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Part 1: Animal Health

There were 41 responses to this question. Strong support was expressed by 34 responders. Some considered that Scottish Ministers having increased flexibility was an important course of action in dealing with foreign, fast spreading animal diseases. The response to the 2001 FMD outbreak was cited as an example supporting this proposal.

In expressing support, responders cautioned, that when considering the best course of action, the interests of the whole rural economy must be assessed, and not purely agricultural economic interests, and close consultation needs to be undertaken with all stakeholders. The slaughter of any animals must be undertaken on veterinary advice and must be pragmatic and proportionate to the scale of the outbreak. There should be sufficient controls in place to ensure the slaughter of appropriate animals only. Concern was expressed over the provision to "ring fence disease beyond a disease infected area" as having potential resource implications for enforcement bodies. The regular review of contingency plans was recognised as a means to review and prioritise resources.

A number of more detailed responses were received. One responder accepted having increased flexibility of action as a reasonable approach. However, any actions taken outside the Infected Area should have greater stakeholder involvement. Furthermore, veterinary advice should not be restricted to the State Veterinary Service but should involve local veterinary practitioners working in the Infected Area. There was support expressed for a contiguous cull when used in front of a disease outbreak but reservations in using retrospectively behind the disease spread.

It was suggested that the wide ranging power of the Minister to specify diseases should be constrained on the face of the Bill, perhaps by reference to the Office International des Epizootes ( OIE) listings.

In relation to Schedule 3A, as inserted by section 1 of the Bill, one responder noted that the Order making power to slaughter animals did not list the other diseases. Such an order should only be drafted in consultation with stakeholders and with veterinary advice. Biosecurity and other such precautions should be the priority in disease prevention and be given greater weight in disease control.

Clarification of Schedule 3A, paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 was requested by one responder. It was also suggested that the phrase "any animal" should be followed by "that are susceptible or likely to transmit disease".

A number of concerns were highlighted by 8 responders disagreeing with the need for greater flexibility. It was suggested that each farm should be assessed individually on merit and risk. A more scientific approach involving vaccination and isolation should be adopted in dealing with a disease outbreak. Control measures used in Scotland should reflect those of adjacent countries in Europe.

One responder was of the opinion that having greater flexibility recognises the need for humane destruction of animals in fighting virulent epidemics or dealing with extreme outbreaks. In proposing alternative wording "…any susceptible (or carrier status) animals to be slaughtered.", it was stressed that if equines, for example, were not in direct contact with diseased animals, there was no need to slaughter unnecessarily. Adhering to and enforcement of strict biosecurity and traceability could act to protect horses. On a similar theme, it was also commented that sanctuary and pet animals which show no sign of disease should be vaccinated and quarantined on site and not killed.

Another responder commented that there was a danger that inspectors, under the Bill's powers, would be biased towards deciding whether infection was present and ordering slaughter to justify their employment.

Thirty five responses were received to this question. Twenty six generally agreed that, if necessary, animals should be culled close to an area already infected by a fast spreading disease but recognised that any decision should be based on scientific and veterinary advice. One responder stated that it was essential for veterinary advice to be available at the site of the outbreak. Furthermore, any action taken in response to an outbreak should be based on effectiveness, and be pragmatic and proportional to the scale of the outbreak. It was proposed by one responder that there should be a facility for a veterinary advisory committee, with input from Defra, academics, veterinary surgeons and the British Equine Veterinary Association ( BEVA).

One responder accepted that the culling of animals close to an area already affected by a fast spreading disease was a reasonable approach. However, it was suggested that there should be greater stakeholder involvement for action taken outside of the Infected Area. Veterinary advice should also not be restricted to the State Veterinary Service but should involve local veterinary practitioners working in the Infected Area.

Support was given to the option of contiguous culling when used in front of an outbreak but there were reservations about using this approach retrospectively behind the spread of disease. Concern was also expressed that slaughter, as a disease control measure, was still given too high a priority.

It was suggested that contiguous culling should only be used as a last resort, and vaccination be used in preference to slaughter when dealing with healthy animals which had not been in any contact with diseased ones or exposed to the virus in other ways. One responder suggested that the interpretation of "contiguous" must take into account the particular disease characteristics, animal population density/distribution and topography of the land.

