The Scottish Government

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Foreword

1. This Scottish Contingency Plan is for use in the event of an outbreak of Avian Influenza ( AI) (in both its highly pathogenic form, HPAI, and its low pathogenic form, LPAI) or Newcastle Disease ( ND). The two diseases are treated together as they are both viral diseases of birds, showing a similar epidemiology. The Plan is intended for use in an outbreak of disease in either farmed poultry or wild birds. It is written in such a way as to be capable of dealing with a major disease outbreak which could be spread widely across Scotland, or equally a more limited incident.

2. The Plan should be seen in the light of the existing civil contingencies framework as described in Preparing Scotland: Scottish Guidance on Preparing for Emergencies¹. The emergency services, local authorities, health boards and utilities come together in Scotland's eight Strategic Co-ordinating Groups to tackle emergencies. This network would be used for the management of the consequences of an AI or ND outbreak, and the structures created in this Plan link in as described.

3. Measures to control Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease are set out in Directives 2005/94/EC and 92/66/EEC respectively. The former is implemented in domestic legislation by the Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (Scotland) Order 2006 and the Avian Influenza (Slaughter and Vaccination) (Scotland) Regulations 2006. The latter is implemented by the Diseases of Poultry (Scotland) Order 2003. The EU requires that an initial stamping out policy be undertaken to control these diseases. This requirement has a significant impact on the contents of the Plan.

4. The Plan sets out the framework which the Scottish Executive will put into place, which maximises flexibility and can be adjusted to take account of the scale of any AI or ND outbreak and other circumstances that are specific to the control and eradication of the disease. The Plan allows the Scottish Executive to respond immediately to all aspects of a disease situation and identifies the key policy and operational responses which are likely to be introduced as a consequence of a major disease outbreak.

5. The Plan is about process and structure and recognises the complex nature of infectious disease and the need for different control measures.

6. Recognising that high standards of biosecurity are already maintained by all major poultry organisations the Plan looks to provide general biosecurity guidance for all poultry and other bird keepers.

Context

7. The commitments in this Plan recognise the serious effects animal diseases such as AI or ND can have on animal welfare and the effect animal health has on industry viability, particularly given the continuous, rather than seasonal output, of the poultry sector. The Plan highlights how the wider impact of a disease outbreak will be taken into consideration and contribute to the strategic decision making process. However, the focus of the Plan is on the control and eradication of disease and as such the wider issues are not covered in any great depth.

8. This Plan is a 'living document' and is subject to regular and ongoing review by the Scottish Executive, with input from industry and other stakeholders. Exercises are undertaken to test the effectiveness of contingency plans in a disease outbreak. Many of the principles of the response to an AI or ND outbreak will be characteristic of the response to other exotic disease outbreaks. Opportunities for learning and training will be taken through a regular programme of rehearsals across a number of exotic diseases.

Legislative Basis

9. The legislative basis under which Scottish Ministers will act to control HPAI and LPAI in poultry is, predominantly, the Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals (Scotland) Order 2006 ( SSI No 336) and the Avian Influenza (Slaughter and Vaccination) (Scotland) Regulations 2006 ( SSI No 337). These provide powers to slaughter birds on infected and dangerous contact premises, to set up movement control zones both on suspicion and confirmation of disease, and to enforce stringent biosecurity. The legislation also allows less onerous measures in certain circumstances where this will not, in veterinary judgement, compromise effective disease control., and the use of vaccination. The exact boundaries of the zones and the measures required within them would be placed on the SEERAD website so that anyone could check the precise details. Further information on the zones can be found in Annex B.

10. In addition to the above, Scottish Ministers will use the powers in the Avian Influenza (H5N1 in Wild Birds) (Scotland) Order 2006 ( SSI 2006 No 196) (as amended by SSI 2006 No 237) to apply prevention and control measures should HPAI virus be discovered in wild birds in Scotland.

11. For ND the relevant legislation is the Diseases of Poultry (Scotland) Order 2003 (Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 354).

12. The Animal Health Act 1981, and secondary legislation made under it in respect of a particular disease, contains a number of powers relating to the entry of land or premises, and who is authorised to do so. Some of these entry provisions have been revised - in particular - by section 12 of the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006 which has inserted new sections 62G (Powers of entry: Scotland), 62H (Warrants) and 62I (Entry and warrants: supplementary) into the Animal Health Act 1981. The Animal Health Act 1981, and secondary legislation made under it in respect of a particular disease, contains a number of powers relating to the entry of land or premises, and who is authorised to do so.

Part of GB response

13. The Plan is specific to Scotland, reflecting the fact that animal health matters are devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive, with Scotland's Minister for Environment and Rural Development leading any Scottish response. However, recognising that GB is a single epidemiological unit, that there is a single GBSVS and that there needs to be strong co-ordination and co-operation in responding to contagious diseases, the Plan connects with the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)'s Generic Contingency Plan ². This linkage is important to facilitate prompt communication and co-ordination in any disease situation. It also offers scope for exploiting the potential economies of scale in the use of some resources.

14. The Defra Generic Exotic Diseases Contingency Plan includes an Annex for AI/ ND procedures. The Plan is based around three levels of command structure - Strategic, Tactical and Operational, that would be deployed in England, although the structures would in the main apply for any outbreak in Scotland or Wales. The Welsh approach is broadly similar to Defra's. A Welsh Co-ordination Centre ( WCC) would provide strategic support and the Welsh Assembly Government would be responsible for any legislation required in Wales.

15. This Plan provides a disease control framework specific to the Scottish situation. The key differences from the Defra and Welsh plans are in the command and control framework, and the links into the Local Plans which exist for each of Scotland's five Animal Health Divisions ³.

