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14. THE CLOSURE OF KERELAW
14.1 The Open School at Kerelaw closed at the end of December 2004 and the Secure Unit in March 2006. A number of former employees suggested to the Inquiry that Glasgow City Council had been waiting for an opportunity to close the school and the speed with which they did so was evidence of that. By extension, some argued, abuse allegations were exaggerated and a witch-hunt was pursued against staff to justify the decision. Linked with this, it was suggested by some that the Council called on the Care Commission and HMIE to bring forward the next scheduled inspection to August 2004 as cover for a decision which had already been taken.
14.2 A variation on this claim is that, if the situation was as bad as it was alleged to be in August 2004, the report of the Care Commission/ HMIE November 2003 inspection would have been much worse than it was; or alternatively, the situation deteriorated so badly after June 2004 because the Council removed the Principal and a large number of staff following the Millerston investigation and the report to the Directors, and because the Deputy (Open School) was also absent on sick leave.
14.3 The turmoil after June 2004 will certainly have had an impact, but there are flaws in such reasoning. As previously noted, the report of the integrated Care Commission/ HMIE inspection of the Open School in November 2003, which was published in April 2004, was far from satisfactory, although it did note positive features as well as weaknesses. Inspectors identified 4 key strengths, including improvements to aspects of residential accommodation, but, as we discussed at paragraph 10.39, there were also a number of concerns, which included follow-up to the previous inspection, and planning for improvement.
14.4 The Inquiry can see why some might argue that, if the position at Kerelaw was as bad as that described in the report of the August 2004 Care Commssion/ HMIE inspection, the April 2004 report of the November 2003 inspection would have been much worse. However, while no specific child care protection issues were highlighted, it was noted that staffing levels within the units were inadequate at times, an issue which the Principal had been raising with HQ, and there were concerns around climate and relationships and other areas. There was moreover, "soft information" which was shared among inspectors prior to the August 2004 inspection which indicated that they had a number of serious concerns which had developed over a period of time.
14.5 This "soft information" referred to concern about the effectiveness of senior management, and raised questions around external management, a macho culture, a bullying management culture, staff cliques and relationships, information weaknesses, night staff attitudes, and TCI. All of these are issues identified as problematic by the Inquiry from the evidence we received. We were told by the Care Commission that the information had been collated from staff who had been involved in previous inspections, but as we have noted (see paragraph 11.11), although these were therefore presumably present in the minds of at least some inspectors at the time of the Care Commission/ HMIE inspection in November 2003, they were not reflected in the April 2004 report. As we have noted, concerns clearly identified by others, including those involved in inspection, failed to translate into concerted action to put things right until August 2004.
14.6 The Inquiry is aware that, although on occasions some placing authorities were sufficiently worried about the safety and well-being of particular children to move them from Kerelaw, they continued to use the school. While in some cases they were bound by Panel decisions in relation to secure accommodation which specifically named Kerelaw, it appears that many individuals and authorities were unhappy about Kerelaw over the years. They were able to overcome their reservations, and the fact that they did so may be an indication of how convenient, or indeed essential, Kerelaw was considered to be at the time as a resource for dealing with their most challenging young people. Their continued use of Kerelaw cannot be construed as evidence that there were no concerns until after the Millerston investigation in 2004, the change in the management team in June, and the suspension of staff.
14.7 A further flaw in the argument that abuse was exaggerated as part of a hidden agenda to close the school is that the report of the August 2004 inspection clearly implies an expectation that Kerelaw was to continue as a going concern. The report outlined planned follow-through inspection activity and indicated that an action plan had been sought from the Council on how it proposed to address the main findings. The intention was that the Care Commission and HMIE would monitor progress and that an interim report would be published within six months. The report noted the intention of the Care Commission and HMIE to conduct a full follow-through inspection within two years.
14.8 It is possible that Glasgow City Council hoped to use the findings of the Care Commission/ HMIE inspection to provide cover for a decision that had already been taken to close the school, but we found no evidence to support that. We were told by a number of witnesses that the Directors of Social Work and Education visited the school in June 2004 and told managers that it would close, although when we checked this, we were informed that it related to a decision to close the school to new admissions while investigations continued, not to shut it down. We also heard in evidence that, when the external manager was put in charge of the school in June as acting Principal, his remit was to continue to operate Kerelaw as a going concern, and admissions to the Secure Unit resumed in August. We also saw papers suggesting that work was continuing to be taken forward on the plans to rebuild the Secure Unit.
14.9 It does not appear to the Inquiry that a decision had been taken to shut down Kerelaw as early as June 2004, although it seems that the view began to form at a senior level that closure might be the most appropriate outcome. The fact that Kerelaw was operating with lower numbers following the agreement to restrict admissions in May, and the closure to new admissions in June, had financial implications. A report to committee in August 2004 noted that numbers in the Open School had fallen to just over half its capacity of 50, although there had been only a small reduction in the Secure Unit. It stated that, prior to June 2004, Kerelaw generated approximately £5.9 million revenue through the sale of places against a budget of £5 million.
14.10 Although Glasgow City Council itself was the source of much of that revenue, it was forecast that, if the ban on new admissions at the Open School continued, numbers would reduce to zero by early 2005. An income loss of over £2 million to the Social Work Budget was said to be the estimated consequence, although another important calculation would have been the additional cost of accommodating 50 young people in alternative, more expensive, residential accommodation. The report noted that there were at the time 116 Glasgow children resident in voluntary sector schools and secure units at a cost of nearly £11 million.
