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Scottish Criminal Record Office Primary Inspection 2004

5. Processes

Business Support

5.1 The Business Support Bureau is led by a Business Support Manager with responsibility for the provision of a range of services including personnel, finance, office services, facilities, health and safety and records management. She is responsible for a range of support staff who specialise in personnel, finance and general administration. This is a significant development for SCRO compared to previous arrangements, providing as it does the means to support the operational bureaux within SCRO without undue recourse to the infrastructure of Strathclyde Police. HMIC acknowledges the very positive progress which has been achieved to date and will examine further developments in this area at the review inspection.

Scottish Fingerprint Service

Introduction

5.2 The police service has used fingerprints as a means of identification for over a century. In the investigation of crime, this typically involves the comparison of finger impressions left at the scene, with those of convicted criminals which are stored on record. The presence of an individual's fingerprint at a crime scene is not conclusive evidence that he or she perpetrated the crime, but it does provide evidence of his or her physical presence there at some time. This may be for a legitimate purpose, such as a householder's fingerprint in his or her own home after a housebreaking and therefore the fingerprints of witnesses too have to be obtained and compared for elimination purposes.

5.3 During the period 2003-04, almost 14,000 cases involving fingerprints were referred for comparison to the fingerprint service in Scotland. Of these, 24.4% resulted in positive identifications. The placing of an individual at a crime scene can add considerably to the weight of evidence available to a court and fingerprint evidence has contributed to the conviction of countless criminals for crimes ranging from the most minor to rape, murder and terrorism.

5.4 The expert analysis of fingerprints is a respected, well-established and highly valued discipline within the criminal justice system in Scotland. Technological developments over the years have increased the potential to capture and search fingerprints and finger impressions, but the process is not capable of complete automation. The comparison of fingerprints requires an expert eye and practitioners require a high level of skill and integrity, coupled with rigorous training and assessment to become an accredited expert. Figure 5 depicts some of the characteristics visible in a fingerprint.

Structure

5.5 The fingerprinting service in Scotland has undergone radical development following HMIC's Primary Inspection Report of the SCRO Fingerprint Bureau in 2000. At that time, the facilities comprised the SCRO Fingerprint Bureau based in Glasgow and a number of individual force fingerprint examination units throughout Scotland.

5.6 The service has now been rationalised into a national structure known as the Scottish Fingerprint Service. This is one business unit of SCRO, administered from its headquarters at Pacific Quay, where the Glasgow Bureau of SFS is housed. Three additional bureaux are maintained at Aberdeen, Dundee and Edinburgh. While the SFS has a management structure, aligned to SCRO, in reality it exists at present only as a collaborative arrangement between SCRO and forces and agreed by chief constables. Comprehensive operating processes have been produced for the service within the 'SFS National Procedures Manual'.

5.7 In September 2004, SCRO published a report which presented its proposals for authorised staffing levels of the SFS. The research appears to be founded on sound principles and the document provides a realistic assessment of the personnel required within SFS over the medium term. This document was prepared to ensure that sufficient fingerprint trainees are recruited to match future needs, and to consolidate the establishment levels in readiness for future changes in governance. The national fingerprint collection is stored within Pacific Quay, but local collections are also maintained at the remote sites. This reflects a transitional stage in a process that is likely to result in SFS merging with a new forensic science service for Scotland. Forensic laboratories are also located in sites at Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow.

5.8 The proposed structure, founded on crime levels, caseload, activity analysis and the impact of technology, is summarised in Tables D and E.

Table D: Proposed Structure - Glasgow Bureau

Table E: Proposed Structure - Aberdeen, Dundee and Edinburgh Bureaux

5.9 It was envisaged, to reflect the national service now in place, that the costs of maintaining the remote fingerprint bureaux could be readily top-sliced from the relevant force budget and allocated to SCRO to fund the SFS as a whole. Disappointingly, this has not yet been achieved for 2004-05. Although ACPOS has agreed the matter in principle, the process of determining non-salary costs has resulted in its Finance and Best Value Business Area opting to operate a shadow budget for 2005-06 in order to better inform a transfer of funds in the following year. Sadly, this will act as a barrier to full integration of SFS but in the interim period, while a number of structural issues remain, much can and should be done at the point of service delivery to present a corporate, nationally aligned identity. While acknowledging that there have been a number of important developments within SFS to achieve integration, including the production of a corporate logo, HMIC considers that there is still some distance to go in order to achieve this.

5.10 The head of the SFS is based at Pacific Quay and is also head of the Glasgow Bureau. Each of the three sites outwith Glasgow is managed by a dedicated head of bureau. All four incumbents are support staff members who are not fingerprint experts, but each has brought valuable experience from the private or public sector. While HMIC recognises the difficulties in establishing an integrated national service solely on a collaborative basis and the significant progress made in spite of this, greater visibility and engagement at the remote bureaux would go some way towards demonstrating corporacy and could facilitate engagement around some of the issues outlined in this section of the report which have stifled integration. HMIC found little evidence of SCRO or SFS management, above bureau head, routinely engaging with operational staff outwith and, to a lesser extent, within Pacific Quay. Furthermore, staff from a remote bureau visiting Pacific Quay are not formally identifiable as SFS members. While each individual is supplied by their local force with an authorisation card to gain access to their workplace, they are not issued with the SCRO pass.

5.11 Certain policies adopted within each bureau, governing working conditions and practice, are applicable to the force in which they are based. Indeed, HMIC recognises that, at this stage in the development of the SFS, most of the personnel involved are still employed under local force arrangements and conditions. However, an example of where the approach can appear divisive is in relation to the absence management policy. Each bureau rightly and legitimately follows local conditions of service laid down within their 'home' force. Absences therefore inform statistical data maintained within that force, but corporate statistics for absence management, as for other performance indicators compiled by SCRO, routinely exclude remote fingerprint bureaux.

5.12 There is also potential for confusion at local level over funding, training and the provision of equipment. While HMIC acknowledges the potential financial implications, in the absence of corporate letter-headed paper and business cards under the brand of the SFS, staff in remote bureaux utilise the stationery supplied by their 'host' force. A similar approach exists in regard to the provision of corporate workwear, which in the Aberdeen and Edinburgh bureaux bears the logo of Grampian Police and Lothian and Borders Police respectively.

5.13 The reluctance to embrace the national fingerprint service is exacerbated at Aberdeen through the operation of a dual-role system where fingerprint experts, once qualified, are additionally trained and deployed as scenes of crime officers. Although they perform either fingerprint work or scenes of crime examination on a rotational basis and do not acquire and examine the same marks, the practice of undertaking training in two disciplines is difficult to support. Personnel at the Aberdeen Bureau are, for all practical purposes, subsumed within the force's identification branch.

5.14 There are other examples which illustrate scope for further integration. The management of fingerprint cases (i.e. finger impressions recovered from a crime scene) is facilitated by a computer application known as the Office Management System (OMS). This was introduced under the auspices of the SFS and is maintained at each bureau. It is an important facility which allows performance information within each bureau and across the SFS as a whole to be accessed from any site. While the Aberdeen bureau does input its caseload to OMS it also, however, continues to key data, essentially the same information, into a separate spreadsheet used by it prior to the establishment of SFS. Staff argue that the legacy system is easier to search, but acknowledge that maintaining two applications is a duplication of effort. In HMIC's view, the official case management application should incorporate all of the necessary functionality and any scope for potential improvements identified at any one site should be progressed for the benefit of SFS as a whole.

5.15 HMIC recognises that there is an appetite among SFS staff for future re-structuring within a national forensic science service and that this is actively being progressed for the medium term. However, it is essential that SCRO hands over a national service which is actually operating as such and, in the interim, it is recommended that SCRO actively pursues further integration of the SFS, taking account of the specific issues raised in this Report.

