if fact-finders had done their work better, various allegations could have been quickly discounted, because dates of employment and residency that made a situation impossible would have been checked.
15.26 We recognise that in some cases investigators found it hard to find adequate written records, but it does appear that in some cases basic, easily checked, facts were left unchecked. We saw examples where staff were accused of doing something in a particular year when records showed that they did not work at Kerelaw at the time. This could simply be because the witness had got the year wrong, an understandable problem when dealing with events that may have occurred several years earlier. Alternatively, the witness might have got the staff member's name wrong - a mistake with potentially very serious consequences, unless thoroughly checked out. Some ex-Kerelaw staff complained that during the fact-finding the interviewers were even wrong about the number and nature of allegations and had to be corrected. Details of that kind were not always properly checked and sometimes only came to light at disciplinary hearings.
15.27 The Inquiry does not consider that the incidence of this was such as to undermine the overall conclusions reached as to whether abuse occurred at Kerelaw as we received adequate evidence of that from the Inquiry's own witnesses. However, failure to check factual details runs the double risk of individuals either being wrongly pursued or of not being pursued who should be. It also provides ammunition to those with an interest in discrediting the entire process, of whom we encountered a large number.
15.28 Some individuals and their representatives complained that they were not given access to information that they needed to offer an explanation or to construct a defence for their disciplinary hearing. They complained in particular that they were not allowed to see the statements of those who had made or corroborated allegations against them. The Inquiry saw and heard evidence of the Council's concern that the disclosure of information during the disciplinary process would create risk of harm to third parties, notably to Kerelaw residents and ex-residents and to Kerelaw staff. There was also a concern that disclosure might in other ways undermine their ability to get to the bottom of matters during their investigation. Not making statements available was no doubt justified in the circumstances as we were told of verbal abuse, threats and intimidation in the local community of staff thought to have been whistleblowers, and of their families.
15.29 Some of those investigated who asked to see the note of their interview felt this did not properly represent the discussion that had taken place, and found the investigation team extremely reluctant to make the changes they requested. Others described making many changes to the statements they were sent but finding that their amendments were not taken on board. In response to this, investigators told the Inquiry that notes of interviews were not verbatim records, but were intended as a fair summary of what they were told. They took the view, which the Inquiry accepts, that it was not appropriate simply to accept substantial changes to what had been said after witnesses had had a chance to reflect on how their statements had come out and in some cases substantially change their story. Investigators said that, where changes were offered, they were prepared to note them in red to highlight where the individual disagreed with the record. The disagreement was then able to be taken up at the disciplinary hearing, if that followed.
15.30 We heard frequent claims by former employees at Kerelaw of aggressive interviewing styles during fact-finding. This could readily be inferred from some of the notes of interviews which the Inquiry read. The Inquiry also heard complaints from a range of ex-staff about the leading nature of questions asked by interviewers, of both former residents and employees. This was also apparent in some of the notes of interviews we read. It was put to us in evidence that anyone questioning or doubting the evidence or fairness in the process was regarded by investigators as insufficiently child-centred and on the side of abusers. One former staff member who was called to give evidence to investigators told us that:
He was called up 3 times to give information.......if he didn't tell them what they wanted to hear he felt as if they thought he was telling lies. They discounted what he said if it wasn't what they wanted to hear.
15.31 It was also put to the Inquiry by some former staff members and their representatives that some people were treated as credible witnesses when giving evidence against other staff members, but as lacking credibility when talking about themselves. If this was indeed the case, and it was not the perception of those involved in carrying out the investigations, it could fuel a perception of bias and prove counterproductive in the long run. However, it must be borne in mind that child abuse is notoriously difficult to investigate as perpetrators almost invariably deny their guilt. If investigators appeared over-eager to achieve a result, this was most likely due to their concern for children, and in an investigation the benefit of the doubt has to fall on the side of their protection.
