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CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY POLICY LESSONS
Introduction
5.1 This section of our report draws the primary findings together and presents a summary of what we see to be the policy lessons learned to date in the Scottish URCs. The points provided can be used to inform future policy decisions relating to the Companies - both new and old.
Vision and Focus
5.2 A key underlying component of the rationale for the establishment of URCs in Scotland was their ability to bring strong vision and focus to their respective areas. Without doubt each has been instrumental in creating a new / renewed vision for their designated areas and through master-planning exercises created a physical development framework that is being used to guide and prioritise investment.
5.3 Importantly, these master-planning exercises have been both need and opportunity orientated. Assembling and analysing baseline data has been an important component in defining problems and in identifying the measures and indicators for monitoring progress. Engaging with the market, including soft market testing and using specialist advisors has also been a critical part of the process of identifying opportunities and possible 'transforming' projects.
5.4 The URCs have also clearly created a new type and level of focus on their respective areas. The creation of new legal structures has helped to signal the intent and seriousness of the partner organisations and at the same time has concurrently placed a new emphasis on the roles and legal responsibilities of company 'members' to act in the best interest of the Company itself. These too have also created a new model for enabling joint ventures with the private sector (developers and investors).
5.5 Whilst creating a stronger focus is generally seen as a "good thing", it brings with it a much clearer spotlight on accountability and the need to produce tangible results. The link between the masterplan and organisation responsible for its delivery is clearly much more clearly defined under the URC set up. Because of this, the URCs themselves should continue to be encouraged to work and behave in a focused way. Implicit here is a requirement not to "burden" the companies with responsibilities and tasks that can either become a major distraction or otherwise can be easily dealt with by other partners / stakeholders.
5.6 The dedicated Executive team in Raploch and Clydebank makes a key difference to delivery. This is also true of both Riverside Inverclyde and Irvine Bay, where results are already being delivered on the ground. This drive should be encouraged.
5.7 The role of the Board is also important in creating focus. There is plenty of evidence that a board with external members helps to maintain a focus on delivery and to increase accountability for it happening. When the almost inevitable difficulties break out between the URC and its principal stakeholders, the presence of outsiders helps to maintain a focus on delivery and results.
5.8 Vision and focus is also best achieved when there is a demonstrable separation of responsibilities and identities of the Council and the URC. Although both Council and community supported the choice of EDI as joint venture partner, the relationship between the City Council and EDI is interdependent. It is also hard to see a distinct identity between PARC and EDI, which has a much wider set of responsibilities.
5.9 Stirling Council decided not to use Stirling Ventures - a wholly owned subsidiary of Stirling Council in the same way that EDI is a wholly owned subsidiary of Edinburgh Council), on the grounds that it was seen to be too close to the Council.
'Brand' Marketing and PR
5.10 Clydebank Rebuilt has had an exemplary programme, involving design events and competitions, high quality publications and public realm investment. In terms of PR, appropriate use has been made of skilled professionals.
5.11 Feedback from design consultation events has been fully and honestly reported and the evidence suggests that the URC has succeeded in interesting the local population. While public consultation events have, as always, been most heavily attended by older people, this has been balanced out by an intensive programme of engagement in schools.
5.12 CR has created a high quality website, on which a great deal of material about the URC and its plans is available. The openness and accessibility which this generates is impressive.
Investor Confidence and Piloting New Models of private finance
5.13 There is some embryonic evidence, particularly in Clydebank, that investor confidence has been boosted. The arrangements in place within PARC have also demonstrated how under the Scottish model new frameworks / structures can be built that encourage the participation of investors (in this case private loan finance). This is a huge leap forward relative to the URC model in place within England - where ostensibly most URCs are reliant on their partner organisations to contract with third parties and create models for equity participation in physical development projects.
5.14 The future URC movement or approach in Scotland should seek to build on the models that have emerged in the United States. Here new approaches are being developed that involve the mobilisation of large amounts of private finance to support complex urban renewal projects. The rationale for building on these is a strong one and the Scottish Executive is already exploring the issue. The outcome from its investigations should be shared with the URCs.
Speeding up Delivery
5.15 The evidence is that the benefits that the URCs have conferred have been in other areas, such as focus, co-ordination, quality and engagement. There is less evidence that the three Pathfinder URCs have speeded up delivery.
5.16 For areas where there is a long history of unsuccessful regeneration attempts, this can be a key issue. The best practice lesson is that what the URC may consider to be Year 1 may be perceived by the community to be Year 4, 5, 6 or even more. In this type of location, URCs are unlikely to be seen as a success unless they can start to deliver early and on a considerable scale.