Recommendation 4
HMIC recommends that SCRO actively pursues further integration of the SFS, taking account of the specific issues raised in this Report.

Service Level Agreements

5.16 The SFS has established SLAs with a number of forces and was actively engaged in completing this activity across each of its force customers. The agreements themselves are largely generic and in the view of HMIC do not establish the specific obligations of both parties in order to achieve the desired service delivery. At paragraph 5.64, HMIC acknowledges the legitimacy of an SLA which exists between Disclosure Scotland and ACPOS and the arrangements within SFS could be enhanced by the adoption of similar provisions. HMIC recognises that the SLAs which have been devised to date are a welcome step in achieving a better service, but they could be developed further for the benefit of each party. HMIC will review progress in this area at the review inspection.

Fingerprint Technology

5.17 Automatic Fingerprint Recognition (AFR) was introduced to SCRO in 1991. This is a computerised system which stores the national fingerprint collection relating to 342,000 individuals. It is used to compare fingerprints (prints) and finger impressions from the scene of a crime (marks). Comparisons can be made of the following:

• print to print - to confirm identity
• mark to mark - to link one crime scene with another
• print to mark - to identify crimes which a suspect may be responsible for
• mark to print - to identify suspects.

5.18 During 1997 the system was complemented by the introduction of a computerised, ink-free facility to record electronically the fingerprints of arrested persons. The system, installed at 33 locations throughout Scotland and known as 'Livescan', uses optical technology to 'capture' an arrested person's fingerprints. Nationally, 74% of prisoners are currently fingerprinted and processed using Livescan technology, with the affordability of additional terminals being the limiting factor for further progress. Even where Livescan is used, the alternative 'paper and ink' process has not been eliminated. As Livescan caters for finger, but not palm prints, police officers and custody staff require to continue to take palm impressions manually. Once the set of finger and palm impressions have been obtained, the fingerprints are transmitted electronically to SFS at Pacific Quay and a 'print to print' search is conducted. Where the individual is on file, SFS undertakes to confirm his or her identity within 2 hours. The inked palm impressions are sent separately to SFS and filed, although the scope to utilise palm impressions for identification is extremely limited.

5.19 Palm impressions are estimated to account for between 14% and 25% of crime scene marks but manually searching them against the entire palm collection is simply not viable. Palm marks are therefore only compared against the palm records held in relation to named suspects for a crime. SCRO has, since Livescan was introduced in 1997, been seeking a facility to capture and search palm prints electronically to keep pace with advances in technology and potentially identify crime scene marks which cannot currently be searched. A solution is now being progressed on a UK-wide basis by the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO), the Home Office, the Scottish Executive, ACPOS and SCRO.

5.20 The system, known as 'Ident1', is to be introduced throughout Scotland to replace existing Livescan terminals. In addition to the 33 existing sites, eight additional terminals will be installed including, for the first time, dedicated access for the British Transport Police (BTP). There are three key benefits anticipated from Ident1:

• electronic capture and searching of palmprints
• enhanced business continuity arrangements
• integrated UK approach to fingerprint databases.

5.21 Ident1 is scheduled to be introduced from March 2005 to replace Livescan and to reach full operational capability by early 2007. HMIC looks forward to examining the impact of its introduction on identification rates and working practices during the review inspection.

Verification of Comparisons

5.22 The case of HMA v McKie involved a Strathclyde Police constable accused of perjury in 1998 after she denied, on oath in court, having been present at the scene of a crime where a finger mark found on a doorframe had allegedly been identified as hers. She was found not guilty of perjury in 1999 and is currently pursuing a civil action for damages. The issues relating to the criminal case included disputed expert fingerprint evidence and the procedures in place in SCRO were examined by HMIC in its Primary Inspection of the Fingerprint Bureau in 2000. It highlighted the need for robust processes in the identification of marks and the preparation of evidence for court.

5.23 The Glasgow Bureau has since adopted a process where anonymity of expert opinion and verification are central factors. The process is resource intensive, involving as it does, three fingerprint experts being deployed in a Verification Unit and another three within a Quality Support Unit. Consequently, these individuals are not available for front-line comparison work. Nevertheless the process has been benchmarked against those in other major bureaux across the UK and HMIC considers it to be effective because it ensures that there are three independent comparisons of marks and detailed procedures are in place to resolve any disputes which arise.

5.24 Bureaux outwith Glasgow operate on a much smaller scale and are unable to adopt the anonymous verification system used at Pacific Quay because of the limited number of experts available. While identifications are all verified by independent expert opinion, this cannot be done anonymously where there are only two or three experts within the bureau. SCRO has benchmarked its processes in the smaller bureaux against those in similar bureaux across the UK and is currently considering arrangements to increase the independence between identification and verification of fingerprint marks at the Aberdeen, Dundee and Edinburgh Bureaux. HMIC will examine progress made in this regard at the review inspection.

Non-numeric National Standard

5.25 Since 1924 the aim of fingerprint comparison in Scotland has been to find 16 points or characteristics of friction ridge detail on a crime scene mark which are identical in sequence and agreement with a fingerprint given by a suspect or individual who has given fingerprints for elimination purposes. This is known as a 'numeric standard', although fewer than 16 points of comparison are acceptable in some jurisdictions throughout the world. There is no scientific basis for the adoption of a 16-point standard.

5.26 In some cases fingerprint experts may be unable to find 16 points of similarity but are able to find a sufficient number to satisfy themselves that it is a positive identification. The move to a non-numeric standard allows experts to express informed opinions on identification based on their skills, expertise and experience and provide a court with the best evidence available.

5.27 England and Wales implemented the non-numeric standard in 2001 and preparation has been ongoing for its introduction in Scotland for a number of years. The changes to the national standard for fingerprint evidence to encompass such an approach is being progressed through stakeholders in the criminal justice system and it is envisaged that the revised arrangements may be adopted in April 2005. Each bureau of the SFS has undertaken preparatory work for change, including consultation with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and the arrangements leading towards its introduction have been led by an ACPOS project team. HMIC has been assured that the Scottish police service is at a proper state of readiness for the introduction of the non-numeric standard and looks forward to reviewing its impact at the time of the review inspection.

Accreditation

5.28 All four SFS bureaux have achieved accreditation under the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) ISO9001. This entails examination of those elements of an organisation's management that direct and control it with regard to quality. The standard is based around the principles of customer satisfaction, continuous improvement and the development of a process based quality management system. It requires an organisation to look closely at itself and consider how it can improve. HMIC acknowledges the positive approach taken by the SFS in undergoing this regular scrutiny and achieving the required quality level associated with the award.

5.29 The Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP) is a professional regulatory body which maintains a register of currently competent forensic practitioners. It embraces eleven forensic disciplines including science, medicine and fingerprinting. Registration is by application, giving details of the applicant's career, qualifications and training and the identification of two professional references. Declarations about past record and commitment to the principles in the CRFP Code of Conduct are required, along with a list of recent casework from which examples are selected for detailed scrutiny and assessment. The emphasis is on current competency to secure public confidence, so each practitioner has to undergo revalidation every 4 years. CRFP examine what steps have been taken to keep up to date with relevant developments, maintain competence levels and further develop professional expertise.

5.30 The SFS has actively encouraged its staff to seek registration, providing support in terms of membership fees and management of workload to allow time for preparation. Registration is voluntary but there has been a positive uptake, with some 86% of SFS experts now accredited or in the process of application. This compares favourably at a UK level, ranking SFS at the upper range of registration rates. HMIC acknowledges the increased level of professionalism which widespread registration brings to the SFS.

5.31 HMIC welcomes the extent of progress which has been made since the Primary Inspection of the Fingerprint Bureau in 2000. Significantly, all of the recommendations and suggestions which remained outstanding from that inspection have been examined and can be discharged. A positional statement in relation to these is reproduced in this report at Appendices 'A' and 'B' respectively. SCRO is committed to participating in the national Fingerprint Board standards sub-committee to produce common UK procedures for fingerprint examination and details its commitment towards further standardisation of practices across SFS in its Corporate Plan.

