« Previous | Contents | Next »
Listen
Part I: Aquaculture
Chapter One: Regulator
Introduction
8. Where possible, the Scottish Executive prefers that a voluntary approach should deliver the required outcomes. Nevertheless, some of the proposals, notably in the areas of parasite control, containment and fish movements will require the oversight of a regulator. The Executive's intention is that any regulator would advise farms and help them achieve best practice. The regulator will also enforce any relevant regulations.
Proposals for a Regulator
9. The Executive anticipates that the Fish Health Inspectorate within the Fisheries Research Services ( FRS) could provide a suitable basis of expertise for a Regulator. The proposed Regulator would act on behalf of the Scottish Ministers in conjunction with Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department ( SEERAD) officials and would liaise closely with other regulatory experts such as the Scottish Environment Protection Agency ( SEPA). All subsequent references to 'the Regulator' in this document refer to the Regulator outlined in this paragraph.
Charging
10. The Executive is considering whether the Regulator should be empowered to recover the costs involved in undertaking certain farm inspections through a charge levied on the operator of a fish farm. The question of charging for authorisation of fish movements should also be considered. The Executive proposes an enabling power to allow the possibility of charging should future circumstances require this.
Question 1:
Do you agree that FRS/ SEERAD would make the most suitable Regulator?
Question 2:
Should there be an enabling power to permit the option of charging in the future?
Chapter Two: Parasite Control
A) PARASITES
Introduction
11. Sea lice ( Lepioptheirus salmonis and Caligus elongates) are endemic to UK waters and affect salmon and sea trout, both wild and farmed. Wild salmon and sea trout stocks have declined in recent years on the west coast of Scotland. It is sensible to assume that sea lice can play a part in the potential for wild stocks to be impacted by sea lice and that wild and farmed salmonid stocks can play a part with respect to lice transfer between each other where they share the same aquatic environment. It is therefore appropriate that we adopt a precautionary approach when dealing with sea lice on farmed salmonids to ensure appropriate protection is afforded to both wild and other farmed stocks. The salmon farming industry, government and wild salmonid stakeholders have been working collaboratively to determine the interactions between sea lice and farmed and wild salmonids with a view to developing appropriate solutions to ensure the maintenance of healthy stocks of wild and farmed fish.
12. The Executive set up the Tripartite Working Group ( TWG) in 1999 to address problems common to both farmed and wild fisheries. TWG objectives are delivered at the local level through voluntary Area Management Agreements ( AMAs). A key AMA objective is the target of zero ovigerous female sea lice on salmon farms, particularly during the smolt run between February and June. Similarly, the fish farming industry has drawn up, in conjunction with wild fish interests and the Executive, the National Strategy for the Control of Sea Lice on Scottish Salmon Farms (the National Treatment Strategy) which sets out an agreed detailed treatment approach, including levels of lice infestation that trigger treatment. This strategy is currently being updated and should form an integral part of the industry's upcoming Code of Good Practice.
Proposals for a Regulatory Framework
Parasites
13. In the first instance, the main concern is the control of sea lice. However, it may be that in the future, other parasites may prove to be a problem, for example affecting nursery grounds for sea fish. It may therefore be sensible under the precautionary principle to make provision for parasites more generally rather than sea lice in particular. Paragraphs 14-19 focus on sea lice, but these proposals would apply to all parasites.
Question 3:
Should the Bill make provision for parasites in general, or restrict itself only to sea lice?
Regulator
14. The Executive proposes a role for the Regulator to have responsibility for ensuring that good management of sea lice is achieved. The Regulator would have a role in advising farms on best practice, particularly as regards sampling techniques and lice identification. In addition, the Regulator would have an enforcement role. It would have the power to inspect a farm's sea lice monitoring and treatment records on request and if there were evidence of a problem, to have the powers to direct remedial action which could include directing mandatory therapeutic treatment. The Regulator would liaise closely with the company vet and SEPA to ensure that the issues of prescription medicines and discharge consents were taken fully into account.
Question 4:
Should the Regulator have both advisory and enforcement functions?
Data
15. The Executive proposes that fish farm operators be required to provide on request to the Regulator sea lice monitoring and treatment records and to assist the Regulator to establish if sea lice infestation is a problem on the farm at the time of inspection. Failure by the operator to provide treatment information or assist the Regulator on request to establish if there is a sea lice infestation problem would be an offence.
