The Scottish Government

« Previous | Contents | Next »

Listen

KEY ISSUES

HMICS INSPECTION

11. The ACPOS Protective Services Capability and Capacity Review ( PSCCR) - Police Use of Firearms Workstream report made eight recommendations:

1. That the proposed Protective Services Framework be considered which incorporates the use of collaborative arrangements and Lead Forces.

2. That the baseline requirement identified be considered and approved.

3. That the specialist support identified be considered and approved.

4. Subject to approval of the above recommendations, that generic service level agreements be developed to enable the delivery of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service provision.

5. That costed options be developed in support of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service delivery.

6. That ACPOS approve the recommendation that the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms; the ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons and the National (Police) Firearms Training Curriculum continue to set the national standard in relation to the Police Use of Firearms in Scotland.

7. That HMIC be invited to conduct a thematic inspection in two years to assess the progress made.

8. That HMIC include the baseline service requirement within its inspection protocols as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness.

In November 2006 ACPOS Council endorsed the above recommendations.

Our findings

12. The governance and standards for police use of firearms are dealt with in recommendation 6. Therefore, to comment on the recommendations in a structured and cohesive manner it is helpful to begin with that recommendation.

Recommendation 6 - "That ACPOS approve the recommendation that the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms; the ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons and the National (Police) Firearms Training Curriculum continue to set the national standard in relation to the Police Use of Firearms in Scotland"

13. That this recommendation is worded 'continue to set the standard' reflects the fact that the ACPOMoG and the ACPOS Statement of Intent were already the core references for forces. The recommendation also recognises the separation of the training element of the manual to form the NPFTC, and the role of the ACPOS Statement of Intent in adopting these for Scotland. Further detail of these documents are included at Appendix A.

14.HMICS has also considered the implementation of the content of the documents referred to within the ACPOS recommendation in the belief that it is insufficient to set a standard unless action follows to comply with it.

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment

15. The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment ( ST&RA) process is outlined in the ACPOS Statement of Intent and forms the foundation of a force's approach to the police use of firearms. Details of the guidance given to forces in respect of their ST&RA can be found at Appendix A, paragraphs 14-16.

16. The inspection found that all forces had completed at least one firearms ST&RA. As the process has improved and evolved, some forces had revised their documents to incorporate improvements and reflect the National Policing Improvement Agency ( NPIA) guidelines. Several forces had completed a second version, Strathclyde a third. Furthermore, there was considerable disparity in the content, analysis of information and use made of the document.

17. Whilst many forces had a breadth of relevant data within their ST&RA, we make the following observations:

Timescales

18. Force ST&RAs should be completed on an annual basis. They are documents that should be updated regularly and used throughout the year to inform the force on the matters listed above.

19. Most of the current ST&RAs supplied to us by forces had not been annually and comprehensively updated. One force indicated that it was its intention to review the document on a three-yearly basis. Another had a draft document which had been compiled but which had not yet been approved four months later, by which time further data would be expected to be available and included.

20. Where forces supplied a draft of their forthcoming ST&RA there was evidence of significant improvement and attempts to become more NPIA-compliant. However, we remain concerned about the time it takes forces to collate and approve documents.

Ownership

21. Each force is required by the Statement of Intent to have an officer of at least assistant chief constable rank ( ACC) as the lead for the police use of firearms. It is this officer who 'owns' the force ST&RA, although it is a matter for individual forces who is then delegated to complete the assessment. It was clear to us that the best documents had involved the collaboration of a number of persons within an individual force.

22. While it is desirable to have an overseer to draw elements of the ST&RA together, it is questionable whether either a firearms training department or an operational firearms unit should take on this role and thus be put in the position of 'justifying' their resources, deployment model, training or budget through the document. Given the nature of the ST&RA, analysts have an integral role to play. HMICS observed a link between the involvement of analysts and the quality of ST&RA reviewed.

