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Policy Annexes

Annex A: MEASURES APPLYING IN SURVEILLANCE AND PROTECTION ZONES

Introduction and Outline

61. When disease is first confirmed, measures to contain and severely limit any spread of virus either by animal or other ( e.g. vehicles) means will be implemented immediately in an area not less than 10 km surrounding the Infected Premises ( IP). As set out in EC Legislation the boundaries should use natural defining features, e.g. roads, rivers, railways, footpaths. The Protection and Surveillance Zones (which taken together are also known as the |Infected Area) will be expanded as necessary in response to any further cases of confirmed disease and the perimeter will always be at least 10 km from the nearest IP. Normally, these disease containment or biosecurity related measures applicable to the will continue until 21 days after the last outbreak in that particular area. Other measures may work on a different timescale.

Main biosecurity) Measures

62. The main measures can be summarised:

Mandatory

• A footbath containing an approved disinfectant and a cleansing and disinfection (C&D) point will be placed at the entrances to all livestock farms.
• Thorough cleansing and disinfection of people, vehicles and machinery moving on and off livestock farms will apply. It is important to note that arable machinery will require licensing and C&D will apply when moving machinery to or from livestock farms.
• Stringent animal movement controls will apply, i.e. no movements of animals except under licence to slaughter or on extreme welfare grounds. Livestock can be moved through the Infected Area by motorway, trunk road or railway, provided that the animals are not unloaded within the Infected Area.
• There will be no unlicensed contact between animals from different premises.
• Licensing of silage, straw, milk, and disposal of slurry will apply.
• Enforcement patrols will ensure the implementation of Infected Area measures
• Access rights and Rights of Way through and within the Infected Area will be closed. SEERAD will provide explanatory leaflets.

Discretionary

• Manned C&D units will be placed at the entrances to all dairy and pig farms 24 hours daily, resources permitting; otherwise subject to veterinary risk assessment.
• Milk tankers, designated for use exclusively in the Infected Area will be accompanied by SVS or SEERAD officials in the area, to ensure thorough C & D on and off premises.
• Option of SEERAD officials accompanying slurry tankers to ensure thorough C&D on and off farms.
• Feed lorries (accompanied by mobile C&D teams to carry out and ensure thorough C&D on and off farms) to go to only one farm in each visit to the Infected Area, resources permitting; otherwise subject to veterinary risk assessment.
• Based on veterinary advice, mandatory C&D stations for all vehicles may be established on all exit routes from the Infected Area. For health and safety reasons, there are no C&D points on major trunk routes. C&D points would be sited on the side roads accessing major routes.

Local Management and Co-ordination

63. Successful management of FMD controls depends on the co-operation of all the agencies involved. To achieve this co-operation, a LDCC Management Control Team will be set up immediately when FMD is confirmed. It will comprise the DVM, ROD, PAO, Local Authorities ( LAs), Police, and SEPA. Others, such as the army or fire brigade, may be co-opted for specific projects as the need arises. Normally this group will meet in the LDCC twice a day in the initial phase and will themselves determine the required frequency thereafter. Where more than one Local Authority or police force is involved all will be expected to participate. The LDCC Management Control Team would be expected to liaise on all FMD issues including Infected Area (biosecurity) issues.

64. In consultation with the LDCC Management Control Team, the ROD will set up a local stakeholders group, specifically to address Infected Area issues. Membership could include industry representatives, the Community Council, as well as some local individuals with business or other interests which might not be represented otherwise ( e.g. forestry, fish farms, tourism, schools, church). The stakeholder group would meet as frequently as desired in the early phase of an outbreak and then possibly weekly, but this would be determined in light of the circumstances.

Division of Responsibilities

The key partners in the operation of an Infected Area are:

65. SEERAD Pentland House will ensure the legislative base and, with the NDCC in London, produce the formal maps defining the Infected Area and update this in response to the developing circumstances. Through the LDCC, the ROD will arrange for the notification of all public utilities, feed companies, dairies and milk collection companies, and others who may regularly visit farms in the area and for a press release for public information. Local radio will also be used where possible. Through the LDCC all licence issues will be undertaken. The ROD will arrange, on the advice of the DVM and resources permitting, for disinfectant teams to be placed at the entrances to all dairy and pig farms; for the setting up of mobile C&D Units, and for disinfectant points, including footbaths, to be sited at the entrances to all other livestock farms. He/she will enlist the help of the Local Authority in setting up and manning these teams.

66. The State Veterinary Service will provide advice and guidance to the other agencies when and where required. The SVS will provide and train personnel, and quality assure the biosecurity operations in the Infected Area.

67. Considerable Local Authority and Roads Department input will be required in identifying all exit points from the Infected Area and in identifying suitable sites where - if deemed necessary - roadside C&D stations would be set up. Such a decision would be on the advice of the DVM. The operation of these C&D stations would involve labour and supervision in addition to the supply and servicing of equipment. Local Authorities will also have a role in informing those in the area, e.g. Community Councils, schools, etc., in monitoring and enforcing the legislative requirements, and in supporting aspects of licensing essential animal movements. The Local Authority Authorised Officers/Animal Health Inspectors will be involved in ensuring that the community follows the necessary biosecurity measures (including banning recreational access to the countryside and the use of rights of way) with, if necessary, a view to prosecutions.

