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03 Risk Assessment
This chapter to be reviewed by November 2006
Summary
- A simple risk management framework for a local risk assessment process is outlined.
- The Community Risk Register is described.
- Annexes provide:
- Guidance on hazards to be considered
- Descriptions of the likelihood of a risk
- Descriptions of the impact of a risk
- A risk matrix for scoring risks
- Examples of an individual risk assessment
- A Community Risk Register
Risk Assessment
3.1 Risk assessment is both an integral component of a risk management process and the first step in preparing for emergencies.
3.2 Risk assessment in this guidance addresses:
Hazards - which are natural and unintentional risks (for example, severe weather or industrial accidents) and
Threats - which are malicious or deliberately made risks (for example, terrorist acts).
3.3 At its simplest risk assessment asks the following questions:
What if? Which seeks to identify risks, both hazards and threats.
What then? When the likelihood and the impact (the consequences) of events are assessed.
So what? Which evaluates the significance of the risks and their relevance to the local area.
Then what? Which takes steps to manage the risks.
3.4 The purpose of risk assessment is to:
- ensure that local responders have an accurate understanding of the risks that they face so that their planning has a sound foundation and is proportionate to the risks.
- enable local responders to assess the adequacy of their planning and capabilities, and allow any shortcomings to be addressed.
- facilitate co-ordinated local preparation based on consistent planning assumptions.
- enable local responders to describe the emergency planning context for the public and officials.
- inform and reflect Scottish and UK risk assessments that support emergency planning and capability development.
- provide a rational basis for the prioritisation of objectives, work programmes and the allocation of resources.
3.5 Risk assessment contributes to a process that is cyclical and subject to regular review that will lead to a continuous improvement in local risk management. It is essential that the risk management process responds quickly to changes in the risk environment. This means that the process should be iterative, monitor risks and be kept up to date.
3.6 The process described below is consistent with that used at various levels of government. Adopting this process will promote better communication of risk between these different levels and with and between local areas. Local risk assessment relates to the duty on local responders under the Civil Contingencies Act, as described in Section 2 of the Preparing Scotland guidance. At the UK level, however, risk assessment will be co-ordinated by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, supported by the Scottish Executive for Scotland's interests, as part of the framework that underpins the UK Capabilities Programme.
3.7 For Scotland, the Scottish Executive Fire & Civil Contingencies Division ( SEFCCD) has commissioned work through formation of a Scottish Risk Assessment Group ( SRAG) on hazard assessment to ensure that variation in the likelihood and impacts of hazards in Scotland is accommodated in local arrangements. The SRAG guidance to Category 1 Responders in Scotland is based on the Local Risk Assessment Guidance issued by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and has been incorporated in Annex 2 of this guidance. Given the difficulties in assessing threats, central Government - lead department, the Home Office - has developed threat assumptions on a UK national level. Strategic Co-ordinating Groups can however expect to be provided with additional assistance from SRAG member organisations in developing their Community Risk Registers.
The Risk Management Process
3.8 Risk assessment is one component of the general risk management process set out below.
Figure 1 - The Risk Management Process
The dashed lines in Figure 1 represent the different aspects of the process:
Establishing the context - involves defining the nature and scope of the risk problem and agreeing how the risk management process will be undertaken.
Evaluating Risk - covers the identification of those threats and hazards that present significant risks, analysis of their likelihood and their impacts which are combined to assist in prioritising risks.
Treating the risk - involves deciding which risks are unacceptably high and developing strategies to mitigate them.
3.9 Risks vary with changes in the environment in which they are set and changes in the hazards and threats. These changes will affect emergency preparedness and capabilities. Periodic reviews are required to ensure that changes are captured then reflected in the risk assessment and emergency planning processes.
The Local Risk Assessment Process
3.10 The recommended local risk assessment process is consistent with that shown in Figure 1 Individual steps are described below and summarised in Annex 1.
3.11 The process will be commissioned by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group which will determine the management arrangements for the project and review its outcomes.
Step 1: Establish the risk management context
3.12 Category 1 responders should begin by defining the scope of the risk management activity in the context of the Civil Contingencies Act and this guidance. They should review the process that they will adopt and identify the project's stakeholders. Key stakeholders will include the local Category 1 and Category 2 responders and groups in the community with a particular interest in elements of the work (for example, local business interests).
3.13 It is important that responders understand, at the outset, the principles and criteria with which risks will be evaluated and prioritised as described in this guidance. This should prepare them for later stages of the process in which they will need to decide which risks are acceptable, which must be tolerated, which require treatment, including those that require emergency plans.
3.14 At an early stage responders should describe the characteristics of the local area that will influence the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the community. To do this they should reflect on the following aspects of their area, describing the current situation, emerging trends and anticipated future events:
Social: - What is the demographic, ethnic and socio-economic composition of the community? How are the various communities geographically distributed within the local area? How great is social cohesion? Are there any particularly vulnerable groups in the community? How experienced is the community at coping with different types of emergencies?
Environment: - Are there any particular local vulnerabilities (poor coastal defences, etc.)? Is the area urbanised, rural or mixed?
Infrastructure: - How is the infrastructure configured in the area (transport, utilities, etc.)? What are the critical supply networks in the area? Are there any sites in the area that are particularly critical for local, regional and national essential services (telecommunications hubs, health, finance, legal, etc.)? What type of economy does the area have?
Hazardous sites: - What potentially hazardous sites exist in the area? Where are they in relation to communities or sensitive environmental sites?
Step 2: Initial hazard and threat assessment
Hazards
3.15 Taking into account the local context, each Category 1 responder should identify the hazards that, in its view, could give rise to an emergency in their area over the next five years. The hazards will be identified on the basis of experience, research or other information. Annex 2 provides a table to assist the process which, although extensive, is not exhaustive and other hazards may be identified. To assist in producing a consistent picture of risk across the UK hazards should be listed under the relevant hazard categories provided at Annex 2. Category 1 responders need only consider those hazards that are likely to present consequences requiring the performance of their functions or a special mobilisation.
3.16 Each Category 1 responder should submit its views of the hazards in the form of a draft Individual Risk Assessment. The example of a completed risk assessment at Annex 3 shows typical subject areas for which information will be required. The draft assessments should provide some outline information for these subject areas, as appropriate to each Category 1 responder's expertise and knowledge.
Threats
3.17 Central Government will also provide Strategic Co-ordinating Groups with general threat assessments. The assessments will describe the types and scales of threats that are assessed to be of sufficient likelihood to warrant consideration in the local emergency planning process. Some of the threats will only apply to certain local areas and it will be for the Strategic Co-ordinating Group to decide which apply to its area. Impacts on the local area can be assessed but the threat risk assessments cannot be treated in the same way as hazards, that is plotted on a risk matrix, and must be considered separately.
Step 3: Multi-agency collation of hazards and threats
3.18 Once all individual assessments are collated, the Category 1 responders best qualified to assess, or gather information on, the likelihood of each hazard should be identified. In most cases the information will be best provided by a lead UK or Scottish organisation. Annex 2 provides this information for a wide range of hazard categories. If further analysis is required, the lead Category 1 responder should liaise with the appropriate lead organisation(s), for particular hazards, on behalf of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group.
