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Executive Summary
The Support and Information for Victims of Youth Crime (
SIVYC) pilot scheme was introduced in
Forth Valley (Stirling, Falkirk and Clackmannanshire) in
October 2003.
The pilot was administered jointly by the Police, Victim
Support Scotland (
VSS) and the Scottish Children's
Reporter Administration (
SCRA). It provided victims with specific
information about what had happened to a child or young
person referred to the Children's Reporter in relation to a
specific offence committed against the victim. Victims
could opt to receive information on referrals either
directly from
SCRA or via
VSS. The service also provided victims
with access to practical and emotional information and
support through
VSS.
The pilot protocol was developed in the context of new
legislative provision set out in Section 53 of the Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. The Act enables the Principal
Reporter to release information to victims of youth crime
regarding decisions and disposals relating to children and
young people referred to the Reporter on offence
grounds.
A monitoring and evaluation exercise was undertaken. The
overall objective was to assess the establishment,
operation and effectiveness of the scheme. The assessment
process included:
- consultation with those responsible for
administering the scheme to ascertain how the pilot was
working in practice and to record any changes that were
made to the service protocol in the course of the
pilot;
- analysis of case records provided by the
stakeholders and of the routine monitoring data held by
each of the agencies (i.e. youth crimes recorded by the
police, victims referred into the scheme and offence
referrals to the Reporter where the victim was eligible
to take part in the scheme); and
- consultation with victims of youth crime to explore
their support and information needs, and whether they
were adequately met. This involved postal questionnaire
surveys and follow-up interviews. There were three
groups of consultees: those who participated in the
scheme; those who had been victims of youth crime in
the pilot area before the scheme was introduced; and
victims of youth crime in a comparison area (West
Lothian).
A costing exercise was also undertaken to identify the
type and scale of activities undertaken by each of the main
stakeholders in the scheme and the associated expenditure.
This also sought to provide an indication of the costs of
different types of support and information provision. The
purpose was to determine the scale of work and expenditure
implied by a national rollout (or other extension of the
pilot) and to assist the Scottish Executive in estimating
the implied costs.
Establishment
A number of procedural difficulties hampered the
operation of the pilot as originally conceived. Each agency
had its own database and problems arose in communicating
between these. Data referencing was a difficult issue,
because of the inherent complexity of case information,
where a single incident could involve single or multiple
young persons, single or multiple grounds for referral,
single or multiple victims, or no victim at all. These
difficulties meant that individual victims could not be
tracked through the
SIVYC administration (i.e. from initial
police contact through to referral information being
released where requested) without considerable manual
effort.
Other procedural difficulties that sometimes affected
the pilot included:
- delays in police reports being issued to the
SCRA;
- difficulties in contacting victims to ascertain
their support and information needs; and
- delays in the processing of offence grounds
referred and, therefore, delays in issuing referral
decision information to victims who had requested
it.
The agencies responded by making revisions to the
protocol. Because the pilot was underway, the revisions had
to be made with limited changes to database functionality
and referencing, so manual workarounds were involved.
However, this significantly improved the service and
allowed tracking of individual victims. At the end of the
12 month pilot period, the main stakeholders were
considering further changes to
SIVYC data processing, which should
further address the operational difficulties that were
experienced in the pilot.
Operation
Due to the data inconsistencies, the recorded numbers of
victims referred to the
SIVYC service differed between
agencies.
Police records showed 1289 victims linked to separate
incidents who were eligible for the
SIVYC scheme. Of these, 1119 were
referred on to either
VSS or
SCRA, and 170 were eligible but were not
referred. The main reason for non referral was a police
decision that the release of information could compromise
either the victim or the young person involved.
VSS records showed that, from 1139
victims who were referred to them, 526 opted into the
scheme (46%). The majority of these opted to receive
information on outcomes via
VSS (85%) and 15% directly from
SCRA. A total of 449 victims therefore
received both information and support from the
VSSSIVYC team.
For the twelve months of the pilot, 1066 offence grounds
referred to
SCRA were linked to
SIVYC victims. It was not possible to
extract the total number of victims associated with these
records. Against the 1066 offence grounds marked with a
victim record, a total of 906 records showed that a
decision had been made at the end of the pilot period. This
is 85% of all victim information requests received. This is
partly accounted for by cases that had not fully run their
course by the end of the pilot period.
Most victims opting to receive information chose to do
so via Victim Support (47%). Many victims (38%) were issued
with information directly from
SCRA (405 cases). However, it was not
possible to identify how many victims asked to receive
information directly and how many received it directly by
default, i.e. because no contact had been made with any of
the agencies to indicate an opt out.