68. The Police have a key role in traffic flow and logistical advice in setting up any C&D stations, in patrolling within the Infected Area to ensure compliance and checking for licences where appropriate.

69. SEPA has a major role in advising on the siting and operation of any C&D stations where a number of aspects, such as disinfectant run off, may be an issue.

70. NFU Scotland will have a major role in helping to communicate information to the industry.

Resources

71. If recommended by the DVM, Local Authorities would be expected to equip and man any disinfection roadside stations. The number of disinfection stations would be identified with the help of the Roads/Highways Department and Police and would depend on the extent of the Infected Area and the number of roads exiting. A team of 2 or 3 for each station is suggested, and each station would require to be manned 24 hours a day for the duration of the biosecurity related restrictions, thus requiring staff rotas or shifts. Thus, a direct labour force or rapid recruitment of staff would be required. Equipment would include road warning signs, disinfection equipment such as power washers, water supply (possibly bowsers), water tankers to refill bowsers, disinfectant supply (citric acid), arc lights for night operation, traffic lights, generators, shelters for staff, toilet, equipment & chemical store, means to collect or contain run-off, and mobile telephones. It is recommended that Local Authorities draw up a comprehensive list of requirements in liaison with the local DVM and consider means of delivering this in their Local Plan. Local Authorities may also be asked to help, on the advice of the DVM, with supply of manpower and equipment for C&D stations at dairy and pig farm entrances and mobile C&D units to perform other biosecurity functions such as accompanying feed lorries in the Infected Area. There is a need to keep records of all visitors to livestock farms and those passing through manned roadside C&D stations so that any claims for damage may subsequently be addressed.

72. Local Authorities would also be responsible for all enforcement issues and required to participate in the LDCC Management Control Team and to consider what other local issues would need to be addressed e.g. local publicity/liaison, helpline etc.

73. Depending on the size of the Infected Area, the police should normally expect to have at least one patrol car operating within the Area to give visibility to the operation and to challenge any agricultural vehicle moving without a licence. In addition, a senior officer should participate in the LDCC Management Control Team.

74. SEPA should have at least one officer involved in FMD operations providing advice on all aspects, including Infected Area operations, through the LDCC Management Control Team.

Annex B: DISEASE CONTROL TOOLS

Objectives of the disease control strategy

75. The Disease Strategy Group will have as one of its roles, the setting of the overall parameters of the disease control strategy. These could include the eradication of the disease in the shortest possible time, with the least economic damage either to the livestock sector or to the Scottish economy as a whole, or with the lowest number of animals slaughtered. To achieve this, a range of disease control tools could be deployed as appropriate.

EU and Scottish legislation

75. EU legislation on FMD is set out in Directive 2003/85/ EC (adopted in September 2003), and implemented in Scotland by the FMD (Scotland) Regulations 2005, under which the basic disease control strategy is the culling of all susceptible species on infected premises and dangerous contacts. The earlier this occurs after initial infection, the more likely that swift action will stop the spread of disease. However, if this fails to work, more rigorous action will be required and there are a range of options which would be considered once the particular circumstances of the outbreak have been established.

76. The EU does not allow routine prophylactic vaccination. It does envisage however emergency vaccination taking place where an outbreak threatens to become extensive within a Member State or where other MSs are at risk. The decision to introduce emergency vaccination would normally be taken by the affected or threatened MS, although provision exists for the Commission to initiate discussion of a vaccination programme with an affected MS if it is posing a risk to others. The Directive also allows a vaccination programme to be carried out and agreement sought later if speed is paramount.

Emergency Vaccination

77. The Directive has moved emergency vaccination to the forefront of potential control strategies, particularly by streamlining EU agreement processes and facilitating an exit strategy. This position was supported by the Scottish Executive policy during negotiations on the Directive, given the importance of avoiding large scale slaughter. Its use is not however automatic, and will be considered along with other disease control options on the basis of the specific circumstances of each area, and on veterinary advice as to the epidemiology of the outbreak.

There are two main modes in which emergency vaccination could be used: 'suppressive', where the vaccinated animals would be subsequently killed and disposed of, or 'protective', where the vaccinated animals live out their economic lives and then enter the human food chain. It is Scottish Executive policy that protective vaccination is the preferred mode whenever circumstances allow.

Either of these modes of using emergency vaccination could have a number of geographical strategies associated with them.

• Ring vaccination is used to describe vaccination within a boundary drawn to circle an area of known infection. The size of the area covered would depend on geography, available human and vaccine resources, and assessment of the disease risk.
• Firebreak or buffer vaccination is when a zone is established between an area with disease and a disease-free area. The aim would be to create an area large enough to protect against spread of the virus around or through the 'firebreak' zone.

