The Scottish Government

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FOREWORD

1. This Scottish Contingency Plan is for use in the event of an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease ( FMD). The Plan is written in such a way as to be capable of dealing with a major disease outbreak which could be spread widely across Scotland, or equally with a more limited outbreak The Plan operates within the structure provided by the existing EU-approved GB Contingency Plan and has been produced within the context of the international obligations associated with disease control.

2. The European Union requires that a stamping out policy be undertaken for infected premises and dangerous contacts to control FMD. This requirement has a significant impact on the contents of the Plan. The publication in October 2003 of a new Directive for the control of FMD has provided a revised framework in which a range of options can be used to control the disease. Emergency vaccination is one of these options and the Directive gives it much greater prominence, codifying the way it should be used, the treatment of products from vaccinated animals, and how a Member State using vaccination can return to disease free status. The Contingency Plan contains a guide on the background to vaccination and the many factors which must be taken into account before a decision is made and a programme implemented. A contract is in place to provide a vaccination resource to assist the SVS.

3. The Plan sets out the over-arching framework which the Scottish Executive will put into place, which maximises flexibility and can be adjusted to take account of the scale of any FMD outbreak and other circumstances that are specific to the control and eradication of the disease. The Plan allows the Executive to respond immediately to all aspects of a disease situation and identifies the key policy and operational responses which are likely to be introduced as a consequence of a major disease outbreak.

4. The Plan is about process and structure, including a consideration of co-ordination across the Scottish Executive in the event of an outbreak. Detailed aspects of the veterinary response are covered in the State Veterinary Service VIPER instructions. ¹ Recognising the complex nature of infectious disease and the need for specific control measures, an additional Contingency Plan has been developed for Newcastle Disease/Avian Influenza.

Context

5. The commitments established in this Plan recognise the serious effects animal diseases such as FMD can have on animal welfare and the viability of many farms and businesses in the rural and wider economy. It also reflects the fact that agriculture is an important factor in the economic and social sustainability of many rural areas. The plan highlights how the wider impact of a disease outbreak will be taken into consideration and contribute to the strategic decision making process. However the focus of the plan is on the control and eradication of disease and as such the wider issues are not covered in any great depth.

6. This Plan is a "living document" and will be subject to regular and ongoing review by the Executive, with input from the Animal Health and Welfare stakeholder group. Exercises will be undertaken to test the effectiveness of National and Local Plans in a disease outbreak, and familiarity with roles and systems that will be used ( e.g. Disease Control System). Stakeholders have been, and will continue to be, involved in these exercises.

Legislative basis

7. The legislative basis for control of FMD in the EU is Directive 2003/85, adopted in September 2003. The domestic legislation implementing this is the Foot and Mouth Regulations (Scotland) 2005, which are currently being finalised. This provides powers for the declaration of zones allowing movement and other controls at suspicion stage, the establishment of Protection and Surveillance zones following confirmation of disease, and measures such as access restrictions in the protection Zone. The legislation provides for the measures required if vaccination is used

(In the event of a disease outbreak occurring before the Regulations come into force, the outbreak will be controlled in line with the requirements of the Directive but using powers available under the 1981 Animal Health Act.)

Part of GB response

8. The Plan is specific to Scotland, reflecting the fact that animal health matters are devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive, with Scotland's Minister for Environment and Rural Development leading any Scottish response. However, recognising that GB is a single epidemiological unit, that there is a single GBSVS and that there needs to be strong co-ordination and co-operation in responding to contagious diseases, the Plan dovetails with the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ( Defra)'s Contingency Plan ² and links up with measures taken by the Welsh Assembly Government ³ This linkage is important to facilitate prompt communication and co-ordination in any disease situation. It also offers scope for exploiting the potential economies of scale in the use of some resources.

9. Defra have produced a Generic Exotic Disease Contingency Plan which includes an Annex for FMD procedures. The Plan is based around three levels of command structure - Strategic, Tactical and Operational, that would be deployed in England, although the structures would in the main apply for any outbreak in Scotland or Wales. There is a specific Disease Control Strategy in place for any outbreak of FMD.

10. The Welsh Plan reflects the same key elements as the Defra version and indicates that although Welsh Ministers are separately advised, they will approve decisions jointly with Defra Ministers. A Welsh Co-ordination Centre ( WCC) would provide strategic support and the Welsh Assembly Government would be responsible for any legislation required in Wales.

11. This Plan provides a disease control framework specific to the Scottish situation. The key differences from the Defra and Welsh plans are in the command and control framework, and the links into the Local Plans which exist for each of Scotland's five Animal Health Divisions ⁴. The main differences at the local level are in the role of the Regional Operations Director and the more extensive set of disposal options.

GB co-ordination

12. In the event of an outbreak a National Disease Control Centre ( NDCC) would be set up at the SVS London headquarters to co-ordinate GB disease control operations. This Centre would provide logistical support to the disease response across GB. A liaison officer from Scotland will be based at the NDCC to be involved in overall management of GB operations, and to ensure that there is strong communication back to and from the Disease Strategy Group ( DSG) and Local Disease Control Centres ( LDCCs) in Scotland.