GB co-ordination

16. In the event of an outbreak anywhere in GB a National Disease Control Centre ( NDCC) would be set up by the SVS Agency to co-ordinate GB disease control operations. This Centre would provide logistical support to the disease response across GB. Liaison Officers from Scotland will be based at the NDCC to be involved in overall management of GB operations, and to ensure that there is strong communication back to and from the Disease Strategy Group ( DSG) and Local Disease Control Centres ( LDCCs) in Scotland.

17. It will be important to draw in scientific expertise to inform the disease control response. This will involve epidemiological modelling and analysis to give a scientific basis to advice and recommendations on disease control. Such work is best taken forward on a GB basis given the size of the field of relevant specialists and the need to avoid duplication of effort. Although this will be considered on a GB basis, arrangements are in place to ensure that the Scottish Executive will receive appropriate advice, particularly on Scottish specific issues.

18. Given the need for close co-ordination and the specific requirements of accountability to their own Parliament, there will be dialogue between Animal Health and Welfare Ministers and the officials leading the response in their administration. The Devolved Administrations would also be represented at meetings of the Civil Contingencies Committee ( CCC) helping to ensure strategic co-ordination at a high level, particularly in terms of consequence management (which remains the devolved responsibility of Scottish Ministers).

Internal Scottish Executive co-ordination

19. The Scottish Executive is responsible for co-ordinating the civil emergency response in Scotland. In a major emergency, the Scottish Executive activates central co-ordination arrangements to ensure an integrated response from all SE Departments and other agencies, particularly the Strategic Co-ordination Groups ( SCGs) through the Scottish Emergency Co-ordination Committee. In Scotland the Ministerial Group on Civil Contingencies ( MGCC) will, on behalf of the Scottish Cabinet, take the Ministerial lead and set the overall parameters of any response. Animal disease differs from most other contingencies in that the Scottish Executive, particularly through the SVS, is responsible for the operational and policy response.

20. The Disease Strategy Group ( DSG) will inform the MGCC and will co-ordinate and manage the Scottish disease control response. It will be supported and briefed by the Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team ( EAT) - a team of senior Scottish Executive officials who will facilitate implementation of decisions taken by the DSG and ensure co-ordination of Scottish Executive activity. They will ensure that in a disease outbreak each Scottish Executive Department mobilises the necessary resources and that activities of each Department are co-ordinated to support SEERAD as the lead Department. The Team also plays an important role in ensuring that each area of the Scottish Executive's interests are accounted for when decisions on the emergency response are being made. A Scottish Executive Emergency Support Team will support the EAT by gathering, processing and sharing information about the emergency so as to facilitate an informed response.

21. The Scottish Avian Influenza Stakeholder Group will help support the Scottish response, and will be joined by relevant organisations depending on the nature and extent of the outbreak.

Links to Animal Health Local Plans

22. The Scottish Plan links directly with the individual Local Contingency Plans that have been drawn up for each of the five Animal Health Divisional Offices in Scotland. The Local Plans are extremely important as it is at the local level that the disease would have to be fought, controlled and eradicated. The Local Plans draw on support from key agencies e.g. Local Authorities (who also have emergency plans in place) and also look to include local stakeholders. Through these local plans the SVS links into the SCGs and the existing emergency planning infrastructure. A principal difference to other arrangements is that the lead agency in a disease outbreak would be the SVS rather than one of the 'Blue Light' emergency services.

Consequence Management.

23. The emergency services, local authorities, health boards and utilities co-ordinate their response to emergencies through Strategic Co-ordinating Groups ( SCGs), of which there are eight in Scotland, one in each police area. These operate at three levels; strategic, tactical and operational. The strategic groups meet periodically to ensure high-level co-ordination and prepare for likely scenarios. The tactical groups meet more commonly at the time of an emergency to ensure resources and strategies are being applied appropriately, while operational groups conduct the on-the-ground operations. At each level sub-groups can be established as required.

24. Above the SCGs sits a structure for the response to major or national emergencies, tying in front-line operations to Ministers via the Scottish Executive Emergency Room and the Emergency Action Team. These structures also link in at UK level to the Civil Contingencies Committee ( CCC).

25. The structures established under this Contingency Plan are intended to mesh with the pre-existing emergency structures. While the animal disease control side of the structure will lead the response and the strategy for disease control and eradication, it will be for the SCGs and the emergency structures to handle the consequence management, such as animal movement controls, providing assistance to SVS in the field, communicating with local communities and so on. These relationships are covered in more depth later in this Plan.

Changes since the Previous Plan

26. This Plan also incorporates the lessons learned from the discovery of HPAI in a wild bird in Cellardyke, Fife, in April 2006. Principally, this has led to the following changes:

• Setting this Contingency Plan in the wider context of response to civil contingencies, and detailing relationships with SCGs.
• Improving systems for notification to stakeholders of an AI/ ND finding.
• Providing for notification of suspect cases.
• Clarification of roles and responsibilities.
• Changing the language on access to clarify that only Scottish Ministers can impose closures.

27. The Plan has been updated to take into account the new domestic legislation which transposes the European Directive on Avian Influenza as well as recent EC decisions, particularly on wild birds. The major changes from the last version relate to the inclusion of controls against LPAI, and the introduction of measures if AI virus is found in mammals, especially pigs. A wider range of Controlled Zones is allowed for. Given the importance of effective management of the early stages of an outbreak, more measures are specified for the suspicion stage.

Contact Point

28. This Contingency Plan is subject to regular review and any comment or questions relating to its content and ongoing development should be sent to:

e-mail: ahwcontingencyplanning@scotland.gsi.gov.uk

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