78. A very high proportion of the livestock within any vaccination area would need to be vaccinated to develop enough immunity to prevent the disease taking hold and spreading to clean areas. Before vaccination could be used it would be necessary to order the manufacture of sufficient doses of the vaccine. A vaccination resource has been contracted to provide and train teams of vaccinators. Tight controls would be needed on the borders of the vaccination area to reduce the risk of disease breaching the vaccination zones through movement of vehicles, animals and/or people. Following vaccination, a programme of blood testing would be needed to check that the disease had been contained in the vaccination zone, before progressive lifting of controls.

Decision making

79. It is for the Scottish Executive to decide whether an emergency vaccination campaign is to be undertaken in Scotland and how it is to be implemented. This will be in conjunction with the CVO ( UK) who represents the UK (the Member State) on the EU Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health. It will have regard to the risk to other parts of the UK, other Member States and the likelihood of the disease becoming widespread. The DSG would determine the scope (species) and extent (geographical and types of premises) of any emergency vaccination programme.

80. The decisions on when, where and how to deploy vaccination depend on a large number of factors. The Directive sets out criteria to be taken into account when considering a vaccination programme; these are however indicative rather than prescriptive, and veterinary and epidemiological judgement will always be the major factor in such decisions. With this in mind, it is possible to follow a structured decision making process.

81. The first point to establish is whether the disease can be eradicated by "stamping out" - culling on infected and dangerous contact premises ( IPs and DCs). Factors to be assessed here include: strain of virus, transmission characteristics of virus, species affected, epidemiology of outbreaks, resource constraints and economic consequences.

82. If the disease can be controlled in this way, the disease strategy concentrates on the stamping out route. If not, the next step, in line with the Scottish Executive's Response to the FMD Inquiries, is to consider vaccination:

• Within this option there are the technical issues such as epidemiological assessment of whether vaccination will suppress virus production before spread; the shape of the vaccination zone (which must be large enough to contain the spread of the virus and take account of airborne spread and natural barriers); production of enough of the relevant strain of vaccine; status of tests to differentiate infected from vaccinated animals (known as "non structural protein" or NSP tests).
• There are also economic/social issues such as the implications for export markets, public and industry acceptance of vaccination itself and of products from vaccinated animals, views of other Member States, costs of mounting the vaccination programme and any subsequent regionalisation as required by the Directive.
• Resource issues relate to availability of manpower to undertake the programme of vaccination and tagging, logistics of a cold chain supply to preserve the potency of the vaccine and data/ IT support to ensure that reliable records are kept.

83. If, in the light of the above, the decision is taken to vaccinate, then the next step is to decide between protective and suppressive modes of vaccination (see above).

• Further issues to be examined here include pressure on slaughter and disposal capacity, the effect on regaining export status (3 months for suppressive and stamping out, 6 months for protective vaccination), identification and records of vaccinated animals.
• Similar economic and social considerations as above, including the possibility of intense public scrutiny (as occurred in the Netherlands in 2001 when suppressive vaccination was used).

Any use of protective vaccination carries with it the need for post vaccination controls on the movements of vaccinated animals, and on the marketing of milk and meat from vaccinates. A three phase exit strategy, with the timing of the phases depending on the results of an extensive serological surveillance programme, is set out in detail in the Directive and the FMD Regulations.

84. Consideration of strategies other than 'vaccinate to live' - protective vaccination - in no way implies that the Scottish Executive is moving away from the position set out in its Response to the main FMD Inquiries. However, as the criteria above demonstrate, the decision is a multifactorial one and ultimately will be governed by the circumstances of an actual outbreak.

85. If neither of these modes is deemed acceptable, then the option of vaccination must fall and extended culling strategies will be considered.

Extended culling strategies

86. The legislation allows for a preventive eradication programme to be undertaken where epidemiological or other evidence indicates, either at the stage of suspicion of disease or when it has been confirmed. The design of an extended cull programme, like that of a vaccination programme, will have the objective of getting ahead of the disease and will be governed by the circumstances at the time. Possible strategies could include a "firebreak" cull (analogous to firebreak vaccination above), culling on contiguous premises, or a cull of premises identified as higher risk. Choice of an extended culling strategy will depend critically on epidemiological information and may also be guided by mathematical modelling of the outbreak.

Implementation

87. At the direction of Scottish Ministers the SVS will manage the vaccination programme, which will require prompt action to put in place an implementation team. A GB contract is in place to provide the vaccination resource, the main features of which are:

• Recruitment and training of vets and vaccination personnel, up to 50 three-person teams.
• Establishment of vaccination centres.
• Identification of holdings and animals to be vaccinated.
• Carrying out the vaccination with regard to biosecurity and health and safety guidelines.
• Tagging of animals once vaccinated and capture of data for records.

163. An extended cull would also be managed by the SVS with assistance from other operational partners, and in certain circumstances, the Army.

