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Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact of the Glasgow Antisocial Behaviour Taskforce

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CHAPTER SEVEN VALUE FOR MONEY

7.1 There is not, as yet, a comprehensive picture of the Taskforce's value for money. This may be due to the fact that the Taskforce has only been operating for a relatively short length of time and Taskforce monitoring data has produced little evidence of outcomes (but instead has focused largely on activities). A substantial amount of money has been spent on high profile interventions such as policing, and not as much spent on activities addressing the underlying causes of ASB.

7.2 The evaluation drew together data on outcomes achieved by the Taskforce in its original 10 target wards between April 2005 and October 2006 to evaluate its value for money. Key sources included the Taskforce's own monitoring data; Strathclyde police incident and reported crime data; and additional ASB data provided by SFRS.

Gap between ASB experienced in Taskforce areas compared to the rest of the city

7.3 A review of Police and SFRS data does not provide clear evidence that the Taskforce has permanently reduced levels of ASB or narrowed the gap between target wards and with other parts of Glasgow: it may however be too early to expect such a result. It may also be the case that reporting rates for crime and ASB in Taskforce areas may increase relative to the comparative areas.

7.4 Police crime statistics were analysed, along with SFRS data on secondary, non-property, fires and damage to fire hydrants. A similar approach to the incident data analysis - using comparator areas, a city-wide picture and trends from a pre-Taskforce baseline - were adopted. Most of the indicators show a decline in reported acts of ASB, but no more so in the Taskforce areas than elsewhere in Glasgow. From the April-to-July 2004 baseline to October 2006, in the four target wards:

  • Violent crimes fell by 16% in the 4 target wards. The corresponding drop for Glasgow was 14% and 41% for comparator areas.
  • Vandalism offences fell by 7% in target wards. The drop for comparator areas was 17% and 5% for Glasgow.
  • Drug offences climbed by 10% since the baseline date but fell slightly elsewhere in the city.
  • A slightly more positive picture is evident in terms of disorder offences such as breach of the peace, drinking in public, drunk and incapable etc. - offences fell by 3%, compared with a 5% drop in comparator areas and a slight increase in the rest of the city.

7.5 SFRS data suggests that decreases in fire-related ASB were more significant in the 4 target ward areas than elsewhere in the city:

  • Damage to fire hydrants was 45% of its 2003 total in 2005 in the target wards, compared to 63% across Glasgow.
  • Secondary fires were at 70% of their 2003 total in target wards, compared to 73% in the rest of the City.

Intermediate Impact

7.6 As already stated findings may suggest some degree of 'intermediate' impact was evident in wards where the Taskforce intervention was of greatest scale and duration. Longer-term impacts, such as a reduction in ASB or a narrowing of the gap with the rest of the City, are likely to require more than the 18-month period of the evaluation to emerge. Future monitoring and evaluation arrangements put in place by GCSS need to take full cognisance of inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts. They also need to draw more effectively on all available sources including those of SFRS such as those summarised above. Key lessons for the new GCSS in terms of monitoring and evaluation include:

  • The need to identify all funding inputs, including discrete funding streams, additional resources drawn in from other partners, and additional expenditure by mainstream agencies as a result of the Taskforce.
  • The need for a more comprehensive picture of activities which captures the full range of GCSS activities, rather than the partial picture presented to date.
  • The need for a clearer distinction between the immediate outputs of activities and longer-term outcomes.
  • A clearer picture of impacts is needed than currently exists: Police Crime and Incident Data and SFRS data could play an important role. Some data sources are currently under-used, while a researched and evidenced analysis is needed to establish the full value and contribution of Police data.

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Page updated: Wednesday, January 30, 2008