Content of ST&RA

23. Paragraphs 14-16 in Appendix A outline the broad contents of a ST&RA. The NPIA guidelines contain a list of expected appendices and the data to be included. Table 1 below shows how the better and less well developed ST&RAs of the Scottish forces compare against the NPIA recommended appendix.

Table 1

24. In the least developed ST&RA the information reproduced in Appendix B of this inspection report, which HMICS collect and report annually, was not included in the force document.

25. There was also considerable variation in the ST&RAs in the recording of sources used. Some examples included comprehensive bibliographies showing public source information, internal data from force recording systems and specialist reports with restricted circulation available from organisations such as the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency ( SCDEA) and Serious Organised Crime Agency ( SOCA). Such references not only help when updating the document but are useful in sharing good practice between forces.

26. As can be seen, at Appendix A, from the purpose of the ST&RA, the analysis of up-to-date accurate data is key to informed risk-assessment and decision-making. This can only be done effectively using the expertise of analytical staff.

27. Several forces identified intelligence gaps in their recording. This was often either due to difficulties in retrieving information from their respective command and control systems, or the result of variations in what information was being collated.

28. This problem was exacerbated by the varied definitions used by forces, often with the same expressions, such as 'deploying an Armed Response Vehicle ( ARV)' meaning different things to different forces. In one force, the term 'deploying an ARV' meant that the crew were authorised to access their mobile armoury and attend the incident according to the directions of the tactical/silver commander. In another, the term merely meant to send the ARV to a rendezvous point, and did not mean that authority would be given either to issue weapons or act further. The first force used the term 're-locate an ARV' to mean this. As a result, to compare the numbers of times a force had 'deployed' an ARV to an incident could prove misleading.

29. A practical example of the use to which a ST&RA should be put is to make informed decisions on the need for one or more ARVs and the hours of the day or night when they should be deployed.

30. In some forces which have ARVs on duty at all times, there was data, including the times and days of the week, showing the incidents requiring their use. Conversely, in some forces which have no or only part-time ARVs, such data was not collated or presented, thus their approach to the use of ARVs did not appear to be supported by analysis.

31. Another practical purpose of the ST&RA is to record and examine the method or tactic used to resolve an incident. By doing so a force will be in a better position to understand the most common types of incident it faces and the tactics it uses, and therefore to identify the most appropriate type of training required.

32. The ST&RA should also ensure that due consideration is given to the diversity of the communities that the force serves. We found evidence of good practice in this regard in the assessment prepared by Lothian and Borders Police, which included the following data table:

Figure 1 Firearms authorisations by ethnicity

33. The table shows the ethnicity of the 45 subjects traced during operations arising from 73 occasions on which the issue of firearms was authorised, during the period from 1st January to 31st December 2007. The gender of these subjects was also recorded, all 45 being male.

34. Given the role of the ST&RA in informing strategic decisions and training requirements, we were encouraged to see that Lothian and Borders had rightly identified this information as being relevant and included it as standard in its core document.

35. We were, however, surprised to note the lack of reference to Special Population Groups ³ ( SPGs) in any of the forces' ST&RAs. This is despite extensive mention of the need to consider SPGs in the ACPOMoG at all levels of AFO and command training. Public domain data ⁴ states that approximately 50% of police shootings in the UK'show some evidence indicating a suicidal motive in those shot, with further indications of irrational behaviour in a number of the other cases'.

36. The functions of an ST&RA are detailed at paragraphs 14-16 in Appendix A. They include identifying risks to the public, gaps in policies, procedures and training and evidencing a link between threats and current firearms establishment. The absence of data regarding such a significant proportion of police shootings raises doubts as to whether sufficient consideration has been given to the training, tactics and less lethal options required to deal with situations involving SPGs.

Risk assessments

37. Although the entire ST&RA can be regarded as a risk assessment, several force ST&RAs contained a number of specific task risk-assessments, for example the search of premises where there is believed to be an armed suspect. Even where the tasks were of a similar nature, different approaches to their risk-assessment were adopted by forces.

