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Introduction
1. The safety and welfare of people who come into police custody is a significant responsibility. It is a challenging area for the Service that presents risks for both staff and prisoners. These risks must be mitigated by high standards within custody suites and robust operating procedures. This inspection found that higher standards of facilities, in terms of design, construction and use of technology, have reduced the need to rely on procedures and processes, though these are still necessary to minimise the remaining risks. The Service will therefore benefit if best practice can be identified and incorporated into the design of new or refurbished custody facilities.
2. The 'Home Office Police Custody Buildings Design Guide' details the basic standards and criteria for custody facilities. This Guide comes in two volumes, the first being a policy document and the second a best practice document. These were developed by the Home Office in conjunction with the Police Property Service Management Group, which principally comprises representatives from police forces in England and Wales. Some aspects of the guidance consequently reflect practice south of the border, although there is a Scottish representative on the group who can influence the content.
Given the significance of people coming to harm in police custody, and the impact that custody suite design has on safety, the Scottish role in this group is important.
3. The Guide and its accompanying best practice document are intended to help police forces to develop briefs when building new custody suites or refurbishing existing facilities. The document is not overly prescriptive and recognises that alternative approaches can be successfully incorporated into custody design; it is for forces to decide which design features best suit their needs. Some further advice can also be found in a guidance document produced by the Association of Chief Police Officers ( ACPO) on 'The Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody'. A Scottish version of this document is currently being produced by ACPOS.
4. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that this thematic inspection found that the design of force custody suites differed across Scotland. There were various reasons for this, including the limitations of sites and the varying ages of custody facilities. And while some units evidently reflected changing views of good practice over time, a variety of design was apparent across even the more modern facilities.
5. The inspection has identified good practice in the design of various aspects of police custody facilities, and builds on the guidance referred to earlier. We also discovered some areas where we believe that the risks associated with keeping people in custody could be further reduced. This will only be achieved if the police service in Scotland adopts a more consistent, common approach to research, review and implementation. These key points are reflected in the recommendations of this report. Other examples of good practice and points for consideration are explored in more detail in Annex A. In addition to our specific recommendations, forces will wish to consider the content of Annex A when planning new building projects or other refinements to custody facilities.
6. This thematic focused on the design and development of the custody facilities, and as such did not explore alternatives to police management of custody. However, before embarking on projects that involve new units, forces should look to the future and consider such alternatives. So too should the Scottish Government. In some parts of England, for example, custody provision is privatised. Certainly as an efficiency measure, centralising provision within and across forces merits consideration (with or without privatisation), as does the possible role of the Scottish Police Services Authority in managing or procuring this. There is currently a requirement for police officer involvement in the process of accepting prisoners into custody. HMICS would simply offer the Scottish Government and forces the professional view that beyond this role there is no compelling operational reason for the custody and care of people arrested or detained by police to remain within the day-to-day management of police forces.
Development of Custody Practice
7. Police custody practices have evolved over time, with the last 20 years seeing a marked improvement in standards of care. There have been many drivers for these changes, including the increasing focus on human rights. In terms of process, the Police and Criminal Evidence Acts in England and Wales too have had a significant effect on the way prisoners are dealt with and cared for. Although these pieces of legislation have never been applied in Scotland, many aspects relating to prisoner management have come to be assimilated into practice north of the border.
8. Developments in approaches to designing custody facilities, as seen elsewhere in the UK and reflected in the Home Office Guide, have also gradually appeared in Scotland as units have been upgraded. Some of these developments are increasingly being recognised as good practice. Scottish forces have also developed aspects of custody suite design independently. However in some cases these were more likely to reflect previous force arrangements than the latest best practice.
9. The ACPOS Criminal Justice Business Area set up a group to oversee the introduction of privatised prisoner escorting in 2004. This group evolved into the National Custody Forum in 2006, with a focus on creating a common, computerised, custody management system. The group went on to take a wider interest in custody as a consequence of bringing together experts from each force. On the other hand, the Estate Management Forum, which reports to the ACPOS Financial Management business area, is made up of those police staff responsible for overseeing the construction and maintenance of police buildings. This Forum gives members the opportunity to highlight and exchange best practice on the physical aspects of custody facilities.