13. The role of science is vital - reflecting the importance of drawing in scientific expertise to inform the disease control response at a strategic level. This will involve modelling and analysis from the National Emergency Epidemiological Group ( NEEG), the results of which will be used by the National Experts Group ( NEG) to provide tactical advice and recommendations on disease control. Such work is best taken forward on a GB basis given the size of the field of relevant specialities and the need to avoid duplication of effort. Although this will be considered on a GB basis the Executive will receive, and be able to seek, advice on Scottish specific issues.

14. Given the need for close co-ordination and the specific requirements of accountability to their own Parliament, there will be dialogue between Animal Health and Welfare Ministers and the officials leading the response in their administration. The Devolved Administrations would also be represented at meetings of the Civil Contingencies Committee ( CCC) helping to ensure strategic co-ordination at a high level, particularly in terms of consequence management.

Internal Executive co-ordination

15. The Scottish Executive is responsible for co-ordinating the civil emergency response in Scotland. In a major emergency, the Scottish Executive activates central co-ordination arrangements to ensure an integrated response from all SE departments and other agencies. In Scotland the Ministerial Group on Civil Contingencies ( MGCC) will, on behalf of the Scottish Cabinet, take the Ministerial lead and set the overall parameters of any response. Animal disease differs from most other contingencies in that the Executive, particularly through the SVS, are responsible for the operational and policy response as well as impact management. It is expected that the group would be chaired by the Minister for Environment and Rural Development.

16. The Disease Strategy Group ( DSG) will inform the MGCC and will co-ordinate and manage the Scottish disease control response. It will be supported and briefed by the Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team ( EAT) - a team of senior Scottish Executive officials who will facilitate implementation of decisions taken by the DSG and ensure co-ordination of Scottish Executive activity. They will ensure that in an outbreak, each Scottish Executive department mobilises the necessary resources and that activities of each department are co-ordinated to support SEERAD as the lead department. The Team also plays an important role in ensuring that each area of the Executive's interests is accounted for when decisions on the emergency response are being made. A Scottish Executive Emergency Support Team will support the EAT by gathering, processing and share information about the emergency so as to facilitate an informed response

17. The Disease Stakeholder Group ( DSG) will also be established and will help support the Scottish response. In addition to relevant core membership e.g. police, local authorities, it would be joined by stakeholder organisations (membership and remit is set out in Section 2 of this plan). All meetings of these groups will be held in Pentland House,

Links to Local Plans

18. The Scottish Plan links directly with the individual Local Contingency Plans that have been drawn up for each of the five Animal Health Divisional Offices in Scotland. Further details on the Local Plans are provided in Annex I. The Local Plans are extremely important as it is at the local level that the disease would have to be fought, controlled and eradicated. The Local Plans draw on support from key agencies e.g. Local Authorities (who also have emergency plans in place) and also look to include local stakeholders.

Changes to previous version

19. This plan reflects Scottish Executive co-ordination in the event of an outbreak, at both operational and policy levels. Although there have been few other substantive changes to the Plan since publication of the previous version, it does reflect that the SVS is now an Agency. This is more process than substance and will have a limited effect on how exotic disease outbreaks will be managed in Scotland.

Contact Point

20. This Contingency Plan is subject to regular review and any comment or questions relating to its content and ongoing development should be sent to:.

21. This section outlines the general principles that are likely to be adopted in the event of an outbreak of FMD. These are in line with EUFMD Directive 85/2003 which forms the framework for response to FMD for all Member States of the EU.

• Susceptible animals are defined under the FMD Regulations 2005 as meaning cattle, sheep, goats and all other ruminating animals, swine, camels, llamas, alpacas and any other domestic or wild animal which can be infected with FMD.
• All premises with a suspect case will be served with Form A (see Annex G) restrictions, which prohibit movements off the premises.
• Where FMD cannot be ruled out and diagnostic samples are taken, Form C (see Annex G) will be signed by the SVS. This will prohibit movement of susceptible animals within a 10km radius of the suspected premises.
• Confirmation of the first case will be made by the UK Chief Veterinary Officer ( CVO) on the basis of laboratory testing.
• If FMD is confirmed, a Statutory Order will be signed establishing a Protection Zone ( PZ), which covers an area with a minimum 3km radius surrounding the Infected Premises ( IP). Surrounding this there will be a Surveillance Zone ( SZ) with a minimum radius of 10 km surrounding the IP. The Protection Zone and Surveillance Zone together make up the Infected Area. Any premises which are partly within a protection zone are considered to be completely within that zone. Premises partly within a surveillance zone are considered to be completely within that zone, unless they are also partly within a protection zone

Principles

• Susceptible animals on infected premises will be slaughtered.

22. This stamping out policy is a reflection of the EU obligations to which the UK is subject through the FMD Directive. These EU rules recognise the fact that FMD is a disease which inflicts serious damage, both in terms of animal welfare and to the economy of the area in which an outbreak is situated. The "culling out" of infected premises is the most effective way of halting the spread of FMD. This principle also applies to premises deemed to be "dangerous contacts", i.e., those epidemiologically linked to infected premises.

