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CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

5.1 The aim of this research project was to , " Produce a complete mapping of Scotland's current capability to deal with a major emergency and to identify ways of improving this" (Research Specification). Achieving this aim in its entirety was always going to be difficult for a number of reasons. Firstly the data set provided for the first stage of the research was incomplete, not totally reliable and collected some 20 months ago before the introduction of the CCA 2004. Secondly the timeframe in which to conduct the research was relatively short and thirdly capability is a relative concept dependent upon a number of variables not least the emergency situation itself and as such does not easily lend itself to absolutes. That said we believe we have gone a long way to achieving the aim and have presented a picture of capability that raises some important issues in determining Scotland's resilience to major emergencies of every kind.

5.2 Part of our remit was to explore areas of funding, exercise and training needs and approaches to future reporting to allow for the targeting of funds and the prioritisation of training and exercising to build resilience, the targeting of resources and the development of methodology for collecting capability data in the future. With this in mind this chapter presents our conclusions to the research, detailing our thoughts on stage one of the research, summarising our overall impressions from stage 2 of the research and finally presenting what we feel are the major strengths and weakness in Scotland's capability.

Stage one conclusions

5.3 Capability is not an absolute quality. It is not hard and fast and constant - rather it varies according to the type and scale of the event. For example, burns beds in hospitals are not the same as intensive care beds or beds in isolation wards. As well as varying according to event type, and to the scale of the event, and to the nature of the vulnerable population, it also varies according to geography (for example remoteness, population density, topography) and it varies according to time of year (for example cold, snow and short daylight hours in winter, longer days but large tourist populations in summer). Indeed, it varies also according to time of day - the rush hour, night time when people are at home asleep and so on. It also varies according to whether command and control systems and the emergency services themselves have been impacted. It is therefore a quality that can only be examined in situ and with reference to local and contextual factors. This allows for planning and management but does not support rigidity or over-confidence and demands flexibility, innovation and enterprise in emergency management.

5.4 We suggest that the data provided in the response to the earlier questionnaire has proved of limited value in assessing Scotland's capability. It is likely that capability is higher than it appears from our Stage one analysis and particularly as the data is now over 20 months old and changes have occurred. A number of these changes can be seen in the findings of Stage 2 of the research. The data has been analysed as thoroughly and as rigorously as it permitted. However, we urge caution in any use of the findings. The results of the questionnaire suffered from significant limitations, overlap and ambiguity and there were numerous gaps in the results and different approaches to answering the questions themselves.

5.5 Caution must be applied to any use or release of these findings. However comments that can be made arising from the data include the following:

5.6 A further aim of Stage 1 of the research was to develop an appropriate methodology for Stage 2. Following evaluation of the questionnaires, we conducted a series of exercises in all 8 Police SCG Areas, involving the Strategic Coordinating Group members, to assess capability against 3 levels of disaster. This involved a dynamic, interactive form of scenario, a 'hypothetical', that enabled us to draw out subtlety and nuance in identifying capacity, strengths, gaps and constraints in the emergency services and in their coordination and strategic management arrangements. Part of our methodology for capturing data at these exercises was a Framework for Assessment that has been grounded in work carried out by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the United States

Stage 2 conclusions

5.7 Our overall impression of emergency management in Scotland was one of professionalism, concern for the future and concern to do the job well. Arrangements for dealing with major emergencies are advanced, well embedded and well organised. We found that the introduction of the CCA 2004 had been broadly welcomed as a step in the right direction and that practitioners were ready to take on extra duties provided they had the resources to do so. However, there is always room for improvement.

5.8 With regard to the objectives of this research we found that funding was as always a controversial topic. There were the inevitable concerns raised with regard to not having enough money to do the job properly (particularly from local authorities) and as a result not having the resources needed to deal with emergencies/crises that went beyond the norm. We also had the impression, to some extent as a result of lack of funds, that the emergency management profession in Scotland is not expanding to meet the needs of the CCA 2004 in the same way as it is in England and Wales and this is of concern to us and an area that needs further research. What must be remembered is the resilience of those tasked with implementing emergency management is as important as the resilience of the structures, arrangements and resources in place to handle an event.