Inspection
16. The Regulator would use its judgement when making requests for monitoring and treatment records to farm operators. They could, for example, make requests as part of a rolling programme of inspections. Alternatively, requests could be made on the basis of other intelligence, including third party notification. The Regulator would only act on third party notification if it believed there to be a strong case to do so.
17. Where louse levels are at or above pre-determined 'trigger' levels, then the Regulator would meet with the operator to discuss reasons why treatment may not have occurred or been effective. The Regulator would take account of the views of the company vet and SEPA before deciding whether a treatment or other action is required. If it is deemed to be necessary, the Regulator would have power to instruct treatment or other actions. The Regulator could decide that the appropriate action is non-therapeutic and may, for example, direct that a fish farm's employees are provided additional training.
Question 5:
What powers should the Regulator have as regards the inspection of data and investigation of potential parasite problems on farms?
Treatment
18. The Regulator should also liaise with SEPA on the issue of discharge consents. It is possible there could be a conflict between required treatment and available discharge consents. The Executive intends to investigate the options for action in such a scenario.
19. Should the Regulator decide that a therapeutic treatment is required then the Regulator would direct the fish farm operator to undertake a specified treatment. Failure to comply with such a direction would allow the Regulator to arrange the necessary treatment through a contractor and for the contractor to subsequently recoup the cost directly from the operator.
Question 6:
Should the Regulator have the power to direct treatment?
Question 7:
Should the Regulator have the power to arrange treatment through a third party contractor where a direction to treat has not been complied with?
Monitoring
20. Once a farm has been subject to mandatory action, it should be the subject of follow-up inspection to ensure that the treatment strategy has been effective. Further treatment may be required should this inspection indicate that lice levels again become too high.
B) Disease
21. Existing powers in relation to notifiable diseases are designed to prevent the spread of disease through restrictions on movements of fish, equipment, etc. The proposals outlined in part A for directing treatments in respect of parasites raises questions about the desirability of enabling the regulator to direct treatments in respect of notifiable diseases. Such directions could apply to treatment in its widest context; it could mean use of therapeutic treatments, vaccination or management strategy. Where the use of therapeutic treatments is desirable then the Regulator would take account of the views of the company vet and SEPA before deciding whether treatment is required. For example, if we failed in our efforts to eradicate another outbreak of Infectious Salmon Anaemia ( ISA) we would wish to be able to direct the vaccination of new inputs of stock in order to protect against ISA infection in surrounding waters or farms.
Question 8:
Should the Regulator have the powers to direct treatment for notifiable diseases?
Chapter Three: Containment
Introduction
22. There continues to be a high degree of public interest and concern about the numbers of fish farm escapes of salmon (and rainbow trout), and their possible impact on wild stocks. For fish farmers, escapes represent a loss of valuable assets (although to some extent this can be offset by insurance). For conservation and wild fish interests escaped fish have the potential to spread disease, compromise genetic integrity and increase competition in the freshwater environment. Wild Atlantic salmon is a species of European importance, by virtue of it being listed in Annex II of the EC Habitats Directive.
23. In the light of these concerns and the views expressed by the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organisation ( NASCO) the Executive established a cross-sectoral farmed fish escapes working group in 1998 to look into the issue. (Report of the Working Group on Escapes, 2001 - www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Fisheries/afBill/addsend ) require that the Scottish Ministers be notified in writing immediately where there is cause to suspect that an escape has occurred.
27. Containment of fish to prevent escapes is a key priority of the Strategic Framework for Scottish Aquaculture ( SFSA). Since the SFSA was published in 2003, a Containment Working Group ( CWG) comprised of key stakeholders including Industry and wild fish interests has drafted new Containment Guidance for regulators and industry on behalf of the Highlands & Islands Aquaculture Forum ( HIAF), relevant parts of which will be included in the upcoming industry Code of Good Practice.
28. The CWG continues to examine containment issues and will shortly be examining fish farm structure and design issues in greater detail with a view to making recommendations to the Ministerial Working Group on Aquaculture.
Proposals for a Regulatory Framework
29. Progress has been made since 2000 to minimise the risks of escapes from fish farms. The Executive welcomes that fact that the aquaculture industry has played its part in recent years through self regulation. This good practice should nevertheless be underpinned by statutory provisions to ensure that the entire fish farming industry puts measures in place to prevent, and if necessary deal with, fish escapes effectively.