15.32 The Inquiry recognises that being interviewed about allegations of child abuse must be a traumatic experience and that the more robust the interviewing style the more difficult the experience will be. Within a few months of investigations starting, the team became increasingly aware of previous allegations, sometimes over a long period, against a number of individuals whose names were being drawn to their attention. They uncovered evidence of less than satisfactory previous investigations, of associated concerns about staff collusion, of failures in the complaints system, and of the fact that concerns on all such matters had been raised by others in the past.
15.33 As this emerged and as allegations multiplied, for some investigators their determination to establish the facts and bring perpetrators to book may have hardened, and this may have been reflected in their approach. Although a determination to ensure that on this occasion there would be no covering up and no obstruction is laudable, employees who are subject to fact-finding should nevertheless be treated with respect. That does not mean that they must be treated with kid gloves: rather, the questioning must be firm but fair, penetrating and insightful, well conducted and properly documented. The Inquiry saw some evidence of good, well-constructed questioning of that kind, which was effective in eliciting the information which was needed.
15.34 One witness to the Inquiry who had been involved in fact-findings at Kerelaw in the late 1990s summed up what he recalled as the challenge involved in getting at the truth:
…there was frequently a collusive atmosphere where staff seemed uncomfortable when backing up a story and ….. it was hard to get to the truth….a number of staff were disproportionately involved in a number of complaints, and on a number of occasions experienced staff were saying they were around at the time of a particular incident when young people did not. That made [him] conclude that collusion was embedded in the management structure. [He]speculated that it seemed staff had had a dummy run through fact-findings in advance to get their stories straight. Cliques were common and both he and ….... felt staff had been coached on occasions.
15.35 It is also important to appreciate the challenge involved in putting together evidence in respect of individual cases which would stand up to the burden of proof, even where the same names came up frequently in witness statements. This had been well evidenced by previous experience at Kerelaw. Like fact-findings in the past, the investigation was hampered by the different allegiances of staff. The Inquiry interviewed a former employee who had cooperated with the investigation and had given accounts of an unacceptable situation which had been poorly handled by a range of Kerelaw managers and staff. She had been dissatisfied at the outcome of the investigation into that incident, believing that those responsible had covered up for one another and had not been properly held to account. She believed they had a case to answer.
15.36 However, when subsequently asked to provide information in a separate investigation of one of her peers, she refused and withdrew cooperation from the fact-finders. While the Inquiry is not in a position to take a view on the merits of the respective allegations, the willingness of this staff member to cooperate appeared to be coloured by who was under investigation. This illustrates the difficulty facing investigators in obtaining open, reflective information from some staff members who had allegiances to particular individuals or groups. Nor was fact-finding helped by the outright refusal of some employees - sometimes having been so advised by their union representative - to offer any comment at all on certain allegations. While "no comment" is any accused person's right, it is unhelpful and it is not surprising if negative inferences are drawn from such a response.
Attention to detail
15.37 The Inquiry was surprised at what appeared to be a lack of attention to detail in some fact-finding reports. Although there were some well-constructed, appropriately analysed, rationally argued and carefully concluded reports, rather more were poorly written, hard to follow and loosely concluded. Indeed the Inquiry heard that the poor quality of the fact-finding reports was a significant factor in Glasgow City Council withdrawing from the Employment Appeals Tribunals in relation to two teachers. Some fact-finding reports did not appear to have been proof-read and this gave the impression that there had been a lack of quality assurance in their production. While the misspelling of the same individual's name at different points - and sometimes in different forms - in a written note of an interview may not undercut the substance of the note, it raises the question as to what else may not be quite right. In the most extreme case it may cast doubt on the identity of the person concerned and may thereby make it harder to substantiate allegations. If the motivation for pursuing investigations robustly and single-mindedly is to ensure that young people are safe, apparent carelessness of this kind runs the risk of having the opposite effect.
15.38 The way in which Violent Incident ( VI1) forms had been completed or otherwise dealt with was an important element in cases against senior managers. Despite this, these were not as well ordered or checked through as they might have been. Those presenting the management case at disciplinary hearings sometimes had to seek out the forms being adduced in evidence after the hearing had commenced, which is unsatisfactory. There were problems with certain other aspects of paperwork and record keeping, which should have been more rigorously audited and presented. The fact that "the accused" had often not had the opportunity to see and comment on the documentary evidence was an issue addressed in the Principal's Employment Appeals Tribunal.
