The Scottish Government

« Previous | Contents | Next »

Listen

Section 1 - Disease Response Assumptions

29. This section outlines the general principles that are likely to be adopted in the event of an outbreak of AI or ND. These are in line with EU Directive 2005/94/EC for AI and 92/66/EEC for ND which form the framework for the response for all Member States of the EU. The Plan includes measures to be taken at suspicion stage but concentrates on the processes which will follow confirmation of disease. Confirmation of the first case will be made by the UK Chief Veterinary Officer ( CVO) on the basis of laboratory testing.

• Birds susceptible to AI or ND include wild bird, domestic fowl, turkeys, geese, ducks, guinea fowl, pigeons, pheasants and partridges.

• All premises with a suspect case (where AI or ND cannot be ruled out and diagnostic samples are taken) will be served with Form EXD1 (Annex J) restrictions, which prohibit movements off the premises.

• If AI is suspected, and depending on the risk of spread of the disease, a temporary control zone may be set up around suspect premises and/or temporary movement restrictions applied to birds and eggs. (See Annex B for further details.)

• If HPAI or ND is confirmed, an Order will be signed by Scottish Ministers declaring a 3 km Protection Zone and a 10km Surveillance Zone ( SZ) around the Infected Premises ( IP).

• When HPAI is found in Great Britain in domestic poultry it is likely that a national requirement for the housing of birds would be issued. This would probably last for several days but would be relaxed as soon as the epidemiological situation was understood and relaxation could be justified.

• When HPAI is found in the domestic poultry industry, national movement restrictions would be introduced as a precautionary measure until the epidemiological situation is fully assessed.

• If LPAI is confirmed, an Order will be signed by Scottish Ministers declaring a minimum 1km Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza Restricted Zone around the IP.

• If pigs are present on any premised infected with AI, they will be tested for AI.

Principles of Disease Control

• Flocks on Infected Premises will be slaughtered.

30. This stamping out policy is a requirement of the EU Directives. These EU rules recognise that AI and ND are diseases which inflict serious damage both in terms of animal welfare and to the economy of the area in which any outbreak occurs. The culling out of Infected Premises, together with movement controls, are the most effective ways of halting the spread of AI/ ND. Epidemiologically separate production units may however be exempt from culling subject to a veterinary risk assessment and to the maintenance of high standards of biosecurity. In the case of AI, this exemption from culling may also be extended to special category premises (eg zoos, rare breed collections etc)

• Notification of restrictions in place will be made to all poultry holdings within both PZ and SZ areas.

• Movement restrictions will be applied on poultry, eggs, manure and used bedding litter within the PZ and SZ. See form DP4 (S) for further details (Annex J)

• In an AI outbreak, poultry in the PZ will, and in SZ may, be required to be kept in their living quarters or other place where they can be isolated. In the case of LPAI or ND, housing of birds may be required in the LPAI Restricted Zone. This will depend on the veterinary risk assessment.

• In an outbreak of HPAI, captive birds (any birds kept under human control other than poultry or racing pigeons) are subject to control measures. These are broadly similar to those for poultry in respect of housing, biosecurity and record keeping but less stringent for movements of birds and products. For ND, captive birds are not subject to measures except for reporting sickness and deaths.

• Movement restrictions of poultry outside any Protection and Surveillance Zones may be introduced subject to a veterinary risk assessment. Permitted movements, and the licence conditions associated with them, will therefore depend on the level of risk inherent in the disease situation at the time. Information on the most likely permitted movements in AI is attached in Annex C.

• In the event of HPAI, export health certificates for live poultry and hatching eggs will be withdrawn. Consignments of live birds, day old chicks and if possible poultry meat exported during the risk period would be identified and authorities in the importing country notified.
• Preferred culling methods will vary depending on circumstances such as the number, species and location of the birds, layout of the farm or poultry house, staff available, etc. Methods of killing that might be used are: exposure of birds to gas; percussion devices; barbiturate injection; electrical stun/kill; neck dislocation; and for day old chicks maceration.

31. A key disease control tool is the enforcement of a number of stringent biosecurity provisions within poultry premises to cut down the risk of disease spreading. For example thorough cleansing and then disinfection of buildings used for housing poultry, their surroundings, any vehicles on the premises used for transport of poultry and all equipment likely to be contaminated. (Annex E gives biosecurity advice for use in a disease situation, to support the existing Biosecurity Code of Practice) http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/crwl-00.asp

• The countryside will be kept open and a presumption in favour of access will be maintained.