Disclosure Scotland

Introduction

5.32 Criminal records were initially maintained by police forces to help in the investigation of crime, although the sensitive information held was clearly relevant to both crime prevention and protection of the vulnerable. For a number of years, criminal history information has been disclosed where there was an implication for national security or in relation to applicants for certain sensitive posts. In addition, individual chief constables reserved the option to disclose criminal convictions where a legitimate local issue had been recognised. More formal arrangements were developed and under the terms of Scottish Office (Police) Circular No. 4 of 1989, SCRO began disclosing conviction information to employers for staff whose duties entailed having substantial access to children. Part V of the Police Act 1997 widened access further and placed the disclosure of conviction and non-conviction information on a statutory footing, paving the way, in April 2002, for the creation of 'Disclosure Scotland' within SCRO which hosts the CHS database for Scotland.

5.33 Disclosure Scotland is a public-private partnership between the Scottish Executive, SCRO and British Telecommunications plc (BT). Its stated aim is:

'to provide an accurate and responsive disclosure service which enhances security, public safety and protects the vulnerable in society'.

5.34 The management team is led by the Head of Bureau, supported by a Deputy Head of Bureau, Contracts Manager, Compliance Manager, Operations Supervisor and Quality Assurance (QA)/Training Officer. There are five teams within Disclosure Scotland responsible for vetting, each comprising an establishment of ten senior clerical assistants and managed by an administrative assistant. The teams operate on a rotating shift pattern over a 24 hours/7 days basis. Two administrative assistants and three senior clerical assistants staff the Force Enquiry Desk whilst the Exceptions Handling Unit consists of a supervisor, an administrative assistant and two senior clerical assistants. The QA/Training section manager has five Quality Reviewer/
Training Assistants.

Basic, Standard and Enhanced Disclosure Certificates

5.35 Three levels of disclosure certificate, namely Basic, Standard and Enhanced are available from Disclosure Scotland. These are each priced at £13.60 although it is possible for certificates for certain people engaged in the voluntary sector to be obtained free of charge. Direct billing arrangements have been established with many registered bodies and employers may choose to reimburse the cost of certificates where a fee is payable by the applicant.

5.36 A Basic Disclosure contains only those convictions which are not considered 'spent' in terms of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Anyone can apply for a Basic Certificate relating to themselves and it is despatched directly to the applicant. This type of certificate is not specific to those seeking particular posts and can be used more than once. The largest single use of Basic Disclosure certificates so far has been to support applications to the Department for Transport (DfT) for a security pass to work 'airside' at UK airports. The flexible nature of the Basic Disclosure is likely to result in further demand for this category of check. Like the other certificates available, it is valid on the date of issue and is not subject to an expiry period.

5.37 Where a specific post is being sought by an applicant, subject to certain criteria, the employer or voluntary body providing a service may seek a Standard Disclosure. This includes all convictions held on criminal records, even if they would be regarded as 'spent' in terms of rehabilitation of offenders legislation. A Standard Disclosure may be appropriate for the following:

• those with regular contact with children and vulnerable adults
• those checked in the interests of national security
• those involved in the administration of law
• those applying for firearms, explosives and gaming licences
• professional groups in health, pharmacy and law
• senior managers in banking and financial services.

5.38 The result of a Standard Disclosure check is sent to the applicant, and a copy sent to the relevant registered body.

5.39 An Enhanced Disclosure provides all of the information available with a Standard Disclosure but may, in addition, include assessed police intelligence which is not related to criminal convictions. Such details are given, to the employer only, where the chief constable holding the information feels they are of relevance to the job or voluntary work sought.

5.40 Enhanced Disclosures are available for:

• work that regularly involves caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of children or vulnerable adults
• applicants for various gaming and lottery licences
• those seeking judicial appointment
• applicants for registration for child minding, day care and to act as foster parents or carers.

5.41 HMIC contacted a number of agencies who use the disclosure service to ascertain the customer's perception of how Disclosure Scotland is meeting its stated aim. Comments received fell into 3 main areas:

• the application form
• the turnaround time
• the invoice.

5.42 These are now addressed in turn.

Application Form

5.43 Analysis conducted by Disclosure Scotland indicates that about 20% of application forms received either have errors or are incomplete. Consequently each year, tens of thousands of forms are referred back to the applicant or the registered body, causing additional work for both parties and delaying the issue of the certificate. Although hundreds of thousands of forms are correctly completed, any scope which can be identified to simplify the process would be welcome.

5.44 Some registered bodies maintain that the 4 page application form itself is problematic, although Disclosure Scotland has provided guidance on its website to assist in accurate completion. Examination of the guidance supplied there tends to support the confusion experienced by the service users who advocate a redesigned and simplified form. The major causes of rejection are invoice and finance errors, address history and counter-signatory details. The following are given as examples of where improvements could be made to the form.

5.45 In the above extract, the applicant is required on the form to provide his or her "name at birth (if different to the above)". Notwithstanding this, the guidance note from Disclosure Scotland states that if the applicant is identified as "Mrs" then the birth name should be repeated even if it is not "different to above". In other words, accurately complying with the information sought on the form could result in the application being delayed while clarification is sought in writing by Disclosure Scotland.

5.46 On the following page, the applicant's previous address history is sought over a 10-year period along with the day, month and year of occupancy. The guidance notes indicate that just 5 years' history is acceptable and only the year of occupancy is mandatory. While in this instance fully complying with the instructions given would not lead to the application being rejected, it does illustrate further scope to simplify the form and ease the burden on the applicant.

5.47 Disclosure Scotland recognises the difficulties experienced by applicants and registered bodies in completing application forms but its efforts have to date been concentrated on tackling the existing form according to the instructions thereon, supplemented by its guidance notes. In the view of HMIC, this falls short of the 'responsive disclosure service' evoked in Disclosure Scotland's stated aim. The extended time-period which has elapsed while amendments to the application form have been considered is, according to Disclosure Scotland, founded on the pre-requisite to seek parliamentary approval for amendments, the adjustment required in IT systems and more recently in anticipation of future legislation which will require further change.

5.48 Provisions under the Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003 are soon to be introduced to make it an offence to employ someone in a child care position if that person is included in a list of those deemed unsuitable to work with children. Such a list already exists in England and Wales although it is of concern that Disclosure Scotland does not have access to it when processing Standard and Enhanced Disclosures. The proposed legislation will close this 'loop-hole'.

5.49 Disclosure Scotland recognises that the current application form does not explicitly ask applicants or registered bodies if the post applied for is within the child care category and therefore a small change will be necessary to capture that information and trigger the additional check of 'the list'. Furthermore, it is aware of many areas for potential improvement in the form's design and HMIC is supportive of the work to address this which is ongoing by Disclosure Scotland in collaboration with the Scottish Executive. HMIC concurs that, at this stage, delaying the introduction of a revised form to coincide with this requirement is reasonable. Nevertheless, the fundamental shortcomings in the existing document should be tackled without delay so that it can be introduced as soon as reasonably practical after the amendments required for the legislative change have been identified. It is recommended that the Disclosure Scotland application form is revised in consultation with representative service users and introduced as soon as possible after the requirements of the Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003 have been ascertained.

Recommendation 5
HMIC recommends that the Disclosure Scotland application form is revised in consultation with representative service users and introduced as soon as possible after the requirements of the Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003 have been ascertained.