10. As part of our inspection we attended a meeting of the National Custody Forum and liaised with members of the Estate Management Forum. Neither group appeared ideally placed to address all the points identified in this thematic inspection. To help forces address these and future developments on related matters, ACPOS may consider it appropriate to review the remit and constitution of these groups, or to create a new group that could co-ordinate all necessary activities.
KEY ISSUES
Development of a Custody Strategy
11. A view commonly expressed during this inspection was that the design of a custody suite should reflect the requirements of the custody process. Though in keeping with the Home Office Guide, in reality the age of many facilities or the available site space meant that this was not always possible. Forces have had to make the best of units that were sometimes badly designed at the outset and with essential functions in the wrong place, such as outside the secure custody area.
12. A clear custody management strategy is essential to developing a design that can support the logical flow from prisoner arrival, through processing, to release. We found that most police custody professionals would prefer the person in charge of the custody suite to have a high degree of control and oversight over what happens in the custody area. This was evident from the desire of some forces to implement a radial design, where corridors to cells and ancillary rooms lead from the charge desk. Using this approach, all access and movement into, through and out of the suite would be not just managed and controlled by custody staff but subject to their direct oversight.
13. However not everyone shared this view. Others felt that custody processing should be kept separate from the prisoner holding and other ancillary functions. This, they believed, would allow uninterrupted prisoner processing, while the necessary supervisory overview could be achieved by other means.
14. Effective custody management relies on having sufficient numbers of staff. The need will be more acute if processing and custody are separated. We were inclined to favour custody design that heightened physical control over options that depended more on technology such as CCTV. It is for individual forces, however, to identify the most appropriate way of creating a secure environment for the custody of prisoners - one that is as safe and comfortable as it can reasonably be for both prisoners and staff. The solution may be influenced by both the constraints of existing building stock and the need to take account of prisoner privacy, highlighted later in this report.
15. This strategic approach to custody design should extend to deciding where ancillary functions, such as interview, medical support and fingerprinting, sit within this. Their proximity to the charge bar and any relationships between these functions should also be considered, as should the matter of access control and how this should be achieved both physically and through the use of technology. Only when forces have recognised all the issues that custody suites will deal with, will they be able to ascertain the optimum design for achieving this.
HMICS recommends that forces combine to develop a clear strategy for custody management that will direct future design and development of custody facilities, taking account of all available information on police custody practice.
Cell Capacity
16. All forces had problems meeting demand for cells at peak times. This invariably entailed prisoners being taken to other holding centres or sharing cells. All forces also referred to recent, ongoing or future custody building projects, but across forces there was no clear and consistent rationale for accurately identifying the number of cells required.
17. Neither is there a common means of measuring actual throughput. This inspection was focused on the physical facilities for custody and has therefore not concentrated on decision-making about people retained in custody for appearance at court. However, it is worth pointing out that, without comparison of this custody usage across Scotland, chief officers, police authorities and the Scottish Government are unable to begin to understand whether individual forces are keeping more people than necessary, or indeed too few people, in custody prior to first appearance in court. If it is the case that throughput can legitimately and safely be reduced there would clearly be potential savings in terms of space and usage and consequent implications for future build. HMICS suggests that this is something which all three parts of the tripartite governance of policing ought to know, not least because any inconsistencies are also likely to have a bearing on fairness, human rights and costs. The Senior Strategic Steering Group (a multi-agency group chaired by the Scottish Government), which brings these three interests together in terms of managing police performance, could usefully consider, perhaps in consultation with the National Criminal Justice Board, introduction of a performance indicator for custody throughput, for instance percentage of arrested people retained in custody for court.
