Scottish Government

ARBITRATION (SCOTLAND) BILL

CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS

INTRODUCTION

1. The Scottish Government issued a consultation paper along with a draft Arbitration (Scotland) Bill on 27 June 2008. The paper identified 35 specific discussion points on which the views of consultees were specifically sought. 29 responses were received. There was extensive stakeholder engagement during the consultation period as explained in the Annex.

2. A copy of the responses to the consultation (other than those given in confidence) has been made available on the Scottish Government website at www.scotland.gov.uk/publications along with an analysis of those responses. The analysis is reproduced below in the Annex.

3. This "Consultation Conclusions and Next Steps" document takes the key issues identified in the consultation analysis document and outlines the resultant changes made to the Bill where appropriate.

4. The Arbitration (Scotland) Bill was introduced into the Scottish Parliament on 29 January. The Bill and accompanying documents can be viewed on the Scottish Parliament's website at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/bills/19-Arbitration/index.htm. These documents should be viewed to find the technical changes made to the Bill following the consultation process.

CONCLUSIONS

Domestic and international arbitration

5. The policy is to remove the dual arbitration regime that currently applies in Scotland. The Bill provides a single codified set of rules that will in principle apply to domestic, cross-border (with other parts of the UK) and international arbitrations, where the Scottish courts have jurisdiction over an arbitration whose juridical seat or place is in Scotland. Accordingly, the separate treatment in Scotland of international commercial arbitrations under the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) Model Law ("the Model Law") will be replaced by a single code informed by the Model Law principles.

6. Some detailed changes have been made to the Bill which may help to more fully reflect the status of the Model Law and address the concerns raised by only two stakeholders, that repeal would act as a barrier to international arbitration business coming to Scotland. First, the Model Law arbitration rules are expressly recognised in section 8(4) (default rules) together with other sets of institutional rules which parties can opt to use to resolve their arbitration instead of the default rules in the Bill. Second, section 24 will allow the Scottish Ministers by order to amend the Bill to update Scots arbitration law to reflect future changes to the Model Law (and also the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards - the "New York Convention"). This will permit arbitration law here to be amended more dynamically in future - subject to affirmative procedure in the Scottish Parliament - to keep it up-to-date with international arbitral practice.

7. The approach taken in the Bill is therefore that the Model Law will be repealed which will mean that there will be only one set of Scots law rules covering domestic and international arbitration in Scotland, based on the principles in the Model Law (and which can reflect future changes to the Model Law (and New York Convention)) but also similar to the UK Arbitration Act 1996.

Arbitral appointments referee

8. Some consultees argued that the arbitral appointments referee should appoint the arbitrator rather than direct the parties to appoint an arbitrator. Therefore, section 22 gives Scottish Ministers the power to specify (by order) arbitral appointments referees. These bodies (for example, the chair of a recognised arbitration body such as the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the Scottish Council on International Arbitration, or the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors) will have a default role on the breakdown of any appointment procedure agreed by the parties. Where, however, a particular appointing or nominating body has been specified in the arbitration agreement then that body will be used instead.

9. Arbitral appointments referees will be designated in subordinate legislation, but in order to be appointed, under section 22, the bodies will have to demonstrate:

• A track record of supplying arbitrators;

• The provision of suitable and appropriate training courses; and

• The provision of discipline procedures.

10. In this way, the quality of arbitrators will be maintained. It is expected that the bodies which currently appoint or nominate arbitrators will already be able to satisfy these requirements, but any body which satisfies the requirements will be able to apply. Certain institutions have extensive experience in making arbitration appointments.

11. Some consultees argued that the courts should retain a role in appointing an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal, if the parties have failed to appoint. But in practice the court usually refers an application to a body like the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators which made over 2,000 appointments in the UK in 2007: the courts made only a handful directly. Others have contended that reference to the court for the appointment of arbitrators should be minimised. The evidence would appear to suggest that this is what happens in practice and the provision in the Bill regularises this by removing an unnecessary step.

12. There will however continue to be a role for the courts if the parties cannot agree on the identity of the arbitral appointments referee (for example if one party wants a surveyor as the arbitrator and the other wants an architect). It would appear that there is then a case for referral to the court to decide which appointments referee to choose. By the same token, there should also be a referral to the court if the arbitral appointments referee, for whatever reason, fails, refuses or declines to appoint an arbitrator.