Particular concern was expressed over the slaughter of pet farm animals and animals in sanctuaries. The slaughter of categories of animals other than those covered in existing legislation (Animal Health Act 1981) should only be permitted via a court order. No equines should be slaughtered unless susceptible or known carriers. The courts should only be empowered to grant such an Order if it was reasonable to do so, it was satisfied that all other disease control measures are likely to be ineffective and once the animals' owner had been given the opportunity to make representations. With regard to "emergency orders" to slaughter animals to prevent disease spread other than those specified in section 32E (see section 1 of the Bill), the Executive should only be allowed to make such an Order if it had first been approved by a judge.

A total of 34 responses were received to this question. Of these, 25 responses supported vaccinated animals possibly being slaughtered, reiterating the need for any decision to be based on sound veterinary advice. It was suggested by one of the responders that any action should be limited only to those animals in the food chain.

One responder highlighted the potential issue of vaccination sometimes masking the symptoms of disease, thus making the identification of carriers more difficult. It was suggested in one response that the powers to slaughter vaccinated animals should be limited to where the Executive is satisfied that the animal is infected/a disease carrier. This was supported by a another responder, drawing attention to the development of a test distinguishing between vaccinated and diseased animals. This could greatly reduce the number of animals slaughtered and was essential for disease control and early resumption of trade. Furthermore, it was suggested that the Executive should engage with the EU to shorten the period required between the last case of infection and the resumption of international trade where vaccination had been used. The Bill should also address the issue of what happens to cryopreserved material on farms where controls are in place. One responder was of the opinion that a policy of vaccination to live should be adopted, opposing section 16B.

One responder stated that there should be a facility for a veterinary advisory committee, with input from Defra, academics, veterinary surgeons and the British Equine Veterinary Association ( BEVA). Another opinion was that the proposal in Question 3 was a matter for stock owning stakeholders and the State Veterinary Service to resolve.

Attention was drawn to the mental and physical pressures placed on keepers. These were considered to be too great, particularly where pedigree/home bred generations were concerned. More legislation and penalties were called for to be directed at the illegal importation of meats and animals to safeguard the animal population, similar to what happens presently in Australia and America. An alternative view was suggested that a more scientific approach involving vaccination and isolation should be adopted. The control measures used in Scotland should reflect those of adjacent countries in Europe.

Expressing concern, one responder stated that the proposals simply used the Bill sections to circumvent a policy of vaccinate to live.

Another responder suggested the proposals should be used as a last resort. Work should be carried out to identify the risk period when vaccinates are deemed to have carrier status. The technology to do this was available. The Executive should be proactive in urging e.g. the Office International des Epizootes ( OIE) to identify protocols for allowing vaccinated animals back into the food chain.

A further view was that if vaccinated animals are to be slaughtered, then only marker vaccines should be considered. Greater resources are required to source and develop suitable marker vaccines. Work should be undertaken to investigate the consequences of vaccinated animals entering the food chain.

Clarification was requested as to whether the costs of vaccination would be paid by the owner or the Executive. If the owner becomes responsible for payment, the view was that many may go out of business as a result.

Thirty nine responses dealt with this question, 34 of which agreed to the need for criminal offences to apply to new proposed Biosecurity Codes. Responders welcomed both the introduction of criminal offences and the new Biosecurity Codes.

It was stressed by the majority of the responders that there needs to be further consultation with industry, making the codes both practical and enforceable and taking into account existing biosecurity plans. One opinion was that some aspects of the codes may be difficult to enforce unless correctly worded.

Two responders expressed caution over the practicalities of how the distinction between good practice and statutory requirements would operate. Codes generally offer advice and the introduction of criminal breaches may cause confusion. It was suggested that individual circumstances are taken into account, distinguishing between negligence and malicious action.

On penalties, one opinion was that they should be significant so as to affect everyone involved. It was also suggested that the criminal offences are included in a schedule to the Bill. One responder commented that it was difficult to consider the criminal sanctions until the Code had been consulted on. Nevertheless, the inclusion of criminal offences should make the enforcement of breaches easier.