• On laboratory confirmation of an outbreak of FMD anywhere in GB, a livestock movement ban will be introduced immediately.

23. In principle, and depending on the nature and scale of the virus spread, the movement ban would be introduced for an initial period, normally of 7 days, as a precautionary measure and would be kept under constant review to minimise disruption to the industry. Introduction would be via the establishment of a Supplementary Movement Control Zone. Limited movements under licence may be permitted to avoid animal welfare problems.

24. A consequence of the introduction of the livestock movement ban will be that auction markets cease to operate. However, it is possible that some livestock will either be in a lairage or on their way to market. In such an eventuality these animals may either be sent back to their original holding, direct to slaughter or held at market. Auction markets should ensure, where possible, that robust contingency plans are in place allowing for the holding of animals if necessary until such time as a course of action is agreed. Any movements will be subject to a SVS veterinary risk assessment. This would also apply to animals that were in the process of being exported.

• In line with EU legislation a ban will be imposed on export of red meat and meat (and some dairy) products.
• Heightened biosecurity measures will be introduced in the Protection and Surveillance Zone.

25. A key disease control tool is the enforcement of a number of stringent biosecurity provisions within PZs and SZs (which taken together form an Infected Area) to cut down the risk of disease spreading by animal or mechanical means, for example through cleansing and disinfection of people, vehicles and machinery moving on and off livestock farms. Such a regime, which concentrated on effective measures to cut down the risk of disease spreading by animal or mechanical means, would be introduced in Scotland throughout the PZ and SZ. In addition, compulsory fixed cleansing and disinfection points may be put in place on all exit routes to 'hot spot' areas, where there are a number of affected but small in size farms close to each other, or a situation of high density pig population.

26. As the disease control measures take effect and the risk of disease spread lessens, on veterinary advice some of the biosecurity related controls may be eased either throughout the Infected Area or in part of the Area. (Annex A provides more details and Annex B gives biosecurity advice for use in a disease situation, to support the existing Biosecurity Code of Practice ( http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/agri/crwl-00.asp ).

• The countryside will be kept open and a presumption in favour of access will be maintained (other than in the Protection and Surveillance Zone).

27. In the event of a disease outbreak there will be a presumption in favour of access outside the Protection and Surveillance Zone, unless a risk assessment agreed by the Local Authority and relevant Divisional Veterinary Manager ( DVM) suggests otherwise, and is then agreed by Scottish Ministers. Annex D provides details of the access policy, guidance for farmers and the model risk assessment which should be used. Within the zones access to the countryside would be closed (see also Annex A), reopening again as quickly as possible, subject to further risk assessment. Access to infected premises would be limited to essential visitors and vehicles, observing strict disease prevention (biosecurity) measures. Access to all other businesses, premises and transport networks within the zones would remain open with appropriate biosecurity measures in force.

• The Armed Forces will be informed immediately of any outbreak but will only be called upon if the outbreak is of such a size that the existing resources are not sufficient.

28. Army Headquarters (Scotland) will be contacted and informed about any outbreak. Discussions will be held on their possible future involvement should additional logistical support be needed. In such an eventuality the Executive will make a formal request to the Ministry of Defence for military aid .

• The existing SVS resource will be enhanced to cope with the disease.

29. The SVS maintains a database of Veterinary Personnel (Local Veterinary Inspectors) who are able to respond to any disease outbreak. Negotiations are currently underway to establish a firm contractual framework for LVIs including creation of a group of 100 LVIs with expertise not only in disease diagnosis and control but also in management of control programmes.

• In the immediate response to a disease outbreak in Scotland, a Local Disease Control Centre ( LDCC) will be established and a Regional Operations Director ( ROD) will be appointed.

30. The LDCC will be established by the local DVM at a level capable of coping with a minimum of 10 infected premises simultaneously. The size of the LDCC will be adjusted according to the scale of the outbreak with the ROD providing appropriate assistance. The veterinary response will be governed by the SVS Standing Instructions. See Annex J for Guidance on resources required for a LDCC and Annex H for the Role of the ROD.

• Rendering or incineration of carcasses will be the preferred disposal method and any decision will be made on the basis of appropriate veterinary and other professional advice.

31. The 2001 outbreak showed that disposal was a key component of any successful disease control and eradication operation. It is to be expected that this situation will also be true of any future outbreak and a preferred hierarchy of choice for carcass disposal is:

• Commercial Incineration
• Rendering
• Landfill
• Burning
• Burial (on farm or mass)

32. The choice of these options will take account of local circumstances and will be considered as part of local planning. The Local Plans will be considered at the strategic level by the Scottish Executive, to ensure that appropriate linkages are being made in disposal options. The priority will be to avoid the build up of carcasses and associated risks to public and animal health and the environment. The DVM will retain discretionary authority for the way in which animals are disposed of, particularly in the very early stages of an outbreak, while appropriate arrangements are being put in place. (At this point pyre burning may be the most appropriate disposal route, subject to proper risk assessment of the site). In practice, the options available for disposal will depend on the scale of the outbreak. It may also be the case that in more remote locations, given transport distances and the probability of dispersal of airborne combustion products, burning cannot be discounted as the best practicable option. Annex E provides further information on the Executive's disposal policy and outlines different disposal options. The priority will be to quickly dispose of any carcasses - avoiding risk to animal and public health.