Annex C: BIOSECURITY ADVICE FOR FARMERS AND THOSE KEEPING LIVESTOCK

88. In the event of a new outbreak of FMD anywhere in Great Britain, the following information will be widely distributed by the Scottish Executive and displayed on the Executive's website. The Executive has developed a Biosecurity Code detailing measures to be taken as a matter of routine to guard against FMD and other diseases. For details of this, as well as advice for use during an outbreak, see the Biosecurity website, which will be regularly updated in the event of FMD ( http://www.scotland.gov.uk/topics/agriculture/animal-welfare/15721/2959 )

89. IF YOU SUSPECT THAT YOUR ANIMAL(S) HAS FMD, ISOLATE IT/THEM AND STOP ALL LIVESTOCK MOVEMENT. CONTACT YOUR LOCAL ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICE IMMEDIATELY:

Ayr; Tel: 01292 268525

Galashiels; Tel: 01896 758806

Perth; Tel: 01738 602211

Inverurie; Tel: 01467 626300

Inverness; Tel: 01463 253098

Key Information

90. Foot and Mouth Disease ( FMD) is caused by a highly infectious virus and among farm stock, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and deer are susceptible. Elephants, camelids, hedgehogs, rats and any wild cloven-footed animals can also contract it.

91. FMD can be spread by:

• Direct contact with an infected animal.
• Airborne spread from an infected animal.
• Indirectly by infected material carried on vehicles' tyres and wheel arches and on machinery. The meaning of vehicles in this instance includes pick-ups, quad bikes, tractors, combines, trailers, any delivery vehicles, milk tankers, feed and fertiliser lorries.
• The virus can also be spread via persons ( e.g. hands, hair, boots), clothing, sheepdogs, scavenging animals, vermin, and use/sharing of machinery.

Clinical signs of FMD

92. Quickly recognising clinical signs of FMD in livestock is vital to controlling the disease and preventing it from spreading.

93. In cattle and pigs the signs of disease are usually readily seen. Sheep do not always show obvious clinical signs of FMD.

Sheep

There is a chance that some sheep in your flock, or single sheep, may be infected without you realising it. Look out for these signs:

• Blister(s) in the dental pad (upper gum).
• Sheep may show lameness and the feet may be hot to the touch.
• Loss of appetite.
• Sudden death in young lambs.
• Whitening and blisters on the coronary band (top of hoof). These may be small and covered with hair. If the blisters have burst, hair may be damp and bacterial infection may be present.
• Abortions.
• Blisters around the mouth are rare, but be aware.

Cattle

• Temperature increase of 2-3°C.
• Loss of appetite.
• Reduced milk yield.
• Lameness with the presence of painful lesions on the feet, making the animal uncomfortable and causing it to shift its weight. Feet feel hot to the touch. Cattle may flick feet as if a stone is lodged.
• Drooling saliva and chomping of jaws.
• Nasal discharge.
• Lesions and areas of whitening in the mouth which can develop into fluid-filled blisters on the tongue.
• The presence of blisters on the teats.

Pigs

• Temperature increase of 2-3°C.
• Loss of appetite.
• Huddling together.
• Lameness, feet feel hot to the touch and unwillingness to stand.
• Hunching their backs if made to move.
• Development of white lesions and blisters on the coronary band (top of hoof) and snout.

94. Stop the spread of FMD. Stringent biosecurity measures can help to avoid disease occurring or spreading to other animals. It is important to apply the biosecurity precautions that suit your farm.

95. Look for early signs of disease. Carry out regular inspections of your animals. Make sure that they are properly restrained and that there is enough light to examine their mouth, feet and teats and check temperatures.

96. Deal with sheep last. Signs of FMD in sheep can be more difficult to spot. These animals are a major threat to other stock, as you would not know whether you are spreading infection from your sheep.

97. Keep livestock separate

• At the first sign of disease, isolate sick animals and stop all livestock movement.
• Keep fencing in good repair. Stop nose to nose contact of your animals with your neighbours' animals. Well maintained electric fencing or a wide unbroken hedge, ditch or similar, are suggested solutions. Where possible, try to keep an empty field, watercourse, wood or road between your livestock and your neighbour.
• Avoid putting cattle on pasture that has been grazed by sheep for at least 6 weeks. Ask your vet for advice.
• Keep new animals separate from your livestock for 20 days. This allows FMD symptoms to develop and tests to be carried out without endangering other animals.

98. Keep yourself clean

• The virus can survive on surfaces such as hands, hair, boots and clothing.
• If all your animals are at one location, keep a separate set of clothing or overalls to wear when working with them. If your livestock are at several locations, keep separate clothing/overalls for each group. Clothing should be washed at the hottest temperature for the material, before being worn near a different group of animals.
• Remove any mud or dung from footwear before applying approved disinfectant. Brush hard in the direction of the tread. Make sure that disinfectant footbaths are kept clean and that disinfectant is changed regularly. Keep footbaths covered so that rain does not dilute the disinfectant.
• After handling animals, clean and then disinfect clothing, footwear and equipment and wash your hands with soap and water.
• If returning from other livestock or a livestock farm away from your farm, you must change your clothes and footwear before you visit your own animals.

