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CHAPTER SIXTEEN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

16.1 When the wardens were first introduced they were moving into a policing void in many areas. The areas selected were chosen because of their levels of deprivation. As well as high levels of unemployment and low levels of educational attainment they also suffered from high crime rates and high levels of antisocial behaviour and associated environmental problems such as graffiti and fly tipping. Resource constraints on the police, and other public staff such as caretakers and park keepers, meant that what were seen as minor crimes and offences often went unchecked, regardless of the enervating impact these can have upon people forced to live with their consequences on a day-to-day basis (Payne, 2003). In many areas the behavioural norms of a number of residents meant that the informal types of social control, that many take for granted, had broken down. Into this policy and enforcement vacuum the wardens moved.

16.2 The areas that they were to operate in varied, from those where the "problems", on any scale of severity, were minor, to ones where the scale of disorder was serious. In such areas there was a culture of non-compliance with official rules and regulations from some residents (Payne, 2003 and Power, 2004). Although undoubtedly in a minority, they often had an impact out of all proportion to their numbers.

16.3 This context needs to be remembered when assessing the achievements of Scotland's community wardens. They were, and still are to some extent, trying to modify the behaviour of residents, some of whom live by norms that many would find alien. What also needs to be remembered is that this evaluation is taking place, at most, 2 years into the implementation of many warden schemes. Arguably 2 years is a very short time in which to engineer social change and behavioural modifications.

16.4 In the light of this what can be concluded about the impact of Scotland's community wardens? There were 4 main objectives of the evaluation (Paragraph 2.2). Some of these related to formative elements (such as supporting the collection of monitoring information), whilst others were about identifying good practices and exploring process issues. However, all of these are relatively immaterial if the schemes fail to achieve their fundamental aims of decreasing the occurrence of crime and antisocial behaviour in their target areas. Accordingly it is with this that this Chapter begins.

What Impact Have the Schemes had upon Crime and Antisocial Behaviour?

16.5 At various places in the report the difficulties of assessing impact have been outlined. It is also the case that most other national evaluations of warden initiatives have encountered these problems. Having said that, we have attempted to assess impact in 3 complementary ways, by:-

• Collecting survey data on residents' perceptions (Chapter Twelve) ;
• Undertaking a variety of qualitative research through the case study visits;
• Analysing official statistics on crimes and antisocial behaviour (Chapters Ten and Eleven).

16.6 The survey data on perceptions does not show a simple picture of uniform change or of change moving in one direction. Given the diversity of schemes, in terms of differing problem severities and different approaches to dealing with these, this is probably to be expected. However, we would argue that, in the case study areas, there is evidence that residents feel that a range of antisocial behaviours have decreased in frequency and that perceptions of safety have improved (see Paragraphs 12.36 to 12.40). These are both absolute and comparative changes. It needs to be stressed that not all areas show such improvements on all indicators. That this is the case may reflect the issues highlighted above: the severity of problems in some areas and the relatively short time that the wardens have been operating.

16.7 The surveys also attribute some of these positive changes to the interventions made by the wardens. Again it should be stressed that by no means all residents made such attributions. Yet again this is to be expected as by no means all survey respondents were aware of the wardens.

16.8 Overall we would conclude that, in those areas where the wardens operate, there is evidence that the quality of life has improved. Some of this improvement is ascribed to the activities of the wardens (see Paragraphs 14.5 to 14.9).

16.9 In a less structured way, the various agencies and the community representatives consulted as part of the case study visits, felt that the wardens had resulted in improvements to the quality of life in their target areas. That this seems to be a widely held view can be seen from the demands to have wardens that are increasingly being made by communities from other areas and local politicians.

16.10 However, perceptions are one thing. To what extent does the reality of reported crime and antisocial behaviour back up these views? A number of theories were outlined in Chapter Nine to explain changes in statistics over time.

16.11 Trying to relate these theories to the changes observed in individual case study areas was challenging. As with perceptions, it was not always the case that there was a consistent pattern of change. Again this should be expected, given the variations in the characteristics of the case studies and the different levels of severity of antisocial behaviours.