3.19 At this stage it may be helpful to start populating the Community Risk Register ( CRR) (see Annex 6) with the hazards identified and threats provided. The CRR will provide an overview and can be used as a working tool for project management, as well as an end-product of the risk management process.
Step 4: Risk analysis
3.20 The lead responders should undertake, or pass on, an assessment of the likelihood of a hazard occurring over the next five years. This timeframe will also be used in UK and Scottish national risk assessments. Where possible the lead responder should also seek to establish the scale(s) of emergencies that are of most concern. Annex 4 describes the quantitative and qualitative scoring for likelihood. Annex 2 provides guidance on likelihood in a five year timeframe for a wide range of hazards.
3.21 It is important for all responders to maintain a realistic perspective on the events. For example, the biggest in scale may not necessarily be the one of most concern as it may be reasonable to expect that significant external resources would be mobilised to assist.
3.22 It is also important to exclude, at this stage, events that are so low in likelihood that planning cannot be justified ( e.g. meteorites hitting the earth). This is not to say that all low-likelihood, high-impact events should be excluded, but a careful judgement will be needed about the likelihood below which particular events will be excluded from the assessment.
3.23 In the case that the UK or Scottish organisation is unable to provide an assessment in the required timeframe, the lead responder should record the fact and make their own assessment using the best information and expertise available.
3.24 The next stage is to assess impacts more fully. This requires joint consideration by all responders of the risks identified and their scale or consequences. This will involve a good deal of common sense and should draw from experience and the information provided in Annex 2 and the separate threats guidance. Whilst the primary short term consequences can be simple, the secondary or long term consequences can be extensive and at times surprising. This activity may involve either a series of meetings or written submission followed by a meeting. The impacts of the hazards and threats should be assessed by using the scales and scoring methodology provided at Annex 4.
3.25 The assessments should be pragmatic, mixing evidence and judgement, both of which should be documented as far as possible. Where appropriate the assessments will be informed by studies on the context in which the assessment is set (see Step 1 above). These should outline the vulnerabilities (susceptibility to damage or harm) and the resilience (ability to withstand damage or harm) of relevant sites, systems and communities. An example completed risk assessment is provided at Annex 3.
3.26 The results should be entered into the Community Risk Register ( CRR). A layout for the CRR with example entries is shown at Annex 6.
Step 5: Risk Evaluation
3.27 Risks are evaluated by combining the likelihood and impact scores for a hazard by plotting them on a risk matrix. The matrix at Annex 5 should be used. This risk matrix enables the risk analysis to be interpreted against pre-defined criteria and facilitates communication and comparison of the risk assessment. Annex 5 also provides definitions of the four risk ratings ('Very High', 'High', 'Medium' and 'Low').
3.28 Note that in the risk matrix the likelihood score is given a slightly greater weighting than the impact score. For example, a 3 [Unlikely) likelihood score gives a "very high" risk with either of the upper 4 (Significant) and 5 (Catastrophic) impact scores whereas a 3 (Moderate) impact score only gives a "high" risk with either of the upper likelihood scores. The formula used to combine likelihood and impact scores varies from one risk assessment approach to another. The guidance presented here is consistent with a number of the major standards and consistency in the application of this risk matrix is essential if the results of the local risk assessments are to be easily compared. The results should be entered into the Community Risk Register.
Step 6: Risk Treatment
3.29 Community Risk Registers are not an end in themselves, but serve as a means for ensuring a common approach to the harmonisation of emergency arrangements, plans and procedures.
3.30 At this stage of the risk assessment process the Strategic Co-ordinating Group should:
- determine the acceptability of the risks based on their rating.
- make decisions about its risk priorities.
- determine risk treatment measures based on its priorities.
3.31 The process has a number of elements that are describe below:
- assess what is needed to manage and respond to the hazards and threats.
- identify the arrangements and plans that are already in place.
- consider any gap between needs and capability to meet those needs.
- identify the additional treatments required to improve preparation and manage the risk more effectively.
- determine the priority for treatment.
- identify the responsibility for providing the treatment. Note that this may involve a transfer of the risk to an organisation outside the local area.
- establish and manage a risk treatment programme.
- record its judgements in the Community Risk Register.
Step 7: Monitoring and reviewing
3.32 There should be a full and formal review of all risks on a four year cycle. However, risks should be monitored continuously and, where a change in circumstances arises, a new risk assessment should be performed. If necessary the Community Risk Register should be updated. Risk assessment should be a standing item on the agendas of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. The Community risk Register should show the date for review of each risk.
3.33 Risk assessment guidance and methodologies will be reviewed on the basis of feedback from the development of risk registers at the local level and from experience in developing Scottish and UK national and regional assessments. The guidance contained in Annex 2 will be reviewed on an annual basis.
Step 8: Publishing risk assessments
3.34 When publishing the Community Risk Register ( CRR) and their individual risk assessments, local responders should take into account the principles of effective risk communication which are documented on the " UK Resilience" website ( http://www.ukresilience.info ). They should also take into account the security classification of the information contained in the assessment. The Strategic Co-ordinating Group should review the information it proposes to publish to ensure that any sensitive information is treated appropriately. [For further guidance see Section 3, Chapters 5 and 7 of Preparing Scotland].
3.35 The CRR is collectively owned by the Category 1 responders who co-operate in its production. We advise that the CRR should be published on the internet. To avoid having multiple versions, this can be done on the website of one Category 1 responder, with links to this site placed on the other Category 1 responders' sites.
Annex 1: Summary of Local Risk Assessment Process
Name of Step | Actions | Inputs | Agencies Involved |
|---|
Establish the emergency risk management context | Set scope of project (relate to guidance and definition of emergency in the Act).
Identify partners.
Describe local context.
Set out risk evaluation criteria. | Initial discussion at Strategic
Co-ordinating Group.
Internal discussions with partners. | Category 1 responders. |
Initial hazard and threat identification | Each Category 1 responder identifies and describes hazards and threats which might present significant concerns in next 5 years to which it would be required to respond. | Guidance Annex 2 Hazard categories and separate guidance on threat categories.
Research and experience.
Category 2 responders contribute as required. | All Cat 1 responders individually. |
Multi-agency collation of hazards and threats | Strategic Co-ordinating Group co-ordinates the collation of hazards and threats identified by local responders. Determination of agencies and Category 1 responders that are best qualified to assess, or lead, on the likelihood and impact of the hazards and threats. | Individual responder hazard and threat assessments. | All Cat 1 responders collectively in consultation with Cat 2 responders. |
Risk Analysis | Lead assessors consider likelihood of hazards in next 5 years.
Lead assessors carry out impact assessment on hazards and threats.
Generate risk statements with likelihood and overall risk assessment. | Risk Assessment Guidance.
Research, discussion and analysis between key partners.
