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Annex B
GENERAL FINDINGS AND COMMENTS ON GOOD PRACTICE
Force Crime Registrars
B1. In our 2005 thematic we pointed out that force crime registrars ( FCRs) had a pivotal, strategic role in applying the Scottish Crime Recording Standard. Nor had the situation changed by the time of our 2007 inspection, with the eight registrars still considered to be the driving force behind the Standard in Scotland. Five of the posts were filled by police staff, the remaining three by police officers (a sergeant, a detective chief inspector and a superintendent), and five of the eight posts were full-time positions. All the registrars were found to be extremely knowledgeable about the SCRS and voiced common concerns about the difficulties they faced. All in all, we were impressed by their commitment and passion for their role.
B2. In terms of additional support, every force had appointed a deputy crime registrar: with the exception of two, all were police officers. For the majority of these individuals, deputising in the absence of the registrar was the limit of their involvement with the SCRS. That said, two deputies had previously taken on the role of FCR. The level of support available to registrars also varied when it came to audit and scrutiny. Two force crime registrars, both police staff, carried out all such work unaided, whereas in other forces the FCR was assisted in the audit process by specialist staff. It is our view that for force crime registrars to perform their role effectively and efficiently they should be afforded an appropriate level of assistance, particularly if they are also acting as chair and/or secretary to the Scottish Crime Registrars Group.
National Co-ordinator
B3. We believe that good practice is evident in the success of the National Crime Registrar role in England and Wales. It is clear that this role has provided a focal point for development as well as invaluable support and assistance to crime registrars. There is a strong argument for developing a similar post in Scotland.
Providing local information
B4. We were disappointed to hear complaints from staff throughout the country about the difficulty of retrieving material from local force intranets. Two common criticisms were that: sites were so cluttered that it was hard to find things such as SCRS reference material; and the search engines were of poor quality. Forces and the SPSA may wish to consider these matters, not just in relation to making SCRS documentation more accessible, but more generally in the wider sphere of information management.
Call Management
B5. A recent Audit Scotland report on call management in the police service in Scotland highlighted that, with more calls than ever being answered by the police, forces had developed their own local call management structures, strategies and policies. Although these differences made direct comparison difficult at times, it was clear that one of the key elements of call management across all forces was the crucial role played by the initial call-taker or handler. Amongst frontline officers and their supervisors nationally, there was a strong belief that one of the most important aspects of the SCRS process was how a call is recorded on the police command and control system at the first point of contact. Most focus groups highlighted the concerns of frontline officers, particularly junior officers who had received no formal SCRS training, about writing-off calls that the call-taker had initially recorded as a crime.
B6. In his recent interim report on the review of policing in England and Wales, Sir Ronnie Flannigan spoke about this culture of 'risk aversion', commenting, as did our focus groups, on how officers would rather avoid potential criticism than question the nature of a call. A better understanding of this dynamic is needed in order to put the role of call-takers, and the equally important role of their supervisors, in perspective. It is important that callers are questioned carefully about the nature of their call and that the incident recorded on the force command and control system reflects as accurately as possible why the person has contacted the police. In too many forces, officers commented that some incidents recorded on force command and control systems reflected not the facts or perceived facts, but the opinions or interpretations, however well-intentioned, of the call-taker.
B7. We acknowledge the difficulties and pressures associated with taking calls from the public and understand that the sometimes poor communication skills of callers can make that job harder. However, given frontline staff concerns, we urge forces to ensure that within call management they have in place a supervisory process that safeguards the need for objectivity and accuracy, particularly in relation to the input of data.
Discretion in Recording
"I was told from day one we don't have discretion" - a constable on core shifts
B8. The majority of police-public contacts leading to a crime being recorded are initiated by a telephone call. Our findings revealed widespread belief among officers across the country that, once a call is recorded as crime-related on the relevant command and control system, there is little room for discretion or professional judgement in how then to deal with it, irrespective of the wishes of the member of the public instigating the contact. Here again Sir Ronnie Flannigan's comments about risk aversion are relevant. So too is the perception of frontline officers, that officers prefer to avoid situations that would put them under scrutiny because of the blame culture they perceive to exist. In terms of the SCRS, the message coming out of our focus groups was the same that had emerged in 2005: crime reports were being recorded without question, even where there may have been reasonable cause to doubt that a crime had occurred. Many examples were given to this effect, such as where local housing regulations required that a crime report be raised before any repairs could be sanctioned.