33. Disposal is a significant priority and will be facilitated by the National Disease Control Centre ( NDCC) at SVS headquarters in London, which will provide logistical support. Disposal issues will be regularly reviewed by the Disease Strategy Group ⁵ in conjunction with regulatory bodies e.g. Scottish Environment Protection Agency ( SEPA), Food Standards Agency ( FSA), and other Stakeholders.

• Emergency Vaccination will be considered alongside other disease control strategies but will not be an alternative to the culling of animals on infected premises.

34. EU Directive 2003/85/ EC sets out clearly that the basic control strategy will be the culling of susceptible species on infected and dangerous contact premises. If further action is required by the epidemiological situation, emergency vaccination will be considered as a potential policy option. The use of emergency vaccination is governed by the Directive and there are potential international trade implications which would emerge under the international rules of the Office Internationale des Epizootes ( OIE). Annex B gives details of the different disease control strategies available and sets out a framework for decision making.

• Stakeholders will be fully involved from the first stages of an outbreak. They will have an important role in helping communicate disease control and other issues to their membership, and their views back to the Department.

35. As sections 3 and 4 outline, stakeholders will have a key role in assisting the Scottish response to any disease outbreak. Specific stakeholder groups will be established to inform decisions on disease control and access. Annex M lists key stakeholders and other key agencies, and contact details. In addition to informing the Executive about situations affecting their members and operating as a sounding board to inform policy decisions, stakeholders will have an important role in communicating disease control related issues to their members.

36. This section describes the overarching command and control systems, which will be put in place to manage any Scotland wide disease control activity. Annex N illustrates the overall management structure, which will be introduced in the event of a FMD outbreak in GB.

Disease Strategy Group

On notification of any case of FMD in GB the Scottish Minister for Environment and Rural Development will be informed and a Disease Strategy Group ( DSG) will be created. The DSG will report to the Minister, and will meet in Pentland House, with phone links to the LDCC as appropriate.

Role:

To co-ordinate and manage the Scottish disease control response, taking account of local conditions, farming practices in Scotland, and other potential impacts on the Scottish economy.

Membership:
Head of SEERAD
Head of Food and Agriculture Group
CVO Scotland
Chief Agricultural Officer ( CAO)
Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Division
Regional Operations Director ( ROD) (based in the field)
Operations Director (Scotland) (based in the field)
(In the event that the army is operationally involved the army commander will become a DSG member)

The Group will liaise closely, as appropriate, with other interests who may be invited to attend e.g.SEERAD Environment Group, Scottish Executive Health Department ( SEHD), FSA, and SEPA.

The FMD Strategy Unit in the Animal Health Division will provide secretariat support.

A flow chart of key actions is attached at Annex F.

National Disease Control Centre ( NDCC)

On notification of an outbreak of FMD in GB the NDCC will be established and based at SVS headquarters, London.

Role:

The logistical support for any Scottish disease control effort will be managed from the NDCC. It will implement an agreed GB disease control framework.

Membership:

The NDCC is composed of various "cells", each with clear operational responsibility, for certain areas. For full details, see the Defra Contingency Plan. Liaison Officers from the policy side of the Executive and SVS in Scotland will be based at the NDCC to ensure that Scotland's situation and Scottish policy are fully reflected in all decision making.

Disease Stakeholder Group ( DSG)

Alongside the creation of the DSG, regular meetings will also be held with stakeholders and key agencies, at Pentland House.

Role (Stakeholder group):

To provide a sounding board to inform policy decisions being taken.

To provide stakeholders with a mechanism for direct communication with the Department.

Role (individuals):

To help keep their members informed.

To alert the Executive to any particular issues they may be facing.

Membership:
National Farmers Union Scotland ( NFU Scotland)
Scottish Rural Property and Business Association ( SRPBA)
SEPA
British Veterinary Association
Scottish Association of Meat Wholesalers ( SAMW)
Road Haulage Association ( RHA)
Quality Meat Scotland ( QMS)
National Beef Association ( NBA)
National Sheep Association ( NSA)
Institute of Auctioneers and Appraisers in Scotland ( IAAS)
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities ( COSLA)
Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty of Animals ( SSPCA)
Scottish Crofting Foundation
Police

Initial focus: to explain the current disease position.

Each stakeholder will be limited to a maximum of two representatives per meeting (contact details are included in Annex M).

Sub-groups may be considered to address specific issues e.g. movement controls.

Local Disease Control Centre: Management Control Team

Established initially by the DVM but later taken over by the ROD. This Team will meet daily or at greater or lesser frequency as determined by the disease situation.

Role:

To enable an integrated management and control response at local level to deal with disease control measures by the inclusion of key enforcement agencies of local and central Government and others

Responsibilities:

Each representative will bring specific expertise and the ability to mobilise resources from the parent organisation. They will have a forum to raise issues and a means of keeping their parent organisations informed of the current situation.

