« Previous | Contents | Next »
Listen
UK HEALTH DEPARTMENTS' UK INFLUENZA PANDEMIC CONTINGENCY PLAN
1. INTRODUCTION
This plan provides the framework for the UK's response to an influenza pandemic. It replaces the 1997 UK Health Departments' Multiphase Contingency Plan for Pandemic Influenza.
A
pandemic is the worldwide spread of a disease, with outbreaks or epidemics occurring in many countries and in most regions of the world.
A pandemic of influenza may result when a new influenza virus emerges which is markedly different from recently circulating strains and is able to:
infect people (rather than, or in addition to, animals or birds)
spread from person to person, and
cause illness in a high proportion of the people infected,
and also
Influenza pandemics have swept the world from time to time throughout history with devastating effect, far in excess of that resulting from the 'seasonal' influenza which occurs most winters. Three pandemics occurred in the last century - in 1918/19 ('Spanish' flu), 1957/58 ('Asian' flu) and 1968/69 ('Hong Kong' flu). Up to a quarter of the UK population developed illness each time, with high mortality and consequent huge economic and social disruption. The most severe - that of 1918/19 - is estimated to have killed around 250,000 people in the UK and between 20 and 40 million people worldwide, a greater toll than the whole of the First World War.
The conditions in which a new virus might emerge and spread continue to exist and thus further pandemics of influenza are anticipated. The timing, extent and severity remain uncertain, but sufficient is known from previous pandemics to indicate the likely range of impact.
A pandemic could rapidly overwhelm health and other services. The overall impact is likely to be even more far reaching, affecting daily life, business and consequently the global economy. Good planning is essential to establish contingency arrangements and improve our preparedness to act if we are to be in the best possible position to cope with an emergency on such a scale, and ameliorate its impact. Disruption is likely to be less if people know what to expect and what to do.
This revised plan takes into account:
guidance from the World Health Organisation
scientific advances in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of influenza
lessons learned during an outbreak of avian influenza in Hong Kong in 1997 which had pandemic potential, and the SARS outbreaks of 2003
greater experience in planning for national emergencies at local, national and global levels following the events of 11 September 2001
changes in the arrangements for health protection and delivery of health services in the UK since 1997
devolution of health to Devolved Administrations and the fact that the NHS and health protection infrastructures are different in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
It recognises the importance, when responding to a new event, of building on existing systems and infrastructures with which people are familiar, such as the current national infrastructure for the prevention and control of seasonal influenza, and plans and organisational arrangements for other outbreaks and emergencies.
The response to an Influenza Pandemic in Scotland should be based within the overall context of emergency planning in Scotland and follow as closely as possible "Dealing with Disaster Together" and the guidance on "Managing Incidents Presenting Actual or Potential Risks to Health" issued by SEHD on 30 January 2003. However whereas the latter guidance focuses on outbreaks that can properly be addressed by a local outbreak control team, the widespread consequences of an influenza pandemic will demand additional strategic direction and co-ordination by the Scottish Executive, advised by the UK National Pandemic Influenza Committee (UKNPIC) and the Scottish Pandemic Influenza Co-ordinating Group (SPICG).
Not least among the uncertainties of a flu pandemic will be the availability of medical countermeasures such as a suitable vaccine to protect people against the new virus before it reaches our shores, and antiviral drugs to prevent or treat the illness. The normal annual influenza vaccine will not protect against a pandemic strain, and a specific vaccine will need to be developed and manufactured. This will take time and may meet technical and other delays. An important part of the Plan therefore concerns optimising the use of these and other countermeasures so that resources in limited supply are used as effectively as possible.
An influenza pandemic, or the threat of one, will create a high demand for information and advice, from health professionals, businesses and organisations, the general public and the media, about the threat and the responses to it. Rapid and effective communications, making difficult policy decisions transparent and managing people's concerns must be an integral part of all plans.
This plan concentrates on the central response at UK and Scottish levels, specifically on collaboration across the Scottish Executive, and on SEHD roles in relation to those of DH, the HPA and HPS. It also contains information for all organisations involved in preparing for and responding to an influenza pandemic in order to provide a coherent approach and with each part knowing its role in relation to others. It identifies the actions to be taken at each phase of the pandemic as defined by WHO with clear modifications to adapt the WHO phases to the UK situation.
The plan is also intended to be flexible so that our response can be adapted as a pandemic evolves and knowledge about the new virus, its impact, and the effectiveness of available countermeasures emerges.
Improving our preparedness is a continuous activity and this plan will be regularly reviewed and updated.
« Previous | Contents | Next »