15.39 The quality of evidence gathered by investigators from witness statements and records they examined was tested first in disciplinary hearings, then in appeal hearings by Councillors, and in some cases in subsequent Employment Appeals Tribunals. The evidence stood up well to the tests in some cases, and in others it did not. The varied nature of disciplinary outcomes, and the outcome of Tribunals, reflect that.
15.40 It is important to bear in mind that evidence which may allow a general conclusion to be drawn in relation to unacceptable practices, a prevailing culture, management failures, or other shortcomings, may have to be more robust to establish that a particular individual is guilty of commission or omission of a specific act at a specific time or place. If disciplinary action is to ensure that individuals who are guilty of misconduct are held to account, it is vital that close attention is paid to the quality of evidence, and that it is scrutinised carefully by the employer's legal advisers. The Inquiry considers that the legal scrutiny of a number of cases as they went forward to disciplinary action could have been more thorough. It is also crucially important that the process followed is compliant with the law and the employer's own procedures. We return to this below.
Outcome of the disciplinary process for ex-Kerelaw staff
15.41 The Council's investigation resulted in 29 disciplinary hearings which gave rise to a number of internal appeals and Employment Appeals Tribunals which have extended over a period of more than 4 years, and are not yet complete. There appears to have been no further action following the fact-findings for the remaining 9 people. Of the staff who were subject to a disciplinary hearing, 14 were dismissed over a period from December 2004 to October 2006. Twelve of those who were dismissed appealed to the Council's Appeals Sub-Committee and one appeal was upheld with a reduced penalty of final written warning. Subsequently, 9 of those who were dismissed and appealed took their cases to an Employment Appeals Tribunal.
15.42 The Principal and the Deputy (Open School) had their claims of unfair dismissal upheld at Employment Appeals Tribunals and will receive compensation. The Council has conceded a further 2 cases and those staff will also receive compensation. Two ex-members of staff have dropped their claims and another has been struck out by the Tribunal because of the appellant's failure actively to pursue the case. The other 2 cases remain active. The disposals for the 15 Kerelaw staff who were not dismissed following a disciplinary hearing varied. For 3 there was no further action and they returned to work: 3 were subject to a management discussion and also returned to work; 7 received final written warnings and the Inquiry has been unable to establish the outcome for 2.
Glasgow City Council's Discipline and Grievance Policy and Procedures
15.43 At local government reorganisation in 1996, the discipline and grievance policy and procedures used by Glasgow City Council were those of the former Strathclyde Regional Council, as were many of the Council's policies and procedures. However, by May 1997 the Council had reviewed the existing policy and rolled out its own Code of Discipline, Disciplinary and Appeals Procedure together with Grievance and Dispute Procedures.
15.44 The Council's Code complies with statutory requirements and conforms to good practice (see Annex D). It makes clear that discipline within the Council need not be punitive and that it provides an opportunity to improve. It also makes explicit that the procedure should work as quickly as possible, consistent with thorough investigation of the facts at each stage. Unless in exceptional circumstances, disciplinary investigations and hearings will be undertaken within 2 working days of discovery of the misconduct, although it is noted that on occasions the timescales will require to be operated flexibly by the parties concerned.
15.45 The Code provides examples of gross misconduct that may lead to summary dismissal. Included are wilful injury to others, neglect of duty resulting in serious consequences, criminal convictions having a material bearing on employment, abusive behaviour towards colleagues and/or the public or customers of the Council, and exceptionally serious offences of unsatisfactory conduct.
15.46 Responsibility for ensuring the maintenance of disciplinary standards rests with Heads of Department, for example the Directors of Social Work and Education, who may in turn delegate that authority to another officer under their control. The Departmental Personnel Officer advises management on disciplinary matters, is present at the disciplinary hearing in matters of gross misconduct or serious misconduct, relays decisions, and assists management in preparation for appeals. The Council's legal officer assists in the preparation and presentation of Employment Appeals Tribunals.