99. Keep your farm secure

• Provide cleaning and disinfectant materials (brush, hose, water, disinfectant and, if possible, a pressure washer) for all visitors/workers on arrival and departure and have protective clothing/footwear/disposable gloves available for on-farm use.
• Make sure your boundaries are secure. Stray animals could carry infection to or from your stock. Pests and vermin can spread disease. Ensure that feed is securely stored to avoid unwanted vermin activity.
• Dissuade visitors from having contact with livestock. Display notices directing visitors to the farmhouse or farm office.
• Clearly identify buildings where your animals are housed and ask people to keep out.
• Risk assessments by veterinary and scientific experts advise that walkers who have had no contact with livestock pose a small risk in spreading FMD. However, access will be closed if disease is confirmed - throughout the infected area only.

100. Keep unnecessary vehicles away

• Infected material can be carried anywhere on the vehicle or its load, as well as on the driver's hands, clothes or footwear.
• Encourage visitors to park at a safe point outside the farm's entrance. Have a cleaning and disinfecting point at the farm's entrance/exit points for visitors to clean and then disinfect footwear and equipment. If a vehicle has to come onto your farm the vehicle must be thoroughly cleaned and then disinfected and, if possible, parked away from livestock.

101. Clean and then disinfect

• All vehicles and trailers must be cleaned and then disinfected before entering and leaving your farm. Firstly, use water to wash off all mud before applying disinfectant. If the vehicle is dirty, disinfectant will not kill the virus. Ensure that hard to reach areas, for example, the wheels and wheel arches are properly cleaned.
• Make sure the inside of the vehicle is cleaned as well, including the foot wells, pedals and mats. Clean all areas used for carrying other things such as feed, bedding or equipment.

102. Avoid visiting other farms

• Visiting other farms risks spreading the disease. If this is unavoidable, follow the cleaning and disinfecting advice. Relief milkers, stockmen and contractors should follow all these precautions.
• Take as little onto the farm as possible and, if you can, wear boots and clothing supplied by your neighbour. Your dog could be carrying infective material on its fur or feet, so it is best left at home.
• Avoid driving through dung, slurry or manure on the road. If any material falls from your vehicle then, if possible, sweep it off the road so other vehicles, people or animals cannot pick it up and cause the disease to spread further.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICE. AN ON-CALL 24-HOUR SERVICE IS PROVIDED FOR EMERGENCIES.

Annex D(i): ACCESS OUTSIDE A FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE INFECTED AREA

Guidance on Risk

103. The only people and/or their modes of transport ( e.g. bicycles) who risk spreading FMD are those who have direct or close contact with infected farms or farms incubating FMD. Infected farms are put under statutory restrictions and access to and from them is limited to essential visitors and essential vehicles only - when strict disease prevention measures (biosecurity) must be observed.

104. Risks of disease being spread by those seeking recreational access to the countryside are very small, and can be eliminated by avoiding direct contact between people and/or vehicles (including bicycles) where livestock are kept or have been in the last 28 days. There is no reason to close access to land in areas outwith the Infected Area. People visiting areas of the countryside outside an Infected Area will be asked to follow the advice later in this chapter.

105. However, landowners/farmers in close proximity to an Infected Area or those who have strong reasons to believe they will be exposed to higher risks, have recourse to suggest that their land is closed. In any such case, the landowner/farmer must complete a risk assessment that demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Local Authority Access Officer and the Divisional Veterinary Manager, that the proposed closure is justified. Subject to central guidance from Scottish Ministers, and only with the agreement of the Divisional Veterinary Manager and Scottish Ministers, can the Local Authority sanction closure outside an Infected Area. Closure should be specific and time limited. Any such closures should also be notified formally to Scottish Ministers (Pentland House FMD Strategy Unit) and will be published on the Scottish Executive FMD website. The public can therefore assume that where there is no official closure then the situation is 'access as normal'. Information for the public or farmers on these risks and the model risk assessment form are in this chapter and in Annex D (ii).

Responsibility

106. Access policy in a disease situation will be directed by the Executive's Disease Strategy Group, due to its importance to disease control and the need for veterinary input. The Executive's Environment Group (who take the lead in access policy) will provide staff to manage access policy in an FMD emergency, reporting to the Head of the FMD Strategy Unit in Pentland House. This person will liaise with Scottish Natural Heritage ( SNH) about establishing a Disease Access Forum, initially under the chairmanship of the Executive, bringing together key representatives from public bodies and other organisations with an interest in recreational access to provide information and discuss issues relating to access outwith the Infected Area.