Turnaround Time

5.50 Disclosure Scotland has established what it refers to as an SLA to process 90% of Standard and Enhanced applications within 2 weeks and Basic applications within 6 weeks. These timescales apply to correctly completed applications which do not trigger a further enquiry with a local force. Additional enquiry can be necessary if the applicant has lived outwith Scotland during the last 5 years or owing to the presence of the following:

• pending case
• criminal intelligence marker
• Procurators Fiscal fixed penalty
• prostitute's warning
• refused or revoked firearms/explosives licence
• absolute discharge
• data protection marker
• registered and unregistered sex offender indicators.

5.51 In reality, the stated SLA times are targets, unilaterally declared by Disclosure Scotland, rather than the result of agreement reached with registered bodies after identifying the customers' needs and securing any reciprocal commitment. This has been the cause of considerable concern to some registered bodies who would highly value the option to fast track certain urgent enquiries at the expense of lower priority applications. During external consultation, HMIC was informed that delays in processing checks had jeopardised the ability of residential child care units to remain open.

5.52 During its first 2 years of operation, the targets were achieved as demand steadily grew from a slow start. Figure 8 illustrates applications received over the first 2 years of operation.

5.53 From April to October 2004, 225,000 applications were received, indicating that steady demand continues. While performance levels were initially within the self imposed SLA periods, developments during 2003 were to have a major impact on Disclosure Scotland's ability to process applications on time.

5.54 In order to enhance safety and security for air passengers and citizens within the United Kingdom, the DfT introduced new measures affecting the issue of security passes to work 'airside' at airports. The new arrangements required a criminal record check (Basic Disclosure) be carried out prior to an airside pass being issued. A list of criteria which would prevent the issue of a restricted zone pass was compiled in consultation with the aviation industry and the police. The disqualifying criteria include:

• offences against the person
• theft
• sex offences
• harmful or dangerous drugs
• criminal damage
• terrorism
• aviation
• maritime
• channel tunnel
• railways
• firearms
• immigration
• evasion of liability
• bomb threats and bomb hoaxes
• offensive weapons.

5.55 With effect from 1 July 2003, all new applicants for a permanent pass to the restricted zone of an airport had to produce a Basic Disclosure certificate. The Criminal Records Bureau in England conducts enquiries on behalf of registered bodies, providing Enhanced Disclosure certificates at £33 and Standard Disclosure certificates at £28. It does not currently provide Basic Disclosure checks although these are planned for the future. The Basic Disclosure checks required by DfT were therefore undertaken at Disclosure Scotland for all UK personnel affected.

5.56 The measures also applied to existing staff, but in order to cope with the need for over 200,000 retrospective checks, the process was phased in over a one year period and all relevant employees had to undergo a Basic Disclosure check by 31 July 2004 in order to retain access to the restricted zone.

5.57 In response to the increased demand, both BT and SCRO increased staffing levels to provide additional operators to process the workload. In the case of SCRO, both permanent and temporary staff were recruited with substantial financial support from the Scottish Executive. The Deputy Director of SCRO assumed a more operational role in disclosure matters and radical measures were taken to increase capacity. The organisation was already operating on a 24 hours/7 days basis but significant finance for overtime payment was made available and smaller desks were introduced in order to increase the number of staff workstations which could be installed. Support staff from elsewhere in SCRO were trained to operate within Disclosure Scotland and deployed there whenever possible to supplement existing resources. Independent consultants were engaged to assess working practices and the resulting recommendations complemented action already being taken. Later, a business analyst, recruited by SCRO to service the overall organisation, was exclusively tasked with addressing performance within Disclosure Scotland.

5.58 In terms of providing the Basic Disclosure checks required by the DfT, Disclosure Scotland consistently achieved the self imposed timescale of 90% being completed within
6 weeks. However, the target of 90% of Standard and Enhanced checks being completed within 2 weeks was severely compromised. Relative performance against disclosure by category is illustrated in Figure 9.

5.59 The sheer volume of checks, combined with the requirement to train, mentor and monitor new staff members resulted in the disclosure system being overwhelmed. Not only were Standard and Enhanced checks routinely outwith the target timescale, but the processing time increased dramatically as illustrated in Figure 10.

5.60 Delays in turning around applications resulted in a large number of telephone enquiries, to seek updates, from applicants and registered bodies. Diverting resources from core processing tasks to respond to these would have further reduced Disclosure Scotland's capacity to process the backlog which had accumulated and the relationship between registered bodies and Disclosure Scotland deteriorated. Disclosure Scotland was severely criticised in the national press and became the subject of parliamentary questions.

5.61 As illustrated in Figure 10, average processing times for Standard and Enhanced checks had returned to within 2 weeks by August 2004. This coincided with the end of the period for retrospective checking for DfT. Since then, processing times have continued to fall with almost 100% of current applications, including Basic Disclosures, being turned around within 3-4 days. While this is excellent news for Disclosure Scotland, it has had implications for both police forces and registered bodies.

5.62 As stated earlier, where a conviction check triggers an enquiry with a local force because of non-conviction information, Disclosure Scotland forwards the enquiry to the force concerned. After a search of relevant local systems, the organisation holding the non-conviction information indicates to Disclosure Scotland what, if anything, it wishes to disclose. A fee is payable by Disclosure Scotland to the force concerned in order to fund the necessary local administrative arrangements on a cost-neutral basis.

5.63 HMIC has considered whether the process for obtaining, assessing and deciding whether to disclose non-conviction information could be delivered, either centrally or in a more cohesive way. It has concluded that given the disparate local information systems which exist across forces and the accountability of the local chief constable for any information disclosed that the current arrangements are appropriate. Nevertheless, Disclosure Scotland is aware of a lack of consistency of response in relation to the information being disclosed and is working with forces to develop common standards where this can be achieved. HMIC welcomes this initiative and supports efforts to maximise consistency across forces in this complex area.

5.64 The local force disclosure process is governed by an SLA, in its true sense, between ACPOS and Disclosure Scotland. Critically, the SLA is a genuine agreement between both parties which defines:

• the services to be provided
• the responsibilities of both the service provider and the client
• the output to be produced as part of the Disclosure Scotland service
• how the SLA is to be reviewed and how any breaches or disputes are to be resolved.

5.65 The rapid clearing of the Disclosure Scotland backlog during the summer of 2004 had an adverse impact at force level on the volume of non-conviction enquiries which had to be undertaken. HMIC recognises the concern this caused forces which, given adequate notice, could have made some preparation for the increased workload that resulted. Figure 11 shows a snapshot of enquiries outstanding at force level during November 2004.

5.66 Given the existence of the SLA, the issue can be the subject of constructive dialogue between both parties with a view to delivering better service across the Disclosure Scotland/force process, rather than allowing the potential for performance to be viewed in separate silos. This is an area which could inform relations earlier in the process, i.e. between registered bodies and Disclosure Scotland.

5.67 From the applicant's perspective, the procedure for standard and enhanced checks begins long before the application has arrived at Disclosure Scotland. Indeed, rapid performance turnaround times of 3-4 days within the agency has exposed shortcomings in the procedures within some, but by no means all, registered bodies. Completed applications are signed and dated by the applicant and then forwarded to an authorised signatory within the registered body who also signs and dates the application. It is then posted to Disclosure Scotland which processes it and despatches the certificate. In order to assess the overall status of applications in the system, Disclosure Scotland plotted the timescale between the applicant signing the form and its receipt at Disclosure Scotland over a 12-week period. The results, illustrated at Figure 12, indicate considerable delays elsewhere, which may have unfairly been attributed to Disclosure Scotland.

5.68 It is therefore apparent that considerable scope exists to improve further the overall processing time, in addition to identifying incomplete or inaccurate forms prior to them being submitted by registered bodies to Disclosure Scotland. In relation to Basic Disclosures, which do not require the involvement of registered bodies, an on-line application system has been developed.

5.69 Issues surrounding the quality of the information received at, and supplied by, Disclosure Scotland could appropriately be addressed within a genuine SLA between it and registered bodies. It is therefore recommended that Disclosure Scotland engages with registered bodies with a view to establishing a Service Level Agreement in relation to performance standards and the responsibilities of both the service provider and the client in achieving them.