15.47 Where a precautionary suspension of an employee is justified and is likely to extend over a period of time, the Code makes clear that the suspended employee will be kept informed of the reasons for the continued suspension at least on a 2-weekly basis. Where the fact-finding investigation indicates that a disciplinary hearing is needed, the employee should be informed and given reasonable time to prepare his or her case and be given relevant copies of reports and documentation.
15.48 The Council's Disciplinary Procedure sets out clearly the stages of the disciplinary hearing and relevant responsibilities, how a decision is arrived at and the disposals that may result, their duration and the opportunities for appeal. There are no additional details or advisory notes in relation to timing of the process, other than that any appeal must be lodged within 2 weeks of receiving written confirmation of the decision and the time limits for disposals that do not involve dismissal.
Handling of criminal offences
15.49 The Code considers the Council's actions in relation to evidence of criminal activity that has a bearing on employment. The circumstances should be ascertained from the employee and the matter should be investigated as fully as possible before calling in the police. Where the police are called in, the disciplinary investigation and any police investigation should be handled separately and, before any decision is taken about disciplinary action, reasonable grounds must be established for believing that the individual committed the offence.
15.50 The Code makes clear that disciplinary action should proceed on the balance of probability and should not be swayed by the need for proof beyond reasonable doubt as the criminal case would require. There is no need to await the outcome of any criminal case in the Courts before proceeding with a disciplinary. Where a custodial sentence is imposed, the decision about whether to dismiss or not should take into account the need to act reasonably in the light of the needs of the Council.
Application of the disciplinary process
15.51 While the Council's Code of Discipline prescribes that disciplinary proceedings should conclude in a matter of days, it also allows for an apparently unlimited extension of time "on occasion". While the complexity of the disciplinary cases comprising the joint Kerelaw investigation must have precluded very swift completion, the looseness of the wording of the Code created an opportunity for the process to become greatly extended. Good practice suggests 6 months should be adequate for completion of a disciplinary fact-finding and hearing and this was significantly exceeded for a considerable number of staff.
15.52 As we have noted at paragraph 15.20, many of the ex-Kerelaw staff we interviewed said that Glasgow City Council failed to keep them informed of progress during their suspension despite the requirement to update at least once every 2 weeks. Some said that, despite hearing little direct from their employer, they did hear rumours about themselves and others about discipline-related actions that were about to happen, apparently so far as they were concerned through leaks of information from the Council. Leaked information found its way into the press too and some interviewees were - and remain - upset that they were named in the newspapers as child abusers. The Inquiry is not able to confirm or otherwise the source of any leaks which may have taken place.
15.53 Some of those who had been suspended told us that they had been given the name of an administrative support worker they could contact for advice, but that this level of support, delivered in this way, was inadequate under the circumstances. Others commented that the support staff appeared to have no training or preparation for the task they were expected to undertake. One interviewee told us he had received 2 calls in 6 months from a junior administrator who had no idea how to provide support. Another said he had never been offered a contact person and that that was in contravention of the Code of Discipline. In contrast to these reports, however, a few interviewees told us they had been very well supported by a particular member of the personnel team. Given the protracted nature of investigations and the time taken for many of those against whom allegations had been made to come to a resolution of their case, it is not surprising that many ex-Kerelaw employees felt more and more abandoned by their employer as time went on.
15.54 Many interviewees reported actions by the Council that appeared insensitive to the impact those actions would have on individuals. Examples were letters reporting allegations that were despatched to home addresses without any prior warning and letters sent out late in the week which would arrive on a Saturday when Union or legal support was hard to come by. The Inquiry heard complaints that individuals were suspended or subject to precautionary transfer, sometimes by phone, without being informed of the specific allegations against them. For some, the detail of allegations remained unclear, while others feel they were informed of the details far too late in the process.
15.55 The evidence of those who were the subject of, or witnesses to, fact-findings, or were the subject of disciplinary hearings would suggest that the Council did not fully meet the statutory requirements in applying their disciplinary procedures. This is borne out by the outcomes in relation to 4 of the Employment Appeals Tribunals which have concluded to date. Delays in moving forward with an Appeal were a factor in the outcome of at least one Employment Appeals Tribunal. It appears to the Inquiry that the joint investigation paid insufficient heed to the rights of Kerelaw staff to fair and reasonable treatment in line with the Code of Discipline and disciplinary procedures.