107. Implementation of access policy on the ground will be the responsibility of the Local Authorities, or within designated National Parks, the National Park Authority (hereafter referred to as Access Authorities. They will have the power to sanction closures of land outwith the Infected Area but only after approval by Scottish Ministers (see above). The Executive plans to develop a recognised official sign which can be adapted locally to add the relevant Access Authority logo. This will allow for consistency across the country and will provide clear advice to the public on the closure of land. Access Authority websites should contain details of all official closures in their area. All closures must be specific and time limited and notified to Scottish Ministers. Access Authorities should ensure that a balanced and consistent approach is being taken. Further information will be displayed on the Scottish Outdoor Access Code website at http://www.outdooraccess-scotland.com The Executive and Access Authority websites will also be supported by information in the local and national press. Furthermore, teletext and ceefax could be another source for obtaining access information.

Legislation

108. Upon confirmation of FMD, a statutory Order will be made granting powers to Access Authorities to permit official closures of land where a risk assessment, agreed by the Access Authority Access Officer and DVM/Scottish Ministers, shows that it is justified.

Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003

109. Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 establishes rights of responsible access to land and inland water for recreation, passage and other purposes. The emphasis of Part 1 of the Act is on the local management of access. A duty is placed on access authorities to assert, protect and keep open and free from obstruction any route or means by which access rights are exercised. In the event of an outbreak of a disease such as FMD these powers are over-ridden, within the Infected Area, by FMD related legislation (Access Authorities will continue to have a role within the Infected Area in resolving local issues with veterinary advice being disseminated via the Disease Access Forum) If however, outwith the Infected Area, landowners prevent or deter access rights by putting up signs in areas , access authorities can serve notices on landowners to remove signs or if necessary they can remove the signs.

Communication

110. Guidance on risks associated with FMD and access will be issued to farmers, at the time of the outbreak, emphasising the presumption in favour of access outwith the Infected Area and outlining restrictions and the procedure for official closure if deemed necessary. In addition, guidance will be issued to all major access bodies and stakeholders giving the same information via the Disease Access Forum. All stakeholders and tourism-related bodies should consider how best to disseminate the message within their organisations and to their customers. To protect the rural economy, it should be stressed wherever possible that the countryside is 'open' and that in land outside Infected Areas (and any land which is officially closed), tourism and other activities can carry on as usual.

General Biosecurity Advice

111. Biosecurity is the responsibility of everybody - it means ways in which farmers, other owners of farm animals, and people who live, work, visit and enjoy the countryside can reduce the risk of FMD occurring or spreading to other animals. Within the Scottish Outdoor Access Code, the normal advice regarding animal health and biosecurity is given in paragraph 3.32, and advice relating to an outbreak of disease including FMD, in paragraph 3.33

112. If you have handled cattle, sheep, goats, pigs or farmed deer in the last 7 days please stay off all other farm land

113. During an FMD outbreak, people using the countryside in areas that are open ( i.e. outwith the Infected Area) will be asked to follow the biosecurity advice below on each visit to the countryside:

• start your walk or ride, etc. with clean equipment, footwear and clothing;
• park your car away from livestock;
• use disinfectant baths where provided;
• observe official notices;
• avoid farm steadings and yards;
• do not approach, touch, feed or handle livestock;
• leave gates as you find them; ( Note this reflects both the Biosecurity and the Access Code;
• keep dogs on a lead at all times - dogs run the risk of disturbing and dispersing other animals and wildlife and can be attracted by dung;
• do not leave waste or scraps of food or litter; and
• clean and, if possibly, disinfect ⁶ your vehicle between visits to the countryside. Pay particular attention to areas which are hard to clean/not immediately visible, for example, wheel arches. Thoroughly clean and then, if possible, disinfect all footwear, clothing, bicycles, etc., after each use.

Information on Risk outside an Infected Area

Origin of visitors

114. Walkers, cyclists, horse-riders and others taking recreational access pose a very low risk of spreading FMD. People who pass close to the Infected Area on roads are unlikely to pick up the virus. The only people who carry any real risk of spreading FMD are those from infected farms or farms that are incubating disease. Those, with livestock interests, who come to a Non-Infected Area from an Infected Area should reduce any risk of disease transfer by changing into fresh, clean clothing and footwear, and thoroughly clean and then disinfect their vehicles on leaving the Infected Area (including pressure washing of the underside, wheel arches, wheels and tyres

Animals in fields

115. Any small risk that exists outside an Infected Area can be avoided by limiting direct contact between people/vehicles/bikes/dogs and livestock. Access onto land that holds animals where the chance of direct contact is low, or onto land that might in the near future hold animals, poses low risk. Mud or dung infected with the virus would have to be deposited by a walker and then ingested by an animal while the virus was still active. The likelihood of oral transmission to grazing animals is further reduced because there needs to be a high dose of infection by the oral route for ruminants ( i.e. ingesting infected soil or dung). In the summer, the survival time of the virus in the environment declines markedly. In any fields or enclosed ground holding animals at such densities that direct contact is likely, should be diverted or a temporary fence erected.