13. As argued by consultees, the fees and expenses of the arbitral appointments referee are to be part of the expenses of the arbitration.

General duty of the tribunal

14. Rule 23 in the Bill replaces rules 17 and 18 in the consultation draft of the Bill. It has been redrafted to take account of the views of consultees particularly that the duties on the arbitrator to act expeditiously to avoid unnecessary expense should not be secondary to the duties of impartiality and fairness.

15. Rule 23 provides that the proceedings must be fair. They must also be conducted in a manner which maintains confidence in their impartiality. The Bill now reflects the views of consultees that arbitrators should also be required to be independent. The meaning of independence for the purposes of the Bill is defined in rule 74.

16. Under the Bill, arbitrators have wide discretion regarding the conduct of proceedings subject to (1) the agreement of the parties, in the arbitration agreement or otherwise, and (2) other duties under the Scottish Arbitration Rules. But rule 23 also imposes a mandatory duty on the tribunal to conduct the arbitration without unnecessary delay and without incurring unnecessary expense. This mandatory duty is intended to address complaints about arbitration that it takes too long and is subject to delays. The arbitrator(s) will now be under a statutory duty to progress an arbitration proactively. A failure by the arbitrator(s) to conduct the arbitration in this fashion will be a ground for challenge to an award under rule 66 (serious irregularity) if it has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the appellant.

17. There is now no hierarchy of duties on the arbitrator so that the duty to conduct the arbitration without unnecessary delay and without incurring unnecessary expense is equal to the duties to be impartial and independent and to treat the parties fairly. The use of "unnecessary" allows the duty to conduct the arbitration proactively to be reconciled with the duties of fairness etc., so that, for example, the tribunal may not be required to act without unnecessary delay if, having regard to the duty of fairness, it would be unreasonable to do so.

General duty of the parties

18. Rule 24 is a mandatory rule imposing a general duty on the parties (identical to the general duty of the tribunal) to ensure that the arbitration is conducted as efficiently as possible. The intention is that the parties should be similarly bound along with the arbitrators for ensuring that the arbitration proceeds without unnecessary delay and without incurring unnecessary expense. The provision is intended to make it clear to parties that the new regime for arbitration in Scotland will not countenance deliberate delaying tactics by one or other of the parties.

19. The sanction on the parties if they do not comply with the general duty in rule 24 will be that the arbitrator will be able to take such non-compliance into account in assessing the parties' liability for expenses under rule 60.

Confidentiality

20. The consultation version of the Bill proposed that the identity of the parties to an appeal to the court (which includes appeals on lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrator, serious irregularity or legal error) must not be disclosed. There was, however, nothing further in the Bill to provide for the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings themselves, a fact which might be thought to be surprising considering that research by Queen Mary University London in 2006 has confirmed that confidentiality is the second most important factor which leads parties to arbitrate rather than litigate (enforceability of arbitral awards is the most important factor).

21. The question therefore arose as to whether the Bill should imply a confidentiality rule into the arbitration proceedings more generally where the parties have not explicitly agreed to do so. They may not have even considered the issue of confidentiality, though research by the Scottish Government's Analytical Services Division into recent arbitrations in Scotland revealed that all of those analysed were conducted on a confidential basis, irrespective of whether the case was commercially sensitive.

22. Scots law on arbitration and confidentiality is undeveloped and unclear on whether it implies confidentiality into an arbitration at present. The question may be a matter of interpretation of the arbitration agreement since it is usually left to the agreement of the parties. In England, although the Arbitration Act 1996 is silent on this issue, it has been accepted that confidentiality is implied into an arbitration agreement by common law and this has recently been confirmed in the case of Emmott v Michael Wilson Partnership [2008] EWCA Civ 184; WLR (D) 82. Although the Scottish courts might have been expected to consider the English precedent, they are of course not bound to follow it. It might be many years before the issue came before a Scottish court to clarify Scots law.

