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Chapter 6 Research Findings and
Recommendations
The Research Findings
6.1 The remit of this research was to assess the
establishment, operation and effectiveness of the
SIVYC pilot scheme.
Establishment and Operation
6.2 The assessment revealed that the scheme, as
originally conceived, was more difficult to implement, and
more procedurally complex than anticipated. The impact on
the agencies involved was a greater than expected
administrative workload and need for revision of systems
for storing and monitoring data. The data systems issues
will certainly have contributed to the administrative
workload. However, despite procedural difficulties, a
scheme is now in operation which does, in most cases,
identify victims' support and information needs and ensure
that the service is offered.
6.3 Time data analysis suggests that some victims waited
longer than they need for case outcome information. Process
delays led to confusion among those victims receiving
multiple correspondence, however, it is assumed that the
timing issues would be resolved in any rollout once the
scheme has bedded in. Decision data shows an increase in
the number of decisions made and issued towards the end of
the pilot which may be indicative of improvements to the
service as the pilot progressed.
6.4 This report has presented descriptive detail on the
establishment and operation of the scheme and has
highlighted the areas where consideration of processes is
required to ensure that a service of this kind operates to
its full potential. The pilot has been useful in
highlighting the procedural problems that can arise in a
multi-agency exercise of this kind. The lessons learned can
be applied in any rollout of the scheme.
Effectiveness
6.5 In terms of effectiveness, this assessment was
somewhat inconclusive. Effectiveness of this scheme, it was
assumed, would be measured most objectively by comparing
satisfaction levels of victims who had experienced the
service with those who had not. The low response rates to
the surveys meant that the results could not be compared
with confidence, however, some general conclusions were
deduced in relation to:
- provision of generic information;
- provision of case specific information;
- provision of emotional and practical support;
and
- coverage of the scheme.
6.6 Data from the baseline, monitoring and comparison
area studies shows that, when asked what (if any) kind of
information and support victims needed, information from
the police and specific information on the progress of the
case were always cited more often than generic information
about the system, moral support or someone to talk to. This
was also supported by qualitative interview data, with many
victims' feeling that they did not require support, most
often because they felt that their victimisation was not
serious or simply that their greatest need was to feel that
something had been done to address the young person's
offending behaviour. It is important to note, however, that
due to low numbers of survey and interview respondents,
such a finding cannot be readily generalised. Indeed, when
looking at all referrals to the pilot, victims of assault
represented the greatest proportion of all referrals, and
this would not typically be considered minor. Further,
although victims who responded to the consultation often
referred to their victimisation as being a minor crime, the
crime categories pertaining to the victims involved in the
pilot were replicable to those of the victims that Victim
Support Scotland supports within the adult criminal justice
system and it cannot be assumed that the experiences of
victims of youth crime are less serious than those of other
victims.
6.7 The stakeholder monitoring data shows that, of 1139
victims who were eligible to receive the
VSSSIVYC service, 526 (46%) opted into the
scheme. Of these, the majority opted to receive information
regarding case outcomes via
VSS (85%) with 15% directly from
SCRA. A total of 449 victims (39%) of
all
SIVYC eligible victims referred to
VSS took up the service for both
information and support. For those opting to receive
information and support via
VSS, however, case study interviews
suggest that support was wanted less than information about
case progress.
6.8 It appears from the data that victims are more
interested in receiving case specific information than
generic information. With regard to support, it appears
that significant demand was low, possibly because many of
those that responded to the consultation considered the
crimes involved to be minor. Defining 'support' is
problematic and discussions with some victims suggest that
the information in itself provided a means of support.
Victims themselves may not have wanted or been able to
articulate their need for support separately from
information and it is difficult to conclude from this work,
therefore, whether a support need was present but not
readily expressed. Further, emotional support or someone to
talk to, where it was needed, appears to have been
effective and, just because the demand was not high, it is
not possible to dismiss the value of this part of the
scheme where it was needed.
6.9 Impact of the scheme on local communities was also
difficult to assess. Interviews with victims indicated that
informal information exists within many local communities
with regard to the actions of specific young people and
their involvement with the youth justice system. This may
have affected victims' understanding of the factual
information provided to them by agencies such as the
police,
VSS and
SCRA.
6.10 Finally, there were very few cases where
information was not disclosed which suggests that the
demand for information could be met in nearly all cases in
a rollout of the scheme. There were no notable differences
in decision making practices between the offices
involved.
Considerations for the Future of
SIVYC
6.11 Legislation means that information can now be
requested and evidence from the pilot suggests that a
systematic and auditable mechanism for providing this
information is required.
6.12 This report does not attempt to make a
recommendation for or against a national rollout, rather,
it seeks to highlight, based on evidence from the pilot,
what the implications may be for all those involved in a
national rollout of the scheme.
Service Delivery Options - Opt in Versus Opt
out
6.13 In considering a national rollout of the scheme, it
is suggested that consideration be given to alternative
models of service delivery. A number of alternative models
were considered and discussed with stakeholders throughout
the duration of the pilot, however, it seems that there are
two principal possible options. These are presented
below.
6.14 Model A presents a simplified model of the current
scheme with
VSS playing a central role in the
provision of support and information through an opt out
model. The unit costs of rolling out this scheme can be
estimated on the basis of Case Type C presented in Chapter
5.
6.15 Model B is an alternative, in which the main
activities undertaken in the
SIVYC scheme are those of the police and
SCRA. Victims would be issued with a
letter (and information pack) by the police, informing them
that decision information would be released unless the
victim opted out of the scheme. The letter would also
indicate that the victim's details were being passed to
VSS and advise the victim that they
could contact
VSS if support was required.