Individual organisations bring likelihood assessments back to Strategic Co-ordinating Group. | Cat 1 responders.
UK and/or Scottish national and local area stakeholders. |
Risk Evaluation | Incorporate risks into Strategic Co-ordinating Group risk register.
Compare assessed risk to risk criteria.
Set risk priorities.
Determine acceptability of risk based on level of risk.
Identify and evaluate options for treatment (accept/transfer/avoid/reduce/prevention/mitigation).
Make treatment recommendation. | Risk assessments.
Risk evaluation criteria. | All Cat 1 responders collectively. |
Risk Treatment | Assess the challenges presented by the risks.
Identify current capabilities and arrangements.
Assess any gaps in response capabilities.
Identify additional treatment measures.
Prioritise treatment measures on basis of risks and gaps
Identify person or organisation to be responsible for implementing measure.
Complete the CRR.
Establish risk treatment programme. | Discussion and analysis between key partners. | All Cat 1 responders collectively. |
Monitoring and reviewing | Monitor risk treatment programme.
Formal review of all risks on 4 year cycle.
Ad hoc review as and when new information or updated guidance suggests the need. | Reports on progress.
Ongoing review of changes to context and hazards within responding organisations.
Ongoing and regular reviews of risks by Strategic Co-ordinating Group between responders. | All Cat 1 responders individually and collectively. |
Publishing risk assessments | Publish appropriate parts of the Community Risk Register.
Publish individual assessments.
Publish plans containing assessments. | Agreement to publication of CRR by SCG.
Consider sensitivity of all information. | All Category 1 responders. |
Annex 2: Classification of Hazards and Threats and Suggested Responsibilities for Assessment
Introduction
Hazards
The tables below provide a framework for risk management that is designed to promote consistent and efficient risk assessment at all levels. They provide a classification of risk sources, so that assessments consider a consistent range of hazards and language when labelling them.
Risk Identifier. Types of Risk prefixed with "H" are hazards which will require a higher level response at Scottish/ UK national level as well as a local response. Those marked " HL" will not ordinarily prompt a higher level response and would usually be dealt with locally.
Scale. This column describes the immediate consequences or significance of the event. Scale descriptions will often be expressed in terms of facilities destroyed, the numbers of fatalities and casualties or the extent of contamination. This is the information which informs the impact assessment.
The assessment of impact at the UK level is co-ordinated by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, for Scotland by the Scottish Executive and at the local level by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group or a sub-group established by the SCG for the task.
The tables show whether the likelihood of the hazards varies locally or whether Scottish or UK assessments apply. In all cases, the table shows the organisation(s) best placed to make the assessments of the likelihood and scale of each hazard.
Variation and Further Information. This column provides additional descriptive or statistical guidance on how the generic likelihood assessment may vary across Scotland. Each SCG will wish to identify which of those hazards listed could not occur in their area because it lacks particular types of site or characteristics. Each SCG will ultimately need to decide on its own likelihood assessments. This should lead to a reduced set of assessed risks for most areas.
To aid this process, cells have been shaded where the lead department or agency does not expect the likelihood assessment to vary significantly between local areas. In addition, where a department or agency indicates a range of likelihoods ( e.g. 1-2) it is anticipated that the local likelihood score should usually fall within that range.
The Cabinet Office will release new versions of this table annually, incorporating improvements that have been identified through the use of local area risk assessment guidance. The SRAG will review updates to the guidance which will then be issued by SEFCCD as replacements for the Annex 2 tables below.
Threats
Separate guidance on threats has also been provided to Category 1 responders containing generic threat assessments provided by central Government. The likelihoods in this table are not subject to local area analysis but the impacts can be assessed, as for hazards, using the scale and definitions provided. It will be for the Strategic Co-ordinating Group to decide which threats apply to its area. These threats will all require a UK and Scottish national as well as a local response. The threats guidance has been classified as "Restricted" by central Government and copies should only be held by staff of Category 1 Responders who require the information for risk assessment. Updates of this guidance will be provided by the Cabinet Office and issued to Category 1 Responders in Scotland by the SEFCCD.
Annex 2 Scottish Local Risk Assessment Guidance. Version 1.0 September 2005
Type of Risk | Risk Categories (& Sub-Categories) | Scale | Likelihood Assessment, Lead Dept & Assumptions | Variation & Further Information |
|---|
Industrial Accidents and Environmental Pollution |
H1 | Fire or explosion at a gas terminal as well as LPG, LNG, and other gas onshore feedstock pipeline and flammable gas storage sites | Up to 3km around site causing up to 500 fatalities and up to 1500 casualties. Gas terminal event likely to be of short duration once feed lines are isolated; event at a storage site could last for days if the explosion damaged control equipment. | Likelihood rating: 0 - 1
Lead: SEJD (Fire & Civil Contingencies Division)/ HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country, although there may be 'clustering' in ( e.g.) coastal areas and industrial areas. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 1). |
H2 | Fire or explosion at an onshore ethylene gas pipeline | Up to 3km around site causing up to 500 fatalities and up to 1500 casualties and serious downstream impact on oil and chemical production. | Likelihood rating: 0 - 1
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country, although there may be 'clustering' e.g. in coastal areas and industrial areas. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 1). |
HL1 | Fire or explosion at a gas terminal or involving a gas pipeline | Up to 3km around site causing up to 10 fatalities and 100 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 0 - 1
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Likely to be applicable only to an SCG which has coastline. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 1). |
H3 | Fire or explosion at an oil refinery | Up to 3km around site causing up to 500 fatalities and up to 1500 casualties. Depending on the location and size of the release, the fire could burn for several days. Explosions would cause primarily crush / cuts & bruises type injuries, as well as burns - fires would cause predominantly burn-type injuries. | Likelihood rating: 0 - 2
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Likely to be applicable only to an SCG which has coastline. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 2). |
H4 | Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site and tank storage of flammable or toxic liquids | Up to 3km around site causing up to 150 fatalities and up to 2000 casualties. Explosions would cause primarily crush / cuts & bruises type injuries, as well as burns - fires would cause predominantly burn-type injuries. | Likelihood rating: 0 - 1
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 1). |
H5 | Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline | Up to 1km around site causing up to 100 fatalities and up to 500 casualties. Explosions would cause primarily crush / cuts & bruises type injuries, as well as burns - fires would cause predominantly burn-type injuries. | Likelihood rating: 0-1
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country, although there may be 'clustering' in ( e.g.) coastal areas and industrial areas. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 1). |
H6 | Fire or explosion at an offshore oil/gas platform | Local to site causing up to 200 fatalities and up to 200 casualties. Explosions would cause primarily crush / cuts & bruises type injuries, as well as burns - fires would cause predominantly burn-type injuries. | Likelihood rating: 0-2