Membership:
Regional Operations Director ( ROD)
Divisional Veterinary Manager ( DVM)
Principal Agricultural Officer ( PAO)
Local Authorities ( e.g. Emergency Planning Officer and Head of Animal Health and Welfare function
Police
SEPA

Local Stakeholder Group

Established by the ROD, meetings will be held with local stakeholders and agencies as required.

Role:

To ensure that developments in local operations are communicated to all relevant parties.

To allow input from all relevant parties and to inform local decisions.

Membership:
To be determined locally in consultation with the ROD and the DVM, but where appropriate will include:
Police
SEPA
Consultant in public health
NFU Scotland
Scottish Rural Property and Business Association ( SRPBA)
Institute of Auctioneers and Appraisers in Scotland ( IAAS)
Road Haulage
Scottish Milk Forum
Ramblers Association
Scottish Crofting Foundation*
Disposal Industry
SAC Disease Surveillance Centre
Local Authority
Deer Commission/ Forestry Commission/ Scottish Natural Heritage*
SAC Farm and Rural Business Development Offices
* if appropriate to the infected area

Access Group

Initial meeting to be chaired by the Head of the FMD Strategy Unit, thereafter chairmanship transfers to the Scottish Executive Countryside and Natural Heritage Unit within SEERAD. Regular meetings of the Access Group will generally be held in Pentland House. The Access Group reports to the DSG.

Role:

To consider access issues and inform members of how access policy is implemented and communicated.

Membership (the following agencies will be invited to attend) :
NFU Scotland
Scottish Landowners Federation ( SLF)
COSLA
Scottish Natural Heritage ( SNH)
Scottish Crofters Foundation
National Trust for Scotland
VisitScotland
Historic Scotland
Ramblers
John Muir Trust
Utility Companies
National Parks Board
Crown Estates
Forest Enterprise
British Horse Society
Sportscotland
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds ( RSPB)

Economic Impact Group

Recognising that an outbreak of FMD can have implications for the wider rural economy, the Head of SEERAD Analytical Services Division will consider creating an Economic Impact Assessment Group. This would report to Scottish Ministers.

Role:

To inform any process of immediate hardship relief and longer term recovery.

Membership:

Scottish Executive
ERAD
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department
Tourism Group
Local Government Finance Group

External
Enterprise Networks
Visitscotland
COSLA
Employment Service
Scottish Agricultural College ( SAC)

Other members would be co-opted as appropriate and links would also be established to the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise.

Links to other Agricultural Departments, Whitehall Departments and European Union

Reflecting the principles outlined in the SEERAD/ Defra/ SVS Concordat, which recognises the importance of close co-ordination and communication in responding to notifiable diseases within a single epidemiological unit. The GB approach allows the development of significant specialist veterinary support from the SVS Headquarters. A policy Liaison Officer (Band C level) will be despatched to the NDCC on confirmation of a GB outbreak. A veterinary Liaison Officer from the SVS in Scotland may also attend the NDCC, to ensure that an agreed GB disease control framework is established. The Head of Food and Agriculture Group, or other senior officials, will attend appropriate Whitehall meetings,

In addition the Scottish Executive European Union Office will keep in contact with the EU Institutions, on the position in Scotland, in co-ordination with the UK's Permanent Representation to the EU.

37. This section describes how the disease control decisions will be implemented in Scotland at the national policy level and on the ground.

38. On identification of a FMD outbreak anywhere in GB, the Head of the Animal Health and Welfare Division will establish 2 units - FMD Strategy Unit and FMD Operational Policy Unit, details of which are provided below:

FMD Strategy Unit

Headed by the existing head of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy and Planning Branch.

Role:

To ensure that key interests inside the Executive ( e.g. Environment Group, Tourism Group, Public health policy, Press Office) and outside ( e.g.FSA, SEPA, stakeholders) are kept fully informed of developments; to support the general management of disease control related policy.

Responsibilities:

Secretariat

• General support to the DSG and Stakeholder Group.
• Dissemination of notes of meetings/instructions.

Personnel: C1, B1

Communications

• Dissemination of policy to public/farmers/media.
• Quick and effective communication to those in the field.
• Departmental and Inter-departmental liaison.
• Stakeholder liaison.
• Parliamentary Statements.
• Parliamentary Questions.
• Briefing.
• Contact point for enquiries from agencies and stakeholders.
• Creation and management of a Helpline.
• Creation and management of an FMD website.
• Dealing with FMD related correspondence (Ministerial and Official).
• Handling national policy issues which develop during the response to the outbreak and its aftermath.
• Co-ordinating a response to any legal appeals against the Executive's handling of FMD ( e.g. over culling powers) in conjunction with the Office of the Solicitor to the Scottish Executive ( OSSE).

Personnel: C1, 2 B2, 2 B1, Press Officer

Access

• Policy lead on access.
• Establish and attend Disease Access Forum.

Personnel: C1, B2 & B1 Access, Vet support

The Unit includes dedicated FMD Press Officer, Communications Co-ordinator and an Access Officer seconded from SE Environment Group. These roles are described in more depth in the communication strategy.