5.17 The pace and scale of development is also a key issue in areas where the funding model depends on sales of residential land at increasing values to fund other elements of the masterplan. Unless sufficient critical mass is achieved, land values may remain stubbornly low for many years.
Procurement and Cost Effectiveness Issues
5.18 One of the themes at the recent SURF urban regeneration conference 14 was the cost effectiveness of the URC model, with annual running costs in the region of £400- £500k per annum, The question posed was, in essence, what scale of project or problem justifies an intervention with operational costs of that order?
5.19 We felt that the argument was based on the premise that the role of the URC under discussion was the delivery of 900 houses. In fact, it operates at two scales - as well as planning for the development of the 900 houses, the URC is providing employability and community support services to an existing community of almost 4,000 people. There was also no recognition of the time limited nature of the majority of the staffing of the organisation, with 7 posts reliant on temporary European funded contracts, several of which have now come to an end.
5.20 However, more broadly, we agree that the URC model should not be the only model considered for large scale major housing renewal programmes, and that simpler and lower cost delivery mechanisms may be more appropriate. Our attention has recently been drawn to a 1,250 house project in Glasgow (Oatlands) which is being delivered by a private developer and two RSL partners, with a less complex but not dissimilar procurement process, using very modest staff resources within the local authority itself. All infrastructure is being funded by the private sector, and much of the social housing is being provided without the use of HAG.
5.21 However, a URC may have advantages where deprivation is multi-faceted and entrenched, or the regeneration process is likely to be complex and over a long time period. The areas in question are not wholly comparable - Oatlands is not so severely disadvantaged or stigmatised as Craigmillar or Raploch, and the Oatlands Project has a higher proportion of housing for sale, which makes the need for subsidy less. Raploch is much more than a housing renewal project, and the design and local labour aspirations are different. In particular, when considering the significant outcomes that it is hoped will be achieved through use of the community benefit clause in the contract with the preferred developer, it is arguable whether this would have been secured had a URC not been created.
Design Quality
5.22 A key objective of URCs is to achieve a better design outcome than would otherwise have been the case. Recent evidence for CABE about the quality of new housing developments in England 15 suggests that the 'counterfactual' standard of housing development is unlikely to be good - fewer than one in five were rated as good or very good, and in the East and West Midlands and the South West, 40% of developments were rated as poor.
5.23 The URCs have each pursued an objective of design quality through master planning and urban design guidance, and in the case of CR and PARC, by exemplar high quality developments. All of the URCs have won awards for both their developments and for the quality of their policies and processes.
5.24 However, it will be important for the URCs and their local authority partners to follow through when the developments reach planning application stage - the ultimate and only important test will be the quality of the development which is actually built.
5.25 It is generally accepted that several of the URCs have pursued the objective of design quality - and innovative design - more vigorously than would have been the case with most mainstream developers. It is recognised too, however, that the pursuit of design quality has the potential to impact on the speed of delivery and on cost.
Increasing Local Employment
5.26 Raploch is the only URC which has become fully engaged with the issue of employment linkages, although all have sought to create new employment through their land use strategies and through the development process.
5.27 The extent to which URCs should become involved in employability support within their area is in our view an area for policy debate, but we would not see URCs as well suited to delivery of mainstream employability support because of their often limited geographical area and their time limited nature. The only issue is how to create linkages between the employment they create and employability support agencies.
5.28 What is critical is that there should be clarity as to where responsibilities lie - with the URC or with existing organisations who are running local employment and training schemes.
5.29 Another key issue is expertise. Raploch benefited from having a team member with previous expertise in this area. The use of a Community Benefits in Procurement ( CBIP) clause was also seen as a significant improvement on earlier voluntary clauses in terms of enforceability. The key lesson is to keep the process simple so bidders understand and can sign up to it.
5.30 The Joseph Rowntree Foundation is evaluating the five CBIP pilots. We understand that the JRF study is nearing completion, and that a toolkit will be rolled out on CBIPs. We also understand that the study has concluded that there were additional benefits above and beyond voluntary local labour agreements, none of which had achieved as good outputs.
5.31 The single joint venture partner for Raploch is key to the success of these various initiatives and indeed it has been argued that the potential for Community Benefits in Procurement would have been even greater had the schools and health centre contracts also been let by the URC. Such clauses may be less appropriate in URC areas where there are a number of different developers involved in delivery.
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