38. We recognise that individual forces may have access to different equipment or tactics that will vary their risk-assessment. Nevertheless, we would suggest that, in common with the ST&RA, risk assessment should improve through greater collaboration of forces and participation in the NPFTC licensing process.

National Police Firearms Training Curriculum

39. By endorsing recommendation 6, ACPOS has in effect adopted the NPFTC national standard for the police use of firearms in Scotland. Consequently, Scottish forces have structured their training well and in a manner consistent with the NPFTC. However, with the exception of Strathclyde, they have been slow to take on the accompanying licensing process and the improvements this would deliver.

40. For a force to demonstrate that it trains officers according to the NPFTC guidelines, it must be awarded a licence of curriculum compliance by the NPIA. This is achieved by making a submission to the NPIA which covers such details as the teaching materials, assessment processes and standard operating procedures ( SOPs) to be used, and by the production of the force's firearms Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment.

41. Initially the NPIA will examine a force and, following consultation, agree a compliance gap analysis and an action plan to address outstanding matters. They will then issue a provisional licence of curriculum compliance. The provisional licence will be monitored by way of an NPIA 'health check'. Forces are then required to make a further submission to the NPIA who, on re-inspecting the force, can then issue either a full licence, a full licence with a development programme attached, or an improvement notice.

42. The involvement of forces in this process brings benefits, not only in terms of compliance with the standards, but by embracing the continuous improvement associated with it.

43. By November 2006 all Home Office forces had met the requirement to have a provisional licence. A little under two years later, 16 forces in England and Wales had gone on to be awarded full licences of curriculum compliance.

44. In February 2006 Strathclyde Police invited the NPIA to give a presentation on the licensing process to representatives of all Scottish forces. The following year Lothian and Borders Police hosted a similar presentation. To date within Scotland, only Strathclyde Police has achieved a provisional licence under the NPFTC, which was issued in November 2006. In addition, the Ministry of Defence Police, based at various locations within Scotland, has a provisional licence and is to be assessed for a full licence in November of this year. Lothian and Borders Police have applied for a provisional licence. The NPIA has not received any other applications from Scottish forces. We believe within the timescale of this workstream all forces should have been at provisional licence status.

45. Home Office forces are not permitted to train firearms officers or commanders without a licence. Any force not able to train its own officers must outsource this training from a compliant force. Here, Strathclyde Police is progressing with its licence with a view to delivering tactical/Silver command training for Scotland from 2009.

46. However, following decisions made by ACPO Police Use of Firearms ( ACPOPUF) and the NPIA, strategic/Gold command training will only be delivered by the NPIA. It is anticipated that many Scottish forces will continue to outsource courses as required, such as Gold command and firearms instructor courses. HMICS noted that while Scottish officers valued attending such courses, there were consistent comments that national courses did not always give proper consideration to Scotland's separate legal requirements.

47. The current lack of licensed training in Scotland is such that the NPIA foresees difficulties with obtaining mutual aid from Scotland for the 2012 Olympics: " the recommendation from NPIA Implementation team would be that Scottish officers would NOT be accepted for deployment in England and Wales" ⁵.

48. Finally in this section, we also observed an inconsistent approach across Scotland in the level of training given to non- AFOs. While it is right that specialist training be focused on those officers who will use it, there is a need for the whole workforce to be aware of their role within an incident involving firearms. HMICS would welcome a co-ordinated and consistent approach to this.

49. We fully support ACPOS' recommendation but have found its implementation to be partial and slow. We are particularly concerned that the development of ST&RAs, which should underpin forces' approach to the use of firearms, has been inadequate in several forces.