FMD Operational Policy Unit

Headed by the existing head of the Animal Health and Welfare Policy Branch.

Role:

Managing the operational side, and in particular legislation.

Responsibilities:

Legislation Team

• Responsible for producing various Statutory Instruments and Secondary Legislation which need to be created to support the Executive's response.
• Supported by a dedicated Solicitor (who would also be available to other Units dealing with FMD - e.g. the Strategy Unit in responding to any judicial reviews).
• Local Authority enforcement/trading standards officer may be brought in as an advisor on the practical aspects of enforcing legislation.

Personnel: B3, B1, Solicitor

Movements Team

• Responsible for devising and implementing movement regimes.
• Works alongside Legislation Team.
• Responsible for policy in Scotland relating to animal movements.
• Includes Agriculture Staff and veterinary input.
• Communication with SEERAD Area Offices, Agricultural Census Branch in SEERAD, Other Government Departments, stakeholders, Local Authorities, police.
• Liaison with licensing and recording units ( SAMU).

Personnel: C1, 1 PAO, SAO, SEGIS, Information Systems Division, Vet support, B2, B1

Compensation Policy Team

• To provide a link between SEERAD and Defra.
• Introduce appropriate secondary legislation (in conjunction with Legislation Team).
• Responsible for policy in Scotland relating to compensation.
• Liaison with valuers.
• Co-ordinate the administration of compensation claims in Scotland.

( Defra are responsible for compensation payments, but policy liaison and oversight will be required).

Personnel: B3, 2 B1

Disease monitoring Team

• Provide support to both the rest of the Policy Unit, and the Operations Unit, in producing up to date maps illustrating the disease situation.

Personnel: SEGIS mapping support, IS Division

Staffing

Core membership of Units: provided by the Animal Health and Welfare Division

Additional technical input: provided from Agriculture Staff and veterinary colleagues

Additional admin input: provided from elsewhere within the Executive

39. A series of daily meetings will be scheduled to take place across the Command and Control Disease Management Structures. Birdtable meetings form part of this schedule and are to be held at regular intervals throughout each day. Representatives from the main headquarters disease control teams, Agricultural Staff, Press Office, and CAP Management and Agricultural Policy Divisions will attend. Lasting approximately 30 minutes these meetings will provide a forum for immediate concerns / key points of information to be raised and corrective action identified. A draft Birdtable meeting agenda is detailed in Annex L (iii).

Schedule of Meetings

Veterinary Unit

The expertise of the Veterinary Unit will be fundamental to the Executive's response to a FMD outbreak. Policy decisions will be based on veterinary risk assessments.

Role:

The CVO Scotland will provide veterinary advice to Ministers and Officials on FMD control in Scotland. The Veterinary Unit will provide veterinary expertise to inform all policy decisions.

Pentland House Agricultural Staff

Agricultural staff have technical expertise in livestock farming and will be vital in informing policy decisions.

Role:

To provide advice and support to the DSG, Ministers and Policy and Strategy Units.

To provide the link between the Agricultural Offices and Headquarters.

Responsibility for the initial production of the Infected Area map(s) remain with SVS Headquarters, but in close consultation with SVS staff in Pentland House, Agricultural Staff and Animal Health and Welfare Division. There will be a requirement for Agricultural staff to produce related maps for a variety of purposes, for example, Press Office, Web page and letters to farmers. Agricultural staff will draw on the expertise of CAP Management and Drawing Office staff for mapping duties. In an extensive outbreak, it is likely that licence to slaughter and movement licence schemes will be introduced. One of the key responsibilities of the Agricultural Staff will be facilitating these.

Licences:

In an extensive outbreak, it is likely that licence to slaughter and movement licence schemes will be introduced. One of the key responsibilities of the Agricultural Staff will be facilitating these.

• All licences for use in the Protection and Surveillance Zones will be issued from the LDCC.
• For licences for use outside the PZ and SZ, the Agricultural Staff will work with the Operations Unit to draw up licences, and guidelines for how they should be used. They will also issue these licences from HQ in Pentland House.

40. This section provides an overview of roles and responsibilities in the field. These will be subject to some variation according to local circumstances and will be outlined in more depth in Local Plans, alongside the roles of other public sector agencies e.g. Police, Local Authorities and SEPA. Further information on the contents of Local Plans is outlined in Annex I.

Veterinary Response

Role:

The SVS will be the lead organisation in all aspects of disease control. Further information on SVS role is available in Local Plans.

Operations Director (Scotland)

Role:

The Operations Director (Scotland) will be responsible for directing the veterinary field response in support of Scottish Executive policy, liaising directly with the ROD, DVM and Management Control Team in the LDCCs

Regional Operations Director

Role:

To support the veterinary response as led by the DVM. To co-ordinate all local agencies, to ensure the interests of Scottish Ministers are met in the execution of policy, and to form a link between the DSG and operations on the ground.

(For details of the role and responsibilities of the ROD, see Annex H).

Divisional Veterinary Manager ( DVM)

Role:

To manage the local veterinary response and more generally (in conjunction with the ROD) the entire local disease control operation.