32. In the event of a disease outbreak there will be a presumption in favour of access. Annex G provides details of the access policy and guidance for local authorities, landowners and producers.

• The existing SVS resource will be enhanced to cope with the disease.

33. The SVS maintains a database of veterinary personnel (Local Veterinary Inspectors) who are able to respond to any disease outbreak. This includes a group of 100 LVIs with expertise not only in disease diagnosis and control but also in management of control programmes.

• In the immediate response to a disease outbreak in Scotland, a Local Disease Control Centre ( LDCC) will be established and a Regional Operations Director ( ROD) will be appointed.

34. The LDCC will be established by the local Divisional Veterinary Manager ( DVM) and control handed to the ROD once in place. The size of the LDCC will be adjusted according to the scale of the outbreak with the ROD providing appropriate assistance. The veterinary response will be governed by the SVS Standing Instructions. See Annex L for Guidance on Resources Required for a LDCC and Annex K for the Role of the ROD.

• The DVM will notify the police at the earliest opportunity so that they can put the Strategic Co-ordination Group on standby or convene it as appropriate.

35. The DVM should consider whether it would be worthwhile giving notice to the police in advance of a confirmed finding of AI where this can be justified and giving the appropriate caveats to the police force regarding the nature of the interim veterinary assessment. The police will decide whether it is necessary to contact SCG members in line with discussions they should previously have had on the matter.

• Incineration, rendering or landfill of carcasses will be the preferred hierarchy of disposal method and any decision will be made on the basis of appropriate veterinary and other professional advice.

36. This decision will be made by Scottish Ministers, and the choice of these options will take account of local circumstances and will be considered as part of local planning. The priority will be to avoid the build up of carcasses and associated risks to public and animal health and the environment. The DVM will retain discretionary authority for the way in which poultry are disposed of, particularly in the very early stages of an outbreak. In practice, the options available for disposal will depend on the scale of the outbreak. Annex H provides further information on the Scottish Executive's disposal policy and outlines different disposal options.

37. Disposal will be facilitated by the National Disease Control Centre ( NDCC), which will provide logistical support. Disposal issues will be regularly reviewed by the Disease Strategy Group ⁴ ( DSG) in conjunction with regulatory bodies e.g. Scottish Environment Protection Agency ( SEPA), Food Standards Agency ( FSA), and other Stakeholders.

• Emergency Vaccination will be considered alongside other disease control strategies but will not be an alternative to the culling of poultry on Infected Premises.

31. EU Directives 2005/94/EC and 92/66/EEC set out clearly that the basic control strategy for HPAI or ND will be the culling of susceptible species on Infected Premises, and is a major option in LPAI. If further action is required by the epidemiological situation, emergency vaccination will be considered as a potential policy option. The use of emergency vaccination is governed by the relevant disease Directive and its associated domestic legislation. However, at the operational level, emergency vaccination for Avian Influenza is not generally considered viable with current technologies. Each bird would have to be individually injected twice; immunity can take up to 3 weeks to develop; and vaccinated birds can still become infected and shed virus. In addition tests to differentiate vaccinated from infected birds are not yet fully developed and this will have implications for disease control and the trade status of affected Member States. Vaccination for Newcastle Disease is available and not subject to the same practical limitations and would therefore be considered. In normal circumstances, some birds are already vaccinated against Newcastle Disease. Annex B gives details of the different disease control strategies available and sets out a framework for decision making.

• Stakeholders will be fully involved from the first stages of an outbreak. They will have an important role in helping to communicate disease control and other issues to their membership, and their members' views back to the Department.

38. As sections 3 and 4 outline, stakeholders will have a key role in assisting the Scottish response to any disease outbreak. Specific stakeholder groups will be established to inform decisions on disease control and access. Annex K lists key stakeholders and other key agencies.

• Human health implications of an HPAI outbreak will be factored into all decisions on disease control strategy.

39. Certain sub-types of the AI virus are capable of infecting humans, with symptoms ranging from mild eye inflammation to fatal influenza. This is most likely to occur if there is significant exposure to material containing the virus, such as poultry faeces, feathers and contaminated dust from the poultry house. This Plan therefore sets out procedures to protect the staff most at risk, and if necessary their close household contacts and to reduce the chance of them acting as intermediaries in the development of a pandemic. Annex F gives further details.

« Previous | Contents | Next »