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CHAPTER ONE THE RESEARCH PROJECT

Introduction

1.1 This chapter describes the background to the research to assess Scotland's resilience to emergencies, carried out on behalf of the Scottish Executive ( SE) Justice Department, Civil Contingencies Division. It examines the important conceptual issues that underpinned the research and contextualises them within the Scottish arena. Finally it outlines the aims and objectives of the research and summarises the research project.

Background of the project

1.2 In Scotland, and in the United Kingdom ( UK) in general, the new millennium brought with it some events that increased the degree of uncertainty faced by policy makers and challenged emergency management arrangements. As a consequence, issues were raised regarding the capability of agencies and government to deal with these new demands and the appropriateness of existing emergency planning arrangements.

1.3 The fuel crisis and floods of 2000 and the foot and mouth crisis of 2001 exposed serious weakness in capability across England, Wales and Scotland, particularly when dealing with wide area emergencies. The subsequent terrorist attacks of 9/11, Bali, Madrid and more recently the London bombings of July 2005 have further emphasised the need to re-examine emergency planning arrangements and to restructure where necessary. The awareness afforded by these events and the proposed changes in legislation recommended by the most recent review of emergency planning in the UK have presented a unique opportunity for government to put its 'emergency planning house' in order. The review suggested that

"The need for effective partnership working across organisational boundaries is a major requirement for emergency planning in the future" (Cabinet Office, 2001:8)

Added to the review, the heightened national security and emphasis on possible chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear ( CBRN) attack, led to the development of a new policy in the form of an agenda to develop 'resilience' in agencies and communities across the whole of the United Kingdom.

1.4 Resilience, an integral part of community capability has been a term adopted by the UK government to describe the way in which it would like to reduce the nation's susceptibility to major incidents of all kinds by reducing the probability of their occurrence and the likely after-effects, and by building institutions and structures in such a way as to minimise any possible effects of disruption upon them (Cabinet Office, 2004). Britton (1998) points out that an emergency management policy like the one envisaged by UK policy makers has the capability to create resilience in communities but only through "a recognition of the risks in the wider hazard-scape, and the essential resources required to reduce their consequences" (p.3) . The approach developed by government to build resilience has included legislation and a 'Capabilities Programme'.

Legislative framework

1.5 The legal framework that now governs emergency planning arrangements in Scotland and the UK consists of several different pieces of legislation, Statutory Regulations and Statutory Guidance. However it is not the purpose of this report to describe the framework here. Details of such can be found in the following key documents

1.6 Further information regarding the arrangements for emergency planning in Scotland, the roles of the Scottish Executive and in particular the Civil Contingencies Division of the Justice Department and the responsible coordinating bodies can be found at the following: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/topics/justice/emergencies.

The Capabilities Programme

1.7 As one of the first measures put in place post 9/11, the Capabilities Programme is an audit of current infrastructure and resources from the full range of responses to the full range of contingencies likely to face the UK in the first decade of the 21 ^st century. The aim is to ensure that a robust infrastructure of response is in place to deal rapidly, effectively and flexibly with the consequences of civil devastation and widespread disaster inflicted as a result of conventional or non-conventional disruptive activity ( CCS, 2003). It uniquely covers all areas of the UK including the devolved administrations of Scotland and Northern Ireland and is seen as part of the core framework through which the government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the state.

1.8 The Scottish Capabilities Programme consists of a total of fourteen capability "workstreams" which fall into 3 groups:

1.9 It is the functional workstreams that are the predominant focus of the Capabilities Programme and consequently there have been significant developments in UK guidance in these areas ( DEFRA, 2003; DEFRA 2004; Home Office 2003b; Home Office 2004; Home Office 2005; NHS 2004; ODPM 2004a; ODPM, 2004b). As a devolved region with specific devolved authority under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Scottish Executive has also issued a number of respective guidance documents which mirror and apply the UK guidance to itself (including Scottish Executive, 2003a; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c). Appendix 1 includes a summary of twelve of the workstreams for which Scotland is responsible which is reflected in the stand alone Scottish Resilience Capability Programme.