16.12 These problems were exacerbated by gaps in the data sets, especially a lack of suitable comparators against which to benchmark changes in the wardened areas. Despite these problems attempts were made, in Chapter Ten, to explain the observed changes in the crime and antisocial behaviour statistics selected by the 9 case study areas, in terms of a variety of impact theories. Of the 39 indicators:-

• It was not possible to come to any definitive conclusions as to impact for 23 (59%), largely as there was a lack of suitable comparator data;
• The observed changes in 9 indicators (23%) were interpreted negatively in that the incidence of crime and antisocial behaviours had increased at a faster rate in the wardened areas than in the wider spatial comparators;
• Changes in 6 indicators (16%) were interpreted positively in that crime and antisocial behaviours had either declined or had risen at a slower rate than in the comparator areas; and
• Change in one indicator was judged to be neutral in that it was tracking change in the wider local authority area.

16.13 The interpretation of the statistical changes is cautious, with a positive attribution to the wardens only being made when there is clear evidence of differential changes in the wardened areas. Despite this the results are disappointing in that only for a minority of indictors is it possible to claim with a degree of certainty that the wardens have had an impact.

16.14 When the changes in the individual case study areas are considered then a more positive picture emerges:-

• For one scheme (Perth and Kinross) there was clear evidence that the wardens had made an impact;
• For a further 4, although the lack of comparators made it difficult to arrive at definitive conclusions, the perception surveys in 3 of the 4 indicated that there had been positive changes in attitudes and perceptions, some of which were quite substantial. Given this, it may be that the interpretation of the statistics is far too cautious;
• For 2 areas there was evidence of impact on some of the indicators. Again these positive changes were backed up by the results of the perception surveys; and
• For the final 2 areas there was no statistical evidence that the wardens had impacted on the statistics of recorded crime and antisocial behaviours.

16.15 To extend this analysis the changes in the indicators selected by more than one scheme (in the case study and non-case study areas) were analysed. A positive picture emerges in that, for 3 of the 4 indicators considered, the changes can be explained in terms of the wardens having had an impact upon crime and antisocial behaviours. For the fourth indicator there was no evidence of the wardens having had any differential impact

16.16 If all of this evidence (the perception surveys, case study analysis and the analysis of crime and antisocial behaviour statistics) is brought together then it can be argued that the wardens are having a positive differential impact upon incidences of crime and antisocial behaviour in their target areas. Given this it seems that the wardens are effecting additional change: that is, but for their interventions, the reality and perceptions of crime and antisocial behaviours in their patrol areas would be higher than they currently are. In parallel with this, given that perceptions of crime seem to be related to its reality (Paragraph 12.42) it can be argued that perceptions of changes in the quality of life in the wardened areas would not be as positive as they seem to be but for the presence of the wardens.

16.17 The extent to which these positive impacts have been achieved at the expense of other areas, that is problems have been displaced to adjacent localities, is difficult to assess and the evidence tends to be contradictory. For example:-

• In some areas, especially those where problems are quite severe, displacement is limited as there are often territorial issues that mean that young people, in particular, are unlikely to move elsewhere to undertake antisocial activities; and
• Some managers felt that a degree of displacement took place when, for example, they targeted specific activities such as drinking. However, it was felt that this had always happened historically when, for example, the police undertook targeted initiatives focused on certain areas or types of offence.

16.18 Overall we do not feel that there is evidence that displacement is a significant issue, certainly not one that should stand in the way of implementing warden schemes in other areas.

16.19 Our conclusion is, therefore, that there is evidence from a number of sources, statistical, survey and anecdotal, that the wardens are having a positive impact on the quality of life in their targeted areas. This comes through actions in reducing crime and antisocial behaviour and, as a consequence, increasing residents' perceptions of safety and security. This is not a pattern that is consistent across all schemes or all types of crime and antisocial behaviours, nor is this always supported by the analysis of crime statistics. Yet, overall, there is complementary evidence that the wardens are having a positive differential impact in those areas in which they operate. This begs the question as to why they are having this impact? What are the ingredients for this success? These are considered in the next section.

Making an Impact

16.20 Drawing on the earlier Chapters a number of factors can be identified that seem to be related to the effectiveness of the warden schemes. Underpinning these is the effectiveness of management. Interestingly management has not figured directly as a significant factor in the consultations. Why this should be may reflect the fact that management is generally seen as being good, albeit that the wardens' survey did identify the quality of management as an issue for a minority of respondents (Table 15.2).