15.56 The question arises as to whether this was the result of sloppy practice, a conflict of interests, or, as some interviewees clearly believe, an "agenda", or some other reason. It is possible to conclude that where, for example, interviewees were faced with allegations that could have and should have been dismissed as impossible on the basis of facts that were easily checked, the fact-finding was sloppy and inadequate. That might allow some observers to conclude, regardless of the facts, that the whole investigation was flawed. The Inquiry would not support such a conclusion. Whether flaws in fact-finding resulted in poor or inappropriate conclusions as regards individuals, and the attendant possibility that guilty people have been exonerated and innocent people inappropriately disciplined, we cannot say, as consideration of individual cases was outside our remit.
15.57 As to whether there was an "agenda", the Inquiry has no evidence that inappropriate pressure was put on investigators by politicians or senior managers, although there was clear political direction to investigate and sort matters out. There will also have been a determination to ensure that what some saw as the failures of previous investigations would not be repeated. It may also be that the investigation team had difficulty in accommodating the compliance requirements of a fair disciplinary process within an approach that made child protection the top priority.
Compensation
15.58 It was asserted by a number of former managers and staff, and some ex-residents, that the avalanche of allegations in which investigators were increasingly engulfed from Spring 2004 onwards was motivated mainly by a desire for compensation. These assertions were made partly by reference to experience of compensation being paid in recent years to the victims of abuse in a variety of settings. They were given weight because at the point in June 2004 that the external manager of Kerelaw was making his report to Directors, a young man for whose removal Millerston staff petitioned the Principal in 2003, approached the Principal himself to complain that - allegedly unlike other young people - he had not been informed that he could claim compensation for being inappropriately restrained. The Principal brought this to the attention of the Director of Social Work.
15.59 Unfortunately, the person who it was claimed had told young people this, one of those who had complained about her unit manager's management style, did not come forward with evidence to the Inquiry; so we were not able to test the claim directly. Nevertheless, it is possible that some young people were told by someone at Kerelaw - in an effort to encourage them to speak up - that they could be eligible for financial compensation if they had been inappropriately restrained. It is also possible that some were encouraged to seek compensation by their solicitors.
15.60 It is possible that the prospect of compensation led to allegations which were not genuine. Just as for many years there was a reluctance to accept that abuse did take place in residential care, there has been in more recent times a reluctance to disbelieve allegations that abuse took place. Neither position is logically tenable. Allegations may be true, or they may not be true. Sometimes they may be partly true. But, because the people making the allegations may be disturbed or difficult, or may be capable of lying, does not mean that allegations will therefore be untrue. Discounting allegations made to investigators on the basis of the lives and background of those making them mirrors the attitudes which undermined the complaints system at Kerelaw, as discussed in Chapter 12.
15.61 The Inquiry team raised the possibility that young people were motivated by compensation in interviews with each member of the joint investigation team. All of those involved acknowledged the possibility, and said they themselves discounted testimony about which they had doubts. They were, however, persuaded that allegations were not made to enable residents or former residents to claim compensation, for a number of reasons. These included how witnesses presented, the fact that a number made positive comments about Kerelaw as well as making complaints, and the fact that many former residents were at first reluctant to speak in case they got someone into trouble. Another important consideration for the investigation team members was that successive "generations" of ex-residents, who did not know one another and who would have had no opportunity to collude, were coming forward with similar, but not identical, stories of abuse and poor treatment. Moreover, young people's statements were often substantiated not only by other young people but also by staff.
15.62 Information held by Glasgow City Council shows that by 31 March 2009 a total of 55 former residents, or a family member, had notified compensation claims to the Council in respect of their treatment at Kerelaw. Of those, 4 predate by some time the beginning of the Council's investigations, including the Millerston investigation, and only 2 of the 4 individuals concerned were subsequently interviewed by the joint investigation team. Of the total of 55 claimants at end March 2009, only 17 were among over 90 interviewed by the investigation team, which strongly suggests that the hope of compensation was not the reason so many people came forward.