23. There would therefore be an obvious advantage in clarifying the law in Scotland because of the importance parties attach to confidentiality as a reason to choose arbitration over litigation. There are difficulties in enforcing confidentiality and finding an adequate sanction to penalise breaches of confidentiality. Interdict might be available, but it will sometimes be too late if the disclosure has already taken place. As regards damages, it is necessary to show loss to recover damages and it can be difficult to prove loss and/or to quantify it. However, that said, a statutory rule, albeit a non-mandatory default rule, to make disclosing information about the arbitration a beach of confidence in Scots law would create an enforceable right of action in some circumstances.

24. Rule 25 makes it clear that Scotland recognises the principle of confidentiality and takes the issue seriously. The effect will be that a confidentiality clause will be effectively implied as a matter of law into an arbitration agreement unless the parties agree otherwise. If the matter is not agreed in advance of the arbitrator's appointment, then, once appointed, he or she will be obliged to advise the parties that the law states that proceedings are to be confidential unless they decide otherwise. Given the possibility to agree otherwise and the wide exemptions, this provision is compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, as it recognises the benefits of confidentiality where parties have agreed to waive their rights to a fair trial by electing to go to arbitration and clarifies the legal position.

25. There are wide exemptions for the express or implied authorisation of disclosure by the parties, protection of the parties' lawful interests and where required by law or the interests of justice. This reflects Scottish Law Commission work on clarifying the Scots common law of confidentiality, and the English courts' approach in arbitration law, drawing on the general principles of banking law (from the case of Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461). The new rule places the arbitrator under a duty to explain to the parties that the process will be confidential unless they agree otherwise.

26. Although the parties will normally receive the tribunal's reasons for an award as part of that award, they should not be entitled to know what the deliberations of the tribunal are prior to the award, which should be confidential to its members (unless of course the tribunal shows the parties a draft award prior to issuing the final award). This is the policy behind rule 26. The only exception to this is that it may be necessary to disclose an arbitrator's refusal to participate in the arbitration.

Challenging the award: legal error

27. This rule appeared as a mandatory rule (rule 56) in the consultation draft of the Bill, but consultees were overwhelmingly of the view that it should be a default rule. As a default rule (now rule 67) it allows the parties to exclude any right of appeal on an error of law which maintains the essence of arbitration that parties have chosen to submit determination of their dispute to an arbitral tribunal to make a final and binding award and so denying themselves recourse to the courts (except under rules 65 and 66).

Duty to disclose any conflict of interest

28. Rule 8 (rule 7 in the consultation draft of the Bill) has been amended to require an arbitrator to disclose any issue which might call into question his or her independence as well as impartiality.

NEXT STEPS

29. The Bill is now the subject of Parliamentary scrutiny. The legislative process is explained on the Scottish Parliament's website at

http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/bills/understanding.htm

For further information, please contact

Alison Dewar

Legal System Division

Scottish Government

2W St Andrew's House

Regent Road

Edinburgh

EH1 3DG

Tel: 0131 244 5764

E-mail: alison.dewar@scotland.gsi.gov.uk

ANNEX

ARBITRATION (SCOTLAND) BILL

CONSULTATION REPORT

Acknowledgements

1. The Scottish Government would like to thank all individuals and organisations who took the time to consider and respond to the legislative proposals contained in the consultation on paper for the Arbitration (Scotland) Bill.

Responses

2. The Scottish Government issued a consultation paper along with a draft Bill on 27 June 2008. The paper identified 35 discussion points on which the views of consultees were specifically sought. Although the 12 week consultation period ended on 19 September 2008, responses were accepted throughout October and into December of that year. Around 800 copies of the paper (which included an initial Regulatory Impact Assessment) were distributed and 29 responses received. Responses were received from a range of stakeholders, professional organisations, the legal sector, religious groups and private individuals. Not all respondents completed the consultation questionnaire. Some respondents preferred to provide a narrative response. The nature of the submissions varied with some providing one word responses and others detailed technical discussion of sections of the draft Bill such as that provided by the Scottish Branch of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.

3. Consultation exercises like this are not numerically representative, but aim to elicit the views and experiences of a wide range of stakeholders. Any interpretation of this proportion of responses in agreement or disagreement must be undertaken with caution. Due to the small quantity of submissions, it would not be generally appropriate to present the results in percentage form. The small number of responses is thought to be indicative not only of the specialised nature of the consultation but also the dearth of arbitral activity in Scotland in recent years.