18. For looking at levels of volume the most developed process we found was that used by Strathclyde Police. As part of an ongoing project to rationalise custody provision, the force had examined previous throughput of prisoners in its cells to identify the maximum number of prisoners in custody at any one time. From this it then derived an estimate of the number of cells necessary to allow single cell occupancy for each prisoner.
19. The issue of cell sharing is central to decisions on cell capacity. Our preference would be to allocate one prisoner to each cell. This is consistent with the fact that almost all police cells were designed for single occupancy. It also allows for individual privacy and recognises that, given the nature of many people who enter police custody, even the most robust risk assessment may still leave some at risk of assault or other abuse. We acknowledge, however, that the number of cells available does not always allow forces to maintain single occupancy.
20. An interesting divergence in practice amongst forces was apparent on occasions of peak demand when they were obliged to consider placing prisoners in the same cell. In some, no more than two prisoners were placed together. Others, in contrast, preferred to put three people together. This they did in the hope both of reducing the likelihood of conflict and raising the prospect of independent evidence should any altercation nevertheless arise.
21. To determine how many cells are required, forces should have a clear policy on cell sharing. We also believe that for the policy to be sustainable and defensible, it should be based on research evidence and applied consistently across Scotland.
22. We were impressed with the way that Strathclyde Police had approached achieving its own standard of single cell occupancy for no less than 99% of the time. For Strathclyde Police to achieve a higher rate with the approach adopted at present would have required more cells, but these would have been used for only a few hours each year. Though too early in this project's development to gauge success, we welcome the fact that clear policy had a direct bearing on design. We also believe that some thought should be given to the use of larger cells, which some forces have and which are designed to accommodate five or more prisoners. Whatever the outcome, it is vital that all forces recognise the effect that changes to policy may have on the demands and risks facing those working in custody areas, and reassess their staffing levels accordingly.
23. When calculating throughput, year-on-year changes in custody numbers, both in overall terms and in relation to female custodies (as reflected in national criminality statistics), should be taken into account. This information can be used to predict future throughput in the short-, medium- and longer-term.
24. In considering future custody throughput, forces will also wish to consider how they plan to meet custody need in terms of the number of holding centres. While we came across some examples of centralised holding centres during this inspection, we also found that, in a bid to reduce operational abstractions, some smaller holding centres had been re-opened. Before embarking on custody building projects, forces must weigh up all competing priorities in order to identify the optimum approach for them.
HMICS recommends that forces develop a robust and sustainable common model to help calculate cell requirements and to inform business cases for refurbishing or building new custody facilities. To support such a model, forces will also need to establish clear policies on cell sharing.
Prisoner Welfare
25. The inspection found that the design of the most recently built/refurbished police custody facilities reflected increased awareness of prisoners' rights and welfare needs. One example was the inclusion of hand washing amenities in cells, which helps to raise hygiene levels. Additionally, the general reluctance to have prisoners sharing cells was due in part to concerns about privacy, particularly in respect of toilet use.
26. These human rights considerations should affect the design of several aspects of custody facilities. Before defining good practice and setting out what should be achieved in future, forces must fully consider all aspects of prisoners' rights and be clear on what standards of accommodation are required.
27. For the purpose of hygiene, cells potentially could provide drinking water, hand washing units with warm running water, hand dryers and soap. We believe that new facilities should offer some method of hand washing. However forces will wish to balance the extent and benefits of doing so against any potential damage or injury that could occur.
28. The question of privacy is also allied to the increasing use of CCTV monitoring of cells, where prisoners' safety must be balanced against their rights to privacy. While technology can allow toilet areas to be shielded from view, it is possible to remove this shielding without prisoners being aware. Clear policies on the use of CCTV in cells should also direct future design.
29. If forces feel that cell sharing is acceptable at least some of the time, they will need to decide whether cell size or design should change to accommodate this. They must also consider whether prisoners should be entitled to some form of exercise away from their cells, particularly if they are to be held in custody for a number of days when, for example, the courts are closed for public holidays. Offering prisoners the option of exercise would not only have staffing implications but would also need to be taken into account in the design of new facilities.