16.21 So what are the ingredients that make up good management in the running of warden schemes? The key ones seem to be:-

• Having the inter-personal skills to:-
• • Establish good relationships with external agencies at the appropriate levels needed to ensure such things as information sharing and joint working;
  • Manage a work force that is predominantly blue collar, with the challenges this may pose for those more used to dealing with professional staff; and
  • Act as a champion for the wardens, publicising their activities and achievements to the wider community;
• Having the flexibility to respond to demands as they arise. This might mean, for example, changing wardens' deployment on a temporal, seasonal or spatial basis when problems are identified;
• Having the strength to establish the wardens as independent of other agencies, such as the police, so that they are able to develop good relationships with their local communities, especially with young people ^51,52;
• Ensuring that the wardens are deployed in such a way that the community not only sees them but sees them taking action to solve problems that are of general concern to local residents; and
• Ensuring that adequate and appropriate training is provided to help the wardens deal effectively with whatever problems they are likely to encounter.

16.22 Many of the other factors associated with "success" draw on these management strengths. We would identify:-

• Appointing wardens who have good inter-personal skills so that they can relate to a cross section of the community, in particular young people (often the cause of antisocial behaviour) and the elderly (who may feel that they are disproportionately affected by it);
• Working closely with other agencies to:-
• • Share information and intelligence; and
  • Work together jointly when this brings mutual benefits;
• Ensuring that the wardens are a visible presence within their patrol areas. This ranges from dressing them in a way that makes them stand out, as most schemes do, through engaging with the community by attending meetings and events, to deploying them in those areas where it is likely that there will be incidents;
• Deploying the wardens pro-actively. This may mean targeting "hot spots", varying patrols if there is evidence that antisocial activities are avoiding patrol times and areas and undertaking community consultations to identify concerns and then responding to these;
• Actively promoting the warden service in a way that emphasises its remit as well as its limitations. This is a way of managing expectations that, in some areas, may have been raised unrealistically;
• Working in a didactic way with young people whenever this is appropriate. This involves explaining the impact on others of their antisocial actions rather than operating in a more authoritarian way;
• Being even handed in their approach so that accusations that they go for "easy targets" cannot be made. This is all part of enhancing community credibility; and
• Finally it seems important that, if the wardens are to make a lasting impact, they engage with young children. It is only by doing this that it seems likely that behaviour modification can be effected.

16.23 Undoubtedly there are other ingredients in the recipe for success. Those given above do, however, seem to be the key ones.

Recommendations

16.24 In the light of the analysis in the earlier Chapters, a number of recommendations can be made.

The Future of the Warden schemes

16.25 The evidence given above indicates that the warden schemes are having an impact upon antisocial behaviour and crime. If the Executive, therefore, decides to provide additional support to the warden schemes we would recommend that:-

• The allocation of funds be more closely linked than it currently is to the severity of crime and antisocial behaviour problems; and
• Discussions are held to see if community wardens are the appropriate initiatives to put in place in those areas where crime and antisocial behaviour problems are limited in absolute and relative terms. For example, the analysis of the 24 month templates showed that the wardens in some remote rural and island areas were undertaking a community development and home help role and were hardly involved in dealing with crime or antisocial behaviour. Whilst undoubtedly valuable, this was not the type of role envisaged by the Executive in its original guidance.

Monitoring and Evaluation

16.26 Some of the biggest disappointments with the warden schemes relate to monitoring and evaluation. At the start the Executive established an outcome agreement, in all but name, for the schemes. In the event very few schemes gathered the information needed to enable the agreements to be used. For most, providing monitoring information to the Executive seems to have been seen as an imposition that bore little relevance to the schemes' implementation. One consequence was the difficulty experienced trying to access data. Accordingly we would recommend that, for any future schemes:-