4. Where respondents gave permission, their responses have been published on the Scottish Government website at www.scotland.gov.uk/publications. All respondents are listed in Annex C and broadly came from:

professional organisations - 8

legal sector - 12

local government - 2

religious groups - 1

individuals - 4

academic/education sector - 1

5. All non-confidential responses are available in hard copy at the Scottish Government Library, K Spur, Saughton House, Broomhouse Drive, Edinburgh, EH11 3XD. Charges for photocopies are made on a cost recovery basis. To request copies by post, enquire about charges or make an appointment to view responses, please telephone the Library on 0131 244 4552.

Discussions with stakeholders

6. There was extensive engagement with stakeholders during the consultation period. The Minister for Community Safety met the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) and the Scottish Council for International Arbitration. Officials held an all day meeting with the CIArb to discuss their very detailed comments on the Bill and also met the Law Society of Scotland.

7. Two focus group meetings were held during the consultation process. These were attended by representatives of the CIArb, the Law Society of Scotland, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, the Faculty of Advocates, the Royal Bank of Scotland, Scottish Financial Enterprise, Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, Professor Russel Griggs (chair of the Regulatory Review Group) and Professor Fraser Davidson, author of the Scottish Universities Law Institute textbook on arbitration law. The response to the Bill during these meetings was overwhelmingly positive.

8. Officials also undertook meetings around Scotland with six different firms to discuss the Bill in order to inform the Regulatory Impact Assessment and the Business Impact Assessment.

Findings

9. This report provides an analysis of the Scottish Government Consultation on the Arbitration (Scotland) Bill. As the responses are technical and complex in nature they are not repeated in the report. Rather, the report is in two parts: Annex A provides a summary of the key issues identified by the consultation process; Annex B sets out the questions posed in the consultation questionnaire and illustrates the number of respondents (who completed the questionnaire) who agreed or disagreed with the questions. However, as noted above the completion of the consultation questionnaire was uneven and therefore the number of responses for each question varies.

10. Overall the respondents welcomed the Bill. The points raised in response to the consultation paper and in meetings with officials were considered at length and the observations made have informed the development of policy on the Bill.

ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

The key issues are cross referenced to the questions in the consultation questionnaire and are further discussed in Annex B where applicable.

Framework for the Bill (Q4)

1. The Scottish Arbitration Rules are set out in a single code in schedule 1 of the Bill to try to make the rules accessible for the users of the legislation. This framework was welcomed by the vast majority of respondents and the focus groups held to discuss the provisions of the Bill. Respondents commented favourably on the fact that the rules were set out separately from the main body of the Bill since this meant that they could be read as a relatively self-standing "code" which could be used as a guide by practitioners and users and also compared easily with the rules of arbitral institutions, for example. It was pointed out that arbitrators would not have to search for the rules in the middle of the "legalese" of the main body of the legislation.

2. Some respondents commented that the Scottish Arbitration Rules in schedule 1 may not form part of the general law because they are not in the main body of the Bill. This is incorrect. Sections 6-8 make it clear that both the main body of the proposed Act and the rules will form part of the law of Scotland, that is, as primary legislation. While they may for some purposes have that effect, they are not implied terms of arbitration agreements, but rather rules of statute. Default rules do not lose their statutory nature just because they apply only in certain circumstances (that is in the absence of contrary party agreement). There are many examples of statutory provisions which, in some way or another, apply in particular circumstances only.

3. Whether a provision is included in the body of the Act or the schedule is irrelevant to its status as part of statutory law. The placement of provisions in the Bill is dictated by whether they deal with part of the arbitral procedural process (the rules) or whether they have general effect outwith individual arbitrations.