30. Privacy is also factor when it comes to prisoner processing. To reduce the time spent by officers in police stations dealing with prisoner processing, forces have increasingly introduced charge desks that allow a number of prisoners to be processed simultaneously. At the many charge desks we visited during our fieldwork, we noted various levels of separation between processing points. One location had two separate rooms, most had some form of barrier between the processing points, but none provided a level of separation that could prevent prisoners being able to hear what was being said at an adjacent processing point.
31. The majority of police staff we spoke to did not feel privacy to be a major problem. On occasions where one prisoner overhearing information from another being processed would cause concern, custody staff, we were told, were able to manage this. Custody staff themselves tended to confirm this view. Even those who reported at times being distracted by incidents at neighbouring processing points, claimed to have no difficulty working this way. One officer would stress to prisoners that if they did not wish to answer any questions they were at liberty to ask to be processed in private. Other staff, in contrast, never processed more than one prisoner at a time as they were anxious about the lack of privacy, despite their sites being designed for this purpose.
32. It is essential that forces consider what is needed in relation to prisoner privacy at each stage of the custody process. The findings should then feed into the force's custody policy, which should in turn be communicated to all staff and used to inform any new construction or refurbishment work.
33. Our inspection revealed processes in place to cater not just for routine custodies but also for those requiring additional consideration because of religion, gender or disability in particular. Accommodating these needs should not rely purely on process, but as far as possible should be addressed by design. For disability, the welfare needs of prisoners centre not only on aspects such as access or lighting, but also include, for example, the selection of colour schemes to minimise any negative impact on people with impaired sight or mental illness. There are many further examples that could be offered here, but the key issue is that the Service recognise its responsibilities arising from what is an important and growing agenda.
34. The most fundamental human right is the right to life. Clearly this must take precedence over any lesser policing priority. For instance, in developing an understanding of duty of care, forces will wish to consider the suitability of installing trap cells to capture items flushed down the toilet, as opposed to treating prisoners suspected of carrying controlled drugs in their body as a medical emergency and taking them to hospital. Forces may also want to establish a consistent position on the use of life signs monitoring equipment to identify when a prisoner stops breathing.
HMICS recommends that forces review their custody facilities with regard to prisoners' welfare and rights, and consult appropriate bodies to determine what facilities should be provided.
HMICS recommends that forces review their custody facilities with reference to prisoner privacy, taking account of staff and prisoner safety, to determine how custody suite functions, including cells and charge desks, should be designed.
Staff Welfare
35. Two major aspects of custody design must be the needs of prisoners and the efficiency of the custody process. However, the needs of the police staff who work in these areas must not be ignored. Older facilities in particular tended to focus on the function of custody and offered no office accommodation or space for staff to take refreshment breaks. Even some of the more contemporary designs similarly failed to take account of the needs of staff.
36. In many places CCTV monitoring had expanded to cover the complete cell complex. Without separate office space, this meant that staff must spend their whole time under the scrutiny of cameras. We understand that camera systems are in place to protect both staff and prisoners, but believe that staff should be allowed some respite from constant surveillance. Custody suites should therefore include some office space away from the charge desk but in a position where appropriate supervision can be maintained.
37. A further reality of working in custody is that, with few exceptions, staff routinely had difficulty enjoying a full refreshment break during their shift. The unpredictable nature of their role - prisoners may arrive or be released at any time - coupled with the need to monitor the prisoners in their care continually, meant that staff frequently took their breaks in the custody suite. Without prejudicing the rights of staff to take a break away from their working environment and ideally outwith the custody suite, some facility in which staff could take their breaks that was situated within the suite but away from the charge desk or office, would significantly improve their welfare. This should be considered in any future design or refurbishment projects.
38. In designing facilities for staff, forces should make sure that any accommodation earmarked for staff use is not subsequently reallocated in future planning.
HMICS recommends that forces consider staff welfare requirements in the design of custody facilities and take all steps to ensure that these are not compromised by future custody planning.
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