Recommendation 6
HMIC recommends that Disclosure Scotland engages with registered bodies with a view to establishing a Service Level Agreement in relation to performance standards and the responsibilities of both the service provider and the client in achieving them.

5.70 Despite the best efforts of Disclosure Scotland and registered bodies, external factors can influence the turnaround times possible in conducting disclosure checks, as illustrated by the effect of DfT transactions. The introduction of new measures under the Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003 outlined at paragraph 5.48 could potentially result in, according to some estimates, retrospective checking of 500,000 people. While Disclosure Scotland will require to prepare for such a volume of additional work, and HMIC is satisfied that it is alert to the issue based on the experience gained of DfT transactions, its ability to respond will be influenced by three key factors. These are:

• the number of checks required
• the sufficiency of notice received
• the timescale for conducting retrospective checks.

5.71 HMIC would wish to underline the importance of continuous improvement of service delivery in the face of increased demand. It welcomes the initiative Disclosure Scotland has displayed by introducing on-line Basic applications via its internet website, and is encouraged by ongoing work to assess the feasibility of having the facility extended to cover Standard and Enhanced business. Disclosure Scotland is also alert to potential to increase automation in the disclosure process and HMIC looks forward to examining progress in these issues at the review inspection.

Invoice

5.72 Disclosure Scotland has direct billing arrangements with registered bodies who are each invoiced on a monthly basis for checks carried out. Where a registered body is a local authority, many checks can be conducted each month across the whole range of its business activities such as education, social work and transport. The invoice sent by Disclosure Scotland gives the date of application, the unique barcode number from each form and the cost of the application presented in a list of the month's checks which, in one example brought to the attention of HMIC, can run to 280 entries over 16 pages.

5.73 Registered bodies can experience understandable difficulty in reconciling the invoices received, given that they do not contain the name of the applicant or the specific service which has sought the check. Disclosure Scotland is acutely aware of the views of registered bodies in relation to the invoicing arrangements, indeed it has to address numerous telephone enquiries on a daily basis to assist registered bodies in consolidating their accounts. However, this is an area where Disclosure Scotland has shown some reluctance to be responsive to customer's needs. Its action to date has been limited to extending invoice itemisation to include the full bar code number, when only 12 of the 16 digits were initially given.

5.74 Disclosure Scotland encourages registered bodies to record centrally the bar code number of applications submitted and track progress within the organisation against invoices received. It also advocates registration at business unit level. So, for example, an authority's education department could have registered body status on its own, resulting in it only receiving an invoice for the checks requested by it. Such an approach has disadvantages in terms of the cost of registration (£150) and may necessitate additional counter-signatories (£10), but there would also be a challenge for organisations to train additional staff to scrutinise application forms for errors prior to submission. Given the current poor performance in that area, a significant increase in the number of authorised signatories is unlikely to assist either the registered body or Disclosure Scotland. It is recommended that Disclosure Scotland enters into consultation with registered bodies with a view to ascertaining customer's billing needs and introducing revised invoicing arrangements to address them.

Recommendation 7
HMIC recommends that Disclosure Scotland enters into consultation with registered bodies with a view to ascertaining customer's billing needs and introducing revised invoicing arrangements to address them.

Public Private Partnership - Contractual Arrangements

5.75 BT's participation in Disclosure Scotland is governed by a 12-year contract entered into with Scottish Ministers. In it, performance standards are established against a number of criteria which are within BT's area of responsibility in the disclosure process. These include, for example:

• percentage of telephone calls answered within 20 seconds
• providing staff to deal with incoming and outgoing mail
• material accuracy in the information provided on Disclosures.

5.76 Core criteria are weighted as either Level 1, 2 or 3, for which a failure to achieve the required standard results in a different financial performance deduction. Others are classified as a 'target' which BT will seek to achieve but for which no deduction is imposed. Provision also exists for BT to supply a 'Monthly Management Information Pack' outlining performance standards achieved. Specifically, this is designed to include details of each failure by BT to meet any of the performance standards, showing:

• details of the failure
• the date, time and duration of the failure
• how and when the failure was rectified
• the level of failure
• the performance deduction to be applied.

5.77 SCRO management within Disclosure Scotland has adopted a pragmatic approach to the contract, concentrating on reducing backlogs and increasing output and efficiency. In fact, at no time since the establishment of Disclosure Scotland has any performance deduction been applied against BT, despite failures having occurred. Furthermore, the 'Monthly Management Information Pack' is no longer supplied by BT, nor sought by SCRO as it maintains that the information contained therein should be revised. HMIC noted the perception of high error rates and lack of performance management information was actively discussed by operational staff of Disclosure Scotland during one of the 'One Lunch' consultation forums (paragraph 3.50).

5.78 HMIC recognises a difficulty faced by SCRO in seeking contractual performance information. The 'Monthly Management Information Pack', as specified in the contract, is not meeting SCRO needs as alternative and additional performance data is required. Merely requiring and receiving the contractual data, which does not comprehensively inform improvements, has therefore been discontinued. Instead, SCRO informs HMIC of its engagement with BT to devise contractual performance information which is fit for purpose. Armed with such information, it would be better placed to assess whether its pragmatic stance in relation to the application of financial penalties is appropriate. Further, it would enable contractual performance to be properly monitored in order that remedial action can be taken to address areas of weakness. HMIC supports this stance and recommends that SCRO actively pursues development and submission of an agreed 'Monthly Management Information Pack' which is fit for purpose, in order to drive continuous improvement.

Recommendation 8
HMIC recommends that SCRO actively pursues development and submission of an agreed 'Monthly Management Information Pack' which is fit for purpose, in order to drive continuous improvement.

5.79 Disclosure Scotland exists within a competitive UK market place for the provision of disclosure services. Accordingly, the Scottish Executive will wish to maintain close scrutiny to ensure that the level of fee is appropriate, that the terms of the contract are being delivered and that value for money is being achieved.

Criminal Justice Information and Intelligence Support

5.80 The CJIB and the ISB are centrally managed by a chief inspector with responsibility for Information and Intelligence Management. Reporting directly to her are two inspectors, as officers in charge of CJIB and ISB. CJIB consists of six duty officers at sergeant rank, one sergeant responsible for the ISCJIS project, one sergeant and an administrative assistant within the Audit and Compliance section and a further two senior clerical assistants. ISB staffing consists of two sergeants and two administrative assistants with another sergeant, three constables and three clerical assistants deployed within Crimestoppers.

Criminal History System

5.81 The CJIB has responsibility for the CHS, the database of which is the primary repository in Scotland for criminal convictions and which is central to the criminal justice process. It is currently accessed by all Scottish police forces and the wider ISCJIS community, (paragraph 5.104) and is fundamental to the operation of Disclosure Scotland (paragraph 5.32).

5.82 In October 2000, a decision was reached to replace the existing CHS system and the SPIS development team was tasked with providing its replacement. Significant financial and technological benefits were identified and a formal project was initiated with a view to delivering the replacement system by March 2004. Unfortunately, a number of issues have arisen which resulted in the system not being delivered within the agreed timescale. At the time of the inspection, HMIC was aware that a number of matters were still to be resolved and some uncertainty remained as to when the replacement system would be ready for service. HMIC was reassured that arrangements are in place to maintain the existing CHS system and, while delays in delivering its replacement were having an impact on introducing new functionality, there was no immediate risk to business continuity. HMIC recognises the level of commitment to deliver a replacement CHS system that is capable of meeting the current and future needs of the criminal justice community. It acknowledges that the Scottish Executive, SCRO, SPIS and ACPOS, working in partnership, are actively developing an exception plan to reassess and deliver the replacement CHS system. However, the strategic importance of this project must not be underestimated. An enhanced CHS system, capable of supporting the development of ISCJIS is vital to the harmonisation of criminal justice in Scotland and HMIC will continue to monitor progress of the exception plan and implementation of the replacement CHS system.