One detailed response commented that the issues under paragraph 14 of the consultation should not be restricted to agricultural land. Farm animals kept on domestic premises should also be included. A further comment received suggested that Biosecurity Codes should be followed by all government operations, for example, Customs and Excise.

Six out of the 39 responses opposed the inclusion of penalty offences applying to new Biosecurity Codes. One responder commented that emergency legislation should only be introduced to tackle emerging serious problems and was of the opinion that codes of practice should not be used as a back door method of introducing legislation.

Other issues included concern over Ministers having an ability to make Biosecurity Codes to deal with animal diseases and issue separate codes for companion animals, not only during a serious animal disease outbreak, but also on a day to day basis.

The issue was highlighted by one responder who commented that a number of questions were difficult to answer until it was known how Scottish Ministers would exercise powers under these codes.

One responder expressed concern at criminal offences being introduced as part of Secondary Legislation without proper discussion. The offences need to be clearly formulated, communicated and provision made for these to be reconsidered once the emergency had ended.

One response welcomed practical and enforceable biosecurity measures but questioned whether a "code" was the best way of introducing such measures from an enforcement view. The Crown Office might not be comfortable with enforcing Codes of Recommendation, which were open to interpretation, but would prefer enforcement measures to be incorporated within Statute. As an alternative, it is suggested that emergency biosecurity measures should be included within a Schedule to the Bill. These would only take effect in a disease outbreak if enacted by an emergency order. A code could still be produced for use under the Bill.

Another responder posed a number of questions. What would the proposed biosecurity codes be used for when there was no exotic or fast spreading disease and under what circumstances would there be a need to create a separate code for companion animals? The responder expressed opposition to the creation of biosecurity codes for pet animals.

Other general comments received to Question 4 included the view of one responder, that biosecurity had been compromised by the Land Reform (Scotland) Act, giving the public access to most farmland, thus increasing the opportunity for disease to spread.

Fifty one responses were received to this question, 40 of which were supportive and welcomed the licensing proposals.

There was a consensus on the need for clarification. The opinion of one responder was that the term "animal dealers" should cover livestock dealers, but not include hobbyists or those selling surplus livestock. Licensing of "animal gatherings" should only apply to events that are predominately sales events with commercial animal dealers. This would therefore include pet fairs with commercial animal dealers but specifically exclude "member only" events and primarily exhibition events. The level of activity which would bring the "animal dealer" within these controls also needed clarification. It was suggested by one responder that there was a need for different levels of operation e.g. a local riding club not in the same league as the Royal Highland Show. There was support for a separate provision for animal dealers to include young companion animals i.e. puppy farms.

Agreeing with the need to license animal gatherings, one responder cautioned on the potential cost implications for bird shows and sales. These could become excessive for bird clubs. The responder also suggested that the proposals were aimed at deliberately trying to kill off the hobby of bird keeping.

Another responder was vehemently opposed to the licensing of rabbit shows. These shows were already licensed through the British Rabbit Council ( BRC) and the proposals would mean double licensing. The BRC already required rabbit shows to satisfy specific requirements and pay a licence fee. Concern was also expressed that the proposed licensing of animal gatherings could force many small clubs to go out of existence.

One responder noted that it would be difficult to comment when the detail of the provision to licence animal gatherings would not be known until the Statutory Instrument had been issued. It would be equally important that normal farming activities do not unintentionally fall within the definition of "dealer". The cost implications of licensing animal gatherings should also be proportionate.

One responder asked for clarification as to whether "animal gatherings" included selling, exhibiting, demonstrations, training clubs and small companion animal type shows? The responder stated that consideration should be given to the number of licenses that would be required and the resources to process these.

Another responder expressed concern that the term "animal gathering" would refer to occasions where animals are brought together for either a sale, show, exhibition, onward consignment within Great Britain or for inspection to confirm that the animals possess specific breed characteristics.

A number of responders enquired whether the people dealing in game birds, for example, pheasants poults, would have to be licensed? It was often the case that the breeder and the rearer are different people.

It was accepted under section 4 that any persons who had bred or reared animals would be exempt. However, would a person buying day-old chicks and then selling them at a later stage be deemed as the person "responsible for breeding or rearing of the animals concerned"? The definition of dealer must be reviewed, particularly regarding the requirement that the dealer must physically take possession of the animals where in practice many dealers may never actually take possession but act as intermediaries.