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Applicable only to an SCG which has coastline. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 2). |
H7 | Explosion at a natural gas pipeline | Local to site causing up to 200 fatalities and up to 200 casualties. Explosions would cause primarily crush / cuts & bruises type injuries, as well as burns - fires would cause predominantly burn-type injuries. | Likelihood rating: 0-1
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country, although there may be 'clustering' in ( e.g.) coastal areas and industrial areas. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 1). |
H8 | Toxic chemical release | Up to 10km from site causing up to 2000 fatalities and up to 10,000 casualties. Toxic release could be due to loss of containment of chlorine - or of a number of other chemicals, e.g. anhydrous hydrofluoric acid, refrigerated ammonia, sulphur di-oxide (or tri-oxide) gas. | Likelihood rating: 0-1
Lead: SEPA/ HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country, although there may be 'clustering' in ( e.g.) coastal areas and industrial areas. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 1). |
H9 | Toxic chemical release | Up to 3km from site of toxic chemical release causing up to 50 fatalities and up to 2000 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 0-3
Lead: SEPA/ HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country, although there may be 'clustering' in ( e.g.) coastal areas and industrial areas. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 3). |
HL2 | Industrial accident involving large toxic release, e.g. from a site storing large quantities of chlorine | Up to 3km from site causing up to 30 fatalities and up to 250 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 0-3
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country, although there may be 'clustering' in ( e.g.) coastal areas and industrial areas. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 3). |
HL3 | Industrial accident involving toxic release | Up to 1km from site causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 100 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 0-3
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country, although there may be 'clustering' in ( e.g.) coastal areas and industrial areas. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 3). |
H10 | Radioactive substance release from a nuclear reactor accident | Up to 4km from site causing up to 150 fatalities and up to 1500 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 0-1
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Clearly, with plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 1). |
H11 | Accidental release of radioactive material from incorrectly handled or disposed of sources. | Up to 5 fatalities and up to 100 contaminated people requiring medical monitoring. Many worried people may present at hospitals. Radiation may be spread over a range of several kilometres but most concentration at the point of accidental release. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: SEERAD | |
H12 | Biological substance release from Control measure failure ( e.g. dangerous pathogen release from containment laboratory) | Up to 10 fatalities and serious injuries or offsite impact requiring up to 1,000 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 0-4
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country - although the incidence is likely to be greater in or near urban areas containing appropriate medical / research institutions. |
H14 | Major contamination incident with widespread implications for the food chain, arising from:
(a) Industrial accident (chemical, microbiological, nuclear) affecting food production areas, e.g. Chernobyl, Sea Empress oil spill, Foot and Mouth Disease.
(b) Contamination of animal feed, e.g. dioxins, BSE.
(c) Incidents arising from production processes, e.g. adulteration of chilli powder with Sudan I dye. | Food production / marketing implications depending on scale and area affected, e.g. major shell fisheries, dairy, livestock production areas. Potential direct animal and consumer health effects including possible fatalities and casualties. Consumer confidence affected leading to lost markets or panic buying. | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: FSA (Scotland) | Local responders will wish to consider the impact at local level and should ensure that their own emergency response plans are clear regarding roles and responsibilities and that plans are in place to resource any local response. |
H15 | Maritime Pollution | Spillage of up to 100,000 tonnes of crude oil into the sea, polluting up to 200km of coastline. Potentially significant damage to amenity value ( i.e. tourism), agriculture/commerce and aquatic ecosystem. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: DfT
Assumptions: SCG has coastline. | Only applicable to an SCG which has a coastline. |
HL4 | Major pollution of controlled waters | Pollution incident impacting upon controlled waters, (for example, could be caused by chemical spillage or release of untreated sewage) leading to persistent and/or extensive effect on water quality, major damage to aquatic ecosystems, closure of potable abstraction point(s), major impact on amenity ( i.e. tourism) value, serious impact on human health. | Likelihood rating: 5
Lead: SEPA | |
HL5 | Major land contamination incident | Pollution incident (for example chemical spillage) leading to persistent and/or extensive effect on land quality, major damage to terrestrial ecosystems, property, amenity ( i.e. tourism) value and major damage to agricultural/commerce, serious impact on human health. | Likelihood rating: 5
Lead: SEPA | |
HL6 | Major air quality incident | Pollution incident (for example uncontrolled emission from an industrial facility or uncontrolled release of landfill gas) leading to persistent and/or extensive effect on air quality, major damage to local ecosystem, major effect on amenity ( i.e. tourism) value and serious impact on human health. | Likelihood rating: 5
Lead: SEPA | |
HL7 | Industrial explosions and major fires | Up to 1km around site causing up to 10 serious injuries and up to 100 casualties. Explosions would cause primarily crush/cuts and bruises-type injuries, as well as burns - fires would cause predominantly burn-type injuries. | Likelihood rating: 0-2
Lead: HSE - Scotland | Plant of this nature is assumed to be more or less evenly distributed across the country. Clearly, with more plants of this nature in the local area, the higher the likelihood ( i.e. closer to 2). |
Type of Risk | Risk Categories (& Sub-categories) | Scale | Likelihood Assessment, Lead Dept & Assumptions | Variation & Further Information |
|---|
Transport Accidents |
H42 | Rapid accidental sinking of a passenger vessel in, or close to, UK waters | Up to 500 fatalities and up to 1000 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: DfT | Only applicable to SCG with coastline. |
HL8 | Rapid accidental sinking of a passenger vessel in, or close to UK waters or on inland waterways | Up to 50 fatalities and up to 300 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: DfT | Only applicable to SCG with coastline or significant inland waterways. |
H16 | Aviation accident over major conurbation | Causing up to 800 fatalities and up to 300 casualties. This represents a worst case scenario involving either two aircraft and an urban environment or one of the new super jumbo jets that will become operational in 2 years' time. Injuries will range from serious burns to fractures and will have long-term medical requirements. There is also likely to be loss of amenities including housing or retail or industrial facilities and subsequent impact on the economy. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: DfT | Although likelihood is greater in SCGs which contain airports, score not expected to exceed 1 even at major airports. |
HL9 | Aviation accident | Causing up to 50 fatalities and up to 250 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: DfT | Although likelihood is greater in SCGs which contain airports, score not expected to exceed 1 even at major airports. |
HL10 | Local accident on motorways and major trunk roads | Multiple vehicle incident causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 20 casualties (internal injuries, fractures, possible burns); closure of lanes or carriageways causing major disruption and delays. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: DfT | |