"As a CP officer I would rather spend half an hour resolving a situation than charge someone and a few days later come back to charge the neighbour" - a community policing constable
B9. The SCRS national training programme and the SCRS policy document clearly state that officers can still exercise discretion, particularly when dealing with minor acts of disorder. However, here too officers seemed sceptical that this was the case. Indeed in some forces it appeared that officers were expected to record all such incidents where a successful detection was possible, whether by submitting a formal police report to the relevant procurator fiscal, issuing a fixed penalty notice, or giving a formal police warning.
B10. It appeared that in some Scottish forces an unintended consequence of the drive for improved performance management has been a culture that misinterprets this aim and erodes the fundamentally necessary discretion of individually empowered police officers. Furthermore, it seemed that in order primarily to demonstrate what was considered improved performance, officers now felt it necessary to detect offences where in the past an informal (discretionary) police warning would have sufficed. We have been one of the driving forces behind the introduction of the Scottish Policing Performance Framework and are only too aware of the need for a healthy performance management culture throughout the Service. As such, we strongly believe that detections that are initiated only for the sake of statistics undermine the credibility of the police service in Scotland and can adversely affect police-public relations. We therefore urge forces to review the way in which frontline staff are being directed in the use of discretion when tackling disorder.
"Discretion is still there but it is not being used" - a detective constable
B11. While many officers who took part in our focus groups blamed the Standard for eroding discretionary power, these officers were on the whole poorly trained in the principles of SCRS and thus appear to have been basing their views on a faulty understanding of the Standard. We believe that there has indeed been an erosion of discretion over the past decade. However, we feel that this has probably had as much to do with the necessary growth of police management and the move to develop national approaches to national policing problems, such as the'Safer Scotland' initiatives and the development of force contact centres, as the introduction of SCRSper se. Staff in all forces acknowledged that where contact was initiated on a one-to-one basis, either in the street, at a front desk, or by telephone call to a local police office, they could and would use discretion on occasion. Interestingly, confidence in using discretionary powers in these circumstances varied not only from force to force, but also from area to area within forces. In some extreme cases, officers mentioned their 'fear' of being disciplined if they were caught failing to record a crime, thus exacerbating the risk aversion culture.
"They have taken away discretion through fear" - an inspector
B12. Our Meeting the Standard report was quite clear that there remained a place for discretion, particularly when dealing with acts of minor disorder. We still believe this to be the case. However, the use of discretion must be seen in context. Given the importance of gathering accurate information on matters affecting local communities, and the way such intelligence is used to inform the tasking and coordinating process that directs how police respond to these, it is important that forces accurately record all crimes reported to them. This includes so-called 'minor crimes' such as vandalism. It does not mean, however, that all crime has then to be investigated (see paragraphs 23-30 of the main report). The police service in Scotland must therefore acknowledge that this more victim-orientated, ethical crime recording policy need not undermine the use of discretion in day-to-day policing.
B13. With the imminent introduction of a national command and control (incident recording and management) system for the police service in Scotland, discretionary warnings for instances of minor disorder will be easily recorded and audited. The information will then be readily available for the tasking process. We therefore encourage forces and the SPSA to review existing training and direction on the use of discretion when dealing with instances of anti-social behaviour and minor road traffic violations.
Where necessary this should highlight the importance of discretion, giving clear guidance for its use as well as any limitations, particularly in the context of the Service's ethical crime recording policy.
De-briefing Staff
B14. In all but one force, we found no consistent approach to de-briefing staff at the end of their shift. In 2000, Strathclyde Police adopted a new force-wide shift pattern that permitted an effective de-brief at the end of each shift, allowing supervisors to review incidents attended by officers and to ensure, amongst other things, that all necessary crime reports had been submitted. No other force had adopted a similarly systematic approach, although Grampian Police had just started a formal de-briefing process. We believe that the other Scottish forces should examine, if they have not already done so, the benefits that might be derived from formalising their de-briefings, such as greater accuracy in recording information.
Data Quality, Force and HMICS Compliance Audits
"It's really not a standard if everyone is doing it differently" - a crime registrar
B15. The inspection found that all police forces operating in Scotland, including the Ministry of Defence Police and British Transport Police, regularly conducted compliance audits using the 2006 ACPOS methodology. Force crime registrars were clearly aware of the importance of this programme of internal force audits, and we were pleased to see that auditing was a standing agenda item at meetings of the Scottish Crime Registrars Group. Regular updates by FCRs ensured the continued dissemination of good practice in relation to the auditing process amongst this Group, and maintained the profile of this crucial aspect of FCR duties.