It was suggested that animal gatherings should be subject to the same standards and controls as live auction marts. Premises which trade in large numbers of livestock should be classified as high risk with licensing and specialist biosecurity measures required. It was noted by one responder that these premises in Scotland trade large numbers of livestock, albeit slaughter stock without any requirement to comply with the regulations. These are high risk premises, requiring licence control and specialist biosecurity measures. The definition of "dealer" required clarification to detail the different categories of animals covered by the term and the level of activity which would bring a dealer within the controls.

Biosecurity at unregulated gatherings was a major concern. The licensing of animal gatherings would effectively level the playing field for livestock markets. One responder considered the licensing of animal gatherings a natural progression and suggested that one licensing body should issue licences for collection centres, markets and shows. It was suggested by one responder that the Bill should include penalties if licensing conditions were contravened. Another responder suggested that the Bill should also include the provision for enforcement bodies to refuse an application or revoke a current licence.

One responder highlighted the potential disease risk posed by the trend of "video auctioning" and other such remote systems, where prospective buyers have been invited to 'view' the livestock on a farm.

One responder stressed that licensing should not result in a structure which placed excessive demands on organisers, particularly given the voluntary nature of the management of shows and exhibitions. Another responder stated that the licensing of animal gatherings should account for differences between farm animal gatherings and horse/pony gatherings. It could result in undue licensing requirements for every equine competition or event, except in a disease outbreak. Concern was also expressed that licensing would result in requirements being imposed on those attending gatherings, on the premises following a gathering and for the inspection of premises and possible appeals.

Reassurances were sought that the provisions set out under the Welfare of Horses at Markets Order 1990 would be maintained and that licensing conditions could include commensurate welfare measures. Two responders stated that horse dealers should be licensed, with an emphasis on high welfare standards. This would go a long way to resolving existing recurring problems of poor biosecurity. Furthermore, any conditions should include particularly strict guidelines on the identification of individual horses. Microchipping was suggested as a possible solution.

One responder stated that exemptions should apply only where appropriate, for example, to private members' meetings at which animals may or may not be sold. Similarly, dog shows were currently controlled and licensed by The Kennel Club. This demonstrated a competence to regulate specific canine activities. The responder recommended that this was recognised by exemption, in any regulations. Another responder stated that exhibitions and shows which were competitive and run by cage bird organisations should not be licensed. Hobbyist shows were considered to have the highest standard of welfare. Most cage bird fairs were run by cage bird societies in Scotland, and were largely only attended by members of these societies. A Code of Conduct and Practice would be welcomed. However, it was also recognised that commercial sales would need to be licensed.

Concern was also expressed over the proposal to regulate pet fairs/markets via licensing. These, particularly the exotic pet trade, pose a considerable health risk to the public and animals (livestock) as well as potential welfare issues. One responder stated that the sale of pets warranted tighter enforcement of prohibition, not the relaxation of prohibitive measures.

Another responder requested definitive guidance from Ministers on the distinction between when a gathering would be licensed and when not. Any action taken should be based on sound scientific advice.

The regular inspection of holdings and transportation facilities under farm assured schemes was highlighted by one responder. Another viewpoint was that the proposed licensing of animal gatherings would curtail the ability of farming and countryside communities to interact and gather socially. One responder suggested including powers of inspection and an obligation to notify enforcement authorities when animals were being gathered at the premises.

Thirty five responses were received to this question, of which 32 responders agreed that inspectors should have powers to check for animal disease and, if necessary, take samples for analysis.

Broad support was expressed for the proposal, with a number of responders highlighting minor areas of concern. Two stated agreement with the proposal, with the proviso that any action taken was appropriate, with an appeal and compensation mechanism in place. A further 2 responders drew attention to the need for inspectors to take biosecurity precautions.

Two responders gave a qualified acceptance provided that inspectors were suitably qualified and trained, with adequate sampling procedures in place. Another view was that there should be a limit on the frequency of sampling and that adequate notice was given by the inspectors.