5.83 CJIB has recently established a Compliance and Quality Assurance Section and is developing a Quality Assurance Strategy for CHS. The objectives of this strategy are to:

• improve and maintain the quality of data held on CHS
• ensure that the users are provided with information that is accurate and up to date
• ensure compliance with relevant legislation and guidelines
• demonstrate Best Value processes in the organisation
• ensure the integrity, availability and confidentiality of data held
• highlight and publish good practice and use of data.

5.84 Compliance and audit checks will be carried out in respect of data held and submitted by all members of the CHS community and used to monitor adherence to agreed processes, procedures and standards. While individual forces and agencies retain responsibility for the relevancy and accuracy of the data held on CHS, CJIB will seek to identify areas for improvement and disseminate good practice. HMIC is supportive of the Quality Assurance Strategy and looks forward to SCRO consulting with the CHS community and implementing procedures for audit and compliance.

5.85 HMIC notes the intention of CJIB to produce statistical data in relation to its compliance and audit activities and would encourage SCRO to agree meaningful performance measurements with the CHS community and publish key performance indicators which assist in improving the quality of data held on CHS. HMIC recognises that this performance information could inform the wider inspection role by HMIC in respect of audit and compliance of key national information systems as part of force inspections and provide the potential to support future joint inspection activity of the wider Scottish criminal justice system. HMIC will be interested to review progress of the Quality Assurance Strategy for CHS at the review inspection.

Violent Offender and Sex Offender Register

5.86 The Violent Offender and Sex Offender Register (ViSOR) will have a vital role in monitoring sex, dangerous and violent offenders throughout the United Kingdom. The ACPOS Sexual Offenders Working Group has agreement on protocols and data standards for links to ViSOR and funding has been approved for Scottish forces to implement it. PITO is currently developing a ViSOR link at SCRO and individual Scottish forces to the PNC. There may be some opportunity in the future to develop links to CHS and SID. HMIC welcomes the involvement of SCRO in the positive development of links to ViSOR.

National Firearms Register

5.87 The CHS has markers which identify individuals who hold firearms or shotgun certificates issued by Scottish police forces. While this system will persist for the foreseeable future and satisfies the need to share information between Scottish forces, SPIS is developing an interface which will take detail from individual Scottish police force firearm licensing systems and map it electronically to the PNC. This is to address Section 39 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997 which requires a central database of applicants for firearm and shotgun certificates. HMIC regrets the time that it has taken to find a UK solution to this matter and would support ACPOS in continuing to work towards a successful Scottish interface in early course.

National Stolen Property Index

5.88 CJIB maintains the National Stolen Property Index on behalf of all Scottish forces. This facility is available on a 24-hour basis and is used for recording and searching on all stolen property which is uniquely or readily identifiable. HMIC notes that the index is accessed almost exclusively by Strathclyde Police, with little or no utilisation by other forces. HMIC considers that there is value in developing systems which allow stolen property to be identified and returned to owners but recognises that the current national system has been largely superseded by local crime recording systems. HMIC is aware that ACPOS has requested SPIS to initiate the development of a crime recording system and recommends that ACPOS consider the functionality of the National Stolen Property Index within the specification and business benefits of any new system.

Recommendation 9
HMIC is aware that ACPOS has requested SPIS to initiate the development of a crime recording system and recommends that ACPOS consider the functionality of the National Stolen Property Index within the specification and business benefits of any new system.

Scottish Intelligence Database (SID)

5.89 During 2003, SCRO established the ISB, co-aligned with CJIB, as a first step towards assuming the centralised management of SID, on behalf of the Scottish police service. This followed from an agreement by ACPOS that SCRO would assume full responsibility for the management and oversight of the system following completion of the project and planned dissolution of the National Project Team and SID Project Board in December 2004. There is concern within SCRO and the National Project Team that some SID responsibilities will require a greater level of resources than initially estimated and that SCRO may have to assume responsibility for some residual project tasks such as the provision of a SID gazetteer and mapping solution. In view of these concerns, a joint paper has been produced by SCRO and the National Project Team which details the required activities for the centralised oversight of SID and seeks additional resources. At the time of the inspection, these issues were being considered by the SID Project Board.

5.90 HMIC recognises the importance of adequately resourcing the ongoing operation of SID and notes that in 'Developing Distinctive Capability' SCRO identified a number of key issues to be addressed as the Scottish police service develops nationally integrated computer systems. These included arrangements for housing computer applications and providing long term support and management. While HMIC acknowledges that SCRO offers a convenient strategic location to centralise national police information systems, it recognises that the consequences and opportunities for systems development go beyond SCRO's boundaries. Consequently it is recommended that ACPOS progresses strategic arrangements for the long-term support and maintenance of national computer applications, where appropriate, through the CPS Programme Board.

Recommendation 10
HMIC recommends that ACPOS progresses arrangements for national computer application hosting and associated issues, where appropriate, through the CPS Programme Board.

5.91 ISB currently undertakes a compliance role and has developed an Audit and Compliance Strategy for SID. The objectives of this strategy are to:

• plan for future changes to application functionality and associated issues
• implement a fair, structured and comprehensive approach to data compliance
• review intelligence material held on SID
• review system administration roles carried out on SID
• advise Scottish police forces and agencies of identified good practice by users
• advise Scottish police forces and agencies of bad practice by users which require corrective action
• record and monitor SID performance, evidenced through statistical information.

5.92 As with the CHS Quality Assurance Strategy (paragraph 5.83), SID compliance and audit checks are carried out in respect of data held and submitted by all members of the SID community. It is used to monitor adherence to agreed rules, conventions and data input standards. While individual forces and agencies retain responsibility for the relevancy and accuracy of the data held on SID, ISB seeks to identify areas for improvement and disseminate good practice. HMIC acknowledges that the success of this approach is dependent on all Scottish forces and agencies establishing their own arrangements for SID data compliance. HMIC is aware that forces and agencies have committed to this approach as part of their agreement to join the SID community, although there appears to be some variance in the processes being followed. HMIC recommends that ACPOS review the internal SID compliance arrangements within forces and agencies.

Recommendation 11
HMIC recommends that ACPOS reviews the internal SID compliance arrangements within forces and agencies.

5.93 HMIC is supportive of the Audit and Compliance Strategy. It notes the intention of ISB to produce statistical data in relation to its compliance and audit activities and would encourage SCRO to agree meaningful performance measurements with the SID community and publish key performance indicators which assist in improving the quality of data held on SID. HMIC recognises that SID performance information could inform a wider inspection role by HMIC in respect of audit and compliance of key national information systems. HMIC will monitor progress of the Audit and Compliance Strategy for SID.

5.94 CHS currently utilises 'Intelligence Markers' to highlight where intelligence is held in relation to individuals. This system has been in place for a number of years and some 269,000 intelligence markers currently exist within CHS. At present, there are no automated links between CHS and SID and there is currently a reliance on intelligence markers being manually created on the CHS system where an intelligence record exists on SID. As part of the compliance process, ISB has highlighted discrepancies between intelligence held on SID and the appropriate creation of force specific markers on CHS. Existing processes within Disclosure Scotland rely upon the existence of force markers within a CHS record as a primary 'trigger' for processing Enhanced Disclosure checks. If these markers do not exist, there is potential for intelligence records on SID to be missed during a disclosure check. HMIC is aware that this issue is being progressed by ACPOS as part of its response to Recommendation 20 of the Bichard Inquiry, which identified a need to develop standards for police forces in carrying out vetting checks. A Quality Assurance Framework (QAF) has been developed and is in a pilot phase within English and Welsh forces. Following an evaluation of the QAF, it will be introduced and evaluated within Disclosure Scotland and if successful, consideration will be given to its extension to individual Scottish forces. HMIC will monitor the progress of the pilot to inform a wider inspection role in respect of disclosure. However, in the meantime, HMIC recommends that ACPOS progresses the issues surrounding intelligence markers on CHS and, as a matter of urgency, considers any requirement for an interim solution to ensure the existence of force intelligence on SID is identified in disclosure requests.