Definition of fish farm
30. The Executive proposes that the following proposals apply to all types of marine and freshwater fish farms, other than restocking hatcheries for wild fisheries and shellfish farms.
Question 9:
Should escapes proposals apply to all the farm types outlined above?
Question 10:
Should shellfish farms and restocking hatcheries be exempted?
Regulator
31. It is proposed that the Regulator will have powers to inspect a farm with respect to the criteria set out in the containment plans with a view to reducing the likelihood of fish escaping. The ability to inspect a farm would not be dependent on an escape or suspected escape taking place. Rather, prevention would be the watchword. If the Regulator found evidence that procedures could be improved, it would have the power to direct the fish farmer operators to take certain specified steps within an agreed timescale with a view to remedying the situation. Failure to comply with such a direction would be an offence.
Question 11:
Do you agree that the Regulator should have powers to inspect and direct with respect to preventing escapes?
Question 12:
Do you agree that the Regulator should have a role in improving containment to prevent fish escapes?
Offence in respect of escapes from fish farms
32. The Executive proposes the creation of a strict liability offence in respect of escapes of finfish from fish farms. In the event of an escape from a fish farm the operator (who would be one or more of the following: the farm owner, the company directors, the farm occupier (the lessee), the farm operator or the farm manager) would be guilty of an offence, unless they could prove to the court that the operator had taken all reasonable steps to prevent an escape from occurring.
Question 13:
Should the Executive introduce a strict liability offence for escapes from fish farms?
Containment plans
33. Fish farm operators must have in place suitable containment plans with the aim of preventing escapes. Figure 1 outlines the possible content of such plans.
Figure 1
Proposed possible content of containment plans
1. Cages, moorings, nets and cables must be assessed by a chartered or other similarly qualified professional to ensure that they are fit for purpose and put in place in a manner which ensures,
as far as practicable, the containment of farmed fish.
2. The chartered (or similarly qualified professional) will provide certification stating that the structural equipment installed on the farm is fit for purpose and appropriately configures for the aquatic environment in which it is placed.
3. Nets and other structural equipment (moorings, cables, etc.) will be subject to an inspection and maintenance plan to meet manufacturers' specifications and recommendations to ensure these elements remain fit for purpose.
4. Fish farmers will ensure that they have appropriate work platforms to allow inspection of cages, which meet with health and safely legislation requirements.
5. Fish farmers and their staff will receive training to and will follow working procedures to minimise any risk of fish escaping due to operational or maintenance failures.
6. Fish farmers will have appropriate security to prevent/monitor theft and vandalism.
7. Inspection of nets and other containment equipment will take place after key activities such as net cleaning or equipment repair.
8. The fish farmer will keep containment records to include contingency plans documentation, a certification of structural equipment and records of inspections to check net and equipment
integrity. Also, all repair and maintenance inspection and actions will be recorded and kept for statutory verification.
9. The fish farmer and his staff will co-operate with the Regulator to provide information relevant to containment or suspected/actual escape incident. Also, the fish farmer and his staff will make themselves available and co-operate in any site inspection requested by the Regulator's staff and
their advisors.
10. Contingency plans must cover procedures to stop further escapes and recover escaped fish where this is a practical option (Environmental Liability Directive).
Question 14:
What elements should be addressed in containment plans?
Escapes notification
34. The current regulatory regime for fish escapes is provided by the Registration of Fish Farming and Shellfish Farming Businesses Order 1985 as amended. Experience over the past three years suggests that a minority of operators are not specific enough about the circumstances of an escape (suspected or otherwise) and very often fail to report 'forthwith' as required by current legislation. There has also been criticism from some quarters about the time taken to determine whether or not an escape has actually occurred.
35. What is now proposed is a wider regulatory regime covering the inspection and regulating of containment measures on farms as well as notification procedures. The full suite of proposals will therefore replace the current procedures set out by order.
Proposed notification procedures for fish escapes
36. Your comments are welcomed on the draft proposals below:
36.1 Where an operator discovers an escape or suspects there has been an escape from their aquaculture facility, they must report the incident to the Scottish Ministers who would in turn notify such bodies as they deem appropriate.