Livestock roaming on the open hill

116. Livestock on the open hillside tend to shy away from human contact and so are less likely to come into contact with infected mud or dung. It is important that visitors to the countryside adhere to biosecurity guidance and pay attention to official closure signs. The risk of spreading disease is low outwith the Infected Area. However, considerable care should be taken if moving from an Infected Area into a Non- Infected Area to prevent disease transfer.

Deer roaming on the open hill

117. Although deer can become carriers of FMD, in the open they tend to flee from walkers and do not often mix with other livestock. Therefore, there is a low risk of them spreading disease to other species.

Areas with unfenced roads

118. In some parts of the country, it is common agricultural practice for animals to have the freedom to roam over large areas of open grazing, which may include unfenced roads. In the event of a disease outbreak in, for example, a crofting area, animals will be enclosed and stringent biosecurity measures will be in place within the Infected Area. These actions will help to reduce the risk of virus being transferred from the Infected Area via mud or dung on vehicles, people, etc to Non-Infected areas. Furthermore, the risk of disease being brought into a crofting county from an Infected Area elsewhere should also be minimised by biosecurity measures, which will be in force in Infected Areas.

Annex D(ii): MODEL RISK ASSESSMENT FORM

FMD RISK ASSESSMENT RELATING TO PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE

Local Authorities can only close land or footpaths outwith the Infected Area restrictions if they provide a risk assessment which satisfies themselves, the Divisional Veterinary Manager ( DVM) and Scottish Ministers that there is a FMD related risk factor that cannot be mitigated and which requires official closure.

This risk assessment form is provided for farmers, crofters and landowners as the basis for demonstrating risk to the Local Authority and applies to all applications for closure.

If a site or property can be divided into management compartments according to use and/or degree of risk this may enable separate assessments to be carried out for each area. However, all areas should be assessed at the same time if possible.

Any closure signs without formal and legal authority may bring the official risk-assessment based system into disrepute.

Annex D(iii): OFFICIAL SIGNAGE FOR CLOSURE OF FOOTPATHS

Annex E(i): DISPOSAL

Disposal Policy

119. This Annex sets out disposal policy and how this disposal will be carried out in Scotland, and links into Local Plans which will identify disposal routes locally.

120. All culled animals have to be disposed of:

• within a reasonable timescale
• under official supervision
• in such as way that there is no risk of spreading FMD
• minimising any environmental or health effects.

Hierarchy

121. Disposal will be allocated according to a hierarchy of preference, which takes account of environmental and public health considerations of the options:

• Commercial Incineration
• Rendering
• Licensed Landfill
• Burning
• Burial (on farm or mass)

122. However not all options will be available or appropriate in every circumstance depending on demand, geography, capacity, veterinary and local considerations. Geographical proximity may not guarantee one option over another. Whenever possible, the hierarchy should be observed and rendering or incineration employed if at all practical. However we must recognise that the need to dispose of large numbers of carcasses in a short space of time may mean resorting to landfill, burning and burial. In addition, given the remoteness of some locations, and therefore the transport times and the rapid dispersal of smoke and particulates, burning may be the best method of dealing with some carcasses.

123. Each Animal Health Office will consider the availability of appropriate areas in their territory where disposal sites may be found, as part of their local contingency planning arrangements. Things to consider when identifying burning and burial options (both on farm and mass), including requirements for authorisations and risk assessments, are detailed in the Department of Health and Environment Agency ( EA) guidelines.

Allocation across GB

124. Disposal will be considered strategically on a GB basis, and material will be allocated to disposal plants taking into account the situation across GB. There is therefore flexibility to make sure that GB can successfully dispose of all its waste material in the most appropriate place. Within the agreed framework, Scottish material will take priority in Scottish disposal facilities. These arrangements will ensure that the best use is made of the available resource.

125. The NDCC will co-ordinate disposal logistics, and the ROD will liaise with the NDCC to agree the use of facilities.

Key Roles

126. Disposal policy will be determined centrally by the DSG (inviting Environment Group and SEHD to the group to attend meetings as appropriate). Disposal of carcasses will be prioritised by the DVM, and in the first instance of disease, for speed, the DVM will activate the disposal mechanisms. Once in place, the ROD will co-ordinate disposal activity, liaising as appropriate with the NDCC.

Contracts

127. Incineration: agreement in principle has been obtained with most large animal incinerator operators in England, Scotland and Wales. Contingent arrangements are in place and will be reviewed on an annual basis.

128. Rendering: a call-off agreement with a major rendering company has been arranged and existing Government contracts for the disposal of older cattle would be utilised. Additional capacity will be arranged in the event of a major outbreak. Biosecurity protocols are being agreed with rendering companies.

129. Landfill: operational protocols have been developed in conjunction with licensed landfill operators and environmental agencies. Powers of Direction may have to be used in an emergency situation. SEPA will be consulted about the use of landfill capacity.