Domestic and international arbitration (Q8)

4. The Bill proposes that the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) Model Law should be repealed in Scotland. The policy is to remove the dual arbitration regime that currently applies in Scotland. The Bill provides a single codified set of rules that will in principle apply to domestic, cross-border (with other parts of the UK) and international arbitrations, where the Scottish courts have jurisdiction over an arbitration whose juridical seat or place is in Scotland. Accordingly, the separate treatment in Scotland of international commercial arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Model Law will be replaced by a single code informed by the UNCITRAL Model Law principles but also similar to the UK Arbitration Act 1996. There were a number of reasons for this approach:

· The Model Law is incomplete and contains many crucial gaps (for example, no powers are given to the arbitrator to award damages, expenses or interest). It does not therefore provide a comprehensive arbitration regime and has to be supplemented by domestic law. The Bill, which (like the UK Arbitration Act 1996) is based on Model Law principles, will, however, provide a comprehensive framework for arbitration in Scotland.

· The Model Law has not attracted any significant amount of international arbitration business for Scotland since 1990.

· Non-Model Law venues such as London, Paris, Stockholm, Geneva/Zurich and New York are thriving.

· Model law jurisdictions such as Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Denmark are not successful and therefore the Model Law alone cannot be considered to be a panacea for attracting international arbitration business.

· There are Model Law jurisdictions which are successful, such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Vienna, but we believe that these are successful for other reasons, not simply because they have the Model Law. Hong Kong benefits from business from the People's Republic of China, where Hong Kong awards can be enforced under the New York Convention of 1958. Vienna is the venue of choice for central and Eastern Europe, including Russia. Vienna is also seen as neutral (also the case with Geneva/Zurich). It has been suggested Scotland might be seen as a neutral venue by, for example, a foreign party in dispute with an English company.

· Even if the Model Law is repealed, it will still be possible for parties to adopt the Model Law for their arbitration if they so wish (apart from the procedural rules which will be mandatory under Scots law).

· If the Model Law is not repealed, this will perpetuate the position where there are two arbitration laws in Scotland, one for domestic arbitration and one for international commercial arbitrations. It may lead to discrimination claims in EC law, in relation to other Member States - analogous case law in the Court of Appeal in England & Wales suggests at least some elements of a discriminatory regime may breach EC law, depending on any justification advanced for discriminating between the regimes.

· The model of the Arbitration Act 1996 may be more familiar to other parties in the UK who may consider using Scotland as the seat of their arbitration.

5. Among those parties who attended focus group meetings and the 29 responses to consultation received, only two, the Scottish Council for International Arbitration and the Law Society of Scotland, have argued that the Model Law should be retained, because they consider that repeal will act as a barrier to international arbitration business coming to Scotland. Those who advocated repeal included the CIArb and the current judges in the Commercial Court of the Court of Session supported by the Judges' Legislation Committee. One senior international arbitrator commented that an informal survey of senior arbitrator colleagues around the world conducted by him failed to identify one jurisdiction which sees the Model Law as a main factor in its success as an international arbitral venue.

6. Professor Fraser Davidson of Stirling University who is the author of the Scottish University Law Institute textbook on arbitration said that the Model Law "does not provide a comprehensive arbitration regime. It is thus much better to look to the example of states such as England which used the Model Law as the basis for the creation of a comprehensive, modern arbitration statute. Little will be lost by Scotland ceasing to be known as a country which has adopted the Model Law. Its adoption has not seen significant numbers of international arbitrations attracted to Scotland." He concluded: "If Scotland is going to attract international arbitrations….being able to boast an effective, comprehensive, modern arbitration statute is going to be more of an incentive than being one of a large number of states across the globe which has adopted the Model Law."

Arbitral appointments referee (Q9)

7. Respondents overwhelmingly accepted the proposal for arbitral appointments referees, but concern was raised about the role of such a body. It was suggested that the arbitral appointments referee should appoint the arbitrator rather than direct the parties to appoint an arbitrator.

8. Some respondents argued that the courts should retain a role in appointing an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal, if the parties have failed to appoint. But in practice the court usually refers an application to a body like the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators which made over 2,000 appointments in the UK in 2007: the courts made only a handful. Others have contended that reference to the court for the appointment of arbitrators should be minimised. The evidence would appear to suggest that this is what happens in practice and the provision in the Bill regularises this by removing an unnecessary step.

9. Some respondents also argued that there should be a role for the courts where the parties cannot agree on the identity of the arbitral appointments referee or if the arbitral appointments referee, for whatever reason, fails, refuses or declines to appoint an arbitrator.