15.63 In contrast, it appears that the outcome of the Court cases against the teacher and the unit manager may have had the most significant influence on compensation claims, with 44 (80%) of the total of 55 claims recorded as having been lodged after the trial. Of those 44, over three-quarters refer specifically to one or other, or both, of the two convicted staff.
15.64 We do not rule out that a desire for compensation may have been a factor in some allegations which have been made against staff at Kerelaw, but the proposition that this was the sole or main motivation is not borne out by the available figures, or by what the Inquiry heard in evidence. This is consistent with the view expressed by Colton, Vanstone and Walby (2002) 23 :
Claims that those who have the courage to come forward and testify to the real and far-reaching harm that was done to them as children in public care are motivated merely by the lure of financial compensation should be viewed with scepticism; they may simply represent the misguided strategy of 'blaming the victim'.
15.65 The Inquiry does not agree with those who have disparagingly claimed that the prospect of access to a "pot of gold" resulted in investigators being hoodwinked by young people intent on lying to secure a share of it.
Support to former residents
15.66 Glasgow City Council offered some support to former residents of Kerelaw who were involved in the investigations. However, this support was limited and late in the day. From January 2006, the Council engaged the services of Barnardo's to provide support to the former residents giving evidence at the criminal trial. Barnardo's was well placed to offer this service as they already knew many Kerelaw residents, having worked with them over the years. They also had a free telephone line in place which young people could use to get in touch. The advice of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal was sought by the Council in arranging the support, given the need to ensure that the criminal process was not compromised. The Fiscal confirmed that the Council should not be directly in touch with witnesses, and as a result contact with all Crown witnesses to offer support by Barnardo's was progressed through the Crown Office, who held contact details. However, as the Council approached Barnardo's only 2 weeks before the trial, most of their work with the former residents took place after the trial.
15.67 Barnardo's received a number of requests for support, some quite separate from the Court proceedings. The Inquiry heard that some residents had been advised by their solicitors against using a support service funded by Glasgow City Council. This suggests the support service may not have been as well used as it could have been. We understand that Barnardo's provided support to 20 young people.
15.68 Because of the nature of the police investigation, many of the former residents approaching Barnardo's were 35 to 40 years old. Barnardo's, as a children's charity, was unable to offer a service to those over 25. Barnardo's raised this with the Council, who agreed with the NHS that former residents over the age of 25 would be offered a psychological assessment followed by clinical support. At least one of the former residents who gave evidence to the inquiry was accessing this NHS support.
15.69 The Council's investigation team was aware of the support needs of those it interviewed. When the Procurator Fiscal decided not to proceed with a number of cases, many of the residents or former residents who gave police statements felt very let down. Investigation team members visited them to offer to link them to support services. As noted at paragraph 3.20, the Procurator Fiscal offered to meet the individuals concerned to discuss the reasons for the decision not to proceed, although only one meeting was requested by a former resident, who ultimately changed his mind before the meeting went ahead. The Inquiry heard that community social work services which were approached did not always offer support in these cases. Members of the investigation team suggested to the Inquiry that the Council had failed to anticipate the need for a support structure for former residents giving evidence to the investigation. The ownership of the process lay with the investigation team, which was inappropriate.
Conclusion
15.70 The joint investigation team set up by the Council faced a formidable challenge in terms of the number of allegations to be investigated and the unprecedented nature of its task. In its investigations of what went wrong at Kerelaw, Glasgow City Council rightly pursued allegations with vigour, but more care should have been taken by investigators to quality control the recording of statements, and to abide by the Council's own disciplinary procedures. The Inquiry found no evidence of political or senior management pressure on investigators to achieve particular disciplinary outcomes, but many staff, including some who gave evidence against colleagues, themselves felt abused by the way in which they were treated. The Inquiry concluded that the Council did not fully meet its obligations of care to all its employees during the investigation and disciplinary process.
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