Disposal of other materials

130. Waste products such as slurry from cleansing and disinfection procedures, and ash from burning, will also need to be disposed of. The disposal of slurry is covered by chapter 3 the VIPER⁷ veterinary instructions, to be followed by the SVS in the event of a FMD outbreak. Ash from burning carcasses, if this option is used, will have to be buried in a suitable location, either on-site or at a suitable landfill site.

Records

131. The ROD will ensure that systems are in place to accurately record relevant details of animals culled and disposal data. Disposal statistics for each LDCC will be entered into DCS and will form part of the Daily SITREP sent by the ROD to the DSG and the NDCC.

Transport

132. Transport will be procured locally and tasked by a transport manager located in the LDCC or at the Scottish SVSHQ. Transport logistics will be managed and co-ordinated nationally - by a national transport logistics manager located in the NDCC. The ROD will link into these transport operations as required.

Annex E(ii): HIERARCHY OF PREFERRED DISPOSAL OPTIONS

1. Incineration

• Upon confirmation of first case the DVM should contact the Rural Payments Agency ( RPA) and they will organise and advise on disposal options. The DVM will be responsible for managing and organising the transport provision for the first 48 hours, until the NDCC disposal manager and the national and regional transport managers are appointed. For subsequent cases, the DMV should then contact 24-hour transport line and order vehicles to transport carcasses to agreed incineration or rendering disposal outlet. If these options are not available then the DVM should consider on farm burning or burial.

2. Rendering

• As for incineration.

3. Landfill

• Ministers have powers to direct waste to landfill, however it would be preferable to agree in advance capacities with Landfill operators. Landfilling of carcasses will be in accordance with the GB protocol which is currently being finalised in agreement with the ESA, EA, SEPA, Defra, SEERAD and the Welsh Assembly Government.

4. Burning

• DVM has the discretion to burn on-farm in the event of incineration and rendering not being practical. This would only be used in exceptional circumstances and would follow the November 2001 guidance issued by the Department of Health in finding a site to burn on farm.
• Animal Health Offices should have a number of sites identified in the Local Plans that are suitable for large-scale pyres. These sites should meet the criteria set out in the annex in terms of both location and construction.
• Before large scale burning is used as an option, this must be agreed by the DSG, who will consult first with the relevant Department/Agency e.g. Environment Group, SEHD, SEPA, Local Authorities (others likely to be affected, as well as the one in which the site is situated), FSA, water companies, local fire service and relevant utility companies. The considerations of the local community will also be taken into account. All local burn sites must be approved by the Local Authority and SEPA.
• Locally the ROD, SEPA and the FSA will consider what measures need to be taken by way of preparation, assessment, method, management, monitoring and restitution, drawing on Department of Health and EA guidelines.
• Consideration should be given by the ROD (in consultation with SEPA/ FSA) to burn materials to be used - including use of accelerants (method).

133. These are the key points of the Department of Health guidelines on considerations for siting of pyres:

• Locate more than 2kms from local population centres for small pyres (250 cattle a day) and 4kms for large sites (1000 cattle a day).
• Carry out a risk assessment for water and air effects.
• Inform public on health effects where pyres have to be located close to houses (stay indoors, close windows etc.).
• Ensure pyre risk assessed by local fire service.
• Source clean fuel ( i.e. no tyres or railway sleepers).
• Ensure the person responsible for operating the fire understands their responsibilities in respect of minimising effects on the public through the consideration of such factors as wind direction and fire temperature.
• Consider at an early stage options for ash disposal.

5. Burial

• Small scale on-farm burial may be necessary where all other options in the hierarchy are unavailable. SEPA must agree to the suitability of the land for burial before this option is pursued.
• Animal Health Offices will identify appropriate areas in their territory where larger disposal sites may be found, as part of their Local Contingency Plan. SEPA, Scottish Water, the Local Authority, SEERAD Waste Management team and the local Agricultural Staff should be consulted in identification of site. SEPA should risk assess the site before it is used.
• Site location must also take into account local sensitivity to smell and noise production and must be accessible and have sufficient capacity.
• Local Plans should also identify where necessary materials can be procured locally and details of local contractors and consultants.
• DSG must agree use of large-scale burial as an option, and the local ROD in consultation with responsible agency ( SEPA) will consider what measures need to be taken by way of assessment, preparation, method, management, monitoring and restitution. Consultants and/or SE Environment Group may be brought in with expertise in these functions to advise.
• During the 2001 outbreak SEAC advised that burial of cattle born after 1 August 1996 posed a very low risk of transmission of the BSE prion. SEAC should be consulted if burial of cattle is being considered, and the DSG and ROD(s) will take account of that advice when considering disposal options.

134. In all cases of burning or burial, consideration should be given to the need for monitoring of environmental and health impacts of the disposal method. There are a number of possible routes by which people might be exposed to pollutants arising from carcass disposal (via air, water, food etc.). To ensure that the attendant health risks for each of these are properly addressed, an appropriate, co-ordinated monitoring programme should be implemented. The SEHD will oversee the development and implementation of such a programme.

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