Responsibilities:

• Initially call together the LDCC Management Control Team for briefing pending the arrival of the ROD.
• Plan the initial Infected Area action, including biosecurity measures, pending the arrival of the ROD.
• Establish the SVSLDCC and field teams.
• Ensure immediate valuation, slaughter and disposal on the initial infected premises pending the arrival of the ROD.
• Advise the Director ( Defra) of Procurement of the need to implement procurement initiatives.

Local Agricultural Staff

Role:

The PAO and his staff will provide professional agricultural and administrative support to the DVM and ROD.

Vital role in liaising with the local farming community.

Responsibilities:

• Assessment of applications for, and issue of, Movement Licences.
• Manning of local Helplines.
• Providing resources for the finance function.
• Preparation, issue and delivery of Forms D and E.
• Technical duties in support of Vets at culls, e.g. organising/accompanying valuers.
• Logistical management of Infected Area operations.

Local Authorities

Role:

• Key role in establishing the LDCC (in conjunction with the ROD and DVM).
• Liaison with the local community.
• Role in enforcing the Infected Area regime and all other disease enforcement issues; including supporting aspects of licensing essential animal movements.
• Responding to applications to close land (in consultation with the DVM).
• Emergency Planning support.
• Providing information on use and location of private drinking water supplies.

Local Authorities will be a core element of the disease control response and their responsibilities, particularly in terms of liaising with local communities, will be determined by matters arising at the time.

Police

Role:

The Police have a key role in the enforcement and logistical side of various aspects of the disease control response.

Responsibilities:

• Enforcement of movement controls and patrolling Infected Area.
• Enforcement of access restrictions.
• Stopping vehicles transporting animals, and checking licenses.

SEPA

Role:

Provide relevant environmental expertise and support with respect to the disease control response.

Responsibilities:

• Advice on siting and operation of Cleanse and Disinfection points in the Infected Area, and the disposal of waste from infected premises e.g. used disinfectant, veterinary medicines, feedstuffs, livestock slurries and animal manures etc.
• Advice on the disposal of abattoir and lairage wastes.
• Input into the animal carcass disposal policy.
• Prior assessment of all proposed burning or burial sites.
• Advice on the use of authorised incinerators, rendering plant and landfill sites for carcass disposal.
• Monitoring of environmental quality and impacts of disease control policy, as appropriate.

SCOTTISH SPCA

Role:

To provide a uniformed presence to assist with animal welfare functions as directed by the Regional Operations Director.

Responsibilities

• Assistance with monitoring compliance with movement licences including accompanying vehicles on request.
• Provide independent welfare audit on request by the SVS.

SCOTTISH SPCA

Role:

To provide a uniformed presence to assist with animal welfare functions as directed by the Regional Operations Director.

Responsibilities

• Assistance with monitoring compliance with movement licences including accompanying vehicles on request.
• Provide independent welfare audit on request by the SVS.

Armed Forces

If the scale of the outbreak is such that existing resources are not able to cope, assistance will be sought from the Armed Forces.

Role:

If they become involved, it is expected that their role will be in the provision of logistical assistance and support to the ROD and DVM.

SE Press Officer

A SE Press Officer will be located in the LDCC.

Role:

• Liaison with the local media.
• Co-ordination with the ROD, DVM and PAO and Head of Press FMD Team.
• Co-ordination on media issues with other agencies and stakeholders e.g. Local Authority, SEPA, and Police.

41. Communications is an area where key lessons emerged from the experiences of the 2001 FMD outbreak and further points were noted in the FMD Inquiry Reports, which highlight the importance of communications in successful disease control. The Scottish Executive commissioned independent consultants to produce a report containing recommendations for a Communications Strategy to use alongside this Contingency Plan in the event of another FMD outbreak.

42. Key features of the communications strategy include:

• Detailed course of action for each stage of an outbreak (suspect, confirmed, ongoing)
• Clear description of the policy position on the naming of locations
• Definitions of roles and responsibilities with job descriptions for key players
• Description of tools and infrastructures used to disseminate information effectively
• A communication Matrix, identifying a wide range of audiences, the information each will require and the best channel of communication with them

43. It is expected that in addition to the national level Communications Strategy, communications issues will also be addressed in Local Contingency Plans. For more details on communications, see the SE Animal Disease Control Communications Strategy. ( http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/environment/sedcp-00.asp )

Internal

44. The FMD Strategy Unit will be responsible for ensuring that Scottish policy is effectively communicated. For this reason a role has been created for a Communications Co-ordinator, who will be responsible for overseeing the effective dissemination of accurate information both internally and externally. A priority will be to ensure that the staff in the field are fully aware of policy, but it will also be vital that appropriate communication is undertaken with other parts of the Scottish Executive, particularly Environment, Health, Enterprise and Tourism colleagues to ensure that the disease control work is fully joined up with any work on its wider impact.

Veterinary Emergency instructions

45. Where a specific Scottish delivery plan is developed and instructions need to be issued to veterinary field staff; this will be done through existing channels by the SVS Headquarters staff. Similarly any veterinary instructions which do not apply in Scotland will not be directly issued to Scottish field staff but will be copied to DVMs for information.