Conceptual issues that underpin the research

Resilience

1.10 Resilience is not a new concept as far as risk is concerned. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) discussed the concept of risk observing that the management of risk posed a dilemma of the polar opposites of anticipation and resilience. They describe resilience as "the capacity to use change to better cope with the unknown: it is learning to bounce back" (p196) and note that "anticipation emphasizes uniformity" and that "resilience stresses variability" (p197). A later study by Wildavsky (1988) further developed the notions of anticipation and resilience with regard to devising effective courses of action by public authorities to cope with uncertain, catastrophic events. He saw anticipation as "predicting hazards, specialized protections, centralisation and detailed standards", whilst he viewed resilience as "trial and error, general capabilities and decentralization" (p244). More recently Britton (1998) suggests that resilience can also be developed through a proactive emergency management strategy that helps communities choose a level of risk appropriate to their circumstances, but warns that "knowing that simply reducing losses from future disasters is too narrow a goal" (p.3). Whilst O'Brien & Read (2005) propose the term reflects a 'holistic and proactive' approach to emergency management and embodies all aspects of the 'disaster cycle', including response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness.

1.11 The Capabilities Programme is a key component of the UK's resilience policy, designed to assess the capacity and ability to detect, prevent and handle emergencies. This not only illustrates the operational strengths of measures available to emergency responders, but also serves to highlight gaps and areas in need of priority intervention. Thus this research project has been commissioned by the SE which, as a devolved administration, is now responsible for the implementation of the Act and the exercising of legislative powers ( CCS, 2004a). In dealing with resilience across Scotland the SE state:

"The Contingencies and Resilience Unit is a central focus, and co-ordinator, for developing the Executive's resilience to a range of major civil emergencies and other severe disruptive events. It is developing resilience throughout Scotland with external partners and is raising the profile of resilience work with organisations in Scotland which are involved in responding to emergency situations" ( http://www.scotland.gov.uk/topics/justice/emergencies)

1.12 Resilience, like vulnerability, is a quality that can be attributed to a society or community and that is in itself dependant on a plethora of other sociological, economic, political and technological factors. These, in conjunction with the concepts of hazards and risk, and in the dynamic global environment, make up a complex system of interactions from which may emerge catastrophe or stability.

Vulnerability

1.13 Vulnerability and resilience are concepts in emergency management which are forever intertwined. Where resilience can be seen as the quality which may mitigate against disaster, vulnerability is conversely that quality which increases and exacerbates the impact of a realised hazard. It has been described by Bankoff et al. (2003) as the quality which increases the susceptibility of some to disasters. Whereas capability can be seen as a constituent of resilience, vulnerability can be seen as a composite of a society's susceptibility to disaster (McEntire, 2001).

1.14 Wisner et al (2004) identify that the term vulnerability, like resilience, is used in a large number of ways in the disaster management literature. Like resilience, vulnerability can also be linked to a number of societal, economic, political and technological factors that can be measured and evaluated. Such information, added to that yielded by hazard identification processes and risk assessments, can be used to predict potential adverse consequences of emergencies. Vulnerability is, once again, a complex issue that is encompassed within the greater system of disaster and emergency management.

Hazards, threats and risks

1.15 Emergencies are the crises triggered by the realisation of a specific hazard or threat faced by a given society or community at any given time. Such crises do not automatically generate catastrophic outcomes, as a number of other factors can be seen to be contributing determinants (Davies & Walters, 1998). Both resilience and vulnerability can (respectively) have a positive and negative effect on the impact of any given disaster.

1.16 'Emergency' is defined in Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act as

"an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK" (Scottish Executive 2006, (p01:2)

1.17 Policy differentiates between hazards , which can be viewed as natural or socio-technical accidents, and threats, which represent deliberate attempts to cause an emergency. The Act and subsequent Statutory Guidance provide a framework for the assessment of risks of which hazard and threat identification is part. It places a duty on responders to assess the risk of each identified hazard occurring and to record the information in 'community risk registers' that can be used to develop planning assumptions for local emergency planners.