14.11 The report also noted that the intention was to rebuild the Kerelaw Secure Unit on the present site with financial assistance from central government, and that there was potential for the Open School to provide complementary services alongside this. It was pointed out that if Kerelaw did not exist, other more expensive options would be needed. It was suggested that the Open School required to be modernised, that the opportunity to reduce numbers should be taken, and the feasibility of developing more specialised, high quality services should be explored. The report envisaged a progress report, in the light of the Care Commission/ HMIE inspection and the investigations, to include options and proposals for service development at Kerelaw School. There was no recommendation at that stage that Kerelaw be closed down.
14.12 The Inquiry was not able to find a written audit trail leading up to the proposal which went to Committee on 15 October 2004. A Sunday newspaper report on 26 September claimed that Kerelaw was facing the axe and "an insider" was quoted as saying that the Care Commission report was very, very serious. An article in a tabloid newspaper at the end of the month asked if Kerelaw was doomed and referred to the Care Commission's serious concerns. Although we found no evidence, it might be inferred that views within the Council were moving towards closure and that these were leaking to the press,
14.13 We heard in evidence about growing concern among a range of elected members at what they were hearing about the police inquiry and the impact of the internal investigations on the running of Kerelaw. We were told that "a feeling just grew" that closure was probably the best option. It appears that this feeling solidified into something much firmer from sometime in the Summer. On 12 October, the same day as the Care Commission served an Improvement Notice on the Council, the Directors of Social Work and Education wrote to Kerelaw staff saying that the Care Commission/ HMIE Inspection report would be published on 15 October, and that they would be recommending closure of the Open School consistent with Council policy to reduce use of residential care. They said they would also be recommending continuation of the Secure Unit under an alternative supplier. Two days later, a press report, accompanied by a photograph of the Director of Education, said that Social Work chiefs wanted Kerelaw closed.
14.14 We alluded in Chapter 6 to the policy debates which have surrounded residential child care over a number of years. In common with other authorities, Glasgow City Council embraced the proposition that alternatives to residential child care should be developed. We also formed the view from the evidence we heard that a number of senior Social Work managers had been for some time at best sceptical about the role of residential establishments in meeting the needs of the Kerelaw client group, although not, it would appear, to the point of stopping sending young people there.
14.15 In February 2002, the Director of Social Work (by 2004, the Director of Education) had reported to committee on a proposed realignment of residential child care within Glasgow, in which he described the number of placements in children's units as being in excess of the Council's capacity. The paper noted that the top priority for the following 5 years was to continue to shift the balance from residential to foster care, and to reduce the number of looked after children in residential establishments. Closure of Kerelaw was therefore consistent with Council policy, but it seems unlikely that, without the catalyst of the Millerston investigation, the subsequent explosion of allegations, and the August 2004 Care Commission/ HMIE inspection, it would have happened when it did.
14.16 The report to committee on 15 October 2004 recommended a decision in principle to close the Open School by the end of the 2004-05 financial year and to continue to take no further admissions. There was a statutory requirement to consult and the Director Social Work was authorised to do so. The Scottish Executive was to be advised that the Council was seeking an alternative provider of secure care and discussions subsequently took place with the Scottish Executive and with other providers. One such provider became involved in negotiations over a period of many weeks, but in the event no agreement was reached and the Council continued to run the Secure Unit until March 2006. The Open School closed rather more quickly than anticipated, at the end of December 2004.
Arrangements for residents
14.17 Once Glasgow City Council had decided to close Kerelaw, plans had to be made for the young people still living there. The Inquiry learned that the 4 young people on sentences in the Secure Unit were able either to complete their sentences at Kerelaw or move on to prison at 18 as planned.
14.18 The Inquiry heard that, when staff and young people were told in October 2004 that Kerelaw was closing, there was considerable grief. At this point many employees were suspended and 2 units in the open school were closed. We heard that staff and young people were distraught, which was in contrast to their previous feelings. We heard that young people still living at Kerelaw wrote to the Director of Social Work as they felt they had not been involved in the decision to close, or in the investigations. They also complained that Care Commission officers had not spoken to them during the August 2004 inspection and they wanted to say they had a good experience at Kerelaw. However, the Care Commission told the Inquiry that the inspection team spent around a week at Kerelaw in August 2004 and engaged with a large number of young people. We heard that, following the closure decision, the Director went to Kerelaw and spoke to the young people, but we gained the impression that the impact of announcing the closure of Kerelaw on those young people living there had not been anticipated or planned for. Yet, for some of those young people Kerelaw was home.
14.19 The Inquiry was told that the Council involved advocacy workers in care planning as they moved young people on to other placements. We heard that rigorous efforts were made to ensure that young people were appropriately placed. The Inquiry read minutes of the Secure Screening Group in Glasgow, including some "Kerelaw Care Plan Discussions" from early 2006. These involved the young people remaining in the Kerelaw Secure Unit as it approached closure. These minutes suggest that a thorough and individual approach was taken to planning for this group of young people.
Conclusion
14.20 The Inquiry considers that closure of Kerelaw was consistent with Council policy to reduce its reliance on residential accommodation for young people, but found no evidence that a decision to shut down the establishment had been taken before the Care Commission/ HMIE Inspection in August 2004. The Inquiry does not consider that the change in senior management in June 2004 was the sole or main reason for the adverse report that preceded the closure of the school.
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