Effectiveness
It was difficult to make an objective assessment of the
effectiveness of the scheme, especially in terms of impact
on victims who had taken part.
Effectiveness of this scheme, it had been assumed, could
be measured most objectively by comparing satisfaction
levels of victims in the area where the scheme was
operational with victims in areas where it was not. A
postal survey of nearly 2,000 victims in the baseline,
pilot and comparison areas was undertaken. However,
disappointing response rates of 18%, 11% and 14%
respectively were achieved. As well as greatly reducing
confidence in the representativeness of the results, the
low numbers of responses will have allowed significant
sample error. The results cannot be compared across areas
with confidence, nor can the overall findings be
generalised reliably to all victims of youth crime.
However, it was possible to form some judgements from the
data, partly because the quantitative data were supported
by in-depth interviews with a total of 37 victims across
all the areas. The following main points were noted:
- victims' most common needs appeared to be for
information from the police and specific information on
the progress of the case. A requirement for emotional
or practical support was less common. Often victims
said that they considered the offence to be minor, so
they were able to deal with its implications unaided;
and
- victims of youth crime in the pilot area were more
likely than non-pilot victims to have received support
or information from Victim Support Scotland.
Although 449 victims (39% of all
SIVYC eligible victims referred to
Victim Support Scotland) took up the option to receive both
information and support, response rates to the survey meant
that it was difficult to arrive at an overall assessment of
reactions to the service. Qualitative interview data
suggests that many respondents appear to have appreciated
the service. However, some expressed concern about the time
taken to receive referral information and were frustrated
by the amount of information that could be released. Some
doubted that the actions taken by the Reporter would impact
on children and young people's future propensity for
offending. This is perhaps reflected in the high proportion
of victims (70%) who participated in the
SIVYC scheme who said that they would
have liked more information.
Defining 'support' in this pilot was problematic and
discussions with some victims suggest that they regarded
information itself as a means of support. It is also
possible that victims may not have wanted or been able to
articulate their need for support separately from
information. It is difficult to conclude from this work,
therefore, whether a support need was present but not
readily expressed. However, some victims did benefit from
emotional support and, when it was needed, it appears to
have been effective. Although the demand was not high, the
value of this part of the scheme, where needed, should not
be dismissed. The scheme did provide a significant number
of victims with information and support that would not
otherwise have been received.
Costs
The costing exercise identified the main component costs
to agencies of setting up and operating the scheme. The
exercise suggested that the current system is
administratively complicated, and therefore quite
expensive.
The benefits to victims and communities cannot be valued
in financial terms, so a cost-benefit analysis of different
operational models cannot be carried out. However, any
rollout of the scheme should take account of the numbers of
victims requiring support as well as information. Although
all were eligible for both, many appear to have wanted only
information.
Recommendations
The research suggests that the current administrative
system is complicated and less expensive models could be
considered. While many victims appreciated the service,
especially in terms of information provision, there is no
evidence that large scale benefits arose. The scheme needs
to clearly differentiate the needs of victims in terms of
support and information. Many victims who were eligible to
receive support and information as part of the pilot appear
to have wanted only information.
Based on the evidence reported here, the following
recommendations are presented:
- a specification exercise is needed including an
agreed referencing system with unique identifiers that
can be used by all agencies;
- a second period of testing is needed to demonstrate
an adjusted protocol;
- consultation with police forces to assess youth
crime recording practices and database capabilities is
required;
- management and co-ordination responsibility for a
future scheme of this kind must be defined particularly
in the early stages. This would take an overview that
might otherwise be missing from the technical and
administrative development processes, given that a
number of agencies are involved; and
- ongoing monitoring is recommended, especially if
there are changes to the scheme administration.
Conclusions
There was widespread recognition among the three
agencies involved that victims should be able to get access
to information and support. Considerable effort and
imagination went into the development and delivery of the
pilot. The scheme served its function as a pilot in that
useful lessons were learnt, and the changes made during the
pilot reflect the commitment of all those involved to
developing an effective system. However, it did not fulfil
the function of a demonstration model for the future. This
was because of the changes that were made, those still
under consideration and the low response rate. All this
implies that further consideration should be given to
further testing of local services before moving towards
large scale rollout.
This pilot should not, therefore, be used as a basis on
which the future effectiveness of an information and
support service should be finally determined, because it is
likely that the procedural changes that have been discussed
and implemented since the end of the pilot will result in a
different and more effective service. Rather, it offers an
insight into the achievements of the scheme during the
first 12 months of its operation as a pilot, and the
difficulties that have been encountered. It also offers an
opportunity to take stock of the lessons that may be
applied in any rollout of the scheme.
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