1.18 Risk, as a concept, completes the generally recognised framework of interactions between hazards & threats, resilience, vulnerability, crisis and disaster. It is a quality or quantity that can be attributed to a hazard or threat and can be seen as a measure of the likelihood of its realisation combined with potential for impact damage and losses. Resilience and vulnerability can both affect the attributed risk, for example by decreasing or increasing the probability of the event taking place (through prevention and preparedness / 'risky' activities), or by reducing or compounding the potential impact (through mitigation strategies / increased susceptibility). For example, a one in one hundred year flood frequency (actually better stated at the 1% chance of occurrence in any year) will have different impacts depending on whether flood retarding basins, levee banks or other barriers have been erected to that standard. Also the risk to the population will be reduced if the population have adequate flood insurance. The hazard remains the same but the outcome may be different.

1.19 However, risk is a perceived quality and as such can be speculative and subjective. O'Brien and Read (2005) suggest that risk assessment (and so prioritisation) in the UK "has been based upon experience and expertise of practitioners without qualitative audit" (pp. 353-361). Indeed, it is experience that form world views and as experience is often more personal than shared, it follows that this approach is likely to yield different risk values for the same hazards when assessed by different people. However, the Act places a duty upon responders to undertake a risk assessment (ibid) and to ensure a scientific and methodological approach is adopted (Scottish Executive 2006). An approach which aims to go beyond the subjective wherever possible. The methodology prescribed for this is the completion of the regional and local community risk registers.

Capability

1.20 'Capability' is a military term which is intended to be inclusive of personnel, equipment and training and such matters as plans, doctrine and the concept of operations. If, as Alexander (2002) suggests, emergency and disaster management is frequently attributed as returning to a 'civil defence' paradigm it comes as no surprise that the term 'capability' should be used so frequently and play such a prominent role in the development of resilience. Scottish policy like that of the UK generally is to localise the emergency management services wherever possible. The Capabilities Programme can be seen as a vehicle for this process, identifying capacities at both the SCG area level and central ( SE) level for use in strategic planning and management, setting targets and minimum standards (Cabinet Office, 2005). Nonetheless, capability remains a valuable concept in developing resilience.

1.21 Capability, however, is not purely a statement of ability in an abstract sense, but is specific to a role or task. Civil emergencies may be of a variety of types, and their causes and consequences can be equally diverse. This raises the question of how capability should best be assessed, i.e. in terms of aetiology, crisis or catastrophe. The Scottish Resilience Capability Programme has adopted an approach based on all 3 perspectives.

1.22 It is important to note here that capability can be considered as a component of resilience and an attribute of a given community and its administration. However, whilst capability is specific to a given population, it is not, by itself, representative of that community's resilience. Vulnerability and hazard/risk data is required in order to build a rich picture of the situation. In addition, capability cannot be considered as constant but is variable over time due to investment, development, spending cutbacks or mismanagement.

Research aims and objectives

1.23 The situation in Scotland closely mirrors policy development in the United Kingdom generally; the aim of this research project was to establish the requirements for a resilient Scotland, in the face of a changing risk landscape, which can dovetail into the general UK Capabilities Programme. Thus the principal aim of the research was to:

"Produce a complete mapping of Scotland's current capability to deal with a major emergency and to identify ways of improving this" (Research Specification)

The work was to be carried out in 2 stages.

Stage one

1.24 The aim of research stage one was to conduct an in-depth analysis of the capability data provided by the 8 Strategic Coordinating Groups, ( SCG) the SAS and MCA. The objectives of the analysis were to:

• Provide a Strategic Coordinating Group level comparison of capability.
• Provide a national representation of experience, capacity and plans relating to each of 5 workstreams.
• Provide an interim report .

Stage 2

1.25 Stage 2 of the research was to gather missing data identified from the analysis carried out at stage one and to clarify and further investigate aspects of SCG resilience capability with a proviso to explore areas of funding, exercise and training needs and approaches to future reporting. Such research would allow for the:

• Targeting of funds and the prioritisation of training and exercising to build resilience.
• Targeting of resources.
• Development of methodology for collecting capability data in the future.

Summary

This chapter has described the background to the research and dealt with conceptual issues that underpin the research and outlined the aims and objectives of the project. Key points are:

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