HL11 | Railway accident | Up to 30 fatalities and up to 100 casualties (fractures, internal injuries - burns less likely). Possible loss of freight. Major disruption to rail line including possible closure of rail tunnel. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: DfT | |
HL12 | Local accident involving transport of hazardous chemicals. | Up to 50 fatalities and up to 500 casualties (direct injuries from the accident would be similar to road or rail accidents; indirect casualties are possible, if substance covers wide area). The extent of the impact would depend on substance involved, quantity, nature and location of accident. The assumption is based on phosgene / chlorine. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: DfT
Assumptions: No major hazardous chemical handling or processing sites in area. | |
HL13 | Maritime accident or deliberate blockade resulting in blockage of access to key port, estuary, maritime route for more than one month. | Fatalities/ injuries minor. Loss of port is likely to have an initial wider impact, but will quickly reduce as shippers seek alternative ports or methods of shipping. Economic impact on local dependent businesses. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: DfT
Assumptions: Area contains major port. | |
HL 14 | Local accident involving transport of fuel/explosives | Up to 30 fatalities and up to 20 casualties within vicinity of accident/explosion. Area would require evacuating up to 1 km radius depending on substances involved. Potential release of up to 30 tonnes of liquid fuel into local environment, watercourses, etc. Large quantities of fire fighting media (foam) would impact on environment. Roads and access routes impassable for a time. Emergency access into/out of large populated areas difficult or impossible. | Likelihood Rating: 2
Lead: SEJD
(Fire & Civil Contingencies Division) | Hazardous chemical traffic is not thought to vary significantly at local levels, so likelihood will be similar throughout. However a high density of hazardous chemical infrastructure in area may affect likelihood scores. |
Type of Risk | Risk Categories (& Sub-Categories) | Scale | Likelihood Assessment, Lead Dept & Assumptions | Variation & Further Information |
|---|
Severe Weather |
H17 | Storms and Gales | Storm force winds affecting most of the country for at least 6 hours. Most inland, lowland areas experience mean speeds in excess of 55 mph with gusts in excess of 85 mph. | Likelihood rating: 3
Lead: Met Office - Scotland | |
H18 | Low temperatures and heavy snow | Snow lying over most of the country for at least one month. Most lowland areas experience some snow falls in excess of 30 cm, some drifts in excess of 1m, and a period of at least 7 consecutive days with daily mean temperatures below -3°C. | Likelihood rating: 3-4
Lead: Met Office - Scotland | Assessed to be 4 across UK (apart from London and South West England where likelihood is 3). |
HL15 | Heat wave | Daily maximum temperatures above 32°C and minimum temperatures above 15°C over most of the area for at least 5 consecutive days. | Likelihood rating: 3-4
Lead: Met Office - Scotland | Assessed to be 3 across UK (apart from London, South East England and East of England where likelihood is 4). |
H19 | Flooding: Major coastal/tidal | Major sea surge, spring tides, gale force winds, heavy rainfall, many defences overtopped or failing. Combined tidal and fluvial event. Many coastal Regions affected and tidal reaches of river. Flooding of 10,000+ properties for 7 days. Potential loss of life. Suddenness of failure of defences would not be possible to predict, tidal inundation would be rapid and wave impact would cause structural damage to properties. Significant economic disruption and damage. | Likelihood rating: 2
Lead: SEPA
Assumptions: SCG has coastline or could be affected by flooding in tidal reaches of rivers. | |
H20 | Flooding: Major fluvial. | A single large urban area flooded as a result of defence failure, causing a single location to be severely affected with high risk to life and little response time. It is possible no warnings would have been issued in time. Flooding of 10,000+ properties for 7 to 21 days. Potential loss of life. Significant economic disruption and damage. | Likelihood rating: 2
Lead: SEPA | |
H21 | Flooding: Major fluvial | A sustained period of heavy rainfall extending over two weeks, perhaps combined with snow melt, resulting in steadily rising river levels over most of the country affecting all Regions. Flooding of 10,000+ properties for 7 to 21 days. Potential loss of life. There would be major impact on minor roads and some A roads and truck roads impassable for a time. Some main rail lines would be closed (where bridges are deemed unsafe for example). Many minor rail lines and stations would be closed. Most water ways would be closed to traffic because of strong currents and high water levels. | Likelihood rating: 3
Lead: SEPA | |
HL16 | Major local coastal/tidal flooding | Sea surge, spring tides, gale force winds, heavy rainfall affecting more than one Region, some defences overtopped or failing at multiple locations. Flooding of more than 1000 and less than 10,000 properties. Multi-agency response invoked, possible large scale evacuation required. Suddenness of failure of defences would not be possible to predict, tidal inundation would be rapid and wave impact would cause structural damage to properties. Impact on infrastructure includes disruption to traffic for 1-3 days, impact on access to agricultural land and impact to infrastructure, e.g. sewage treatment works flooded. | Likelihood rating: 3
Lead: SEPA | |
HL17 | Localised coastal/tidal flooding | Sea surge, high tides, gale force winds affecting the coastline and one Region, some defences overtopped or failing at a single location. Localised impact with infrastructure affected and up to 1000 properties flooded. Flood warning service would operate effectively. Multi-agency response invoked with some local evacuation and cordoning off of affected areas. Impact on infrastructure includes disruption to traffic for 1-3 days, impact on access to agricultural land and impact to infrastructure, e.g. sewage treatment works flooded. | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: SEPA | |
HL18 | Major local fluvial flooding | A sustained period of heavy rainfall extending over two weeks, perhaps combined with snow melt, resulting in steadily rising river levels over a region. Localised flooding of more than 1000 and less than 10,000 properties. There would be major impact on minor roads and some A roads and truck roads impassable for a time. Some main rail lines would be closed (where bridges are deemed unsafe for example). Some minor rail lines and stations would be closed. Most water ways would be closed to traffic because of strong currents and high water levels. | Likelihood rating: 3
Lead: SEPA | |
HL19 | Major local fluvial flooding | A sustained period of heavy rainfall extending over two weeks, perhaps combined with snow melt, resulting in steadily rising river levels over a region. Localised flooding of more than 100 and less than 1,000 properties. There would be some impact on minor roads and some A roads and truck roads impassable for a time. Some main rail lines would be closed (where bridges are deemed unsafe for example). Some minor rail lines and stations would be closed. Most water ways would be closed to traffic because of strong currents and high water levels. | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: SEPA | |
HL20 | Localised fluvial flooding (flash flooding) | Heavy localised rainfall in steep valley catchment leading to flash flooding. Likely that no flood defences in place. Possibly no flood warning service available / suddenness of event means timely flood warnings not possible. Flooding of up to 200 properties. | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: SEPA | |
Type of Risk | Risk Categories (& Sub-Categories) | Scale | Likelihood Assessment, Lead Dept & Assumptions | Variation & Further Information |
|---|
Structural |
HL21 | Land movement (tremors and landslides) | Roads and access routes impassable for a time. Emergency access into/out of large populated areas difficult or impossible; severe congestion over wide geographical area. Loss of power and other essential services over wide geographical area. Potential for a number of persons to be trapped or missing either in landslide itself and/or in collapsed structures. Up to 5 fatalities depending on the size and location of land movement. | Likelihood rating: 0 - 1
Lead: SEJD
(Fire & Civil Contingencies Division) | It is considered that such incidents are rare within the UK with some areas being more prone to landslides than others. Geography and climatic conditions will determine likelihood. |