ACPOS 2006 RECOMMENDATIONS 1 - 5, 7 AND 8

Recommendation 1 - "That the proposed Protective Services Framework be considered which incorporates the use of collaborative arrangements and Lead Forces"

50. Following the October 2006 publication of the PSCCR report, the Firearms Training Advisory Group Scotland ( FTAGS) met in January 2007. At that meeting the chairman, ACC Ian Learmonth, directed that a Working Group from FTAGS be formed. Accordingly, the inaugural meeting of the Police Use of Firearms working group was held in March 2007. From this the following terms of reference were approved and subsequently adopted by the Group:

"To progress the recommendations contained within the ACPOS Protective Services Capacity & Capability Review (Police Use of Firearms Workstream) relative to baseline and specialist firearms support.

In so doing, generic service level agreements and fully costed options are to be developed to enable the delivery of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service provision."

51. The ACPOSPSCCR Strategic Review Group meeting in August 2007 endorsed the creation of two Strategic Alliance Co-ordination Units ( SACUs) for baseline and specialist service firearms provision in Scotland:

• East SACU - Grampian Police/Tayside Police/Lothian and Borders Police/Central Scotland Police/Fife Constabulary.
• West SACU - Strathclyde Police/Northern Constabulary/Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary.

52. The SACUs meet quarterly, attended by nominated representatives from each force. The format includes both individual SACU meetings and a forum with both SACUs present.

53. The West SACU is in effect led by Strathclyde Police, which can supply both Northern and Dumfries and Galloway Constabularies with the services they lack. The five forces in the East SACU have more similar capabilities and as a consequence there has been less clarity around how efficiencies and improvements could be secured. While there have been discussions about certain specialist services being led by a specific force, no agreement has been reached. Recognising the need for greater strategic involvement in this forum, the ACPOS officers with responsibility for firearms matters in the East SACU met in August 2008 to examine how this might be achieved.

54. When the East SACU was formed, Tayside, Fife and Central Police did not have regularly deployed ARVs. In the intervening period, they have not only initiated regular ARV deployments but have also sought to enhance this with a collaborative tri-force agreement to ensure mutual support if and when required.

55. We acknowledge the collaborative measure put in place to form these structures. There is also evidence of collaboration between all Scottish forces and other agencies and forces in the form of Memoranda of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence Police ( MDP), the Civil Nuclear Constabulary ( CNC), and forces in which these organisations have a presence. Further protocols have been developed between Scottish forces and the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency ( SCDEA) and the adoption of these is progressing well with only one force left to complete theirs.

56. While there are clear collaborative arrangements within each SACU, progress continues to be slow. Despite the recommendation being approved, it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.

Recommendation 2 - "That the baseline requirement identified be considered and approved"

57. The PSCCR report recommended a 'Suggested Baseline Requirement' that each Scottish force should, as a minimum, have access to for firearms support/capability. This requirement is as follows:

• Authorised Firearms Officers ( AFOs)
• Basic AFOs
• Rifle Officers
• Bodyguards ( VIP Close Protection)
• Armed Response Vehicles ( ARVs)
• Tactical Firearms Advisors
• Strategic Firearms Commanders
• Tactical Firearms Commanders
• MASTS Commanders
• Post Incident Managers

58. Armed Response Vehicles can take on different formats. For example, while one force can have a dedicated unit with 'standing authority' to patrol overtly armed, another might have a vehicle which has a specific function, such as roads policing, until it is called upon to act as an ARV. The decision on what model a force operates should be informed by its ST&RA. Additionally, the specific weapons and tactics that the crew members of an ARV are trained in is a matter for individual forces, again in line with its ST&RA.

59. At the time of our inspection, only one Scottish force had achieved the minimum firearms support/capability described above.

60. An informed baseline relies on a sound ST&RA to identify the needs of each force and how they should best be serviced. However, the ST&RAs of each force differ greatly in content and are not sufficiently robust to do this. Until all forces have a sound ST&RA in place there will be no definitive understanding of the actual baseline requirements. Indeed the preparation of these documents may show a change to the proposed baseline service requirement. We appreciate that circumstances and requirements change over time and therefore would accept any deviation from the baseline should a force ST&RA provide solid evidence in favour of this.