10. It was also argued that the fees and expenses of the arbitral appointments referee should be part of the expenses of the arbitration.

Rules 17 and 18 (principal duties of the arbitral tribunal) (Q10)

11. In the consultation draft of the Bill, the duties on an arbitral tribunal in rule 18 of the Bill (to conduct an arbitration in accordance with the parties' wishes, as quickly as is reasonably practicable and without incurring unnecessary expense) are subordinate to a principal duty in rule 17 (duties of impartiality and fairness, including allowing the parties reasonable opportunity to put its case and deal with the other party's case).

12. Some respondents argued that the two duties should be amalgamated since they do not believe that the duties on the arbitrator to act expeditiously or to avoid unnecessary expense should be secondary to the duties of impartiality and fairness. This might encourage arbitrators to lose sight of the importance of quick resolution. Those who were interviewed for the Business Impact Assessment were also of the view that arbitrators did not have the power to move the arbitration along. CIArb claimed that it has been possible for arbitrators in practice to reconcile the equivalent duties in the Arbitration Act 1996.

Rule 56 - Challenging the award: legal error (Q22)

13. In the consultation draft of the Bill, rule 56 is a mandatory rule which gives parties an automatic right to challenge an arbitral award on grounds of error in law, though subject to many restrictions (drawn from the Arbitration Act 1996) requiring leave of the court etc to limit court challenges. In many arbitration jurisdictions there is no appeal at all on such grounds. Respondents were overwhelmingly of the view that, while there should be a procedure for challenging an award on grounds of legal error, the parties should have the option of agreeing that they will choose to deny themselves this right. This is to promote the finality of the arbitration process. They therefore suggested that rule 56 should be made a default rule to allow parties the option of choosing whether or not to allow the possibility of an appeal on grounds of legal error. Some respondents noted that if this change were not made it would conflict with the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration and the London Court of International Arbitration.

Confidentiality (Q23)

14. The consultation version of the Bill proposed that the identity of the parties to an appeal to the court (which includes appeals on lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrator, serious irregularity or legal error) must not be disclosed. There was, however, nothing further in the Bill to provide for the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings themselves.

15. Scots law on arbitration and confidentiality is undeveloped and unclear on whether it implies confidentiality into an arbitration at present. Research by Justice Analytical Services Division into recent arbitrations in Scotland revealed that all of those analysed were conducted on a confidential basis, irrespective of whether the case was commercially sensitive.

16. A narrow majority of respondents (11-7) who responded on the point disagreed with the proposal that the Bill should contain a statutory rule requiring the parties to respect the confidentiality of the arbitral process. Those who took this view preferred to leave the matter to the agreement of the parties. The CIArb, however, favoured clarifying the law in the Bill to try to ensure that arbitration is private in Scotland and to move the law in the direction of that taken by the courts in England. They suggested that the rule should be default only, however, so that parties who do not wish to have their arbitration subject to a confidentiality rule can so agree and thus contract out of the rule. Stakeholders interviewed by officials were almost unanimously in favour of the introduction of a confidentiality rule.

Rule 7 Duty to disclose any conflict of interests

17. Rule 7 only requires an arbitrator to disclose to the parties to the arbitration anything likely to give rise to justifiable doubts about the member's impartiality. Respondents were in favour of requiring an arbitrator to disclose also any issue which might call into question his or her independence.

ANNEX B

RESEARCH FINDINGS

ANNEX C

RESPONDENTS

Professional Organisations

Agricultural Industries Confederation

Association of Residential Letting Agents

Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Scotland

Institution of Civil Engineers

Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors in Scotland

Scottish Consumer Council

Scottish Property Federation

Traprain Consultants Ltd

Legal Sector

Institute of Trademark Attorneys

Judges' Legislation Committee

Judges of the Commercial Court

Law Society of Scotland

David Bartos

Kenneth Campbell

R Craig Connal QC

David Sturrock WS

1 x anonymous

3 x confidential

Local Government

East Renfrewshire Council

1x confidential

Religious Groups

Scottish Council of Jewish Communities

Individuals

Richard NM Anderson

James Arnott

Jane Irvine

Bryan Porter

Hong-Lin Yu

Academic/Education Sector

Professor Fraser Davidson