HL22 | Building collapse | Potential for a number of persons to be trapped or missing. Localised loss of power and other essential services. Local access routes affected due to road closures. Up to 5 fatalities depending on the size and construction of building, and occupation rates. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: SEJD
(Fire & Civil Contingencies Division) | A number of such incidents annually within the UK. Some areas will be more at risk than others due to age of local building stock. |
HL23 | Bridge collapse | Roads, access routes and transport infrastructure impassable for considerable length of time. Severe congestion over wide geographical area. Emergency access into/out of large populated areas severely restricted. Potential for a number of persons to be trapped or missing. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: SEJD
(Fire & Civil Contingencies Division) | It is considered that such incidents are rare within the UK. |
H44 | Major reservoir dam failure caused by internal erosion or overtopping. | Complete destruction or serious damage to up to 200 downstream properties. Several thousand other properties could be flooded. Extent of downstream effect could reach 50-60km depending on topography. Up to 2000 fatalities could result though this would be mitigated by the extent of warning time given and evacuation taking place effectively. | Likelihood rating: 0 - 1
Lead: SEERAD | Depending on presence, condition and location of infrastructure in SCG area. |
Type of Risk | Risk Categories (& Sub-Categories) | Scale | Likelihood Assessment, Lead Dept & Assumptions | Variation & Further Information |
|---|
Human Health |
H22 | Influenza type disease (epidemic) | A serious epidemic of much greater severity than the usual seasonal flu. Weekly GP consultations for new episodes of flu-like illness likely to exceed 400 per 100,000 of population at the peak (compared with a peak of around 200 per 100,000 population per week in an average year). | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: SEHD | |
H23 | Influenza type disease (pandemic) | Pandemic likely to occur in two waves, about 3-9 months apart. Each wave likely to last 12 weeks. A quarter of the population could be affected. High number of cases and consultations (greater than 500 GP consultations per 100,000 population per week at peak) overwhelming health and other services. Clinical attack rate of 25% with mortality assumption of 0.37-2.5% of those infected. Age range vulnerability - all ages, including children, likely to be affected. | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: SEHD | |
H24 | SARS type disease. | Based on US figures, outbreak will cause between 250-2000 casualties. | Likelihood rating: 2
Lead: SEHD | |
HL24 | Legionella / meningitis outbreak | Localised outbreak of a disease which could cause up to 10 fatalities and up to 50 casualties, with no variation in likelihood between localities. | Likelihood rating: 2-3
Lead: SEHD | |
Type of Risk | Risk Categories (& Sub-Categories) | Scale | Likelihood Assessment, Lead Dept & Assumptions | Variation & Further Information |
|---|
Animal Health |
H25 | Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases ( e.g. Foot and Mouth Disease ( FMD), Classical Swine Fever, Blue Tongue and Newcastle disease of birds). | Slaughter of up to 4 million affected and exposed livestock plus the possibility of a significant number of animals culled for welfare reasons. For poultry the number of birds culled might be much higher or up to 120 million birds. An outbreak might last 6-18 months. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: SEERAD | There is no requirement to produce a local likelihood assessment but local responders will wish to consider the potential impact of an animal disease at local level. Local responders should ensure that their own emergency response plans are compatible with the national contingency plans, that roles and responsibilities are clear and that plans are in place to ramp up resources locally. |
H26 | Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases ( e.g. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza ( HPAI), rabies and West Nile Virus). | Culling of up to 120 million poultry ( HPAI) or euthanasia of up to 20 companion animals (plus the possibility of wildlife being affected (Rabies). For West Nile Virus spread by viable vectors in the UK the slaughter of 20-1000 horses is a possibility. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: SEERAD | See above. |
Type of Risk | Risk Categories (& Sub-Categories) | Scale | Likelihood Assessment, Lead Dept & Assumptions | Variation & Further Information |
|---|
Public Protest |
H28 | Large scale public protest | Large scale public protests. Tens of thousands of highly motivated protesters, including a hard core of 2,000 protestors, causing physical damage, requiring a nationally coordinated police response. | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: CCS | Protest/demonstration on this scale only likely to occur in major conurbations, with London by far the most likely venue. There is some possibility of military bases being targeted as during the second Gulf conflict. The overall likelihood of such events is high, but the malicious element is less likely. |
H29 | Targeted disruptive protest, e.g. fuel protest. | Nationally co-ordinated protest that could generate shortages of essential supplies, and lasts for up to 1 week. | Likelihood rating: 4
Lead: CCS | |
Type of Risk | Risk Categories (& Sub-Categories) | Scale | Likelihood Assessment, Lead Dept & Assumptions | Variation & Further Information |
|---|
Industrial Technical Failure |
H38 | Technical failure of upstream (offshore) oil/gas network leading to a disruption in upstream oil and gas production. | Technical failure leading to catastrophic accident destroying all or parts of an offshore facility and taking 6 months to restore normal levels of service. A fire or explosion on board a significant offshore installation could result in a 5 - 30 per cent loss of gas supply to UK which, at the top end, would cause the disconnection of users with interruptible supply and would impact on power generation, possibly prompting three hour rota electricity cuts. Downstream oil would not be so adversely affected given alternative means of supply. | Likelihood rating: 3
Lead: DTI | SCGs may wish to include this risk regardless of the offshore capability in their area. The likelihood score represents the chance of this event happening anywhere in the UK. The impact would be felt nationally. |
H39 | Accidental failure at water treatment works | Between 10 - 50,000 people could be without piped water for up to 3 days. | Likelihood rating: 1
Lead: SEERAD | |
H40 | No notice failure of a public telephony provider | Loss of service to up to 100,000 people for up to 5 hours. | Likelihood rating: 3
Lead: CSIA | |
H41 | Technical failure of electricity network | Total shutdown of the electricity supply over whole of mainland UK, occurring during working hours and lasting for 24 hours. | Likelihood rating: 2
Lead: DTI | |
H43 | Telecommunication infrastructure - human error | Loss of telecommunications across an SCG area for up to 5 days. | Likelihood rating: 3
Lead: CSIA | |
H45 | Technical failure of electricity network | Total shutdown of the electricity supply over Scotland, occurring during working hours and lasting for 24 hours. | Likelihood rating: 3
Lead: DTI | |
Annex 3: Example Risk Category
Hazard/threat category | Sub-category: |
|---|
Severe Weather | Flooding: Major Fluvial |
Hazard and Threat Description including Scale: | Risk Reference No. |
|---|
River Doon, 5 sq. miles (100 homes/8 business premises) and 20 sq. miles (500 homes/30 business premises) affected. | SW1 |
Date of revision: | Next review date: |
|---|
September 2005 | November 2006 |
Overview of Hazard or Threat
The catchment of the River Doon is in an upland area and prone to both prolonged rain, intense burst of intense rainfall and heavy snowfall in winter. Three tributaries Merk Water, Doon Burn and Struie Burn influence the potential for flooding as the Doon flows south.
Key Evidence
River Doon
1975 The Doon was affected by rapid thawing of snow in the upper reaches of its catchment resulting in flooding below Laxford Bridge and the evacuation of 27 homes in Kirkland. Ten homes were severely damaged.
1996-2004 Flooding of low lying agricultural land has become a frequent event in the Doon Valley. On six occasions sand bags have been prepared and homeowners have made preparations for inundation.