61. During the inspection we attended the SACU co-ordinating meeting in July 2008. There we saw a clear indication of the willingness of each force representative to participate fully in implementing this recommendation. However, there was still no agreement on some of the terminology and definitions used. This means that for baseline requirements such as AFOs and ARVs forces may use the same term for a different capability. This problem is by no means restricted to Scotland. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the planned increase in the involvement of ACPOS officers will resolve this matter.

62. Although this recommendation was approved, those forces without a robust ST&RA are not in a position to contribute fully to the development of an agreed baseline. Therefore we do not regard this recommendation as discharged.

Recommendation 3 - "That the specialist support identified be considered and approved"

63. The PSCCR report recommended that the following ' Access to Specialist Support' be provided by identified lead forces:

• Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance ( MASTS)
• Dynamic Entry/Hostage Rescue
• Suicide Killer Intervention
• Armed Surveillance

64. We previously drew attention to the need to improve MASTS provision in our 2003 primary inspection of the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency ( SCDEA). In that report we recommended that:

" ACPOS rigorously pursue the issue of firearms support for surveillance activity towards an early conclusion in order that national guidelines are clearly understood and any resulting training requirements addressed."⁶

65. Since making this recommendation we have reviewed the matter on two occasions, most recently in 2006. At that time, we observed that it had ' not [been] discharged and its urgency and need [were] perhaps greater than when it was initially made' ⁷.

66. Presently within the whole of the UK there is no set minimum standard as to what constitutes either MASTS or armed surveillance. Some Home Office forces have a capability in both these areas, as does SOCA. What little guidance there is in the ACPOMoG or the NPFTC and has been interpreted in varying ways. However, this inspection does not seek to pre-empt the work of the UK Covert Armed Surveillance working group, which was established in February 2008 and is working on a number of matters to define standards and provide guidance.

67. There still remains an unacceptable lack of progress in relation to specialist support services. Some five years after our first recommendation, there is no tangible progress on the subject of MASTS and while some training and initial steps have been taken by forces such as Tayside, actual capabilities have not progressed. Strathclyde Police is the only force in Scotland that has any capability for MASTS beyond the most basic response. In the absence of any impending resolution, we would welcome at least a structured interim measure. Again, the benefit of a sound ST&RA would inform all forces of their requirements for this service.

68. Recent press comment has highlighted steps being taken to secure further access to firearms for the SCDEA. As these will involve changes to legislation, they will not deliver improvements in the short term.

69. Although this recommendation was approved, persistent delays and inaction mean that it has not yet been implemented or complied with. We therefore do not consider it to be discharged.

Recommendation 4 - "Subject to approval of the above recommendations, that generic service level agreements be developed to enable the delivery of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service provision"

70. Sharing specialist services, such as underwater capabilities, across forces has been normal practice for many years. In such cases, the force with the available expertise and capacity is referred to as the 'Lead Force'. Increasingly this approach is now being extended to encompass both operational and 'back-office' functions.

71. We support the development of shared services where it is efficient to do so. We also accept that the need for access to specialist support is greater for some forces than others. Indeed, the frequency of operations requiring this level of support can be rare in some forces, and the collaborative arrangements in place should reflect this. However, only a competent ST&RA will fully inform this debate.

72. Within the West SACU, Strathclyde has taken on the role of lead force and at the time of our inspection was discussing options for providing specialist support to the other two forces. For Northern Constabulary, this arrangement was in the form of a service level agreement ( SLA), whereas for Dumfries and Galloway a memorandum of understanding ( MOU) was being developed.