36.2 The Scottish Ministers must immediately be informed in writing of the discovery of an escape or suspected escape.
36.3 A written report to the Scottish Ministers must include:
36.3.1 the date, estimated time and location of the escape or suspected escape;
36.3.2 the species of finfish that escaped or may have escaped;
36.3.3 the estimated number of finfish that escaped or may have escaped;
36.3.4 the cause or suspected cause of the escape or suspected escape;
36.3.5 the calendar year in which the finfish were stocked at the aquaculture facility;
36.3.6 the average weight of the finfish that have escaped or may have escaped;
36.3.7 the rearing facility from which the finfish were received by the aquaculture facility; and
36.3.8 a record of each drug administered including:
36.3.8.1 the name of the drug;
36.3.8.2 the period of administration, including the dates of commencement and completion of the drug treatment;
36.3.8.3 the name of the prescribing veterinarian;
36.3.8.4 the prescribed withdrawal period; and
36.3.8.5 identification of finfish treated.
Question 15:
Do you have any views on the above proposals?
Powers to investigate incidents
37. Under existing notification procedures the Scottish Executive has no power to investigate a suspected escape where it has been informed by a third party. Up to now the Executive has contacted the operator of the fish farm in question and requested that they establish whether or not there has been an escape. The Executive proposes that the Regulator should have powers to investigate escapes and suspected escapes of fish from fish farms however the intelligence of an escape is received.
Question 16:
Do you agree that the Regulator should have powers to investigate escapes and suspected escapes from fish farms whatever the source of the information?
38. Where an escape has been confirmed and reported in writing to the Scottish Ministers (through the procedures in paragraph 34 above) the Scottish Ministers should have the power to instruct/require the fish farm operator concerned to improve existing procedures for the prevention of escapes (site containment measures and contingency plans) within a reasonable time period.
Chapter Four: Data Collection
Introduction
39. At the moment, the only data the Executive receives from the aquaculture industry comes from the annual shellfish and finfish production survey undertaken by the FRS, based on returns submitted by industry on a voluntary basis. The Executive does not currently receive reliable economic information which means it is not in a position to monitor trends, which can complicate matters where it has to deal with trade issues at an international level.
Proposals
40. The Executive proposes that the Scottish Ministers have the powers to oblige the aquaculture industry to submit data that they deem necessary. The data will inform how the Scottish Ministers develop future policies, future decisions and ensure that the industry continues to move towards achieving the SFSA vision of a sustainable, diverse, competitive and economically viable industry.
41. The data submitted will include all data currently obtained through the annual production survey as well as additional economic data from producers and trade bodies. For example, the Scottish Ministers may require farm gate price information and breakdown of cost data and production value and volume. This would give information on company financial performance or cost structures.
Question 17:
What data, in addition to the production survey data, do you believe are appropriate to submit?
Chapter Five: Fish Farm Relocation
Introduction
42. The relocation of finfish farms is one of the priorities for action in the SFSA. A location/relocation working group ( LRWG) was established and comprises key stakeholders representing the public sector, wildfish interests, the aquaculture industry, environmental NGOs and regulators. The LRWG was tasked to prepare criteria against which to assess whether or not any finfish aquaculture site is poorly located. The main driver for the relocation of fish farms is the potential for finfish farming to adversely affect wild salmonid stocks.
43. The LRWG has adopted a practical approach with a view to eventually drawing together a framework to facilitate relocation. The framework will be informed by work currently being undertaken by FRS and the Scottish Aquaculture Research Forum in addition to pilot relocation studies. The Scottish Executive intends to publish a draft Framework and Environmental Assessment for public consultation in spring 2006.
Proposals for Regulation
Financial assistance for fish farm relocation
44. The Executive proposes that the Scottish Ministers be given powers enabling them to offer financial assistance to fish farm operators who wish to relocate any or all parts of their operations where they are able to demonstrate that there is an environmental benefit from doing so. The enabling provisions should apply to all types of fish farm, in all parts of Scotland in both the freshwater and marine environment.
Question 18:
Do you agree that financial assistance be given to fish farm operators to relocate where there is a clear environmental benefit in doing so?
Powers to close fish farms
45. As a last resort, the Scottish Ministers should have the power to close a fish farm where they believe there is a clear public interest for them to do so, but only where an operator is not prepared or unable to relocate their operations.
Question 19:
Do you agree that the Scottish Ministers should have powers to close fish farms where there is a clear public interest to do so and where owners are not in a position to relocate?