Scotland/ UK
1999 - October/November - two severe rainfall events led to flooding in Glasgow at a scale only expected at a "once in 100 years" likelihood.
2000 - April - Prolonged rainfall in east central Scotland led to 800 homes flooded in Edinburgh. October/November - prolonged severe rainfall led to the flooding of 12,000 homes in UK.
2005 - January - Prolonged heavy rainfall and gales in central and SW Scotland and NW England - the River Eden at Carlisle flooded hundreds of properties with estimated £40 million damage.
This pattern is confirmed in a recent study (Reference) which suggested that patterns of flooding would change over the next 50 years in the UK leading to:
- increased river flows and flood risks in lowland valleys during winter months
- increase in land area covered by 1 in 100 year fluvial indicative floodplain map
- the emergence of a winter flood season with high river flows prolonged periods derived from higher groundwater or run-off
- changes in the pattern of flooding in other seasons
- the frequency and intensity of rainfall appears to be increasing through the effects of climate change.
Likelihood
Hazard and Scale | Likelihood (over 5 year period) and score on Likelihood Scale |
|---|
Major flooding - River Doon, 5 sq. miles affected. | 25% - Score 4 (Possible)* |
Major flooding - River Doon, 20 sq. miles affected. | 2.5% - Score 3 (Unlikely)* |
* Estimated by SCG on basis of national guidance, evidence of previous flooding and evidence of previous flooding and future weather predictions report and flood plain mapping. Occupancy of flood plain areas based on 2001 Census.port and flood plain mapping. Occupancy of flood plain areas based on 2001 Census.
Impact
Hazard and Scale | Impact and scores from Impact Scoring Scale |
|---|
Major flooding - River Doon, 5 sq. miles affected | Health 2, Social 3, Economic 3, Environment, 2
Total Score - 3 (Moderate) |
Major flooding - River Doon, 20 sq. miles affected. | Health 2, Social 5, Economic 4, Environment 3.
Total Score - 4 (Significant) |
Details of Impact:
Health: Immediate threat of drowning for people, pets and livestock. Possible short term problem from polluted flood water (sewage, chemicals and fuel stores). Short and longer term stress-related impact.
Social: Evacuation and temporary/longer-term accommodation and re-housing. Loss of moveable property including vehicles. Damage to buildings and insurance implications. Damage to agricultural land and premises. Public information and advice/support on emergency/payments benefits. Loss of or damage to utilities and other services - communications, water, gas, electricity - schools. Requirement for community recovery strategy.
Economic: Disruption of road/rail transport, including damage to or loss of bridges in area. Disruption of local business and general disruption of economic life in area, including impact on tourism. Requirement for safety assessments for premises and possible demolition. Relocation/re-building and insurance. Requirement for economic recovery strategy.
Environment: Pollution in flood water and contamination of built and open environment post-flooding. Collection of rubbish/disposal of items post-flooding - link to advice on insurance assessment. Requirement for disinfection and decontamination measures in premises.
Vulnerability and resilience
There are a number of areas across Westerland where there is a high potential for flooding based on topography and historical incidents. On the River Doon, these are Kirkland, Haugh of Doon, Merkland and Broomieknowe. In line with the wider picture for the UK, Westerland appears to be experiencing more instances of all forms of flooding in recent times.
Recent forestry harvesting above Kirkland may increase run-off to Struie Burn catchment. Debris washed down from area may reduce flow at Kirkland road bridge. New building at Kirk land riverside area and development of business park at Merkland will require revision of potential houses/business premises affected.
Recent work undertaken by Council below Laxford Bridge has improved flood defences. Additional work planned by Council for creation of flood wall and flood overflow holding area at Kirkland meadow - completion by November 2006.
Overall Assessment
Hazard / threat category: | Sub category: |
|---|
Severe Weather | Flooding: Major Fluvial |
Scale | Likelihood | Impact | Risk |
5 sq. miles | Possible | Moderate | High |
20 sq. miles | Unlikely | Significant | Very High |
Controls in place:
Council: Emergency Response Plan; Generic Flooding Plan, "Good Neighbours" Warning Scheme. Other Organisations:
Police: Flood alert for Good Neighbours Scheme; Flood Plan for River Doon.
Environment Protection Agency: Automated water level and flow system for River Doon and Struie Burn. Early warning arrangements with Police and Council. Additional risk treatment required: - Extend Good Neighbours Warning Scheme in preparing self-help arrangements with the local community.
- Work with Kirkland and Haugh of Doon Community Councils to improve local self-help schemes.
- Consider implementing automated telephone warning system for up to 200 premises most at risk.
- Re-assess occupancy/number of households in Kirkland and Merkland areas.
- Review of progress on flood prevention scheme at Kirkland meadow.
- Promote discussion of economic recovery measures through local business forum.
- Major flood exercise 2006 for higher level of flooding.
- Consult with SEPA on likelihood estimates.
|
Note: In the above (fictitious) example, two levels of flooding are considered - equivalent to HL20, flash flooding of up to 200 premises and HL19, major river flooding of more than 100 but less than 1,000 premises in the Annex 2 local risk assessment guidance tables.
The lower scale event is something that has happened in the past and for which plans and flood prevention measures are in place or in development in the SCG area.
The higher level of flooding is estimated to be on the scale of a "one in two hundred year" event, but for which, in the light of evidence of changing weather patterns both locally and nationally, an SCG may consider that further contingency planning and other measures need to be put in place.
How other more severe river flooding events need to be considered and treated - such as HL18, H20 and H21 in the Annex 2 local risk assessment guidance tables - will depend partly on the local area geography and infrastructure - e.g. the size of urban areas adjacent to rivers - and partly on the need to consider events, which although unlikely could have wide-area or Scottish and UK national impacts.
Annex 4 - Likelihood and Impact Scoring Scales
Likelihood Scoring Scale - Quantitative and Qualitative Measures
Level | Descriptor | Indicative Chance of Occurrence in 5 Year Period | General Description |
|---|
1 | Negligible | 0.005% to 0.05% or 20,000 up to 1 in 2,000 chance | May occur only in very exceptional circumstances. May occur with a chance of between 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 10,000 per year at most. |
2 | Rare | Greater than 0.05%, up to 0.5% or > 1 in 2,000 and up to 1 in 200 chance | Very few recorded incidents or anecdotal evidence; and/or no recent incidents in associated organisations, facilities or communities; and/or little opportunity, reason or means to occur. May occur with a chance between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1,000 per year. |
3 | Unlikely | Greater than 0.5%, up to 5 % or > 1 in 200 and up to 1 in 20 chance | Might occur at some time; and/or few, infrequent, random recorded incidents or little anecdotal evidence; and/or few incidents in associated or comparable organisations, facilities or communities; and/or some opportunity, reason or means to occur. May occur with a chance of between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 100 per year. |
4 | Possible | Greater than 5%, up to 50 % or > 1 in 20 and up | Regular recorded incidents and strong anecdotal or predictive evidence. May occur/ recur with a chance of between 1 in 100 and to 1 in 2 chance 1 in 10 per year. |
5 | Probable | Greater than 50% or1 in 2 chance | High level of recorded incidents and/or very strong predictive evidence. Likely to occur/recur with a chance of more than 1 in 10 per year. |
Note: The likelihood scale above changes exponentially - by an order of magnitude (times 10) - per level of the scale - a logarithmic scale. This is because many of the events covered in any risk assessment will tend to be unlikely and the majority will then cluster at the lower end of a linear scale of likelihood. This makes it difficult to discriminate between event types and gives a picture of little value to planners. In addition, for many types of event it is only possible to differentiate likelihoods by orders of magnitude because no accurate statistical or historical data is available to support a more definitive analysis. The ">" symbol in the table means "greater than".