46. In devising this Plan the Scottish Executive has made a commitment that additional resources will be made available from elsewhere within the Executive and its Agencies to support the Environment and Rural Affairs Department in its lead Department role. The Executive is working to develop an Emergency Cadre of staff who can be identified and quickly released to help with the Executive response in any emergency situation, such as an outbreak of animal disease .

47. Part of this strategy means that staff working in an intense policy area will be rotated as appropriate to ensure that they are not overburdened to the detriment of their health. This is a key element of the lessons learnt from the 2001 outbreak, and reflects army policy.

LDCCs

48. The Scottish Executive is responsible for providing the LDCC infrastructure and locations will be identified in Local Contingency Plans. In the first instance this will be established with the capacity of responding simultaneously to 10 Infected Premises and will be adjusted to meet the circumstances at the time.

49. The DVM will set up a LDCC when disease is confirmed. DVMs will identify and regularly review the availability of potential LDCCs. They will also maintain information on suppliers and contractors should temporary accommodation be required and ensure access to telephone / IT equipment. The Executive will also be prepared to deploy and connect its own communications infrastructure at immediate notice. (Details on locations and capacity requirements of LDCCs are detailed in Annex J).

IT Infrastructure

50. The main computer system for FMD control is fmd- DCS. This is currently operating only for training purposes but will be made active in the event of a disease emergency. DVMs will ensure that all their AHO staff are familiar with the functionality of the DCS, requesting training from SVSIT Unit as appropriate. Work is in hand to ensure adequate access to DCS from the Executive's SCOTS system and it will also be made available to operational partners who require access.

Procurement

51. The Animal Health budget responsible for funding disease control strategy is held by Defra on a GB basis. This reflects the need for co-ordinated action within a single epidemiological unit and the ability to exploit economies of scale in procurement. As such, operational procurement will be co-ordinated with Defra and will take advantage of various call-off contacts which have been established as part of GB-wide contingency planning arrangements.

52. The Defra Procurement and Contracts Division ( PCD) will provide a team to operate at operational level from 72 hours or sooner, in a declared emergency, to manage all of the procurement activities at a local level. These will include a Commercial Manager (Procurement), Contracts Manager, Purchasing Manager, Quantity Surveyor, Field Store Manager and Field Manager (Procurement). Forensic accountants will be engaged prior to receipt and approval of supplier/contractor invoices and will be responsible for the certification, verification and evaluation of these invoices.

53. The ROD/ DVMs will ensure that PCD have been contacted at the suspect case stage, so that the appropriate resources can be placed on standby. Sources of supply for personnel have been identified by PCD and these resources can be called upon in the event of a notifiable disease outbreak or other emergency situation. Best practice guidance is available to Animal Health Divisional Offices which will provide support until Procurement staff arrive and will include guidance covering the triggering of contingency contracts; authorisation and use of emergency purchase orders and procurement cards; and contract management and letting.

Contracts

54. DefraPCD are, and will be responsible for ensuring that robust, value for money contracts are let and mobilised for goods, services and works requirements including their contract management and forensic examination. These contracts will be let on a regional and local basis, in consultation with local animal health offices, and supply contingency arrangements to meet all foreseeable requirements of an emergency or notifiable disease outbreak. All Suppliers will be vetted and will be subject to regular review.

55. These contracts and arrangements will include but not be limited to slaughter and disposal, shepherds, gatherers and ancillary equipment; carcass pick-up; preliminary C&D including detoxification units; slurry treatments, management and disposal; lagoon and environmental protection measures; electrical works and technical services associated with discrete supply chains, e.g. dairy engineers. Details of contingency contracts will be held locally (at each Animal Health Divisional office) and centrally ( PCD).

56. A supplementary list of suppliers will be kept in Animal Health Offices as a back-up to the contingency contracts already in place, and these are likely to be engaged where a notifiable disease cannot be confined either in scale or geographically.

57. These lists include, for each AHDO, a list of transport companies indicating the number and type of vehicles that the companies have available for immediate use together with the companies' ability to scale up supply within defined timescales.

Procurement by the Scottish Executive

58. Procurement of goods and services required for administrative support (including accommodation, furniture, personnel and utilities) is the responsibility of the Scottish Executive. SE Procurement Division will liaise with the ROD to ensure that these are procured in line with Scottish Executive policy. Consultation between Defra's PCD and Scottish Executive Procurement Division would be undertaken as necessary.

Serological capacity

59. A serosurveillance facility run by the SAC, on behalf of SEERAD, is available at Dumfries. In the event of a disease outbreak within the GB, diagnostic samples would only go to the Institute of Animal health, Pirbright which is the National Reference Laboratories. The Dumfries facility is designed to handle low risk samples associated with serosurveillance operations.

60. When undertaking serosurveillance exercises within Scotland samples would initially go to the Dumfries facility and only then be sent to laboratories in England, if there was a shortage of capacity. Where the disease outbreak occurred in other parts of the GB the serosurveillance facility at Dumfries would be put on standby and would be ready to be used for processing samples in the event of a shortfall in the laboratory capacity local to the outbreak.

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