Recommendation 12
HMIC recommends that ACPOS progresses the issues surrounding intelligence markers on CHS and, as a matter of urgency, considers any requirement for an interim solution to ensure the existence of force intelligence on SID is identified in disclosure requests.

Scottish Crimestoppers

5.95 Crimestoppers is a charitable organisation which provides a UK-wide freephone telephone number, 0800 555 111, for the public to call, anonymously if they wish, with information to prevent or detect crime. Calls are answered at a local level, with the service for Scotland being provided centrally at the ISB.

5.96 Where the call leads to an individual being charged, the caller may be eligible for a cash reward but less than 4% of callers express an interest in this. In fact, the potential to receive a monetary payment is only one of a number of reasons cited for choosing to pass information via Crimestoppers. Others include:

• fear of retaliation
• not wishing police to attend caller's house
• reluctance to be a witness
• previous threats received
• the offender is a family member or otherwise known to the caller.

5.97 A system of registering callers without ascertaining their personal details has been devised and this facilitates the payment of rewards without an individual's identity being compromised. Callers maintain their anonymity and conversations are not recorded, but the information provided is, wherever possible, acted upon. The payment of rewards represents excellent value for money, averaging out at £17,000 worth of stolen property or drugs being recovered for every pound paid out. Each arrest represents the equivalent of just £3 in rewards paid.

5.98 In March 2004, Scottish Crimestoppers launched 'Hear for You 24/7!', making it the first UK Crimestoppers region with the capacity to answer calls at any time. However, a difficulty has been identified in relation to calls made from a mobile telephone. In common with other agencies using a national 0800 number to service local units, many calls from a mobile aimed at one area can be directed to another of its business units. This is problematic for Crimestoppers, given that although a number of other regions now offer 24/7 service, the majority do not. Where a call from a mobile 'phone is made outwith hours and is received at another Crimestoppers unit, only an answering machine facility may be available. Crimestoppers is aware of this anomaly and is working with telecommunications providers to overcome it. Notwithstanding this, the 24/7 operation has been very successful with actionable calls and results dramatically increasing compared to the previous year's figures as shown.

Table F: Crimestoppers Results (Jan to Aug) 2003 and 2004

5.99 During core hours worked by Crimestoppers staff, the call is addressed within ISB. Outwith these hours, it is answered by the duty officer within CJIB. Regardless of who takes the call, the ability to elicit the necessary quality and quantity of information is vital. It was therefore very positive to see that Crimestoppers has developed a standard guide to call handling for its operators. In addition, a prompt sheet in relation to '6 Crucial Calls', i.e. those in relation to drugs, weapons, assault, theft, drink-driving and terrorism is also in use at Crimestoppers Scotland.

5.100 Once the best possible information has been ascertained from the caller, it is entered by the operator into SID. This provides a secure means of disseminating intelligence to the relevant police force or law enforcement agency, while ensuring that the officers acting upon it are insulated from its source. Forces are requested to inform Crimestoppers of the outcome of any action taken in order to collate the figures reproduced at Table F, but there is significant under-reporting of results. Crimestoppers staff are acting very positively in promoting every aspect of the process and in driving tailored solutions at individual force level to address under-reporting.

5.101 HMIC acknowledges the very positive developments in Crimestoppers since its integration into ISB and recognises further potential being considered. In particular, the agency is actively seeking calls from people who are unable to speak English. This is evidenced by the publication of Crimestoppers posters in minority community languages, although no formal arrangements currently exists to deal with any such calls received. It is encouraging to note that the services of a translation agency which maintains anonymity is now being sought, based on a model used by a Crimestoppers branch in England. HMIC will review progress in the provision of minority language facilities for Crimestoppers at the review inspection.

Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

5.102 ANPR is a system which uses cameras to read car registration numbers and automatically compare them against computer databases. This enables police officers to identify quickly vehicles which may have been reported as stolen or are otherwise being sought by the police. ANPR equipment can be conveyed in police vehicles or installed at strategic locations.

5.103 The ISB has recently adopted responsibility for ANPR in respect of the maintenance, management and development of the Scottish Back Office Facility and the Strategic Fixed Site Network. This additional responsibility is in a transitional stage at present with one officer of sergeant rank seconded to ISB from Strathclyde Police for a period of 6 months to evaluate and develop the role requirement for a full time post and analyse any additional resourcing implications. HMIC acknowledges the significant value of ANPR for the Scottish police service and will monitor developments in this area.

Integration of Scottish Criminal Justice Information Systems (ISCJIS)

5.104 SCRO plays a pivotal role in the delivery of the ISCJIS programme. This is a joint initiative led by the Scottish Executive, involving SCRO and all of the major criminal justice partners, including the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, the Scottish police service, the Scottish Court Service, district courts, the Scottish Prison Service, the Scottish Children's Reporters Administration, Scottish local authorities, the Scottish Legal Aid Board, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and other specialist reporting agencies.

5.105 The ISCJIS programme is a series of linkages between the existing computer systems of these organisations using agreed data and communication standards and aims to bring benefits to the wider criminal justice community through the electronic sharing of information. This involves faster and more accurate exchange of data, improved access to information and consequently a more efficient criminal justice process. The key role for SCRO within ISCJIS is to provide the central repository for conviction and non-conviction information that can be utilised by its criminal justice partners to discharge their independent legal obligations.

5.106 Information is input directly onto the CHS by each agency as cases progress through the criminal justice process, providing improved, real time information and a more auditable system. As a result, ISCJIS has extended the function of SCRO's CHS from being an operational tool, primarily for use by the police, to one held for the benefit of all criminal justice organisations. With the current emphasis on greater sharing of information, this is a welcome development.

5.107 The evolving role of SCRO in this regard requires a transition in the relationship between it and the criminal justice community. SCRO no longer serves purely a police customer base and, consequently, the relationship with SCRO's ISCJIS partners needs to reflect this in order that the benefits of the programme can be maximised for everyone. While SCRO is right to ensure that greater access to the CHS is not detrimental to the quality, integrity or confidentiality of the data, there is a need for all parties to consider how the process for access by the wider criminal justice community can be simplified.

5.108 Increased data inputting by other criminal justice organisations, such as the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service or the Scottish Courts Service, is aimed at improved efficiency and reducing the burden on the police service. Prior to ISCJIS, the police were almost solely responsible for the input of data to SCRO, including the results of decisions taken by the Procurator Fiscal and sentences administered in court. The revised approach is welcomed by HMIC, but the practicalities of its implementation have raised a number of issues.

5.109 Within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998, the data controllers for the information held within SCRO remain the eight Scottish chief constables, despite much of the data belonging to, and being input by, many of the other criminal justice partners. In order to ensure data integrity, identify and correct any errors and protect the legal position of chief constables as data controllers, the police service continues to check data emanating from other criminal justice organisations, such as court disposal lists. This is witnessed by HMIC during force inspections and continues to impose a significant burden on the police service thereby reducing the intended benefits of ISCJIS membership. The Office of the Information Commissioner has apparently been consulted regarding this situation and indicated an intention, where necessary, to pursue the organisation at fault, rather than the data controllers. In the interests of efficiency, HMIC would fully support the concept that organisations accessing and updating the CHS should be accountable for the quality and accuracy of their own data and must accept responsibility for their own actions. It is a situation which needs to be resolved if the full potential of ISCJIS in the modernisation of the Scottish criminal justice system is to be realised. HMIC recommends that ACPOS consults with the Scottish Executive to determine a formal framework which protects the interests of all stakeholders in maintaining an accurate CHS, but which facilitates the increased efficiency in working practices which ISCJIS offers.