A particular concern of one responder was that the powers were too wide in permitting an inspector to enter any premises, take samples and carry out tests. As an alternative it was suggested that the powers should only be exercised when authorised by a Sheriff's warrant. There should be clear reasons given for entry. Another responder suggested that the diseases which inspectors were allowed to collect samples for should be listed. One responder queried if it would be appropriate for local authority inspectors to take samples.

Thirty two responses were received on this question. With the exception of one, all responders agreed that it should be possible to vaccinate or treat an animal beyond the current infected area limit.

Two responders cautioned against vaccinates entering the food chain. The Executive must be proactive in the creation of clear protocols for the introduction of vaccinates to the food chain and the supermarket/consumer reactions to vaccinated meat must be actively managed. Resources should be made available to educate the general public as to the safety of vaccinated meat.

One opinion was that vaccination should only be carried out with the permission of the owner/person in charge of animals, and on the basis of veterinary advice. Inspectors must be suitably qualified.

It was felt by one responder that animals vaccinated beyond the current area limit should not automatically be destroyed. Three responders considered the proposal acceptable, provided that they are part of a protective vaccination programme, allowing the animals to live. It was suggested that vaccination must be justified on stronger grounds than Ministers "think fit".

One responder requested clarification of section 6 of the proposed Bill, which referred to the treatment of a bird or an animal, because a bird is an animal.

Twenty eight responses covered this question. Twenty one agreed with the question, seven disagreed and .one responder did not know.

Two responders recommended that the list of diseases be subject to regular review. One responder stated that the 15 specified diseases were adequate at present but would not cover any new notifiable diseases in the future.

A number of responders made detailed suggestions for the inclusion of additional diseases. One commented that tuberculosis, brucellosis, rabies and TSEs should be added to the above list, as these diseases were already subject to regulatory control and compensation potentially paid in the event of their diagnosis.

One responder stated that the additional diseases of Hendra Virus, Encephalitis (including Eastern and Western equine encephalitis) and West Nile Fever, all of which had the potential to enter the UK in future, should be added to the list. There was no mention of Myxomatosis. Furthermore, all notifiable equine diseases should be included in Section 2B of the Bill.

Disagreeing with the question, one responder suggested that the confirmation of a definitive list of diseases was unnecessary given that the option to introduce appropriate remedial action in emergency conditions was available.

Another responder suggested that the list of diseases should be extended to include the aquaculture industry. It was also suggested by one responder that there is a need to include recognised virulent infectious diseases in domestic animals.

Twenty nine responses were received on this question. There was only one responder who disagreed with the draft proposal to clarify and extend the powers to seize and safely dispose of carcases. The responder agreed with the safe disposal of carcases but suggested that each case should be examined on an individual assessment of merit and risk.

One responder stated that the powers needed to be clarified but not extended. It was also felt that there should be heavier sentences for those that did not dispose of carcases properly. Clarification was requested for when the powers would be used in the case of TSEs.

Another responder requested clarification of the basis upon which valuations were made for compensation payments.

Forty responses were received to this question. All but one agreed that it should be a crime to infect deliberately an animal with disease. A number of concerns were also highlighted.

Concern was expressed over the potential adequacy of the arrangements that would be in place to detect and monitor deliberate infection. It was also recognised that it would be very difficult to prove deliberate infection. Farmers would need to be monitored more robustly in terms of their management of animals, incorporating an appeal mechanism.

Two responders drew attention to the importance of having the correct wording in secondary legislation. In particular, it was important to avoid loopholes in the wording of any disqualification provision, preventing the same person continuing under different name/partnership. Furthermore, it was highlighted that at present people can be disqualified from keeping animals but could continue to work with animals when ownership is changed to a friend or relative. In extreme cases, working with animals should not be allowed and made an offence if disqualified by a court. One responder also suggested limiting compensation for livestock slaughtered during an outbreak if it was proved that the farmer had failed to comply with the biosecurity measures in place.

Two responders agreed that it should be a crime to infect deliberately an animal with a notifiable disease but expressed reservations over deliberate infection with other diseases, requesting that such should be discussed further with a stakeholder group. Attention was drawn to circumstances where there are some non-notifiable diseases where deliberate exposure to disease, possibly at an early age, is an important tool in disease management. There is therefore a requirement for a better definition of the term 'deliberate infection of animals.' Another responder suggested that the proposal under Question 10 should be carried over into Part 2 of the Bill, to protect non-agricultural animals.