73. An SLA is a formally-negotiated agreement between customers and their service provider, outlining the services to be delivered, the availability and costs. An MOU is a document indicating an intended common line of action agreed by the participants. In the police service it generally covers mutual aid, where a force will provide assistance if possible. It does not have the formality or the specificity around availability and cost associated with an SLA.

74. We concur with ACPOS' recommendation, which explicitly calls for SLAs rather than MOUs to be developed, as we believe these would create suitably robust and formal arrangements for such an important aspect of policing.

75. As discussed at paragraphs 52-54, the East SACU had yet to reach agreement on which of its forces should lead on specific specialist functions. As a result, discussions around appropriate SLAs had not taken place.

76. Although this recommendation was approved, we find that it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.

Recommendation 5 - "That costed options be developed in support of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service delivery"

77. We recognise that costed options will depend on both the nature of the specialist support required from a lead force and the equipment necessary to provide it.

78. The actual costs for firearms resources, in terms of both staff and equipment, are considerable. A 'full-time, 24-hour' ARV unit of two vehicles crewed by two officers each, can involve at least 25 officers. The initial equipment and ammunition to train a Strathclyde tactical firearms officer has been calculated at £5,870, with ongoing annual ammunition costs for training of £1,092. A single piece of night vision equipment can cost in excess of £5,000. Again, exactly what resources are needed can only be demonstrated by a comprehensive ST&RA.

79. Collaborative arrangements, whereby lead forces provide services to those with no demonstrable need for 'full-time' resources, are a logical method of ensuring that best use is made of specialist resources and that this is cost-effective and contingent upon need. For the West SACU forces that were pursuing the SLA option, discussions as to the actual costs involved were still underway at the time of the inspection.

80. We acknowledge that costed options are on the SACUs' agenda, and that some progress has been made. Nevertheless, we are concerned at the slow pace of the overall process, which has meant that existing options are not well developed.

81. Although this recommendation was approved, it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.

Recommendation 7 -"That HMIC be invited to conduct a thematic inspection in two years to assess progress made"

82. As previously stated, we included this thematic inspection in our 2008 programme precisely because of this recommendation. We also met with the ACPOS portfolio holder for the police use of firearms to ensure that our remit was consistent with the Service's needs.

83. HMICS regards this recommendation as discharged.

Recommendation 8 - "That HMIC include the baseline service requirement within its inspection protocols as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness"

84. Some forces had clearly developed their ST&RAs in accordance with NPIA guidelines, and therefore had an informed view of their baseline and specialist needs. We are reluctant to make it mandatory to comply with a baseline that may not be suitable for all forces, especially given the costs involved.

85. We believe that this recommendation has been superseded by the need for individual forces to respond to the findings of their own ST&RAs.

ACPOS RESPONSE TO 'STOCKWELL' AND GLASGOW AIRPORT INCIDENTS

86. Much of this report concentrates on the recommendations in the ACPOSPSCCR. It is, nevertheless, also pertinent to comment on significant events that have occurred since its publication and which have had implications for the Service.

87. Within our terms of reference, specific mention is made of the 'Stockwell' and Glasgow Airport incidents. At the time of writing, the inquest into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes had just been concluded and the implications for the police service in Scotland are still being assessed. Therefore we do not propose to comment on this area in this report.

88. At the conclusion of the first Stockwell inquiry a working group was set up to examine the published report and outline the implications for the police service in Scotland. Its findings have since been circulated to all forces, and although certain matters are still being considered by ACPO we are satisfied that ACPOS Police Use of Firearms ( ACPOSPUF), (formerly ACPOS Firearms Training Advisory Group, Scotland, FTAGS), is well placed to oversee any further developments and promulgate good practice. A similar approach was apparent in the aftermath of events at Glasgow Airport. In this case, any matters raised were taken to the SACUs.