Descriptions of hazards such as "a one in one hundred year event" are equivalent to the likelihood for this scale of event expressed as a fractional or percentage probability for each year, i.e. for this example, a "1 in 100 per year" likelihood, or a "1% per year" likelihood of this scale of event happening. This is the format used in the general descriptions column of the above table. This yearly likelihood becomes 5 times greater (more likely) extended over a five year period - i.e. for the above example - a 1 in 100 per year likelihood becomes a 5% or 1 in 20 likelihood over five years.
Impact Scoring Scale - Qualitative Measures
Level | Descriptor | Categories of Impact | Description of Impact |
|---|
1 | Insignificant | Health | - Insignificant number of injuries or impact on health.
|
Social | - Insignificant number of persons displaced and Insignificant personal support required.
- Insignificant disruption to community services, including transport services and infrastructure.
|
Economic | - Insignificant impact on local economy.
|
Environment | - Insignificant impact on environment.
|
2 | Minor | Health | - Small number of people affected, no fatalities and small number of minor injuries with first aid treatment.
|
Social | - Minor damage to properties.
- Minor displacement of a small number of people for less than 24 hours and minor personal support required.
- Minor localised disruption to community services or infrastructure for less than 24 hours.
|
Economic Environment | - Negligible impact on local economy and cost easily absorbed.
|
- Minor impact on environment with no lasting effects
|
3 | Moderate | Health | - Sufficient number of fatalities with some casualties requiring hospitalisation and medical treatment and activation of major accident procedures in one or more hospitals.
|
Social | - Damage that is confined to a specific location, or to a number of locations, but requires additional resources.
- Localised displacement of more than 100 people for 1-3 days.
- Localised disruption to infrastructure and community services.
|
Economic | - Limited impact on local economy with some short term loss of production, with possible additional clean up costs.
|
Environment | - Limited impact on environment with short-term or long-term effects.
|
4 | Significant | Health | - Significant number of people in affected area impacted with multiple fatalities, multiple serious or extensive injuries, significant hospitalisation and activation of major accident procedures across a number of hospitals.
|
Social | - Significant damage that requires support for local responders with external resources.
- 100 to 500 people in danger and displaced for longer than 1 week. Local responders require external resources to deliver personal support.
- Significant impact on and possible breakdown of delivery of some local community services.
|
| Economic | - Significant impact on local economy with medium-term loss of production.
|
| Environment | - Significant impact on environment with medium-to long-term effects.
|
| 5 | Catastrophic | Health | - Very large numbers of people in affected area(s) with significant numbers of fatalities and large number of people requiring hospitalisation with serious injuries with longer-term effects.
|
| Social | - Extensive damage to properties and built environment in affected area requiring major demolition.
|
- General and widespread displacement of more than 500 people for prolonged duration and extensive personal support required.
|
| - Serious damage to infrastructure causing significant disruption to, or loss of, key services for prolonged period. Community unable to function without significant support.
|
| Economic | - Serious impact on local and regional economy with some long-term, potentially permanent, loss of production with some structural change.
|
- Extensive clean up and recovery costs.
|
| Environment | - Serious long-term impact on environment and/or permanent damage.
|
Assessment of Impact. The impact scoring should be based on the estimations of scale provided in Annex 2 or the additional threats guidance - or as determined by the appropriate Category 1 Responder(s) and UK, Scottish or other organisations, using the approach suggested in this guidance.
The impact categories are given equal weighting and the overall impact score for each hazard or threat - for use in the risk rating matrix - is obtained by calculating the arithmetic mean (total divided by 4) of the four levels scored - i.e. one score for each category. The total impact score should be a whole number (no fractions) and the decision to round the mean value up or down will depend on local judgement, informed by the local circumstances prevailing.
For example, if the scale of a particular hazard scores Level 3 for Health, Level 3 for Social, Level 2 for Economic and Level 1 for Environment, then the mean score will be 9 divided by 4 = 2.25, rounded down to an impact score of 2 on consideration by the SCG.
Annex 5 - Risk Rating Matrix
Definitions of Risk Ratings
Very High ( VH) Risk - these are classed as primary or critical risks requiring immediate attention. They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are such that they must be treated as a high priority. This may mean that strategies should be developed to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of (multi-agency) planning, exercising and training for these hazards should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency. Consideration should be given to planning being specific to the risk rather than generic.
High (H) Risk - these risks are classed as significant. They may have high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are sufficiently serious to warrant appropriate consideration after those risks classed as 'very high'. Consideration should be given to the development of strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks but also that mitigation in the form of at least (multi-agency) generic planning, exercising and training should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency.
Medium (M) Risk - these risks are less significant but may cause upset and inconvenience in the short-term. These risks should be monitored to ensure that they are being appropriately managed and consideration given to their being managed under generic emergency planning arrangements.
Low (L) Risk - these risks are both unlikely to occur and not significant in their impact. They should be managed using normal or generic planning arrangements and require minimal monitoring and control unless subsequent risk assessments show a substantial change, prompting a move to another risk category.
Annex 6 - Example of Community Risk Register
Community Risk Register for (Strategic Co-Ordination Group Area) | |
|---|
Date of Revision: September 2005 | Next Review Date: September 2006 |
|---|
Risk Reference and Hazard or Threat Category | Hazard or Threat Sub- Category | Hazard or Threat Description and Scale | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Rating | Capability Required | Controls in Place | Additional Risk Treatment Required | Risk Priority | Lead Agency for Risk Assessment | Review Date |
|---|
SW1 Severe Weather | Flooding (Main River) | River Doon major flood incident | Unlikely | Moderate | High | Regular checks at Kirkland Bridge. Strategic stockpiles of sandbags | Flood Defences below Laxford Bridge. Major Emergency Plan. Generic Flooding Plan. Good Neighbours Warning Scheme | Major flood exercise every 2 years. Self help assistance to Kirkland and Haugh of Doon | 4 | SEPA/Council | September 2006 |
TA1 Terrorist Attack (Information provided by central government) | Conventional explosive | Explosion in a crowded place, killing up to 100 people | (To be left blank) | (To be left blank) | (To be left blank) | Hospital surge capacity | Police counter terrorism arrangements. Emergency services and local authority Emergency Response Plans | Identify temporary mortuary sites. Finalise SCG post-disaster response co-ordination plan | 2 | Police | September 2006 |
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