It was suggested, in addition, that legislation should be put in place that would prevent the sale of animals with known disease status, not disclosed by the seller. Another responder called for flexibility to deal with situations when a "farmer" had more than one holding, deliberately infecting one of these holdings and covertly infecting the others.

Thirty seven responders answered this question. All agreed that the courts should have the power to ban those convicted from future keeping, or dealing in, animals. It was recognised that there should be a right to appeal. It was stated by one responder that the question should apply to notifiable diseases only.

One responder suggested that not coming into contact with animals should be considered, in addition to banning those convicted from future keeping or, or dealing in, animals. Moreover, it was suggested that a ban on keeping animals should apply for life and be enforced. Supporting this view, one responder stated that courts required better guidance to ensure offenders were taken out of contact with animals for substantial periods of time, if not life. In extreme cases working with animals should be disallowed.

Two responders stated that ownership should not be permitted to be transferred to another party/family member, exploiting loopholes in the existing legislation. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the loophole of a ban issued in Scotland not applying elsewhere in the UK

One responder stated that penalties should be consistent with those for aggravated offences under Part 2 of the Bill.

Thirty responses were received to this question. There was general agreement with the proposals. One responder commented that the procedures required under section 36P "restriction on breeding notice" (sterilise/castrate or slaughter) should only be undertaken by a veterinary surgeon (or slaughterman) and that the appropriate anaesthesia and analgesia administered. This should similarly apply to section 36R. The Bill should give the Executive the power to regulate the approved methods of slaughter in such cases.

Another responder suggested that the proposed new powers of slaughter to prevent the spread, control or eliminate TSEs (section 36T) were too widely drawn. Similar concerns were expressed about the power of entry proposed in section 36U. A responder stated that this should only be exercised under warrant granted by a Sheriff. Slaughter should only be used where the Executive, or preferably a Judge, were satisfied that all other measures stated in the "restriction on breeding" notices were likely to be ineffective.

Two responders expressed support for the inclusion of a section which stated that the powers did not apply to animals that would never be slaughtered to provide food for humans. One responder stated that it was a matter of time before a live test for TSEs is developed. The proposed powers should therefore be reviewed on a regular basis to take account of advances in science and veterinary medicine.

Another responder commented that the proposed powers were appropriate as part of Scottish contingency plans. However, it was suggested that there should be regular reviews undertaken to ensure that actions remain proportionate and relevant. All measures introduced to reduce the risk of TSEs must take account of existing measures that are in place. Any decision to slaughter genotypes should be taken in consultation with the industry.

One responder called for the promotion of organic farming as an approach to addressing TSEs. Another responder's view was that the measures were too crude to deal with the complex issue of TSEs and that further research and consultation with scientists should be undertaken.

Disagreeing with the proposal, one responder requested further investigation of the Scrapie risk groups 3, 4 and 5's interactions with performance. The responder also commented that other associated traits of these risk groups required careful consideration and enclosed a paper giving further details. Another responder stated that the policy on Scrapie resistance and homozygosity at the PrP gene should be reviewed.

It was noted by one responder that the proposals were not applicable to equines. Concern was expressed that the proposed powers to deal with TSEs could result in complete breeds being wiped out. One responder commented that the proposal to wipe out certain genotypes was scientifically and agriculturally a blunt instrument. Two responders suggested the creation of a gene bank to retain genetic material as a possible solution. Furthermore, in the absence of clear scientific understanding of the situation regarding TSEs and resistance to TSEs in animals other than sheep, concern was expressed over the scope and scale of powers that were being proposed. One responder expressed concern that the proposed powers permitted detailed control of farm animal breeding and production.

Thirty three responses were received on this question, of which all but one stated that they agreed that the powers of entry were needed.

Agreeing with the need for powers of entry, one view was that inspectors entering a premise should first fully consider the biosecurity implications for that premise and also be accompanied by a qualified vet. One responder stated that the power of entry should only be exercised on the basis of identifying dangerous contacts through veterinary assessment.