Chapter Six: Discretionary Power to Pay Compensation for Compulsory Fish Slaughter
Introduction
46. At the time of the ISA outbreak in 1998/99 there was no compensation for losses due to Executive disease controls. Ministers recognise the possibility that compensation may have a role to play in dealing with future disease outbreaks.
Proposals
47. Compensation on any terms could give rise to substantial costs to the public purse, for which no provision is made in current spending plans and the Scottish Ministers would have to consider carefully whether any such costs could be afforded. The Executive therefore proposes that there should be an enabling power such that the Scottish Ministers could, if they saw fit and without obligation, pay compensation of such amount in what circumstances as they prescribed by statutory instrument, for any fish destroyed for the purposes of disease controls.
48. Any compensation scheme for any given outbreak of disease would be detailed in a Statutory Instrument ( SI) which would be consulted on at the time. Any scheme would be funded only on the basis of shared risk. Should a scheme for limited compensation be drawn up under the enabling power outlined above, the Scottish Ministers may be of the view that compensation would be payable only to operators that demonstrated clear evidence of compliance with the industry's Code of Good Practice.
Question 20:
Under what circumstances might it be useful for the Scottish Ministers to have discretionary powers to pay compensation to fish farm operators?
Chapter Seven: Fish Movements - Fish Farms
The need for control
49. One of the greatest risks of spreading disease is posed by the movement of live fish. This became clear during the outbreak of Infectious Salmon Anaemia ( ISA) in 1998/99 when it was confirmed that there was only one source point of infection and that the disease was spread to a further 10 sites in all the main production areas of Scotland. Apparently healthy fish were moved, under veterinary supervision, from infected farms (prior to the infection being discovered) resulting in a subsequent disease outbreak in the receiving sites. While ISA is the main impetus behind bringing in controls, it is important to recognise that novel diseases may arise in the future and that compulsory slaughter could be required for other serious diseases such as Infectious Haematopoietic Necrosis ( IHN) and Viral Haemorrhagic Septicaemia ( VHS).
Proposals for a Regulatory Framework
50. The Executive is keen to reduce the risk of the introduction and spread of disease into and between fish farms. To do so, there are three main areas we would seek to manage: the movements of all live fish (at all life stages) in and out of marine farm management areas; movements of live fish in and out of freshwater farms; and transportation by wellboats.
Movements of all life stages of live fish in and out of marine farm management areas
51. The ISA Code of Practice advises against movements between management areas (except in certain limited circumstances) as a means of preventing the spread of ISA and other diseases. The experience of ISA leads the Executive to believe that the potential consequences of inadvertent transmission of disease out a local management area are sufficiently serious to justify statutory regulation.
52. The Executive proposes therefore that the consent of the Regulator will be required for movements of live fish out of management areas to be defined in secondary legislation. To move fish without such a consent would be an offence. This would also regulate movements ashore for stripping of broodstock and for processing. The Regulator outlined in paragraph 9 of this document would be responsible for authorising such movements.
Question 21:
Do you agree with the need to regulate live fish movements out of, and between, marine farm management areas?
Movements of live fish in and out of freshwater farms
53. In general, there should be no need to restrict fish movements between freshwater fish farms because the Diseases of Fish Act 1937 as amended gives sufficient powers to be able to deal with an outbreak of a notifiable disease. That said, it would be helpful to include a power in the Bill for a 'standstill provision' that would be able to cover the whole of Scotland and could prevent all movements in the event of an outbreak of a novel disease which would not, by definition, be covered by the above Diseases of Fish Act.
Question 22:
Do you agree there is no general need to restrict live fish movements between freshwater fish farms?
Question 23:
Is the proposed power to bring in a national standstill provision in case of a novel disease appropriate?
Wellboat disinfection
54. A wellboat is a vessel for transporting live fish in tanks. Many of the wellboats operating in Scottish waters subcontract from other countries, notably Norway. The Epizootic Report into Scotland's ISA outbreak suggested the possibility that the virus was accidentally introduced as a result of inadequate disinfection of a wellboat before departure from Norway where ISA has not been eradicated. The Executive proposes to enable the Regulator to be able to inspect any wellboats before they begin operations at a farm. The Regulator would grant an operating licence if it was satisfied that the vessel had been properly disinfected or withhold a licence until disinfection had been carried out to its satisfaction.
Question 24:
Should the Regulator be empowered to licence the transfer of fish by wellboats in Scotland?
« Previous | Contents | Next »