• Financial allocations should be conditional on the submission of complete monitoring and evaluation data. This should be linked to the preparation of an outline action plan setting out what will be done if targets are not being met;
• Advice should be given as to setting appropriate and meaningful baselines, targets and comparators;
• For future wardens' initiatives, monitoring should be integrated into the antisocial behaviour outcome agreements;
• For schemes such as the wardens, that are Scotland-wide, at least one indicator should be selected by all schemes. This would make it far easier to assess the overall impact of interventions as well as local variations;
• A limit should be set on the number of monitoring indicators, given that there is likely to be redundancy above a certain number. Six would seem to be a manageable upper limit;
• The final selection of indicators should be done 6 months into a scheme's life. By this stage there should be a degree of clarity about what is achievable;
• For remote and sparsely populated rural areas, indicators need to be selected that reflect their unique characteristics;
• When initiatives intend to undertake their own surveys, guidance should be given on appropriate methodologies; and
• When setting up new initiatives all managers should be required to attend monitoring and evaluation training. This would stress its importance and clarify the various concepts and how these are defined.

Staffing

16.27 The analysis identified 2 main issues related to staffing: training and retention. Training has been a perennial concern, emerging in all of the template reports as an issue. Staff retention has also been an issue and is now increasing in importance as the schemes near the end of their funding. Accordingly a number of recommendations can be made:-

• At the start of any scheme the training needs of staff should be assessed and appropriate training provided;
• Training should cover health and safety issues as well as interpersonal skills, such as mediation, conflict resolution and community engagement;
• For Scotland-wide initiatives the Executive should provide guidance on salaries, career development and working conditions. Guidance on salaries, in particular, would stop the poaching of staff that was a concern in the early stages of the scheme's development; and
• For national schemes, collaboration and staff exchanges to share experiences and good practices should be considered, facilitated by the Executive.

Economic Impact of Community Wardens

16.28 As mentioned in paragraph 2.9, an economic evaluation of the community wardens schemes was being undertaken separately as part of the Scottish Executive commissioned Evaluation of Antisocial Behaviour Strategies at Neighbourhood Level. This evaluation is still underway but a first draft (which examines not only community wardens but also other selected antisocial behaviour interventions) has been submitted. The following is a summary of the findings in relation to the community wardens that was prepared in by the Neighbourhood Studies economist and the SE project manager.

16.29 The economic evaluation was undertaken in 4 case study areas (Edinburgh; Fife; North Lanarkshire; and Scottish Borders) and adopts a cost consequences approach. This approach does not combine costs and benefits into a single measure. Instead, it identifies all relevant costs and the consequences associated with the intervention and leaves decision makers to draw their own conclusions about value for money.

16.30 In terms of the community wardens schemes, the annual costs that were identified were associated with recruitment, salaries, premises, equipment and overheads. The economist also considered the possible costs to other agencies as a result of the identification of problems that would otherwise go unnoticed. It was concluded (after examining the economic analysis undertaken in the evaluation of Neighbourhood Wardens in England and Wales, (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004)) that the overall impact on the workloads of other agencies would be neutral (because wardens were more likely to affect the timing rather than the actual workloads and that they would also play an important preventative role).

16.31 Although the benefits of the warden scheme will include non-quantifiable (improved quality of life, reduced fear of crime etc.) as well quantifiable outcomes, no attempt was made to assign a monetary value to the former. Instead the analysis focused on the cost savings associated with reductions in antisocial behaviour and crime. Quantifying those reductions was not possible for all the reasons already outlined in this - the GEN Consulting - report (lack of comparative data, changes in patterns of reporting). Nevertheless, the economist concluded that the evidence from neighbourhood-level case studies suggests overall that the wardens are having a positive impact on reducing antisocial behaviour.

16.32 Other published estimates of the unit costs of antisocial behaviour and crime (e.g. those collated by Whitehead et al (2003) and Home Office (2005) estimates of the economic and social costs of crime against individuals and households) were used to estimate a value for the output of wardens. The report also highlights other possible benefits associated with not losing rental income from properties that would otherwise have been void and savings associated with not having to board up these properties.

16.33 The economist concludes that, given the relatively modest costs associated with the warden schemes and the high costs associated with many of the criminal and antisocial incidents that they are likely to have prevented (plus the less tangible benefits to quality of life), they represent good value for money. The full analysis is due to be published in the Evaluation of Antisocial Behaviour Strategies at Neighbourhood Level in summer 2007.

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