One responder commented that inspectors should be able to enter premises where there was evidence that cruelty or neglect was taking place or would occur if no action was taken. However, the view was that it should only be the police that were entitled to use force to enter the premises. Similarly, 3 responders stated that the powers of entry should only be exercised under a warrant granted by a Sheriff, with a warrant also required for residential premises.

Thirty responses were received on this question, all of which expressed support, some with qualified comments, that vehicles could be stopped in a disease infected area, with police in attendance.

One responder called for consideration to be given to extending the power to animal health inspectors without requiring police attendance. This was countered by two opinions that the police should always be in attendance, with inspectors having the power to enter vehicles when they had been stopped.

Other transport issues within an Infected Area were identified for consideration. One responder suggested a scheme of co-ordinated vehicular movements within an Infected Area as a possible solution. The scheme would minimise the number of risk movements within an Infected Area and pay compensation to those companies if their business was affected. Another responder commented that it would be appropriate, within an Infected Area, for the proper burial of fallen stock to be permitted rather than having collection vehicles entering the Infected Area with the potential to transfer disease. In exercising this power, one responder commented that it would be important for the enforcement bodies to have the power to seize vehicles.

Thirty four responders answered this question with only one responder disagreeing with the proposal.

There was a strong view that the time limit in section 75(3) should be extended from 6 months to 1 year. This would allow more time for case preparation by both the Procurator Fiscal, State Veterinary Service and SEERAD. It was recognised, however, that in a disease outbreak situation resources would be stretched, with the preparation of cases taking second place when enforcement bodies were committed to preventing the spread of disease.

One responder stated that the sentencing policy should be subject to regular reviews, with a time period of 5 or 10 years proposed.

Expressing agreement with the question, one responder considered the sentencing policy still to be too weak. Similarly, another responder stated that the maximum penalties must reflect the seriousness of the offence.

Thirty five responses were received of which 33 agreed with the revised arrangements for publishing legal matters. One responder queried the question, whilst another stated that they were not qualified to comment but stated that the proposals appeared sensible.

Accepting the proposals, one responder cautioned that it would only be useful to those that can access the internet. The potential negative impact of the proposal was highlighted for those that did not have access to the internet. This view was supported by the one responder who disagreed with the proposal, stating that 3 out of 4 pet shops had limited internet access, with half of kennels and catteries not having access at all. The use of the web was recognised as an additional route, however the view was that it was not appropriate at this point in time to make the web the preferred method for publishing legal matters. One responder queried if the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities ( CoSLA) and/or the Local Authorities Coordinators of Regulatory Services ( LACORS) could be used as possible alternative routes.

More detailed responses commented that the existing system was inefficient, not cost effective and that more effective methods existed, which should be incorporated into Scottish contingency plans. It was also mentioned that local authorities should still be advised of new legislation and of any associated news releases.

Thirty two responses were returned on this question. There was general agreement that animal samples already taken could be used again for other diagnostic purposes, if necessary without the animal keeper's consent.

Six responders raised concerns over using samples again without the consent of the animal keeper. The view was that subsequent testing should only be with the consent of the animal keeper. One responder also suggested an option for the keeper to receive feedback on outcome of additional tests. To retain confidence of producers, such tests should be carried out in partnership with the Government.

Furthermore, animal keepers should be informed what the samples would be tested for and the implications if any disease was found. If disease was identified the animal owner should be informed. One responder commented that to take samples without the owner's permission was deemed unnecessary and heavy handed, and the rights of owners should be considered.

Two responders highlighted an apparent lack of trust between farmers and the Executive. In their opinion the farming community would be concerned over what Government officials would do with the information. This could be overcome through greater transparency.

It was stated by one responder that while the proposal was required to control major disease outbreaks, samples taken from pet animals should be excluded from the proposals.

In practical terms responders asked for guidelines to be produced on which samples would be retained, how long they would be retained and under what conditions. Also, the samples that could be used in diagnostic surveys should be clearly detailed in the new legislation. Clarification was requested by one responder on who would meet the storage costs of samples.

One responder suggested that, to establish and identify the ownership of the samples, a copy of the sample's identify should be noted in the animal's passport. Another responder suggested that the control over the laboratories holding the samples was reserved to the Home Office.