Recommendation 13
HMIC recommends that ACPOS consults with the Scottish Executive to determine a formal framework which protects the interests of all stakeholders in maintaining an accurate CHS, but which facilitates the increased efficiency in working practices which ISCJIS offers.

5.110 The expansion of the number of organisations inputting information to a core database raises issues within SCRO in respect of maintaining data quality, compliance with agreed rules and conventions and legislative requirements. To this end, SCRO has established a Compliance and Audit Section with a view to ensuring a quality service to users and customers that meets law enforcement and public safety needs as well as retaining public confidence. SCRO is in the process of developing a data compliance audit procedure that will monitor and evaluate adherence to the accepted standards in respect of data creation, update, amendment, deletion and auditing. Performance information will be issued to all criminal justice partners and HMIC looks forward to reviewing progress in this area.

5.111 The situation surrounding the delay in providing the replacement CHS is documented at paragraph 5.82, but it is important to highlight the resultant impact on ISCJIS. Successful delivery of a number of current and future projects is dependent on the planned upgrade of the CHS. These include enabling the Procurator Fiscal to obtain the latest previous conviction and DVLA information at the time of considering a case for prosecution, automated updating of bail information and a central register of warrants. These developments are of major importance to the creation of a modern criminal justice system and it is vital that ACPOS and SCRO make every effort to ensure that a replacement CHS, capable of supporting these and other developments, is delivered at the earliest possible date.

Police National Computer (PNC)

5.112 The PNC performs a similar service in England and Wales to SCRO's CHS with details of all relevant pending cases and their subsequent disposals entered onto PNC following their input to CHS. Within Scotland, the PNC database is updated electronically by SCRO using an automated interface, which has been given the name Phoenix. This interface takes information entered into CHS by forces and other criminal justice agencies and populates the PNC database within four hours. HMIC notes that the 'Phoenix' interface provides an effective means for Scottish forces to update PNC and make Scottish criminal information accessible to police forces and criminal justice agencies elsewhere in the UK.

5.113 The Bichard Inquiry noted that the PNC makes a major contribution to both operational policing and the wider criminal justice system but highlighted issues over data quality and, particularly, timeliness (Recommendations 5 and 6). While PNC management information on timeliness of updates has been made routinely available to forces across the UK for some time, there have been a number of technical and procedural issues which result in Scottish forces displaying generally poorer results than forces within England and Wales. HMIC notes that ACPOS has recently reviewed this area in response to the Bichard Inquiry and secured agreement from all forces to work towards a target of 90% of pending cases being recorded onto CHS, and by implication PNC, within 5 days of caution and charge. Further work will, thereafter, be carried out to consider if even more demanding standards can be met. SCRO will assume responsibility for measuring performance in this area and publish monthly reports showing individual force results against targets. HMIC is supportive of this commitment by ACPOS and will monitor the PNC quality and timeliness performance of individual forces as part of its ongoing inspection programme and current responsibilities for PNC audit within forces.

5.114 Legislation applicable to England and Wales allows police forces there to retain DNA and fingerprint samples from people who have been arrested but are not subsequently convicted. This is contrary to the law in Scotland where such material must be destroyed and corresponding references on the CHS are deleted. Whilst it will be necessary to change the current PNC weeding process to accommodate the retention of samples in England and Wales, there is a need to ensure that robust arrangements remain in place for processing Scottish cases. This is essential to ensure there is no disparity between information held on PNC and the CHS that could potentially compromise the disclosure process. ACPOS has been in dialogue with PNC and a technical solution has been agreed, although there are still issues surrounding the timing and implementation of it. HMIC recognises that Scottish cases will continue to be weeded from PNC and acknowledges the action by ACPOS in progressing a solution.

Information Technology

5.115 The Information Technology Bureau is managed by a Head of Bureau, Applications and Development Manager and Communications and Operations Manager. The bureau is arranged into five sub-sections. The Applications and Development Manager is responsible for Database Administration, Research and Development and Applications. The remaining two sub-sections, Communications and Operations are the responsibility of the Communications and Operations Manager. The Database Administration section has a Database Administration Supervisor and two Database Administrators whilst the Research and Development section consists of a Research and Development Supervisor and a Project Development Officer. The Applications section is managed on a day-to-day basis by an Applications Supervisor and has ten Application and Development Officers, three of whom are in temporary posts. The Communications and Operations department has a supervisor and a Technical Support Officer for each section. The Operations sub-section consists of four teams, each with a supervisor and two officers providing cover on a 24/7 basis. The remaining post within the IT bureau is that of Documentation Administrator, responsible for all administrative tasks within the bureau and reporting directly to the Applications and Development Manager.

5.116 A significant change was made to the structure of the IT Bureau in 2002 with the introduction of a database administration group to address the needs of the new shared infrastructure introduced for SID, ANPR and the replacement CHS. This shared infrastructure will also support future centrally held systems. Where necessary, consultants or third parties are engaged if the Bureau does not have the necessary skills or resources for a particular task.

5.117 SCRO aims to provide efficient and reliable systems which meet customer needs. The IT Bureau regularly monitors systems and shared infrastructure in terms of availability, utilisation, response times and usage and provides relevant management information. At the time of the inspection, additional equipment was being added to the shared infrastructure to provide better resilience and flexibility. HMIC acknowledges the high level of availability of applications sustained by the IT Bureau.

5.118 SCRO sits on a number of groups and working parties with other organisations both within and outwith to the police service including ISCJIS, PITO, PNC and the ACPOS Information Management Business Area. Through these groups SCRO maintains awareness of and can influence the development of national strategies. The IT Bureau is currently the subject of a Best Value review, which is due to report in Spring 2005. HMIC will be interested to examine the implementation of this report at the review inspection.

Information Security and Data Protection (IS/DP)

5.119 SCRO employs a full-time IS/DP officer and has adopted an Information Security Policy which is compatible with the Police Community Security Policy. The policy is backed up by relevant operating instructions and supporting material where appropriate. The Information Security Policy was approved by the Director and forms part of the Accredited Document Set (ADS) submitted to the Criminal Justice Extranet (CJX) Accreditor. SCRO is currently accredited until March 2005 in terms of the CJX and the ADS incorporates a risk assessment based on recognised methodology.

5.120 SCRO has an Information Security Group chaired by the Deputy Director, which meets bi-monthly, or more frequently if required. The group is responsible for ensuring that the 126 controls within the quality standard BS7799 are actioned where appropriate. This allows SCRO to examine controls that are currently relevant for each business area and monitor compliance.

5.121 The IS/DP Officer sits on ACPOS Information Management security officers group and the Police Information Security Forum and ensures that SCRO is sighted on national developments. All staff within SCRO are issued with an IS/DP Handbook and a computer-based learning package has been purchased to deliver ongoing IS/DP training. All staff receive IS/DP training as part of initial induction. HMIC acknowledges the high level of attention paid to information security matters within SCRO.

Freedom of Information (FOI)

5.122 Whilst the statutory responsibility for FOI within SCRO lies with the Scottish Executive, the operational responsibility and arrangements for implementation have fallen to SCRO. In order to progress FOI, SCRO formed a working group with representation from each bureau. SCRO has also been participating in the ACPOS FOI working group and has been sighted on national developments. In June 2004, the Information Commissioner approved the SCRO Publication Scheme which is compatible with ACPOS arrangements and is published on the SCRO website. A series of information audits and a review of records management have been undertaken and a document management system has been procured to assist in information retrieval. All of the SCRO management team and bureaux staff have been briefed in relation to FOI and selected staff have attended practitioner training and instruction for trainers offered by the SPC. In addition, an online training package is available for staff.

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