5.9 An area that appears to need some development in Scotland is education and training and as such would benefit from the targeting of funds and resources. We felt that practitioners were not particularly happy with current provision and that they wanted to see more courses tailored to Scotland's distinct needs as well as targeted training in things like business continuity, warning and informing the public and so on.

5.10 Finally we found that all agencies across all SCGs were looking to the SE to provide leadership and guidance as Scotland moves forward in emergency management; research like this project is broadly welcomed as long as it helps to provide the knowledge needed to develop appropriate guidance. Although a note of caution is needed here and an over dependency on the SE is not allowed to develop.

5.11 Methodologies for capturing future capabilities data are detailed and discussed in the following chapter. The remaining sections of this chapter are devoted to what we believe are the major strengths and weaknesses of Scottish emergency management.

Strengths

5.12 What was striking from the results and the observations at the scenarios was the high level of trust and good will that was evident amongst those present. This appeared to us to be a major strength as it augers well for cooperation and the sharing of information in the light of a major event/crisis. However we are cautious, mainly because we only met with those people serving on the SCG who attended on the day. It could be that other key individuals are not in this cohort and the same degree of trust may not be present. Further research could determine whether this is the case. Having made this point and with so many category one and 2 responders present at each of the sessions it is very likely that what we perceived to be a high level of trust is the 'norm'. This trust was perceived by the participants to be an important component in dealing with the response aspects of an event. It also means, as was universally stated, that they are more than willing to share information and resources in the case of an emergency or crisis.

5.13 Effective networks, formed over a number of years and across the various services, were also observed during the scenarios. Again this can be viewed as a further strength particularly when coupled with the high levels of trust present.

5.14 The experiences at Tayside appeared to be reasonably typical of such cooperation across the SCG areas. We were advised that the members of this SCG were all professionals with a very good working relationship. They were experienced in dealing with a variety of emergencies and they would use the same processes to deal with unusual events. For them, voluntary agencies, services, business and councils are brought in under one umbrella organisation and this extended involvement was perceived to be a major strength.

Weaknesses

5.15 One of the most serious gaps raised during all of the scenarios in relation to emergency planning was the apparent perception regarding the lack of arrangements to deal with a wide area major event across Scotland or across more than 2-3 SCG areas. Coupled with this are issues such as the lack of formal mutual aid agreements, vertical and horizontal coordination and cooperation and the lack of resources and facilities for dealing with mass fatalities and mass casualties.

5.16 Another weakness identified was the lack of real understanding of the business continuity process across all agencies, the priority it is being given and what this means for organisational resilience in general.

5.17 The research also uncovered misplaced confidence in plans not yet audited or tested. Added to this is the apparent lack of testing of mass evacuation plans and what this means for the ability to handle wide area emergencies. It is therefore suggested that an ongoing programme to test and validate plans is implemented as soon as possible.

5.18 Planning for recovery, along with extra resource allocation to enable more emphasis to be placed on the recovery processes, appear to be other major gaps in current capability. Further research is needed in this field to analyse the current policies and practises and to ensure that there is a seamless move from disaster/crisis to recovery in the future.

5.19 Lack of national guidance and clarification of roles and responsibilities with regard to warning and informing the public in the event of a major pandemic or CBRN attack was also highlighted as a gap in capability.

Summary

This chapter has presented the conclusions to both stage one and stage 2 of the research project. Key points are:

• Capability is a relative concept.
• The data provided for stage one analysis was incomplete and out of date.
• Scottish emergency management arrangements are professional, well organised and well embedded.
• A major strength of the system are the networks and levels of trust established between practitioners.
• There are various gaps and weaknesses in the system that need to be addressed

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