Essentially, this means that the victim would have to 'opt
in' to contact with
VSS. Referrals would then be passed
directly to
SCRA for all victims who did not opt out
and decision information would be issued when available. At
this time,
SCRA would provide a copy of the
decision information to
VSS in the event that they were
contacted by the victim to discuss the decision letter in
more detail.
6.16 The cost data presented in Chapter 5 indicates that
Model B may be the least expensive. Of all
SIVYC eligible victims, only 68% had
contact with
VSS, despite a large volume of contact
activity undertaken by the
VSS team. Only 46% of all
VSS eligible victims opted into the
scheme and 15% of these opted to receive information
directly from
SCRA. Whilst the remaining 449 victims
still represent a sizeable proportion of all victims
referred, interviews with victims and questionnaires
returned during the monitoring exercise suggests that many
of the victims who did have contact with
VSS were principally interested in
receiving information from
VSS, rather than any other support. An
issue is the difficulty of defining 'support'. A telephone
call in which victims are afforded an opportunity to simply
explain what happened in their own words may, for some, be
a means of support in itself. The issue of opting in or out
of contact with
VSS is one that the service has
themselves discussed many times in the past and the opt out
approach is the one they favoured. Opting in to such
schemes means that those who are most in need of support
may fail to request it and, although the evidence presented
here does not suggest a high demand for emotional or
practical support, there is significant research evidence
reported elsewhere that advocates victims' emotional
support needs.
6.17 A final significant consideration in relation to
Model B is the additional work that may be generated for
SCRA, as this model would undoubtedly
result in more victims contacting
SCRA directly (for example, to chase
delays in information). There is a potential in this model
for the information providing agency to find that they
inevitably become involved in delivering emotional support
alongside the information and this would present new
challenges. However, it remains likely that the cost of
this model would be significantly less than model A. Costs
presented for Case Type B in Chapter 5 are indicative of
those that might be involved here for the 'core' service,
though the cost of opt ins to support would have to be
added along with additional
SCRA administration costs.
National versus Local Models
6.18 The options presented here are simplified in terms
of the processes involved. Any national rollout of the
scheme would need to take account of:
- database system and other administrative
requirements, in particular different crime recoding
databases and practices operated by different police
forces;
- current
VSS referral schemes; and
- Reporter capacity to process referrals.
6.19 It may be that different models would be most
appropriate in different areas and that variation on a
basic model may be required to take local circumstances
into account.
6.20
VSS themselves noted during the
evaluation that different police forces have different
systems of referring to
VSS services and that a single model for
referrals would not suffice without substantial changes to
practice. The minimum basis for this scheme to be activated
would be a system whereby the trigger was the delivery of
the
SPR from the Police to
SCRA.
Managing the Future of
SIVYC
Data Management and Administration
6.21 Prior to any rollout of the scheme, issues relating
to data management and administration should be finally
resolved in the pilot area and taken into account
elsewhere. The two issues of central importance are data
referencing and database functionalities.
6.22 Only when these issues have been resolved should a
rollout of the scheme be undertaken. An option well worth
considering would be to test the revised procedures in a
demonstration area before moving towards national
cover.
Summary
6.23 In sum:
- the current administrative system is complicated
and less expensive models could be considered;
- while many victims appreciated the service,
especially in terms of information provision, there is
no evidence that large scale benefits arose;
- adjustments to the specification of the service
processes are required and a demonstration period to
test the revised system might be prudent;
- the scheme needs to clearly differentiate the needs
of victims in terms of support and information. Many
victims who were eligible to receive support and
information as part of the pilot appear to have wanted
only information. Many hours of
VSS time and resources could be
saved in a new model which makes it clearer to victims
that information can be provided without
VSS contact.
Recommendations
6.25 Based on the evidence provided here, the assessment
team present the following recommendations:
- a specification exercise is needed including an
agreed referencing system with unique identifiers that
can be used by all agencies easily and that does not
require workaround packages to be developed at the
local level. Workaround packages are resource intensive
and should be unnecessary. The specification exercise
would have to take all police forces into account if
national rollout was under consideration;
- a second period of testing is needed to demonstrate
an adjusted protocol;
- consultation with police forces to assess youth
crime recording practices and database capabilities is
required. A similar exercise would not be required, it
is suggested, for
VSS local services or the different
Area Children's Reporters' offices as they would, it is
assumed, be able to adopt the same practices as those
in the pilot, provided that input from all the police
forces was identical. Also, these organisations have
central management;
- management and co-ordination responsibility for a
future scheme of this kind must be defined particularly
in the early stages. This would take an overview that
might otherwise be missing from the technical and
administrative development processes, given that a
number of agencies are involved; and
- ongoing monitoring is recommended, especially if
there are changes to the scheme administration.
Conclusions
6.26 The pilot has been a valuable exercise, yielding
useful lessons. However, it has not functioned effectively
as a demonstration model.
6.27 The establishment and operation of the scheme has
been complicated and all those involved have expended
considerable unanticipated resources in making the pilot
work. Revisions to protocol are required and the pilot has
been useful in identifying how such a protocol should
operate.
6.28 It is difficult to assess the true effectiveness of
the scheme, especially in relation to overall levels of
victim satisfaction, due to the process and administrative
challenges, and the low responses to the victim
surveys.
6.27 That said, the scheme has provided a large number
of victims with information and support that would not
otherwise have been received. The benefit of the scheme to
these victims cannot readily be measured against the costs
to the different agencies involved.
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