89. Taken together these incidents have served to highlight to all those involved the urgency with which this work needs to be carried out. The resources needed for Strathclyde Police to effectively deal with the events at Glasgow Airport and its aftermath have also served to demonstrate the requirements for specialist firearms support.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR STAFF IN SPECIALIST ROLES

90. The NPIA guidelines for Appendix 10 of an ST&RA recommend that the diversity of staff working as firearms specialists be considered. We believe that this is relevant to all specialist roles, not just firearms ones. Police forces have recognised for some time that steps should be taken to improve the diversity of their staff, as is clear from the positive progress apparent across Scotland. In the last three years, the proportion of female police officers in Scotland increased from 21% to 24%. At the time of our inspection 35% of newly-recruited officers were female, while the percentage of recruits of black or minority ethnic origin rose slightly from 1.6% in 2004/5 to 1.9% in 2006/7.

91. While these overall improvements are welcome, forces have recognised that attention should also be paid to staff in specialist policing units. Several examples were encountered of events or initiatives designed to improve the diversity of firearms staff. To date these have not had a large impact. Interestingly, when seeking data on the gender and minority ethnic profile of authorised firearms officers, we found that in many cases force systems were not configured to provide this level of detail.

92. An exception to this was Fife Constabulary. In its Annual Equality and Diversity Employment Monitoring Report 2008, 'Diversity Matters', the force provides comprehensive data on the gender, ethnic origin, disability and age of its staff. Although the figures themselves highlighted the lack of female (one) and black and minority ethnic staff (one male, no females) working in firearms specialisms, it was encouraging to see this level of detail being captured and monitored on a continuous basis rather than just in response to our request.

93. In addition to profiling general AFOs, Fife recorded similar data down to more detailed levels of specialism such as firearms instructors, firearms incident managers, and firearms Silver (tactical) commanders. The force also applied this approach across a wide range of other specialist functions.

94. We endorse this approach to monitoring as good practice and would encourage forces to follow Fife's lead. Doing so should help focus attention on increasing diversity across all specialisms.

Conclusion

95. The importance of conducting thorough ST&RAs has been commented upon throughout this report. These documents are the foundation on which police use of firearms should be based. Although the guidelines date from 2006, the process was in fact started following the 'Statement of Intent' in 2004. And yet the slow progress of some forces would suggest that these have not been given due priority. Moreover, in our opinion, the lack of these assessments in several forces has hampered their ability to respond to the majority of other recommendations from the PSCCR.

96. The joint progress achieved so far by the forces of the West SACU has undoubtedly benefited from the lead role of Strathclyde Police. However here too, what gains have been made have not been fully capitalised upon, nor have they been translated into finalised agreements consistent with recommendations 1, 4 and 5. In the East SACU, the ACPOS lead officers have recently acknowledged the need to increase their strategic grip on the process in its five constituent forces, a move which we believe will bring benefits to the SACU.

97. The East SACU has also started work on an overarching ST&RA, which should inform the need for shared specialist services. We welcome the development of what is in effect a joint threat assessment. However we also note that it is reliant upon each force being able to submit its own robust assessment in order to inform this wider picture.

98. In sum, we are aware of the benefits to be derived from the ACPOS recommendations and are therefore deeply concerned by the slow overall progress in their implementation. We would encourage forces to build on what has been achieved so far and to focus on actual outcomes, that is, on providing more efficient services to meet with greater consistency the needs of police forces and communities across Scotland.

99. We believe that applying for a provisional licence of curriculum compliance while working towards a full licence will require forces to address many of the areas where progress has been slow. The licensing process involves submission of the ST&RA and other basic documents recording the force's approach to police use of firearms. Taking part in this process should ensure that forces have more complete information to inform their decisions on what baseline and specialist services are required. It will also assist in driving further improvements as each force moves from provisional to full licence.

100. Consequently we make only one additional recommendation:

HMICS recommends that all forces work to achieve NPIANPFTC licensing within six months from the date of publication of this report. This will require forces to produce robust and comprehensive ST&RAs, and will bring them under continuing scrutiny in the short term.

« Previous | Contents | Next »