A number of comments on the payment of compensation, although not a specific question, were received, in relation to questions 1 and 2. One view put forward was that the Executive should consider limiting the compensation payable to a person if their livestock had to be slaughtered during a disease outbreak where it was proven that the person failed to comply with any biosecurity measures put in place by Ministers. Existing compensation levels for the loss of income due to restriction notices under the proposed Part 2A of the Bill were considered inadequate or absent. Another responder was opposed to the suggestion that compensation paid would be based on a table system. This approach was considered acceptable for the poultry industry but inappropriate for the sheep or cattle sectors. Another responder stated that disease compensation should fully reflect the true market value of the animal. The responder expressed full support for accountability but was of the opinion that reassurances on fair valuation would be essential to ensure the full co-operation of farmers. One responder suggested that any owner who had suffered loss under the provisions in Part 1 should be fully compensated, based on independent valuations at the time. The basis for any valuation should be set out clearly. Another responder cautioned that compensation payments could exceed the overall benefits to the farming industry of the early resumption of exports and suggested that a cost-benefit analysis be carried out to determine the validity of the approach.

Uncertainty as to the extent to which companion animals would or would not be included under Part 1 of the Bill was highlighted. One responder's view was that the Executive had little experience in applying legislation to companion animals and a solution to this would be to establish an expert group, including commercial stakeholders, to provide advice to the Minister.

General comments were received from responders concerning the movement of livestock. Two responders stated that this practice was detrimental to the welfare of animals and the control and containment of disease. It was suggested that animals should be slaughtered on the farm using mobile abattoirs or near the farm in local slaughter houses. An alternative solution was suggested whereby markets and abattoirs should be more local, therefore outbreaks of disease would be more easily contained and traced. This would also result in improved welfare through shorter travel times and distances for handling and transport.

On the proposals concerning the slaughter of animals, two responders commented that this should be restricted to animals in the food chain. Similarly, exemptions should be considered for the export of zoo animals provided they were part of a conservation breeding programme and would never enter the human food chain. Concern was also expressed that the Bill gave the Executive wider powers to slaughter in the event of a disease outbreak, despite public anger at similar actions taken during the 2001 FMD outbreak. One responder suggested that farmers should carry insurance to cover them against losses from stock that was ordered to be destroyed. Also, if disease was caused by actions of other farmers, those affected farmers should be prepared to sue the offending party for damages. Another response was that the proposals did not adequately cover the right of appeal for affected animal keepers. If possible, producers should have the option of a second opinion from a vet with experience of the disease. However, it was recognised that this would be difficult to deliver in a fast moving disease situation.

Further comments received on Part 1 of the Bill focused on disease epidemics which caused financial damage to the agriculture industry rather than concentrating on the suffering of the animals. It was noted that there was little control on fish farming, yet aquaculture was not included in the draft Bill. Another responder stated that there was no promotion of organic farming, no consideration to the impact of vaccinations or biosecurity codes in the proposals.

Two responders commented that there should be greater emphasis on disease prevention. One responder suggested that this could be achieved through the reduction of stocking densities on farms. Another responder commented that many welfare problems could be avoided if health issues were dealt with promptly. Similarly, it was noted that hill sheep suffer from foot rot, which could possibly mask other conditions and delay the identification of Foot and Mouth Disease. A potential solution was proposed in making vaccination against foot rot a legal requirement.

Reference was made in the consultation document to amendments of the Animal Health Act 1981 introduced in England and Wales. A number of responders were unaware of similar changes being introduced in Scotland and requested clarification on this point.

One responder stated that new laws should be detailed in the Bill, thus avoiding the practice of referring to new law being made by orders prescribed by Scottish Ministers. This would simplify/clarify and make the legislation more user friendly. Another responder commented that previous legislation had given the general public the right to enter animal and crop enclosures. This represented a danger of introducing/spreading disease and appeared to conflict with the proposals contained within the Bill. It was noted by one responder that the power to make emergency orders without consultation was very wide. Clarification was requested as to what types of emergency would justify such an emergency order.

One responder commented that it was difficult to assess the financial implications of the Bill until there was clearer information available on the extent to which inspectors were to come into contact with farmers and others in the agricultural industry.

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