B16. As a consequence of the SCRG's work, forces carried out a national compliance audit in late 2006 which, amongst other things, tested the suitability of the audit methodology. The results suggested that some elements of the process should be reviewed, and so a separate audit methodology review group was set up. This group had since prepared a number of amendments that, at the time of inspection, the SCRG was shortly to consider. We are pleased that the SCRG has taken the initiative in this key area and await the final recommendations of the review group.
B17. Little appetite was apparent in forces for conducting telephone surveys of customers, as outlined in recommendation 7 of our 2005 report. We believe that forces ignore this to the detriment of the quality of crime recording and the SCRS, and urge that steps are taken to address this un-discharged recommendation as soon as possible, perhaps by all forces joining to commission work by another body, such as the SPSA or a completely independent organisation.
B18. Up until March 2007, HMICS conducted force crime audits as part of our inspection programme. In 2006 we completed audits in Grampian and Dumfries and Galloway, and in 2007 Lothian and Borders. Under our new inspection regime, it was likely that the other forces would not be audited for at least another 18 months. Rather than leave such a lengthy period between visits, we audited the remaining five between June and July 2007.
B19. In line with the results of force crime registrars' own internal audits, our findings suggested that forces were generally complying with the SCRS. What was lacking, however, was any national consistency in how forces used their command and control systems.
B20. We recognise the substantial improvements that some forces have made over the last two years. We are also confident that the introduction of STORMMA as a common Scottish command and control system will alleviate many of the problems encountered to date. This assumes that there will be national consistency in the approach to incident handling and closure, as discussed below.
B21. Recording information accurately is essential if Scottish forces are to be able to assess, not just how compliant they are with the SCRS, but how well they are performing against the Scottish Policing Performance Framework. In a previous thematic report, Managing Improvement, we recommended that data be readily accessible and drawn from common IT systems. This may soon become a reality with the current rollout of the national command and control project, to be followed by three other key projects:
- The PDA project - an electronic notebook project being piloted in two forces in Scotland.
- The Platform Project - which will introduce a national data warehouse, allowing forces to retrieve an unprecedented level of management information.
- The Information Management Project - which, when it comes on line, will standardise amongst other things, crime recording across Scotland.
B22. We believe that, taken together, all four projects present the police service in Scotland with a unique opportunity to create and access standardised data of the highest accuracy and quality. This will undoubtedly help to make the Service more efficient and effective across the range of its activities, including SCRS compliance.
B23. There are, however, challenges in meeting these aspirations. For instance, across forces we found a lack of consistency in the application of the new opening and closing codes for the STORMMA (command and control) project. Properly used, these codes could yield much valuable information on efficiency and effectiveness and provide force crime registrars with a powerful tool to check compliance against the Standard. However, because of a lack of national direction in this specific area, the two forces that have to date implemented the agreed opening and closing codes have begun to apply their own interpretation to the codes, thus removing at a stroke one of the benefits of having a national system.
B24. Moreover, we found that training for operators was not being run to a national standard, nor was there a life-time management plan for the project. These concerns, raised by us at the time of inspection, highlight potential problems that could arise from a lack of consistency in data quality and accuracy. This may be especially pertinent when recording incidents that historically have not been recorded with any degree of standardisation, such as those involving anti-social behaviour. Given that individual force command and control systems have evolved separately, the situation is perhaps understandable. Moreover, the systems are primarily used to record and manage incidents - activities that are not prescribed by statute or any other pressing national need. HMICS appreciates that the way forces and sub-units of forces record incidents can vary considerably for a variety of reasons, not least the different uses made of command and control systems in rural and urban areas and in parts of Scotland where there is insufficient recording capacity in other systems. However, the opportunity now exists to use minimum standards to gain a more complete and accurate picture of policing demand, need and reaction across the country. We therefore encourage ACPOS to finalise national minimum standards for incident recording as soon as possible and devise a means of monitoring compliance.
B25. While we believe that a more settled approach to implementing national projects such as STORMMA and monitoring compliance would be welcome, we also recognise the need to co-ordinate this with a drive for national standards. It may be that this is one of the areas where national leadership has not been at fault but where the lack of agreed ground rules on implementation of national systems has struggled with the fact that there are eight different police forces in Scotland and no failsafe system for agreeing absolute, irrevocable standards.
B26. It follows that, on a more general note, we also strongly suggest that the SPSA and ACPOS engage in an effort to address the need for a process, where justified, whereby minimum standards for the use of information and communications technology can be agreed in advance of implementation, and thereafter cannot be unilaterally revoked or disregarded.
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