The Scottish Government

« Previous | Contents | Next »

Listen

SECTION 3 - SITE CLEARANCE

3.1 Generic Forward Planning Issues and Assumptions

In the event of a CBRN incident the recovery role of the local Consequence Management Strategic Co-ordinating Group will be of paramount importance. Whilst the development and implementation of a Site Clearance Plan will be dependent on the post incident circumstances, a number of generic planning principles can, and should be addressed at the planning stage to enhance the level of preparedness. In preparing generic emergency plans, local SCGs should therefore take heed of the following:

(a) Costs

The costs associated in dealing with a major CBRN incident may be significant and complex for agencies involved in the process of site clearance, which may last for several months or years. In circumstances where it is necessary for a local authority to enter into contractual arrangements (preferably with a supplier identified by the Government Decontamination Service ( GDS)) then all reasonable costs associated with that contract will be met by the Scottish Government. A sound financial management regime should therefore be implemented at the outset and certainly at the commencement of the contract, ensuring that competent cost control and cost capture protocols are in place. Evidence of sound financial management will be required for central government cost assessment, payment and audit purposes.

Clearly, this financial arrangement will remain under review and will be lead by a senior official from the Scottish Government who will participate in the site recovery management process. These arrangements are intended to offer a degree of assurance to local authorities that the Scottish Government will provide as much support and assistance as possible as they have done during previous emergencies such as Lockerbie and severe weather.

(b) Response Hierarchy

All personnel who are likely to be involved in site clearance activity should be aware of their expected participation, their role and their responsibilities. They must also fully understand the command and control, communication and accountability protocols as set out in this document and further explained in Preparing Scotland.

(c) Planning, Training and Exercising

Experience in the UK in dealing with CBRN incidents is very limited. Plans must therefore be developed by each SCG to ensure that key responder personnel, at strategic, tactical and operational levels, are regularly engaged in training and exercising. It is essential that staff representing responder organisations/agencies fully understand the command and control arrangements and what their respective roles and responsibilities are.

Experience gained in responding to live incidents in the UK and elsewhere should also be shared and used to achieve continuous improvement in our general level of preparedness.

(d) Business Continuity

Key to effective planning is a strategic recognition and understanding from the outset that site clearance following a CBRN incident will be a complex and long term process involving many agencies. A business continuity strategy for delivering essential services, including the reallocation of senior staff responsibilities etc, is therefore a key consideration for all responders planning for such emergencies.

(e) Mutual Aid

Few aspects of site clearance are capable of being delivered by a single responder. Bearing in mind the likely duration of the site clearance process, pressure on resources will particularly apply to the local authority and other key supporting responders. Strategic Co-ordinating Groups should ensure that their aims, objectives and agreed partnership arrangements allow for mutual support and assistance in all aspects of multi-agency, multi-level preparation and response.

(f) Identification of Key Support Resources

Whilst it is difficult to predict the types and amounts of resources that may be required, planning for a CBRN incident should include a strategy for mustering a range of critical resources quickly and effectively.

The Government Decontamination Service ( GDS) has established liaison arrangements with a number of specialist suppliers/contractors and arrangements are in place for their deployment. ¹³ Whilst these suppliers/contractors will principally be used for decontamination of the built and open environment, infrastructure and transport, they may, if invited to do so, be able to offer other resources to assist in the site clearance process.

Furthermore, a range of support resources, equipment, materials and plant, is likely to be required, sometimes at short notice and for indefinite periods, to deliver the site clearance plan. SCG's should identify likely sources of key equipment in developing their generic planning processes.

(g) Co-ordination and Communication Protocols

Effective co-ordination is essential to the success of any emergency response. Equally so, good communication between organisations is essential and protocols must be clear and well understood by all responders.

Two sets of communication systems and procedures will require to be established while work is being performed at the site of the incident, as follows:

• Internal communications between site managers and workers, e.g. intrinsically safe two-way radio systems, air horns, flashing lights, etc.; and
• External communications with off-site decision-making teams and other personnel e.g. cell phones.

In planning for CBRN events, SCGs should ensure that data sharing systems and communication equipment and networks are available, resilient, understood and tested under extreme circumstances.

(h) Command and Control Accommodation

Suitable and well equipped office accommodation for all strategic and tactical groups and on-site operational personnel will be required. Options to meet the needs of such office accommodation should be identified and an office deployment plan developed, identifying essential equipment, layout and welfare needs. Available equipment should ideally include secure telephony systems, video-conferencing facilities, computer access network, geographical information system, printing facilities, etc.

Bearing in mind the likely duration of site clearance operations local responders should consider novel ways of working, e.g. virtual accommodation, with participants being connected remotely using (secure) email, video conferencing and telephone conferencing.

(i) Public Information ¹⁴

Continuous and sustained demands for information by the public and media will be extremely high from the outset through to completion of the site clearance process. Information should be coordinated and integrated across all responder agencies and government departments and delivered to the public in an accurate, coordinated, timely and easily understood manner. A sustainable public communication strategy, which identifies those responsible for information and media management (including protocols identifying "talking heads") at strategic, tactical and operational levels, should therefore be developed and tested as an essential element of SCG's generic planning process.

Key questions to be answered are:

• what will the message be to the public?
• how is the target audience to be identified?
• how will this message be communicated?

Taking into account the likely duration of the remediation process, the information needs of varying community audiences e.g. residents, businesses, special needs, travellers, should be assessed and flexible mechanisms established to ensure effective dissemination and feedback. The provision and management of adequate telephone helpdesk arrangements should also be considered to ensure that calls from the public and media are answered promptly by well informed call handlers. Automated helpline systems should also be considered to handle the volume of calls expected during a major emergency.

(j) Temporary Off-site Storage Facilities ¹⁵

A temporary site, or sites, between the incident scene and ultimate disposal destination may be required for the storage of materials including evidence. Such facilities may be required by the emergency services to aid forensic investigation of the materials or by the Site Clearance Group for sorting and interim safe segregation and storage of waste. Suitable sites should therefore be identified in collaboration with SEPA and the local authority taking into account location, travel logistics and other operational requirements.

« Previous | Contents | Next »